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holding that plaintiff's "attempts to cast a sinister light" on Defendants' comments by "pull[ing] out several soundbytes to suit her purposes, when those statements are viewed in context, one cannot reasonably conclude" that defendant was attempting to discriminate was insufficient for a discrimination claim
Summary of this case from Kunik v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.Opinion
99 Civ. 3793 (JSM)
March 1, 2001
Attorney for plaintiff: Catherine Kiley McGuire 107 Northern Blvd. Great Neck, NY.
Attorney for defendant: Ira Rosenstein Orrick, Herrington Sutcliffe 666 Fifth Ave. New York, NY.
OPINION and ORDER
Geraldine O'Neill-Marina ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Omni Hotels Management Corp. and Omni Berkshire Place Hotel (collectively "Defendant") pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII"), New York State's Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et. seq., and New York City's Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107 et. seq. Plaintiff claims that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her by imposing unreasonable work hours in order to force her to resign because she was a married woman with children. Plaintiff also seeks overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Defendant moves for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1987, Plaintiff began employment at Defendant's Omni Park Central Hotel as an assistant to the Regional Director of Food and Beverages. In 1989, Plaintiff was married. She was regularly promoted until September 1995, when she accepted a position as Conference Service Manager with Defendant's Omni Berkshire Place Hotel (the "Hotel"), a four-star hotel. Plaintiff gave birth to her second child in December 1995.
Plaintiff apparently had up to a three-hour daily commute between work and home.
In August 1996, Plaintiff's title was changed to Director of Conference Services. In this position, Plaintiff was responsible for managing the Hotel's conference meetings, including making the necessary arrangements with Hotel clients prior to their conferences and monitoring their needs while the conference was taking place. Plaintiff assisted clients in determining what services they would need, and she oversaw such tasks as reserving guest rooms, setting up banquet rooms and meals, and arranging transportation. She was also responsible for coordinating conference needs with other departments within the Hotel, and she participated in compiling a manual of conference polices and in formulating business goals in order to increase business. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 47-52, 58-61.) Although the parties dispute whether Plaintiff actually negotiated contracts and prices with conference clients, Plaintiff admits that she sometimes performed sales functions due to turnover in Hotel staff and that she negotiated changes to pre-set contracts. Plaintiff claims that she always followed an established guideline when she discussed price terms with clients, and that any changes to a pre-approved contract required approval from her supervisors.
In March 1998, Defendant hired Martin O'Brien ("O'Brien") as its General Manager. Because the Hotel's conference operation was performing poorly, the Hotel's Executive Committee sought to develop ways to make their conference services more competitive. (Waterbor Dep. at 64-66, 71-73, 77, 79.) One policy that Defendant implemented was a requirement that Plaintiff be present at the Hotel starting an hour before a conference began and continuing throughout the duration of the conference in order to meet any client needs that arose. As a result of the new scheduling, Plaintiff was often required to be present in the evenings and on weekends. Previously, Plaintiff's working hours were from 7:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., although she frequently stayed until 5:30 p.m. to cover a meeting, and she was not required to be at work prior to an event or to work evenings or weekends unless a major function was scheduled.
Precisely when the decision to increase Plaintiff's hours was made remains unclear, but in September 1998, Kristin Ohlin ("Ohlin"), the new Director of Catering and Plaintiff's direct supervisor, began to prepare work schedules for Plaintiff and others designed to ensure that a conference employee was present at each function. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff frequently failed to abide by the new schedules, often leaving work early or failing to show up for weekend events. (Sansone Dep. at 19, 21-22, 38; O'Brien Dep. at 12-16, 39-40.) Plaintiff claims that she followed the schedules "as much as I could," (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 133, 135, 143), but that often there was no legitimate need for her presence and that she sat in her office idly. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 129, 130-33, 243.) For example, Plaintiff claims that she was sometimes scheduled to be at work when there was no meeting, (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 144), and that her schedule was not adjusted to account for the times that she worked on evenings or weekends. During the Fall of 1998, Plaintiff complained numerous times to her supervisors about the unnecessary hours, stating that she had never before been required to remain at the Hotel throughout every function. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 131-32, 142-45.)
Plaintiff alleges that in or about September 1998, a conversation took place between several members of Hotel management in which they discussed ways of terminating Plaintiff, including making an offer to induce her to leave and instituting progressive disciplinary action if she did not accept the offer. Plaintiff alleges that they also discussed eliminating her position. (Knollmueller Dep. at 8-9, 10, 23, 37.) Plaintiff also claims that sometime during the Fall of 1998, two other employees told her to watch her back. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 156, 168.)
Plaintiff's October 1998 performance evaluation noted that Plaintiffs credibility was in jeopardy because there was a perception that she was around to help out only when it was "convenient" for her. (O'Neill-Marino Dep., Ex. 10.) The evaluation also noted that Plaintiff failed to adjust her hours to meet "overall business demand." Plaintiff complained about this performance evaluation, and in response she alleges that O'Brien called her to his office, became angry, and told her to speak only to him about her complaints and to just keep quiet and do her job. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 159, 173.)
In December 1998, members of the Hotel's Executive Committee allegedly met and concluded that Plaintiff's attendance and attitude problems were impacting on the Hotel's conference business. (Waterbor Dep. at 62-66, 78-79.) The Executive Committee determined that Plaintiff would remain in her position, but that Holly Waterbor ("Waterbor"), Hotel Manager, would speak with Plaintiff about her attendance issues. (Waterbor Dep. at 59-63, 70, 81, 84-85, 109.) Also in December 1998, Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to report to Stephen Baker ("Baker"), Director of Sales and Marketing, rather than Ohlin. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 185-86.) This request was granted.
On December 31, 1998, Waterbor met with Plaintiff and presented her with three options: (1) continue in her job but satisfy the new responsibilities of her position; (2) seek another position within the Hotel or elsewhere; or (3) resign and request a severance package. (Waterbor Dep. at 116 Ex. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Waterbor also told her that she would have been fired that day had Waterbor not intervened. When Plaintiff asked "Why?", Waterbor responded "Because you take lunch." (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 138-41.) On January 6, 1999, Plaintiff informed Waterbor that she would like to remain in her position, but only if she could work the hours that she had worked in the past. When Waterbor responded that this was not an option, Plaintiff stated that she could not continue to work the required hours, and that she would resign. Plaintiff also asked about a severance package. Plaintiff tape-recorded this conversation.
Apparently Plaintiff was not owed a severance package under Omni policy, but her supervisors felt that one might be appropriate in light-of Plaintiff's twelve years of service with Defendant's hotels. Plaintiff claims that at this meeting Waterbor suggested the possibility of obtaining unemployment, not a severance package. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 141.)
On or about January 25, 1999, Sansone met with Plaintiff in a bar and explained to her that her position required that she be present both before and during conference events. (Sansone Decl., Ex. 1 at D278.) Sansone spoke with Plaintiff about the difficulties of balancing work with family, and recounted instances of people he knew who had been forced to make a choice between the two. Plaintiff claims that Sansone commented that Plaintiff had been burning the candle at both ends, and he would have thought that by now she would either have her head in a bottle or be taking Prozac. He also allegedly cautioned her against filing a lawsuit, claiming that it could effect her chances of finding another job. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 194-200, 206, 209, 220-21.) Plaintiff asked Sansone to look into a severance package for her.
Sansone claims that at his first meeting with Plaintiff, he suggested that Plaintiff consider taking a concierge position. (Sansone Decl. Ex. 1 at 278.) Plaintiff states that it was at a second meeting, on January 29, 1999, that Sansone suggested the concierge position. Plaintiff claims that this position was outside her area of expertise and offered a lower salary, and that she was not offered a position in the Sales department, even though some were available. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 220-21.) At this second meeting, which Plaintiff tape-recorded, Plaintiff expressed her fear that she was going to be fired. Sansone responded that as long as she fulfilled the requirements of her job, she would not be terminated. Plaintiff also complained once again that the hours were unnecessary, and that no one could work such a schedule. In the course of their lengthy conversation, Sansone at various times made comments to the effect that Plaintiff must really need a paycheck because he could not imagine anyone putting work before family, and that if Plaintiff continued on her present course, something could go wrong at home or at work.
On February 1, 1999, Plaintiff asked Sansone for an eight-month severance package. On February 5, 1999, Plaintiff met with Sansone and Baker. Sansone rejected Plaintiff's request for eight months' severance pay and informed her that there would be no further discussions regarding a severance package. Sansone and Baker told Plaintiff that they would like her to remain in her job, but that she would be required to follow her work schedules. In order to alleviate problems with last-minute scheduling, Baker agreed to post Plaintiff's schedules two weeks in advance and to give her alternative time off. Plaintiff claims that despite Baker's promise, her schedules were not posted two weeks in advance. When she complained to Baker, he apologized and promised to work with her to resolve scheduling conflicts.
On February 12, 2000, Plaintiff sent Baker a memorandum stating that she was seeking additional childcare to cover her extra work hours. After receiving the memorandum, Baker told Plaintiff that he would work to accommodate her until she arranged childcare, and that he would have Ohlin post Plaintiff's schedules three weeks in advance. Plaintiff claims that once again she did not receive her schedules at the promised time. On February 17, 2000, Baker informed Plaintiff that she was required to be present at work in the morning before her events began, during evening events at least until the entree was served, and on weekends.
On February 25, 1999, Plaintiff left work before the evening entrees were served. Plaintiff claims that she asked another employee, Patrice Harrington ("Harrington"), to cover the event for her. Plaintiff also failed to cover an event on Saturday, February 27, 1999, although Plaintiff claims that she was not scheduled for this event. On March 12, 1999, Plaintiff requested March 17th as a day off. Baker denied the request, allegedly because Plaintiff was scheduled to cover a conference that day. Plaintiff claims again that she was not responsible for this group, and that therefore the denial was not based on a legitimate reason. On Saturday, March 13, 1999, Plaintiff failed to report to work for a weekend event, during which several problems ensued. Plaintiff again claims that she was not responsible for that group. On March 15, 1999, Baker met with Plaintiff and allegedly reiterated his instructions about the hours that Plaintiff was required to work. Baker claims that Plaintiff told him that her hours were 7:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., that she never works weekends for groups under thirty, and that no one had told her that she was required to work weekends. Plaintiff never returned to work after March 15, 1999. Patrice Harrington, a single female, took over Plaintiff's position.
Plaintiff claims in this action that Defendant's new policy in 1998 requiring Plaintiff's presence before and during conferences was deliberately designed to force her to leave because the policy was unrelated to any legitimate business need. Plaintiff also claims that the work schedules were only enforced against her, and not against other employees, and that the 1998 performance evaluation was intended to provoke her resignation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's campaign to force her resignation was motivated by discrimination based on her status as a married woman with children. Plaintiff also claims that she is owed overtime compensation under the FLSA as a non-exempt employee.
II. DISCUSSION A. Employment Discrimination
To bring a claim for discriminatory discharge under Title VII, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996). Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Stetson v. Nynex Serv. Co., 995 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1993). In order to rebut the presumption that arises from establishment of a prima facie case, Defendant has the burden to produce competent evidence that, if taken as true, would permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the challenged employment action was taken for a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981). Once such a reason is proffered, the burden returns to Plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a trial worthy issue of pretext underlying Defendant's stated reason for termination. See id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
Because New York courts look to federal law in adjudicating discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, see Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., 95 F.3d 1170; 1177(2d Cir. 1996); Ferrante v. American Lung Assoc., 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (1997); Burner v. Litton Indus., Inc., 91 Civ. 0918, 1996 WL 421449, at 18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1996), those claims are evaluated under the same standards.
While Plaintiff declines to identify with precision exactly which protected classes she belongs to, her theory of discrimination appears to center on her status as a married woman, with occasional reference to her status as a female parent. Therefore, the Court will proceed to analyze whether Plaintiff has made out a claim for constructive discrimination based on sex plus marital status, see Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1995), or sex plus parental status, see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
Plaintiff alleges that the adverse employment action that she suffered was the irrational and deliberate increase in her hours which was designed to force her resignation. In order to establish a claim for constructive discharge, Plaintiff must submit evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to conclude that Defendant deliberately created a work environment so unpleasant that a reasonable person in Plaintiff's shoes would feel compelled to resign. See Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specalities, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2000). Mere disagreement with working conditions or difficult assignments will not suffice to meet Plaintiff's burden. See Stetson, 995 F.2d at 360; Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993).
There is no question that Defendant increased Plaintiff's work hours, and that the increase imposed a considerable burden on Plaintiff because of her family responsibilities and her long commute. Indeed, Plaintiff's working hours apparently increased from around 40-50 hours per week to as much as 75 hours per week. However, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence that the change in her hours was deliberately motivated by any impermissible intent.
First, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence sufficient to establish that Defendant deliberately increased her hours in order to create intolerable working conditions or to force her to resign. Defendant submits evidence that it is standard industry practice to require that conference managers be present at the hotel both before and during conferences in order to meet client needs, and that hotel conference managers notoriously work long hours. (Waterbor Dep. at 64-66, 71-73; O'Brien Dep. at 78; Baker Dep. at 44; Wing Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff herself admits that such hours are typically required, (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 179-82), although she claims that such a high level of service is the standard for large social hotels that host weddings and the like, rather than smaller business hotels such as Defendant's. However, Defendant asserts that the reason for the change in Plaintiff's duties in 1998 was the new management team's desire to increase the competitiveness of the Hotel's lagging conference services by bringing them up to par with other hotels. (Waterbor Dep. at 66, 73, 76-77.)
Not only is Defendant's explanation facially neutral, but its actions indicate a lack of deliberate intent to force Plaintiff's resignation. Plaintiff was told repeatedly that she could continue in her job so long as she worked the hours that were required. In attempting to alleviate Plaintiff's difficulties with her new responsibilities, Defendant granted Plaintiff's request for a new reporting supervisor and attempted to provide Plaintiff with advance notice of her work schedule, although these attempts were not always successful. Sansone and Baker asked Plaintiff to stay in her position after she had requested a severance package, and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to take another position in the Hotel. These remedial measures are not the actions of an employer who is trying to force an employee to leave the company. See Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 74;Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361-62; Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983).
In an attempt to raise a question of fact regarding Defendant's intent, Plaintiff disputes that Harrington, Plaintiff's replacement, is required to work the same long hours that were required of Plaintiff. (Hurt Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11-12.) However, Plaintiff's proof consists of the affidavit of a former employee who was not in the same department as Plaintiff or Harrington and who did not supervise either, although her desk was nearby. (Waterbor Reply Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7.) Defendant, on the other hand, submits declarations from Harrington's current supervisors who state that Harrington is subject to the same hours requirements as was Plaintiff. (Wing Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Waterbor Reply Decl. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff also points to the conversation among members of the Executive Committee around September 1998 during which they allegedly discussed either buying Plaintiff out or imposing disciplinary action upon her. (Knollmueller Dep. at 8-9, 10, 23, 37.) As proof of this conversation, Plaintiff submits the deposition testimony of Phil Knollmueller ("Knollmueller"), who was privy to a conversation between O'Brien, Sansone, and a former hotel manager. Plaintiff admits, however, that she complained to supervisors several times about her new hours, that she followed the schedules "as much as she could," and that her October performance evaluation noted that she was not abiding by her hours requirements. Thus, evidence exists that beginning in September 1998, Plaintiff was having difficulty with her work schedules. In light of this, the discussion among members of the Executive Committee evidences little more than a conversation regarding an employee who was having problems performing her job. Similarly, the alleged hearsay statements by two other employees to the effect that management was looking to get rid of Plaintiff were also apparently made sometime after September 1998.
Plaintiff offers a potpourri of other incidents that allegedly evidence deliberate intent. For example, Plaintiff claims that she was singled out by Baker and required to meet with him regularly. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 190.) Plaintiff also alleges that many of her duties were taken away from her, such as running meetings and hiring her own assistant. However, Plaintiff's deposition testimony indicates that these changes were made by Ohlin, who was brought in as Director of Catering, a newly-created position, in order to "increase business and increase revenues." (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 106-14.) Ohlin apparently took a very proactive approach to her job, reallocating several of Plaintiff's responsibilities, instituting the schedules, and basically "running the show." However, close monitoring of an employee does not amount to constructive termination, see Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d Cir. 1993), nor does dissatisfaction with changes in one's job as a result of a "tough taskmaster." Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361.
In any event, Plaintiff's request for a new reporting supervisor was granted.
What Plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating is a garden variety disagreement with her employer over the nature of her duties. The primary dispute between the parties involves the wisdom of requiring that a Director of Conference Services be present both before and during Hotel events, even when there was no apparent need for her presence because the client experienced no problems. In addition, Plaintiff apparently felt that she should not be scheduled to cover conferences that did not involve her own clients. It is well-settled, however, that disagreements over unpleasant working conditions that are part and parcel of the job do not form the basis of a constructive discrimination claim. See Stetson, 995 F.2d at 360-61; Spence, 995 F.2d at 1156; Pena, 702 F.2d at 325-26; Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998); Greenberg v. Union Camp Corp., 48 F.3d 22, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1995); Katz v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., No. 95 Civ. 7183, 2001 WL 11064, at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2001).
Moreover, even if one were to assume for the sake of argument that Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of constructive termination for the purposes of her prima facie case, she has presented no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for increasing her hours is pretextual or that the decision was made as a result of her gender combined with her marital or parental status. Plaintiff was replaced by Patrice Harrington, a female, see Clark v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 67 F. Supp.2d 63, 73 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (replacement by member of protected class undermines discrimination claim), and several of Plaintiff's supervisors were women. Moreover, several of Plaintiff's supervisors were married, including Ohlin. (O'Brien Dep. at 33; Sansone Dep. at 5.) In addition, Plaintiff was hired by Waterbor in 1995 when Plaintiff was married and pregnant with her second child. These facts together strongly negate any suggestion of discriminatory intent.
Also, in 1996, Waterbor briefly left the Hotel and offered Plaintiff a job as conference director at her new place of employment. That job would have required that Plaintiff work the same long hours than she was later required to work with Defendant. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 91-96; Waterbor Dep. at 31-32, 37-38.) This strongly suggests that Waterbor had no problem with Plaintiff's status as a married mother of two children.
Plaintiff attempts to cast a sinister light on Sansone's comments during his conversations with her, the second of which Plaintiff tape-recorded. Plaintiff accuses Sansone of trying to make her feel guilty about balancing work life with her family responsibilities. She points to comments by Sansone to the effect that he could not "conceive of anybody who's got a family putting job before family" and that "anybody else in (Plaintiff's] situation . . . would either have been on Prozac or climbed into a bottle or . . . have had serious family problems." (Sansone Decl., Ex. 2 at 7, 24.) Even assuming it were admissible, a review of the entire transcript of the second conversation reveals that Sansone was attempting to sympathize with Plaintiff's acknowledged difficulties and to relate experiences of himself and others in similar situations. Although Plaintiff pulls out several soundbytes to suit her purposes, when those statements are viewed in context, one cannot reasonably conclude that Sansone was attempting to coerce Plaintiff into resigning because she was a married woman. Rather, Sansone frankly acknowledged that Plaintiff had numerous demands on her time that could impact on her job or her family, and Plaintiff does not today dispute that the increased hours required by the position were difficult for her to fulfill. Even more importantly, Plaintiff does not connect Sansone's comments in January 1999 with the decision to increase Plaintiff's hours in September 1998. Because Plaintiff offers no other evidence of discriminatory intent, she has failed to rebut Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for the change in her hours.
Defendant had a right to change the nature of the job duties assigned to the Director of Conference Services in order to compete with the level of service that other hotels were offering. See Spence, 995 F.2d at 1156. The fact that these new requirements disrupted Plaintiff's previous stable work schedule do not form the basis of a Title VII claim where the changes are in no way shown to result from discriminatory intent. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
B. Fair Labor Standards Act
Plaintiff claims that she is entitled to overtime compensation under the FLSA, 29 U.S. § 201 et seq. The FLSA exempts administrative employees from its maximum hours and overtime requirements. See id. § 213(a)(1). Plaintiff's annual base salary, which rose from $40,000 to nearly $64,000 between 1995 and 1998, qualifies her for the "short test" for administrative exemption because she earned more than $250 per week. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.214. In order to establish an administrative exemption pursuant to the "short test," Defendant must show that Plaintiff meets both a "salary basis test" and a "duties test."
Plaintiff concedes that she satisfies the salary basis test because her salary consisted of a predetermined amount paid out in regular installments and was not subject to reduction. See id. § 541.118(a). The duties test has two components: (1) the employee's primary duty consists of "office or nonmanual work" that is "directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his employer's customers" and (2) those duties require the exercise of "discretion and independent judgment." 29 C.F.R. § 541.2(a)(1) (b).
Under the first prong of this test, Defendant must establish that Plaintiff is an employee in an administrative capacity who performs "work of substantial importance to the management or operation of the business of his employer or his employer's customers." Id. § 541.205(a) Administrative responsibilities include ""servicing' a business as, for example, advising the management, planning, negotiating, representing the company, purchasing, promoting sales, and business research and control."Id. § 541.205(b).
Here, there is no question that Plaintiff was engaged in an administrative capacity as Director of Conference Services. Moreover, Plaintiff was responsible for negotiating services with clients before their arrival at the hotel, assisting clients during their meetings, and coordinating various Hotel departments in order to properly service the client. In addition, she participated in management meetings and budget forecasting, and she compiled the Hotel's manual on conference services. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 47-52, 58-61, Ex. 1; Baker Dep. at 36-39; Waterbor Dep. at 129-31; Rosenstein Decl. Ex. 8.) Defendant's conference business amounted to ten percent of the Hotel's annual revenues, or about $3 million per year. (Baker Dep. at 39; see also O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 50-51.) Defendant has therefore fulfilled the first prong of the duties test. See Haywood v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 121 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 1997).
Under the second prong of the duties test, Defendant must show that Plaintiff engages in the "comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct . . . [and makes] a decision after the various possibilities have been considered" and that she had "the authority or power to make an independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision and with respect to matters of significance." Id. § 541.207(a). Recommendations to supervisors fulfill this requirement, as do decisions that are subject to a supervisor's approval. See id. § 541.207(e)(1).
Plaintiff admits that she at times negotiated contracts and price terms with clients. The fact that she may have negotiated within pre-set limits or that her contracts were subject to approval by a sales manager does not remove her from the purview of the exemption. In addition, Plaintiff re-negotiated services once functions began, coordinated various aspects of events, such as banquet set-up and transportation, and generally solved any problems that the client encountered. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 50-52, 58-59, 61; Waterbor Dep. at 130-31.) Defendant was the primary point of contact between conference clients and the hotel, and by her own admission was left largely unmonitored because she was trusted by her superiors. (O'Neill-Marino Dep. at 58-59.) As such, Plaintiff's conclusory assertions that she had no decision-making authority and functioned merely as a liaison fail to raise a question of fact on her FLSA claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.