Opinion
9:20-CV-1503 (DNH/TWD)
06-21-2022
REYNALDO PABON, Plaintiff, v. NELSON, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: REYNALDO PABON Plaintiff, pro se HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General Attorney for Defendants The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 OF COUNSEL: BRENDA T. BADDAM Assistant Attorney General
APPEARANCES: REYNALDO PABON Plaintiff, pro se
HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General Attorney for Defendants The Capitol Albany, New York 12224
OF COUNSEL: BRENDA T. BADDAM Assistant Attorney General
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Reynaldo Pabon claims Raymond Nelson, John Doe, and Jane Doe (collectively, “Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to prison conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1; see also Dkt. No. 7 at 5, 8-9.) Defendant Nelson now moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (See Dkt. No. 21.) For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Doe defendants and grant Nelson's motion. See id.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Pabon initiated this action pro se in late 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1.) He signed his Complaint on November 26, 2020, and it was postmarked for mailing on December 1, 2020. See Id. at 1, 6; see also Dkt. No. 1-4. On December 7, 2020, this Court received Pabon's Complaint, as well as his application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), and an Inmate Authorization Form. (Dkt. Nos. 1-3.) Pabon's IFP Application was incomplete, so Senior District Judge David N. Hurd ordered the case administratively closed until Pabon submitted the full filing fee or a complete IFP Application. (See Dkt. No. 4.) Pabon subsequently filed a complete IFP Application, and Judge Hurd ordered the case re-opened. (See Dkt. Nos. 5, 6.)
On February 12, 2021, Judge Hurd granted Pabon's IFP Application and conducted an initial review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Dkt. No. 7.) Judge Hurd accepted for filing Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim against defendants Nelson, John Doe, and Jane Doe, but dismissed all remaining claims and defendants. See Id. at 14-15. Judge Hurd ordered the Clerk to serve Nelson with Pabon's Complaint, and urged Pabon to “take reasonable steps through discovery to ascertain the identity of defendants John Doe and Jane Doe.” Id. However, Judge Hurd warned Pabon that his “failure to timely serve” the Doe defendants “will result in dismissal of the claims asserted against them and termination of those defendants from the action.” Id. at 15. Pabon never identified or served the Doe defendants.
On December 8, 2021, Nelson moved for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 21.) Pabon filed his response after the undersigned granted several extensions. (Dkt. Nos. 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33.) Nelson did not file a reply.
B. Pabon's Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim
Pabon claims the Defendants, corrections officers at Clinton Correctional Facility, violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to unsafe prison conditions. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6; see generally Dkt. No. 7 at 5.) Specifically, Pabon alleges Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the dangers of forcing him-an individual who experiences random fainting spells-to use stairs to access the law library. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) According to Pabon, his injuries resulted from Defendants' failure to comply with medical accommodations that involved avoiding the use of stairs. Id.; see generally Dkt. No. 1-1 at 21. Pabon asserts Defendants' “refus[al] to permit special accommodations for law library,” as well as their alleged “inactions” caused him to fall down the stairs while he was being escorted to the law library on December 1, 2017, resulting in several injuries. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.)
C. The Parties' Arguments
Through his summary judgment motion, Nelson claims he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because: (A) Pabon's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (B) Pabon produced no evidence that he was personally involved in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation, (C) Pabon failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (D) Pabon cannot satisfy the objective or subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference test. (Dkt. No. 21-1.)
Pabon failed to respond to Nelson's Statement of Material Facts. (Compare Dkt. No. 21-9, with Dkt. No. 33.) He also offered no response to Nelson's arguments that his claim is untimely and unsupported by any evidence of Nelson's personal involvement in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. (See Dkt. No. 33.) Rather, Pabon argues he exhausted his remedies, and Nelson was deliberately indifferent. See Id. at 3, 5.
II.SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
“A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” S. Katzman Produce Inc. v. Yadid, 999 F.3d 867, 877 (2d Cir. 2021). “A material fact is one capable of influencing the case's outcome under governing substantive law, and a genuine dispute is one as to which the evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find for the party opposing the motion.” Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013). “The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [where] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); El-Nahal v. Yassky, 835 F.3d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 2016).
Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all alterations, internal quotation marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. See, e.g., Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (2d Cir. 2020).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “Where, as here, the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party . . . the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy [its] burden of production under Rule 56 in either of two ways: (1) by submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Nick's Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017). “If the movant makes this showing in either manner, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to point to record evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006).
On a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, all permissible inferences are to be drawn in [his] favor, and the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2012); see also S. Katzman Produce Inc., 999 F.3d at 877; see generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (explaining the jury is not required to believe contradicted evidence or impeached testimony).“[I]n reviewing the evidence and considering what inferences may reasonably be drawn, the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” S. Katzman Produce Inc., 999 F.3d at 877. Moreover, “[t]he evaluation of ambiguous acts is a task for the jury, not for the judge on summary judgment.” Redd, 678 F.3d at 174. “In sum, summary judgment is proper only when, with all permissible inferences and credibility questions resolved in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict . . . i.e., it is quite clear what the truth is.” Id.; Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Court is mindful of the Second Circuit's instruction that a party's pro se pleading- including a written opposition to a motion for summary judgment-must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that it suggests. Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).
III.DISCUSSION
At the outset, the undersigned concludes the Doe defendants should be dismissed and Nelson's Statement of Material Facts is undisputed. First, the Doe defendants should be dismissed because Pabon failed to ascertain their identities and timely serve them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); NDNY LR 4.1(b). Judge Hurd warned Pabon that if he “fails to ascertain the identity of the Doe defendants so as to permit timely services of process, all claims against those individuals will be dismissed.” (Dkt. No. 7. at 9; see also Id. at 15 (“Plaintiff's failure to timely serve those defendants will result in dismissal of the claims asserted against them and termination of those defendants from the action.”).) Because Pabon failed to serve the Doe defendants, the undersigned recommends dismissing those defendants from this action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); see, e.g., Berman v. Durkin, No. 9:13-CV-0136 (LEK) (DJS), 2017 WL 1215814, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1207834 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017); Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416, 440-41 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
Second, Nelson's Statement of Material Facts is undisputed. (Compare Dkt. No. 21-9, with Dkt. No. 33.) On initial review, Judge Hurd specifically warned the parties they must “comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions.” (Dkt. No. 7 at 15.) Among other requirements, that rule provides “[a]ny motion for summary judgment shall include a Statement of Material Facts, and any opposition shall contain a response to the Statement of Material Facts.” NDNY LR 7.1(b)(3). Pabon failed to file a response to Nelson's Statement of Material Facts, and did not controvert Nelson's evidence with citations to his own evidence. (See Dkt. No. 33.) Under Local Rule 56.1(b), “[t]he Court may deem admitted any properly supported facts set forth in the Statement of Material Facts that the opposing party does not specifically controvert.” NDNY LR 56.1(b); see also Frantti v. New York, 850 Fed.Appx. 17, 19 (2d Cir. 2021) (approving the adoption of an unopposed Statement of Material Facts); Marino v. Schult, 764 Fed.Appx. 73, 74 (2d Cir. 2019) (“If a non-moving party fails to comply with local rules governing summary judgment, a district court may rely on a moving party's statement of undisputed facts as long as those facts are supported by the record”). Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). Because Pabon failed to respond to Nelson's Statement of Material Facts and did not controvert his factual assertions, the undersigned regards those factual assertions as undisputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); NDNY LR 56.1(b).
“Proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant from the usual requirements of summary judgment.” Zuk v. Onondaga Cnty., No. 5:07-CV-732 (GTS) (GJD), 2010 WL 3909524, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010), aff'd, 471 Fed.Appx. 70 (2d Cir. 2012); Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer, 559 F.Supp.2d 223, 234-35 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). This includes complying with the procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for this Court. White v. Drake, No. 9:10-CV-1034 (GTS) (DRH), 2011 WL 4478921, at *8 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011); Christman v. Utica Nat. Ins. Grp., Inc., No. 606-CV-1392 (GTS) (GHL), 2009 WL 838128, at *6 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009), aff'd, 375 Fed.Appx. 106 (2d Cir. 2010).
A. Pabon's Eighth Amendment Claim is Timely
“The statute of limitations for claims brought under Section 1983 is governed by state law, and, in this case, is the three-year period for personal injury actions under New York law.” Middlebrooks v. Bradt, 794 Fed.Appx. 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2019); Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009). “A Section 1983 claim ordinarily accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d at 181; Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 2004) (Sotomayor, Circuit Judge). In this case, the statute of limitations on Pabon's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim began to run on December 1, 2017, the date of the incident, and expired three years later on December 1, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1; see, e.g., Jones v. City of New York, No. 18-CIV-1937 (VSB) (GWG), 2021 WL 5562694, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021); Gutek v. Borchardt, No. 9:17-CV-00471 (BKS) (TWD), 2020 WL 2336187, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 11, 2020).)
“Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's complaint is deemed filed upon its delivery to prison authorities for transmittal to the district court.” Griffith v. Troy, No. 9:19-CV-00354 (MAD) (ML), 2021 WL 4437584, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2021); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Hardy v. Conway, 162 Fed.Appx. 61, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2006). “That date of delivery is presumed to be the date that the inmate signs his or her complaint.” Griffith, 2021 WL 4437584, at *4; see also Hardy, 162 Fed.Appx. at 62-63 (“Indeed, in the absence of contrary evidence, district courts in this circuit have tended to assume that prisoners' papers were given to prison officials on the date of their signing.”) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Corrigan v. Barbery, 371 F.Supp.2d 325, 328 n.4 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); Pack v. Artuz, 348 F.Supp.2d 63, 67 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “If the complaint is not signed, the date of the postmark is the date the petition is presumed filed.” Griffith, 2021 WL 4437584, at *4; see, e.g., Alexander v. Superintendent, No. 9:07-CV-00680, 2009 WL 762108, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009).
Nelson claims Pabon's claim is untimely because he “filed this action with his initial complaint on December 7, 2020.” (Dkt. No. 21-2 at 11; but see Dkt. No. 21-10 at 120 (“Q: You filed this on November 26th, 2020, correct? A: Yes, ma'am.”).) However, Pabon signed his Complaint on November 26, 2020. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Under the mailbox rule, Pabon's complaint is deemed filed upon its delivery to prison officials, which-unless there is contrary evidence-is presumed to be the date he signed his complaint. See Griffith, 2021 WL 4437584, at *4. The evidence demonstrates Pabon delivered his complaint to prison officials on the day he signed it, November 26, 2020. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 6; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 120; see, e.g., Corrigan, 371 F.Supp.2d at 328 n.4; Alexander, 2009 WL 762108, at *2.) The undersigned accordingly concludes Pabon timely filed his Eighth Amendment claim.
Judge Hurd's administrative closure of the case due to an incomplete IFP Application does not change the date of filing for purposes of the mailbox rule and the statute of limitations. See Vangundy v. Haque, No. 17-CV-0024(LJV), 2017 WL 1274318, at *2 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2017) (“Administrative termination is not a dismissal for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rather, if the case is re-opened pursuant to the terms of this order, it is not subject to the statute of limitations time bar as long as it originally was timely filed”); Leitner v. I.R.S., No. 13-MC-6010CJS, 2013 WL 2385169, at *1 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. May 24, 2013) (same); see, e.g., Burroughs v. Petrone, No. 9:15-CV-0818 (DNH) (ATB), 2016 WL 5376371, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5374126 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2016); see generally McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Although a complaint is not formally filed until the filing fee is paid, we deem a complaint to be constructively filed as of the date that the clerk received the complaint-as long as the plaintiff ultimately pays the filing fee or the district court grants the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis.”).
B. No Evidence of Nelson's Personal Involvement
Sometime before August 28, 2017, Pabon was diagnosed with “syncope,” a medical diagnosis characterized by sudden and unpredictable fainting. (Dkt. No. 21-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 24-26.) Due to this condition, on August 28, 2017, Pabon requested certain accommodations, including “medical showers, phone calls in the block and to be transferred to a facility that specialized in his medical condition.” (Dkt. No. 21-5 at 2, 5; Dkt. No. 21-6 at 2, 7.) Pabon's request was received by the appropriate authorities, and referred to Vonda Johnson, M.D. (Dkt. No. 21-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 21-6 at 2-3.) Dr. Johnson opined Pabon suffered “from syncope of unknown etiology.” (Dkt. No. 21-5 at 2.) Dr. Johnson accordingly imposed several accommodations for Pabon, including “protective head gear, flat housing and block showers.” Id. at 2, 5. Although Dr. Johnson indicated Pabon should “avoid stairs,” Dr. Johnson opined “a transfer was not necessary,” because, in relevant part, Pabon could access the mess hall, the yard, and the phone without using stairs. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 21-6 at 3. Pabon was subsequently “advised to limit his use of the stairs due to the unpredictable nature of his syncopal episodes.” (Dkt. No. 21-5 at 3.)
On the morning of December 1, 2017, Pabon left his cell for a scheduled visit at the law library. (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 63.) At that time, Pabon had no indication that he was going to have a syncopal episode-he was not feeling sick or dizzy, and he had no chest pains. See Id. at 65, 68. On his way to the law library, Pabon told Nelson, who was working in the “Bubble,” that he did not want to go to the law library. Id. at 66-67, 71-72; see also Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3. Pabon indicated he did not want to take the stairs to the law library because he was “feeling a little lightheaded.” (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 67, 74; see also Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3.) Nelson explained to Pabon that if he wanted to be excused from his scheduled library visit, “he would have to speak directly with a representative from the law library.” (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3.) Nelson also explained that, pursuant to policy, a misbehavior report would be filed if Pabon was not excused from the scheduled library visit. (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 63, 66-67, 72; see also Dkt. No. 21-7 at 1-2.)
According to Pabon, he was not having a medical emergency in that moment- he was simply feeling “a little lightheaded.” (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 67-68.) However, as he began descending the stairs with an unknown escort officer, Pabon suffered a syncopal episode, fainted, and tumbled down the stairs. Id. at 65-69; see also Dkt. No. 21-7 at 2-3. As a result of the fall, Pabon suffered pain and bruises to his back, groin, and knees. (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 84-85.) Pabon later testified the syncopal episode “came out of nowhere.” Id. at 68.
Nelson was aware of Pabon's diagnosis, but on the morning of December 1, 2017, he was unaware Pabon “was suffering from a syncopal episode which would result in [his] fall down a flight of stairs.” (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3; accord Dkt. No. 21-10 at 68 (“it just came out of nowhere because I can't tell that it is coming”).) At the time of Pabon's fall, Nelson was not escorting him down the stairs-he was in the “Bubble.” (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 71-72; Dkt. No. 21-7 at 2-4.) According to Nelson, “[t]he officers located in the ‘Bubble' are not responsible for escorting individuals,” rather, they monitor access to and from the housing dorm from a station (i.e., the “Bubble”) located in the center of multiple housing dorms. (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3; accord Dkt. No. 21-10 at 71-72.) Nelson believed he did not have the authority to cancel Pabon's scheduled law library visit, but “a representative from the law library” did. (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3-4; see also Id. at 6 (providing the Law Library Administrator “shall receive and respond to requests for special access to the Law Library.”).)
1.The Parties' Arguments
Nelson argues he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Pabon failed to allege he was personally involved in the incident on December 1, 2017. (Dkt. No. 21-1 at 12.) Nelson further argues he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence demonstrates he “did not have any supervisory authority over the escort officers [who walked Pabon down the stairs], nor did he have the authority to cancel Plaintiff's scheduled call-out to the law library.” Id. at 13. In the alternative, Nelson argues Pabon cannot satisfy the objective and subjective elements of his Eighth Amendment unsafe prison conditions claim. Id. at 21-24.
In his opposition to Nelson's motion for summary judgment, Pabon offered no rejoinder to the argument that Nelson was not personally involved in the incident on December 1, 2017. (See Dkt. No. 33.) Rather, Pabon argues Nelson was deliberately indifferent to unsafe prison conditions because he knew Pabon suffered from fainting spells, but forced him to take the stairs by explaining to Pabon that failure to visit the law library at the scheduled time would result in a misbehavior report. Id. at 3-5.
2. Legal Standards
“Section 1983 authorizes a court to grant relief when a party's constitutional rights have been violated by a state or local official or other person acting under color of state law.” Washington, 373 F.3d at 315; see generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that defendant deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law. Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Washington, 373 F.3d at 315; Bridges v. Corr. Servs., No. 17-CV-2220 (NSR), 2022 WL 1500633, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2022).
Moreover, “to establish a defendant's individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Durr v. Slator, 558 F.Supp.3d 1, 25 (N.D.N.Y. 2021). It follows that “a defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Veloz v. New York, 339 F.Supp.2d 505, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 178 Fed.Appx. 39 (2d Cir. 2006). Rather, to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claimant “must directly plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Keyes v. Venettozzi, No. 9:18-CV-0372 (GTS) (DJS), 2022 WL 991402, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022). Stated differently, a claimant must establish that the defendant violated his rights through the defendant's own conduct, not through the defendant's supervision of others who may have committed the violation. McCluskey v. Roberts, No. 20-4018, 2022 WL 2046079, at *3 (2d Cir. June 7, 2022); Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618.
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official based on conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) objectively, the deprivation [he] suffered was sufficiently serious that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, and (2) subjectively, the defendant official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . such as deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2020). To meet the objective element, the claimant must show the conditions “objectively posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health so as to deny him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Cintron v. Doldo, 688 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Thus, prison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.”). “When considering these conditions, a court should assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Cintron, 688 Fed.Appx. at 45. “To meet the subjective element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with more than mere negligence.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125; see generally Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment claim where the alleged conduct “involve[d] more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety”). “To constitute deliberate indifference, the prison official must know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125; see also Cintron, 688 Fed.Appx. at 45 (“The defendant must have known of the condition that posed an excessive risk to inmate health and chosen to disregard it.”).
3.Analysis
For the following reasons, the undersigned concludes no reasonable juror could find that Nelson was personally involved in Pabon's fall down the stairs on December 1, 2017. See Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 98; see also Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 612. The undersigned further concludes Pabon's choice to walk down the stairs did not pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, and Nelson did not act with deliberate indifference to Pabon's health by telling him he could either walk down the stairs to the library, call the library to request an excused absence, or go back to his cell. See McCray, 963 F.3d at 117. The undersigned accordingly concludes Nelson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
First, based on the evidence before the Court, no reasonable juror could find that Nelson was personally involved in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation on December 1, 2017. See Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 98; see also Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 612. On the day of the incident, Nelson was working in the “Bubble,” he was not working as an escort. (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 66, 71-72.) Although Nelson was nearby when Pabon fell, he did not physically force Pabon to walk down the stairs, nor did he physically escort Pabon down the stairs. (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 2-3; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 66, 71-72.) Evidence that Nelson was nearby when Pabon fell, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable inference that Nelson is personally responsible for the fall. See, e.g., Oles v. Sauer, No. 19-CV-8865 (NSR), 2022 WL 1204862, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2022) (“Merely alleging that the Kitchen Defendants work in the kitchen and that he receives inadequate meals is insufficient for a constitutional claim.”); Williams v. Mangano, No. 17-CV-2667 (RRM) (AKT), 2021 WL 84280, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2021) (concluding “Mathewson is entitled to summary judgment,” even though he was “present at the scene” of the alleged constitutional violation, because “Williams has not alleged that Mathewson was personally involved”).
Moreover, the evidence indicates Nelson did not compel Pabon to walk down the stairs. (See Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3-4.) Under New York State Department of Corrections and Community Services Directive 4483, it is the Law Library Administrator-not the officer in the Bubble- who “shall receive and respond to requests for special access to the Law Library.” Id. at 6; see also Id. at 4 (“On December 1, 2017, I did not have the authority to cancel Plaintiff's scheduled call-out to the law library.”). When Pabon indicated he did not want to use the stairs to visit the law library, Nelson told him “he would have to speak directly with a representative from the law library to be excused from” the visit. Id. at 3. Nelson further explained that, pursuant to policy, a misbehavior report would be filed if Pabon was not excused from the scheduled library visit. (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 63, 66-67, 72; see also Dkt. No. 21-7 at 1-4.) In response, Pabon chose to try his luck on the stairs rather than calling the law library or facing a misbehavior report. Nelson did not compel Pabon to make this choice-he simply told Pabon that he did not have the authority to cancel the law library visit, he indicated who did have that authority, and he explained the consequences of failing to attend his scheduled visit. (See Dkt. No. 21-7 at 1-4; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 63, 66-67, 72.) This evidence demonstrates that Nelson did not, by his “own individual actions,” cause Pabon's injuries. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 612; see, e.g., Bryant v. Miller, No. 9:18-CV-494 (GTS) (CFH), 2021 WL 5095284, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4272396 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2021) (reviewing defendant's job responsibilities and concluding he played “no personal role” in the alleged violation); accord Gutierrez-Pinto v. Annucci, No. 20-CV-4490 (CS), 2022 WL 523628, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022) (“Plaintiff provides no facts plausibly showing that Annucci . . . was in a position to prevent an accident like the one that occurred.”); Hall v. Dep't of Corr. Med. Dep't, No. 18-CV-6892 (NSR), 2021 WL 2894646, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2021) (“At best, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ferdous and Ezekwe could have engaged in actions to expedite his surgery. However, such allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege personal involvement.”). Furthermore, no reasonable juror could conclude that by explaining these policies to Pabon, Nelson was personally responsible for Pabon's decision to walk down the stairs. See Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 98; see also McCluskey, 2022 WL 2046079, at *3.
Second, the condition of the stairs was not “sufficiently serious that [Pabon] was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” McCray, 963 F.3d at 117. Pabon has failed to demonstrate that when he began descending the stairs on December 1, 2017, it was clear to Nelson that Pabon's use of the stairs “objectively posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health so as to deny him the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Cintron, 688 Fed.Appx. at 45. According to Pabon, at the time he began descending the stairs, he was not having a medical emergency, he was not feeling sick or dizzy, he had no chest pains, and he had no indication that he was going to have a syncopal episode. (Dkt. No. 21-10 at 65, 67-68.) Indeed, Pabon explained the ensuing syncopal episode “came out of nowhere.” Id. at 68.
On these facts, the stairs were simply stairs-they were not the dangerous gauntlet Pabon makes them out to be. Even if a reasonable juror could conclude that Pabon's diagnosis rendered the stairs a slip-and-fall hazard, the existence of such a hazard, standing alone, cannot satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim. See Allen v. Stringer, No. 20-3953, 2021 WL 4472667 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (concluding the existence of “broken stairs alone cannot satisfy the objective prong of a conditions-of-confinement claim.”); Martinez v. Schriro, No. 14-CIV-3965 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 87049, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017) (“As courts in this circuit have regularly found, wet floor conditions that cause a prisoner to slip and fall do not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (collecting cases); accord Cintron, 688 Fed.Appx. at 45 (concluding “the placement of the chair on the baseball field did not constitute a deprivation sufficiently serious that Cintron was denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”).
Moreover, because neither Pabon nor Nelson knew a syncopal episode was imminent, (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3; Dkt. No, 21-10 at 65, 67-68), Pabon's fall down the stairs is best described as an accident. “Courts in this Circuit routinely find that an accident, even if arising from a risky condition, does not rise to the level of a sufficiently serious deprivation.” Gutierrez-Pinto v. Annucci, No. 20-CV-4490 (CS), 2022 WL 523628, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022) (collecting cases). Pabon has accordingly failed to satisfy the objective prong of his Eighth Amendment claim.
Finally, Nelson did not act with deliberate indifference to an objectively unsafe prison condition. See McCray, 963 F.3d at 117. When Pabon told Nelson he did not want to take the stairs, Nelson explained to Pabon that he could either go forward with the law library visit, skip the visit and receive a misbehavior report, or contact the law library and request to be excused. (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 1-4; Dkt. No. 21-10 at 66-67, 71-74.) Although Nelson was aware of Pabon's “sudden and unpredictable medical condition,” he had no idea that in the ensuing moments, Pabon would “suffer[] from a syncopal episode which would result in [his] fall down a flight of stairs.” (Dkt. No. 21-7 at 3; accord Dkt. No. 21-10 at 68 (“it just came out of nowhere because I can't tell that it is coming”); see generally Patterson v. Colon, No. 20-CV-9317 (CS), 2022 WL 563860, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022) (explaining “a correction officer ordering an inmate to complete a task that the inmate does not want to complete hardly shows that the officer was aware that the order would present a substantial risk of serious harm.”).) At worst, Nelson may have been negligent for failing to foresee that Pabon would face some risk of fainting while descending the stairs. See, e.g., Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 281-82 (concluding plaintiff failed to prove the subjective prong of his medical indifference claim where defendant's belief that he was in “no immediate danger” of serious harm “leads only to a finding of unactionable negligence”). However, to meet the subjective element of his Eighth Amendment claim, Pabon must show that Nelson “acted with more than mere negligence.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125; see, e.g., Abernathy v. Comm'r of Correction, No. 3:20-CV-628 (VAB), 2020 WL 5097566, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2020) (concluding allegations of negligence did not amount to deliberate indifference). Rather, Pabon must demonstrate Nelson knew of, and disregarded “an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125. Pabon has failed to do so.
IV.CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes: (1) the Doe Defendants should be dismissed; (2) Pabon timely filed his Eighth Amendment Claim; (3) no reasonable juror could find that Nelson was personally involved in Pabon's injury on December 1, 2017; (4) Pabon failed to demonstrate the condition of the stairs was sufficiently serious to satisfy the first prong of his Eighth Amendment claim; and (5) Pabon failed to demonstrate Nelson acted with deliberate indifference.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that the Court sua sponte dismiss the Doe defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m); and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Nelson's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 21) be GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).