Summary
denying motion to dismiss in the instant case in part due to availability of post-graduation relief
Summary of this case from Oliver v. Dallas Independent School DistrictOpinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2627-N
September 29, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Dallas Independent School District ("DISD") and the Texas Education Agency's ("TEA") motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' amended complaint, filed January 30, 2003. Defendants allege that (1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter due to Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"); (2) Plaintiff Lynette Oliver fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she has no independent causes of action under IDEA or Section 1983; (3) Defendant TEA alleges that it is not a proper party to this action, since it has no obligation to Kortney Oliver under IDEA. In addition, defendants allege that: (4) Plaintiff's fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Defendant TEA is a state agency and thus not a "person" as defined by Section 1983; and (5) Plaintiff's fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plainitff Kortney Oliver has graduated high school.
Upon review of Plaintiffs' allegations and the applicable law, the Court holds that: (1) because Plaintiff's have satisfactorily alleged an exception to the IDEA'S exhaustion requirement, Defendants' 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is denied; (2) Plaintiff Lynette Oliver has no independent standing to assert her adult daughter's rights under IDEA or Section 1983, and therefore her claims for relief are dismissed; (3) TEA, a state educational agency ("SEA") charged with specific responsibilities under IDEA, is a proper party to Plaintiff Kortney Oliver's IDEA claims; (4) TEA is not a "person" under Section 1983, and is thus immune from liability under Section 1983; and (5) Plaintiff Kortney Oliver has stated a claim for relief under the IDEA and Section 1983, because remedies may be available despite her graduation from high school. Accordingly, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part, without prejudice to reurging those grounds in a motion for summary judgment, if defendants should choose to do so.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Kortney Oliver was a student at the Yvonne A. Ewell School of Health Professions in the DISD from 1996 to 2000. She alleges that she suffers from a mathematical learning disability referred to as "dyscalculia" which was not identified or addressed during her high school career. During this time, Kortney Oliver's mother, Plaintiff Lynette Oliver, repeatedly expressed her concerns to teachers and administrators, pointed out that many of Kortney Oliver's teachers were not certified in mathematics, and shared resources on how to respond to mathematical disabilities. From 1998 to 2000, Kortney Oliver failed the mathematical section of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills ("TAAS") seven times. In late April, 2000, Lynette Oliver brought Kortney Oliver for diagnostic testing that revealed that she had a specific learning disability. Based on this diagnosis, Kortney Oliver was granted a modification to the mathematical section of the TAAS and was able to pass the test. However, the test was marked irregular by the testing coordinator and monitor, and the test results were disallowed. One week before Kortney Oliver was to graduate high school, Defendant DISD conducted an assessment meeting with Lynette Oliver concerning the disallowance of the test, and concluded that Kortney Oliver did not suffer from a disability and that the test results would not be reinstated. Plaintiff's allege that at no time before or after this hearing were they informed of their rights under IDEA. Subsequently, a separate Texas Education Agency investigation determined after Kortney Oliver's graduation that Kortney Oliver had a disability, was entitled to the modification, and that these facts were known prior to the administration of the test.
II. ANALYSIS A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants allege that the instant action must be dismissed entirely because Plaintiff's failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA, depriving the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. Because Plaintiff's have plead valid exceptions to the exhaustion requirement of IDEA, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not appropriate at this time.
Section 1415(1) of the IDEA provides in relevant part that:
[B]efore the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). Courts interpreting this statute have "uniformly held that parents are precluded from seeking relief in state or federal court under the IDEA or section 1983 until they have exhausted their administrative remedies." Stauffer v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 742, 748 (E.D. Pa. 1993); See also Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[e]very court that has considered the question has read [IDEA's] statutory scheme as a requirement for the exhaustion of administrative remedies").
However, courts interpreting IDEA and its predecessor, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EHCA") have stated that, "[t]he legislative history of the Act . . . reflects the understanding that exhaustion is not a rigid requirement." Ruth Anne M v. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 463 (S.D. Tex. 1982). In some instances, "wooden application of the exhaustion doctrine . . . would accord neither with the salutary interests the doctrine is intended to serve . . . nor with the basic purposes underlying the [legislation]." Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, courts have recognized two principal exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in IDEA cases: (1) lack of notice of rights and (2) futility or inadequacy of administrative remedies. Stauffer v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. at 748. See also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (explaining that parents may avoid administrative requirements where exhaustion would be "futile or inadequate"); 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[E]xhaustion . . . should not be required . . . in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a legal or practical matter"); Ruth Anne M v. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist., 532 F. Supp. at 463 (holding that plaintiffs' action was not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because district did not notify plaintiff's of their administrative rights under the EAHC).
Plaintiff's bear the ultimate burden of proving that exhaustion would be futile or inadequate, or that they were not notified of their administrative rights under the IDEA as contemplated by 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b). See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. at 327 (plaintiff's bear burden of proving exhaustion would be futile or inadequate); Rose v. Yeaw, 214 F.3d 206, 211 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[t]he burden of demonstrating an exception from the exhaustion requirement falls on the party seeking to avoid the requirement"). However, for the purposes of a rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss unsupported by affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials, the Court "is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true. If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient the complaint stands." Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff's allege that subject matter jurisdiction exists despite their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, citing futility and Defendants' failure to inform them of their procedural rights under IDEA. Namely, Plaintiff's claim that (1) Kortney Oliver was never referred for an assessment for a learning disability or an individual education plan; (2) Plaintiff's were never informed of or given any notice of procedural rights under the IDEA; (3) Defendants do not recognize mathematical disabilities as learning disabilities under the IDEA; and (4) Defendant DISD's first assessment of Kortney Oliver occurred just one week before she was scheduled to graduate DISD. The Court holds that Plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations are sufficient to withstand facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1)
Because Plaintiffs' claim of exception from IDEA'S exhaustion requirements is sufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal, Plaintiffs' related Section 1983 claims are not dismissed at this time for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
B. Plaintiff Lynette Oliver's Standing
Defendants allege that because Kortney Oliver has reached the age of majority and has not been alleged to be incompetent, Plaintiff Lynette Oliver has no standing to assert claims under IDEA or, correspondingly, Section 1983. The Court agrees.IDEA provides parents procedural safeguards and the right to assert the rights of their minor children, but does not confer substantive rights upon parents. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The Third Circuit explained in Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 1998) that:
[T]he IDEA does not confer joint substantive rights on parents and their children. We agree that the IDEA grants parents ample procedural rights to ensure active parental involvement at all stages of the development and implementation of a child's individual educational program, even through the administrative process. We think, however, that Congress's decision to endow parents with these procedural rights should not be read, under the language of the IDEA, to imply that parents also possess the same underlying substantive rights that their children possess.Id.; see also Francine v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:02-CV-1853, 2003 WL 21501838, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2003) (Solis, J.) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because "a parent does not have a right of action under the IDEA, other than in a next friend capacity, for her disabled child"). Since Kortney Oliver has reached the age of majority and has not been alleged to be incompetent, Lynette Oliver may not maintain an action to assert her daughter's IDEA rights. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17; TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. § 129.001 (defining age of majority in Texas as 18 years old); MCDONALD CARLSON TEX. CIV. PRAC. § 5:15 (discussing contours of "next friend" standing in Texas). Lynette Oliver's allegations that she was forced to endure monetary expense and emotional distress simply do not state an independent claim under IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m) (granting states ability to transfer IDEA rights to child upon reaching age of majority); 19 TEX. ADM. CODE § 89.1049 (all rights granted to parent under IDEA will transfer to student upon reaching age 18); Hayes v. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. A. 02-55-SLR, 2003 WL 105482, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2003) (parent's separate claim for attorney's fees dismissed, because any such award in IDEA action would accrue to child). Likewise, because Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method of vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere," Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994), Lynette Oliver has no independent Section 1983 cause of action for damages. Accordingly, Lynette Oliver has no standing to assert either claim against Defendants. Defendants' motion to dismiss Lynette Oliver's claims is granted.
C. Defendant Texas Education Agency is a Proper Party
Defendant TEA claims that since it is not a local education agency and therefore not obligated to provide an education to Plaintiff Kortney Oliver under IDEA, it is not a proper party to this lawsuit. TEA cites no authority for this proposition. However, TEA concedes that it is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the IDEA are carried out, and confirms that each educational program for children with disabilities within the state is under its general supervision and must meet its general standards. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(11). TEA is responsible for administering funds on the state level and implementing policies and procedures to ensure that each local educational agency expends funds in a manner consistent with the purpose and substantive provisions of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1411-1413.
Courts have consistently held that state educational agencies may be held liable for failure to provide a free appropriate education under IDEA. For example, the Fifth Circuit held in St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. La., 142 F.3d 776, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1998), that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allocating full financial responsibility for an autistic student's special education costs to the Louisiana Department of Education, rather than the local school district. Id. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit explained that the language of IDEA "suggests that, ultimately, it is the [state educational agency]'s responsibility to ensure that each child within its jurisdiction is provided a free appropriate public education. Therefore, it seems clear that [a state educational agency] may be held responsible if it fails to comply with its duty to assure that IDEA's substantive requirements are implemented." Id. at 784 (quoting Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 952 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that an SEA may be held responsible for failure to provide a particular child with a free appropriate education under IDEA)).
In addition, the language of IDEA makes clear that the district court has broad equitable powers to rectify the failure to provide students a free appropriate education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (giving the district court authority to "grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate"); see also Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing broad equitable powers granted district court by IDEA). In the instant matter, Plaintiff's sufficiently state a claim that the TEA failed to ensure a free appropriate education or require local school districts to identify and test students for mathematical disabilities. Accordingly, dismissal of TEA as a party is not appropriate at this time.
D. Section 1983 Claims Against TEA
Defendant TEA argues that because it is a state entity, it is not a "person" under Section 1983 and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted as to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim. The Court agrees.
Generally, Section 1983 plaintiff's must prove that (1) a person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected the plaintiff's or caused the plaintiff's to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 88 F. Supp.2d 683, 688 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Plaintiff's concede that TEA is not a "person" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support, at 2 n. 1. Indeed, it is well-established that a state entity, such as TEA, is not a person who can be sued under Section 1983 because the statute lacks evidence of the "clear and manifest intention" of Congress to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); see also Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 88 F. Supp.2d at 689 (TEA is a state agency and thus not a "person" liable under Section 1983 for violations of IDEA). Accordingly, Plaintiff's have no cause of action under Section 1983 against TEA, and that claim must be dismissed.
E. Plaintiff Kortney Oliver's Allegations State a Claim under IDEA and Section 1983
Defendants argue that because Kortney Oliver has graduated from high school, she cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claims that would entitle her to relief, and thus dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is required. In particular, Defendants allege that because Kortney Oliver graduated with a regular high school diploma, she is not entitled to services under IDEA, and without a proper IDEA claim, damages under Section 1983 are not available. Defendants point to Section 89.1070 of Title 19 of the Texas Administrative Code, which states that "[g]raduation with a regular high school diploma under subsection (b) or (d) of this section terminates a student's eligibility for special education services under this subchapter and Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)." 19 TEX. ADM. CODE § 89.1070(a). However, Section 89.1070 concerns students receiving ongoing special education services, and simply explains that once a student has successfully completed special education and has qualified for graduation with a regular diploma, eligibility for special education terminates. Id. Plaintiff's contend that Kortney Oliver was never identified for special education, nor provided any services related to her learning disability.
The cases cited by Defendants in support of their Rule 12(b)(6) arguments are inapposite. In each case cited, the plaintiffs' disabilities had already been identified, evaluated and addressed by the defendants through specialized education prior to regular graduation. See T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff denied retrospective relief post-graduation for allegation that his Individualized Education Plan was incomplete); Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Nathan R., 199 F.3d 377, 379-80 (7th Cir. 2000) (question of whether school district had to continue IDEA services during plaintiff's expulsion was moot, since plaintiff did not serve expulsion before high school graduation); Browell v. Lemahieu, 127 F. Supp.2d 1117, 1126-27 (D. Haw. 2000) (plaintiff denied relief for eight weeks of not receiving special education instruction because plaintiff graduated and received makeup education); Dept. of Educ. v. Rodarte, 127 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1112 (D. Haw. 2000) (defendant's motion for summary judgment granted because plaintiff had already received compensatory education under IDEA and graduated).
On the other hand, Plaintiff's allege that Kortney Oliver graduated prior to ever receiving appropriate evaluation or services by Defendants. Plaintiff's request remedies, including compensatory education and damages, which are available to a prevailing plaintiff despite her graduation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (giving the district court authority to "grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate"); Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) ("even after graduation, compensatory education is an available remedy [under IDEA]"); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d at 873 (citing Miener v. Mo., 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986)) (concluding that Congress intended to make both compensatory education and tuition reimbursement available under IDEA); Shaft v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. A. 3:99-CV-748H, 2000 WL 33975581, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 20, 2000) (explaining that even after graduation, school district could be required to provide remedial education, counseling, training, and other services); Doe v. Vernon Parish Sch. Bd., 928 F. Supp. 663, 664 (W.D. La. 1996) ("The courts have allowed recovery for monetary damages under the IDEA . . ."); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 35 F. Supp.2d 1260, 1267 (D. Colo. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000) ("the majority of federal courts confronting this question have concluded that IDEA allows a cause of action for general damages"). Congress could not have intended that the simple act of conferring a high school diploma on a student who was improperly denied services under IDEA could insulate the district from all responsibility for failure to provide a free appropriate education or inform the student of her procedural rights under IDEA. See, e.g., Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d at 872 ("We cannot believe that either Congress or the Supreme Court meant to allow a school district to withhold a disabled minor's educational rights at age 18 or 19 without remedy."). Therefore, dismissal of Kortney Oliver's IDEA and Section 1983 claims is not warranted at this time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff Lynette Oliver from this action for lack of standing and to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against defendant TEA under Rule 12(b)(6) are granted. Plaintiff Kortney Oliver has alleged sufficient facts to survive facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, TEA is a proper party for her IDEA claims, and she has plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief under IDEA against both Defendants and Section 1983 against defendant DISD, so the balance of Defendants' motions are denied.