Summary
In Oliver v. Homes of Legend, Inc., No. 00-W-148-S, 2000 WL 1092130 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2000), the plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer of her mobile home alleging various defects in the workmanship, materials, and set-up of the home.
Summary of this case from Sanks v. Parke-DavisOpinion
Civil Action No. 00-W-148-S
April 17, 2000
ORDER
Background
Plaintiff Sarah Oliver commenced this action on December 27, 1999 in the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, asserting claims against the defendants arising from purchase of a mobile home. Plaintiff alleges that after the delivery and installation of her new mobile home, she discovered "numerous defects in the materials, workmanship and setup of the home," that she gave notice of these defects and an opportiunity to repair the defects to defendants First American Homes, Inc. and Homes of Legend, Inc., and that they failed to repair the defects in violation of written warranties and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). (Complaint, ¶¶ 5-6, 8-9).
Defendant Homes of Legend, Inc. removed the action to this court on February 11, 2000, asserting that this court has federal question jurisdiction by virtue of plaintiff's MMWA claim. (Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 5-6, 7-8). Defendant further asserted that "[i]f Plaintiff is allowed to proceed under the state common-law claims asserted in the Complaint, then the evidence shows that said claims, more likely than not, may exceed $50,000," and that "[c]ourts in Alabama have affirmed verdicts in excess of the $50,000 jurisdictional limit based upon mental anguish claims related to manufactured homes." (Id., ¶¶ 9, 12).
Diversity jurisdiction is not an issue in this case because defendant First American Homes, Inc. is an Alabama corporation. (Complaint, ¶ 2).
A Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim brought by an individual plaintiff supports federal jurisdiction only if the amount in controversy is at least $50,000. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(B).
On March 30, 2000, after the court's review of Attachment A to the motion to dismiss filed by BankAmerica Housing Services revealed that the purchase price for the home at issue in the present action was $27,030.00, the court entered an order requiring defendants to show cause, on or before April 10, 2000, why this action should not be remanded to the Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, for failure to meet the amount in controversy requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(B). Defendant Homes of Legend, Inc. responded to the show cause order, arguing that the purchase price of the home is not determinative of the amount in controversy because plaintiff has sought damages for emotional distress and because Alabama courts have affirmed verdicts in excess of $50,000 based upon mental anguish claims related to manufactured homes.
No other defendant filed a response to the show cause order.
Discussion
The question before the court is whether plaintiff's MMWA claim meets the amount in controversy requirement. Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294, 1296 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1999)("The manufacturer and dealer properly conceded that the only claims . . . the district court could consider in determining whether the jurisdictional amount of 2310(d)(3) had been met were the purchasers' claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act.");Ansari v. Bella Automotive Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 1998)("The amount in controversy for purposes of Act § 2310(d)(3)(B) does not include damages flowing from any pendent state law claim brought by a plaintiff."). Since the value of the mobile home at issue is well below the jurisdictional minimum, whether this court has jurisdiction depends upon whether plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress under the MMWA in the present case. The court concludes that she may not, and thus, that this action is due to be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.In Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1984), rehearing denied 759 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether claims for personal injury are cognizable under the MMWA. The court analyzed the statute and concluded that, under 15 U.S.C. § 2311 (b)(2) , personal injury damages are available only where there has been a violation of the substantive provisions of § 2308, § 2304(a)(2) or § 2304(a)(3) of the Act, and that the "MMWA does not create a federal cause of action for personal injury damages based solely on a breach of warranty. . . ." Id. at 1065-66. Accord Hughes v. Segal Enterprises, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Ark. 1986); Bush v. American Motors Sales Corporation, 575 F. Supp. 1581 (D. Colo. 1984); Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981). Section 2308 imposes restrictions on disclaimers, modifications, or limitations of implied warranties. Section 2304(a)(2) prohibits full warrantors from limiting the duration of implied warranty coverage, and section 2304(a)(3) requires that any limitation of consequential damages be conspicuously displayed on the face of the warranty.
This section provides:
Nothing in this chapter (other than sections 2308 and 2304(a)(2) and (4) of this title) shall (A) affect the liability of, or impose liability on, any person for personal injury, or (B) supersede any provision of State law regarding consequential damages for injury to the person or other injury.15 U.S.C. § 2311 (b)(2). "It is generally agreed that the reference to section 2304(a)(4) was a draftsmanship error and that section 2304(a)(3) was intended." Hughes v. Segal Enterprises, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (citing Boelens, supra, andGorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981)).
In this case, plaintiff does not allege any physical injury, but that she "has been caused to suffer great emotional distress due to the fact that the mobile home is her primary residence." (Complaint, ¶ 10). She seeks "[c]onsequential damages for emotion[al] distress she has suffered." (Id., ad damnum clause). The court concludes that the term "personal injury," as used in 15 U.S.C. § 2311 (b)(2) includes emotional injury as well as physical injury. Cf. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) (describing emotional distress as one of "traditional harms associated with personal injury") (tax case); Greer v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 294131, *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 22, 2000)("Courts and the IRS have long recognized that § 104(a)(2)'s reference to personal injuries `encompasses . . . nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those affecting emotions, reputation, or character . . .'") (citations omitted; interpreting tax code); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301, 1305-07 (Ala. 1991) (interpreting UCC provision allowing damages for "[i]njury to person . . . proximately resulting from any breach of warranty" to include mental anguish damages).
In the present case, plaintiff alleges damages arising from breach of warranty only, and not from any breach of the substantive provisions set forth above. The court concludes, based on the court's analysis inBoelens, that plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages under the MMWA for breach of warranty and, thus, that defendant has not met its burden of establishing that the requisite amount is in controversy on this claim. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present action.
Alabama law allows recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of warranty. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301 (Ala. 1991). Resort to state law is inappropriate here, however, because the MMWA contains an explicit provision regarding recovery of personal injury damages. 15 U.S.C. § 2311 (b)(2); see Boelens, supra, 748 F.2d at 1064-65 (rejecting district court's application of Texas law allowing mental distress damages).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it isORDERED that this action is hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court for Houston County, Alabama, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.