Summary
denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because "it involve[d] only reformulations of arguments already considered and rejected"
Summary of this case from ISASI v. U.S. GOVOpinion
98-CV-5952 (JG)
August 24, 2000
ANDREW J. MALONEY, III, Kreindler Kreindler, New York, NY, Attorney for Plaintiff PAB Aviation, Inc.
DAVID W. OGDEN, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Torts Branch, Civil Division U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., By: Stephen R. Cerutti II, Trial Attorney, Attorney for Defendant United States
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PAB Aviation has moved for reconsideration of my memorandum and order, dated August 3, 2000, dismissing its claim against the United States.
Eastern District Local Civil Rule 6.3 authorizes motions for reconsideration when accompanied by "a memorandum setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked." The requirements of Local Rule 6.3, which applies in both the Southern and Eastern Districts, are strictly construed in order to keep the court's docket free of unnecessary relitigation. See Bell Sports, Inc. v. System Software Assocs., Inc., 71 F. Supp.2d 121, 125-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that a party seeking reconsideration bears a "difficult burden . . . `in order to dissuade repetitive arguments'" (quoting Ruiz v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Transp., 687 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))); see also Quartararo v. Catterson, 73 F. Supp.2d 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting Rule 6.3's "design to prevent re-litigation").
A party may not advance a new argument in a motion to reconsider; that argument is waived. See Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) ("To be entitled to reargument. a party `must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion." (quoting Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (emphasis added));cf. Brown v. J.F.H. Mak Trucking, 95-CV-2118, 1999 WL 1057274, at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1999) ("[S]uch motions cannot be used as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that should have been set forth during the pendency of the prior motion or could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence."). Nor may the party merely reiterate or repackage an argument previously rejected by the court; that argument is for appeal.See Brown, 1999 WL 1057274, at * 1 (noting that a motion to reconsider "may not be used as a substitute for an appeal"); see also Resource N.E. of Long Island v. Town of Babylon, 80 F. Supp.2d 52, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[A motion to reconsider] is not a vehicle to reargue those issues already considered when a party does not like the way the original motion was resolved."). The purpose of the motion to reconsider is to allow the district court to correct its own mistake, by calling its attention to a factual matter or a controlling precedent previously put forward by the party but "overlooked" by the court. Bell Sports, 71 F. Supp.2d at 126.
Because PAB's motion involves only reformulations of arguments already considered and rejected, reconsideration is not warranted. The motion is therefore denied.
PAB notes that I relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C, but contends that I overlooked comment (b) to that section. That comment, however, does not apply to this case. The comment addresses "physical harm to the . . ., chattels of the plaintiff," and there was no physical harm to any property owned by PAB. Treasure Solutions owned the aircraft; PAB had only a contractual right to use it. The case is therefore indistinguishable from Illustration 1 to comment (a) to § 766C: A has contracted to tow a barge owned by B between two ports. Before the contract can be performed, C negligently sinks the barge, and A is prevented from towing it and so deprived of the profit to be made out of the towage fees. C is not liable to A.
So Ordered.