Summary
In Owusu, the Third District considered a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial court's order precluding the petitioner from taking a deposition.
Summary of this case from McCloud v. TackettOpinion
No. 3D19-2385
04-15-2020
Robert OWUSU, Jr., Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Respondent.
Pierre Simon, LLC, and Faudlin Pierre (Fort Lauderdale), for petitioner. Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney, for respondent.
Pierre Simon, LLC, and Faudlin Pierre (Fort Lauderdale), for petitioner.
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Eric J. Eves, Assistant City Attorney, for respondent.
Before EMAS, C.J., and FERNANDEZ, and LINDSEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order precluding him from taking a deposition in a public records case. Because he failed to establish irreparable harm, we need go no further.
"Certiorari is not a general license for appellate courts to closely supervise the day-to-day decision making of trial courts." Stockinger v. Zeilberger, 152 So. 3d 71, 73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). Indeed, "[v]ery few categories of non-final orders qualify for the use of this extraordinary writ." Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. San Perdido Ass'n, 104 So. 3d 344, 351-52 (Fla. 2012) ; see also Damsky v. Univ. of Miami, 152 So. 3d 789, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) ("Under this high standard, few non-final orders qualify for the use of a writ of certiorari.").
To obtain first-tier certiorari relief, the petitioner must demonstrate "(1) a material injury in the proceedings that cannot be corrected on appeal (sometimes referred to as irreparable harm); and (2) a departure from the essential requirements of the law." Blamey v. Menadier, 283 So. 3d 938, 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting Nader v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012) ). The existence of "irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal is a condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction." Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enterprises, LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 454–55 (Fla. 2012) (citations internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade County, 117 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 2013) ("Only after irreparable harm has been established can an appellate court then review whether the petitioner has also shown a departure from the essential requirements of law.").
"[A]n order that denies discovery normally does not rise to the level of irreparable harm because it can be readily remedied on appeal ...." Damsky, 152 So. 3d at 792 ; see also Clarke v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 282 So. 3d 897, 898-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reversing a protective order from a deposition on direct appeal); Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 1332-33 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (resolving a pretrial discovery dispute in a public records case on direct appeal). Thus, "orders having the effect of denying discovery are almost invariably not reviewable by certiorari because of the absence of irreparable harm." Damsky, 152 So. 3d at 792 (quoting Neeley v. CW Roberts Contracting, Inc., 948 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ). Such is the case here.
Petition for certiorari dismissed.