Opinion
2:20-cv-04466-TMC-MGB
06-10-2021
Rolando Aldama Ocampo, PLAINTIFF, v. J. Al Cannon Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Dr. Theodolph Jacobs, Dr. James Hurteau, Gerald Joye, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, Tyrone J. Shaw, DEFENDANTS.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Rolando Aldama Ocampo, through counsel, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Gerald Joye, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott (also referred to as "Sergeant Last"), Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw ("Defendants"). (Dkt. No. 17.) Defendants Dr. Theodolph Jacobs and Dr. James Hurteau are represented by separate counsel and have not filed a dispositive motion. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion be granted.
Defendants contend Melissa McDermott's name is actually Melissa Gerena. The Complaint refers to this Defendant as both Melissa McDermott and Sergeant Last. On March 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing Sergeant Last as a Defendant in this action because "the Defendant identified as Sergeant Last is the same individual as the Defendant identified as Melissa McDermott." (Dkt. No. 8.)
Any reference to "Defendants" in this Report and Recommendation refers to only Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Gerald Joye, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw.
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises out of an alleged assault that occurred while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Al Cannon Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). The assault occurred after Plaintiff reported on another inmate for stealing. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on November 18, 2017, he "reported to Sergeant Last [McDermott] that his commissary was stolen by Inmate Jackson Damon." (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Inmate Damon was then found guilty for this incident. Damon "was sentenced to serve time in the Behavior Modification Unit" and he was listed as an "Enemy" on Plaintiffs "Keep Away" list. (Id.) On December 28, 2017, Plaintiff "was assaulted by two of Inmate Damon's friends: Inmate Stanley Edwards and Inmate Byron Rivers." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was lured into Inmate Rivers' cell, and Edwards and Rivers hit Plaintiff with a sock full of batteries and punched Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that he "cried for help; violations in policy, lack of training, and the delay in the response of any correctional officer to come to Plaintiffs aid led to the Plaintiff being severely injured." (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, "Officer Joye was the first to arrive to Plaintiffs aid and escorted Plaintiff to his desk, at which time Sergeant Last [McDermott], Sergeant Shaw, and Operators Fishburne, McPherson, and Ragos entered. Plaintiff was then escorted to the medical office." (Id.) Inmate Rivers was sent to the Special Management Unit ("SMU") to await a Disciplinary Hearing. (Id.) "Sergeant Shaw spoke to Plaintiff and further identified that Inmate Edwards was also involved, leading Operator Fishburne to enter Unit A3L to escort Inmate Edwards to the SMU for a Disciplinary Hearing." (Id.)
Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC"). (Id.) He received four to five stitches on his right leg under the knee and was admitted for observation. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was discharged from MUSC on December 29, 2017, and he remained in the "correctional infirmary" for 12 days. (Id.) Plaintiff visited MUSC twice in January 2018 for problems with his right eye. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, "the correctional facility" did not provide him with the prescribed eyeglasses and instead told Plaintiff he had to buy the glasses himself. (Id.)
On January 24, 2018, "Plaintiff was released from the Correctional Infirmary and moved to unit A1D1 cell D24O2." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Inmate Damon was sent to the same unit, three doors down from Plaintiff on January 30, 2018, in violation of the Detention Center policy (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Inmate Damon told him the December 28, 2017 assault was in retaliation for Plaintiff ratting on him, and that Plaintiff now had to pay Damon ten dollars per day. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff alleges he "reported this to Sergeant Sheppard and informed him that Inmate Damon was on Plaintiffs enemy list and should not be housed in the same unit with Plaintiff." (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff was then rehoused to a different unit.
In March 2018, Plaintiff was informed by a doctor that "they may need to operate on his face due to bone fractures." (Id.) That same month, Plaintiff complained to the Detention Center that his teeth were bothering him. (Id.) The Detention Center sent Plaintiff to Dr. James Hurteau, "the in-house Dentist, where Plaintiff was given an exam and x-rays and an estimate of what it would cost Plaintiff." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he continues to have "pain on the right side of his face, vision disturbances, and tooth damage that has gone untreated." (Id. at 8.) He further alleges he has "lost feeling in the upper part of his lip, has lost some teeth, experiences headaches often, has discoloration on the right side of his face, and has suffered severe emotional distress." (Id.)
Plaintiff filed this action on December 28, 2020, alleging Defendants have violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Id. at 9.) He asserts one cause of action against all Defendants under § 1983. On April 26, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking to dismiss the claims against Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw in their entirety and to dismiss certain claims against Defendant Gerald Joye. (Dkt. No. 17.) Plaintiff responded to the Motion on May 25, 2021 (Dkt. No. 22), to which Defendants replied on May 27, 2021 (Dkt. No. 23). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a "complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "In reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) ... [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the complaint are 'enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "A plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. 555 (quoting Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court must "take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "In considering a motion to dismiss, [the court] accept[s] the complainant's well-pleaded allegations as true and view[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Stansbury v. McDonald's Corp., 36 Fed.Appx. 98, 98-99 (4th Cir. 2002) (citingMylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)). However, while the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it need not accept the "legal conclusions drawn from the facts, . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999); Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 298).
DISCUSSION
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs § 1983 cause of action should be dismissed to the extent it is based on violations of Plaintiff s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. (Dkt. No. 17 at 4-6.) Defendants argue the Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution are inapplicable here, where the events at issue occurred while Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee. (Id.) Defendants further assert that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege any personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations by Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw and that these Defendants should therefore be dismissed from this action. (Id. at 6-10.)
The undersigned considers Defendants' arguments for dismissal, below.
A. Violation of Fourth and Eighth Amendments
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs § 1983 cause of action should be dismissed to the extent it is based on violations of Plaintiff s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee during the events alleged. (Dkt. No. 17 at 4-6.) Plaintiff offers no argument in rebuttal.
Because Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee during the events at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment governs his constitutional claims in this action. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.4O (1977) ("Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions."); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e have made clear that Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to arrestees or pretrial detainees."); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Because Martin was a pretrial detainee and not a convicted prisoner at the time of the alleged denial, this claim [for denial of medical care] is governed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment [sic]."); Seth v. McDonough, 461 F.Supp.3d 242, 258 (D. Md. 2020) ("Eighth Amendment protections extend to those detainees already found guilty of a criminal offense, whereas similar protections apply to pretrial detainees pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Accordingly, any § 1983 claims based on violations of Plaintiff s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments should be dismissed.
B. Personal Participation in § 1983 Claims
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege any personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations by Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw and that these Defendants should therefore be dismissed from this action. (Id. at 6-10.) More specifically, they assert that: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege "any alleged act of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff by these Defendants; and (2) Plaintiff fails to state any supervisory liability claims against Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Melissa McDermott, and Tyrone J. Shaw.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' Motion is "premature" because "[d]iscovery has not occurred." (Dkt. No. 22 at 3.) According to Plaintiff, "[e]ach person named was either directly involved in the situation arising to the violation [of] Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights or had [a] supervisory role in training, policy making, discipline." (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he has stated sufficient facts against the Defendants "in his or her respective personal and official capacity." (Id. at 4.) He does not point to any specific allegations in the Complaint to support this assertion. Plaintiff further asks that, should the Court determine that the Complaint is insufficient, he be allowed to file an Amended Complaint to cure any deficits. (Id. at 4.)
1. § 1983 Deliberate Indifference Claims
Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Gerald Joye, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw appear to rest on a theory of deliberate indifference based on their alleged failure to protect Plaintiff from the assault at issue either directly or in a supervisory capacity. An officer's failure-to-protect an inmate from assaults by fellow inmates can give rise to a constitutional violation under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To bring a § 1983 claim against an official for failing to protect from injury, the prisoner plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was "incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm"; and (2) the defendant prison official had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," one of "deliberate indifference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
The Complaint specifies that Defendants "are sued in their individual capacities for violating Plaintiffs constitutional rights . . . ." (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) "The law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a Section 1983 claim against government officials in their individual capacities." Blessing v. Scaturo, No. 6:16-CV-1832-BHH-KFM, 2017 WL 3575734, at *9 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017) (citing Trulock v. Free, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)), adopted by, 2017 WL 3535104 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2017); see also Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that liability will lie under § 1983 only "where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally" in the violation of plaintiff s rights and affirming dismissal of claim where plaintiff did not allege personal involvement by defendant) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)).
"[W]here the only remaining claims are against a public official in [his] individual capacity, to hold the official liable for [his] subordinate's conduct, that 'conduct must meet the test for supervisory liability.'" Pratt-Miller v. Arthur, 701 Fed.Appx. 191, 193 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mikkelsen v. DeWitt, 141 Fed.Appx. 88, 91 (4th Cir. 2005)). The Fourth Circuit has set forth three elements "necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983":
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must show the following: "(1) the supervisor's knowledge of (2) conduct engaged in by a subordinate (3) where the conduct poses a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to he plaintiff." Id. (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984)). "Establishing a 'pervasive' and 'unreasonable' risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is widespread, or at least has been used on several different occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the subordinate poses an unreasonable risk of harm of constitutional injury." Id. (citing Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373-74).
2. Allegations in Complaint
As discussed above, the Complaint makes the following factual allegations against the Defendants at issue: On November 18, 2017, Plaintiff "reported to Sergeant Last that his commissary was stolen by Inmate Jackson Damon." (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) After Plaintiff was assaulted by Inmates Rivers and Edwards on December 28, 2017, "Officer Joye was the first to arrive to Plaintiffs aid and escorted Plaintiff to his desk, at which time Sergeant Last [McDermott], Sergeant Shaw, and Operators Fishburne, McPherson, and Ragos entered. Plaintiff was then escorted to the medical office." (Id.) "Sergeant Shaw spoke to Plaintiff and . . . identified that Inmate Edwards was also involved, leading Operator Fishburne to enter Unit A3L to escort Inmate Edwards to the SMU for a Disciplinary Hearing." (Id)
The Complaint does not allege the direct involvement Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr. and Willis L. Beatty in the events at issue. (Id. at 1-2.) It alleges that J. Al Cannon, Jr. "was running the Charleston County Sheriffs Office," which "owns, operates, maintains, controls, and staffs" the Detention Center." (Id. at 1.). The Complaint alleges that Willis L. Beatty was a Deputy Chief of Charleston County Sheriffs Office and Jail Administrator of the Detention Center. (Id.) The Complaint alleges Beatty "was a supervisor who had the responsibility to oversee and train [the Detention Center] correctional officers, including Joye Fishburne, McDermott, McPherson, Pura Ragos, Shaw, and Last [McDermott]." (Id. at 2.)
The Complaint specifies that all Defendants "are sued in their individual capacities for violating Plaintiffs constitutional rights . . . ." (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.) It states that Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Melissa McDermott, and Tyrone J. Shaw are also sued in their supervisory capacities. Under the § 1983 cause of action, the Complaint alleges:
At all relevant times, Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that Inmate Damon was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
constitutional injury to the Plaintiff. The response of Joye and others to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to, or express or tacit authorization of, the alleged offensive practices. There was an affirmative causal link between the inaction of Joye and the particular constitutional injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.(Id. at 10.)
3. Analysis
Upon careful review and construing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Defendants' personal involvement in any alleged constitutional violations. Specifically, while the Complaint mentions that Defendants Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw were present after the assault at issue occurred, it does not allege that they personally committed any constitutional violations. See, e.g., Woodhouse v. Clarke, No. 7:19-CV-00634, 2021 WL 1216889, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2021) (dismissing § 1983 claim where "[t]he only allegations . . . [are] that he labeled Woodhouse as an at-risk inmate and recommended out-of-state transfer"; finding plaintiff "fails to allege personal involvement. . . [of defendant] in violating his federal rights (emphasis in original)); Holley v. Meredith, No. 7:18-CV-00535, 2021 WL 1198301, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 29, 2021) (dismissing § 1983 claim because plaintiff does not "identify any way in which [defendant] personally caused him harm; "a claim under § 1983 must be based on allegations that the specific defendant was personally involved in violating the plaintiffs rights"); Nichols v. Maryland Corr. Inst.-Jessup, 186 F.Supp.2d 575, 583 (D. Md. 2002) (dismissing § 1983 due process claim where plaintiff "has failed to identify a liberty or property interest of which he has been deprived by [defendant] as alleged in Count Three.").
As for Defendants Al Cannon, Jr. and Willis L. Beatty, the Complaint does not mention their involvement in any of the events at issue. Because the Complaint is entirely devoid of any direct conduct by these Defendants that potentially violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, the § 1983 claims against them based on their direct liability should be dismissed. See Murrill v. Merritt, No. CV DKC 17-2255, 2020 WL 6544832, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2020) (dismissing § 1983 due process claim against defendant supervisor because plaintiff "has notplead facts stating that [defendant] played any role in the untimely processing of either his pre-attack or post-attack grievances."); Armstrong v. City of Greensboro, 190 F.Supp.3d 450, 464 (M.D. N.C. 2016) ("Personal involvement and affirmative misconduct or tacit authorization are necessary to establish the direct liability of a supervisor."); cf. Latson v. Clarke, 249 F.Supp.3d 838, 858 (W.D. Va. 2017) ("The plaintiff has alleged that [defendants] personally reviewed and approved decisions regarding his segregation and treatment, which plausibly includes decisions about his medical care and the failure to provide a pre-segregation hearing. These allegations, if true, could show their direct involvement; Latson does not seek to hold them liable merely on the ground that they supervised employees who deprived him of his constitutional rights.").
Further, there are no allegations that Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Melissa McDermott, and Tyrone J. Shaw had any knowledge of a pattern of conduct engaged in by a subordinate that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. Because there are no factual allegations of this nature in the Complaint, Plaintiffs supervisory liability claims should also be dismissed. See, e.g., Armstrong, 190 F.Supp.3d at 468 (dismissing supervisory liability claim where plaintiff failed "to allege facts sufficient to show a widespread pattern or practice from which to derive [the defendant's] liability"); Hill v. Robeson Cty., N.C, 733 F.Supp.2d 676, 689 (E.D. N.C. 2010) ("generalized allegations" that Robeson County was "aware of widespread criminal conduct within the Robseon County Sheriffs Office" did not satisfy "Shaw's knowledge requirement"); Nichols, 186 F.Supp.2d at 583 (dismissing § 1983 failure to protect claim because plaintiff "fails to offer sufficient evidence that Filbert was deliberately indifferent to the threat against him and he has not shown that there was a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm existing at MCI-J").
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege any § 1983 claims against Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Gerald Joye, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw, and these Defendants should be dismissed from this action.
C. Plaintiffs Request to Amend
In his briefing, Plaintiff asks that should the Court find "the Complaint is insufficient," Plaintiff be allowed "leave to file an Amended Complaint." (Dkt. No. 22 at 4.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that courts "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Leave should be granted "[i]n the absence of . . . undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Here, Plaintiff has not offered any explanation of how he would remedy the deficiencies in his Complaint, nor has he provided a proposed amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends Plaintiffs request to amend be denied as premature. See, e.g., Cobb v. South Carolina, No. 2:13-CV-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *7 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014) ("At this stage in the litigation, Plaintiffs have been on ample notice for some time of the deficiencies of their complaint, and have proposed no amendment that would solve them. Therefore, the Court agrees that granting leave to amend at this time would be futile."); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3:I3-CV-438-RJC-DSC, 2014 WL 200276 (W.D. N.C. Jan. 16, 2014) adopted by, 2014 WL 1654061 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2014) (Denying a motion to amend as futile because "[p]laintiff does not state what facts he intends to plead or how those facts would salvage his Complaint.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 17) be GRANTED. Defendants J. Al Cannon, Jr., Willis L. Beatty, Anthony F. Fishburne, Melissa McDermott, Elijah McPherson, Jose Enrico Pura Ragos, and Tyrone J. Shaw should be dismissed from this action. Additionally, any § 1983 claims brought against Defendant Gerald Joye based on violations of Plaintiffs rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendment should be dismissed.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th C¡r. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th C¡r. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th C¡r. 1984).