Summary
holding that "motions to transfer must identify inconvenienced witnesses whom the defendant proposes to call and contain a general statement of what their testimony will encompass"
Summary of this case from Ramada Worldwide, Inc. v. Bellmark Sarasota Airport, LLCOpinion
Civ. No. 00-0242(WGB)
March 28th, 2001
SPECTOR GADON ROSEN, P.C., Paul R. Rosen, Esq., Timothy C. Russell, Esq., Michael C. Wagner, Esq., Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Plaintiff NPR, Inc.
MOUND, COTTON WOLLAN, William D. Wilson, Esq., Newark, N.J.; MITCHELL, McNUTT, THREADGILL, SMITH SAMS, P.A., James L. Carroll, Esq., Myles A. Parker, Esq., Bradley R. Peacock, Esq., Jackson, Mississippi, Attorneys for Defendant American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico
OPINION
Defendant American International Insurance Company of Puerto Rico "AIICO" or ("Defendant") moves to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and 1391(a). For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant's motion to transfer.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
NPR, Inc. ("Plaintiff") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey (Pl. Rep. at 3). Plaintiff is in the business of commercial shipping between points in the U.S., Latin America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. (Pl. Rep. at 4) (Wagner Aff. ¶ 5). Plaintiff manages and administers its logistic and financial operations from its offices in New Jersey. (Pl. Rep. at 4). Plaintiff operates a shipping facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico, among other locations.
Defendant is a Puerto Rico corporation, with its principal place of business in San Juan, Puerto Rico. (Def. Mot. at 2). Defendant provides first-party property insurance coverage to entities with properties located principally in Puerto Rico. (Id.) (Picon Aff. ¶ 2).
B. The Policy
AIIC Policy No. 026-16761 (the "Policy") is the insurance policy at issue in this litigation. The Policy was negotiated and signed by both parties in Puerto Rico. The Policy was issued to Plaintiff and it covers the policy period of July 1, 1998 to July 1, 1999. The Policy insures Plaintiff and its parent company, as well as eleven of its affiliates, and provides coverage throughout the United States. (Pl. Rep. at 5) (Wagner Aff. ¶ 3). Losses insured against include property damage, business interruption, and related extra expenses. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 6).
Defendant asserts in Footnote 2 of its motion to transfer that the Policy provided for only nominal coverage for other locations in addition to San Juan.(Def. Mot. at 6). However, based upon its reading of the Policy, the Court finds this interpretation unpersuasive.
C. The Insurance Claim
In 1998 Hurricane Georges ("Georges") struck Puerto Rico, resulting in material damage to the port of San Juan as well as to Plaintiff's facility located there. (Def. Mot. at 3) (Taylor Aff. ¶ 6). The extensive damage to the San Juan terminal caused a "ripple effect" throughout Plaintiff's business over the months following the hurricane. (Pl. Rep. at 6). The alleged "ripple effect" manifested itself in an inability by Plaintiff to maintain efficient, on-schedule transport of cargoes between all of its ports of service. (Id.) This in turn led to loss of revenue as a result of lost or delayed sailings, non-renewed customer contracts, and volume reductions. (Id.) (Wagner Aff. ¶ 24).
Plaintiff asserts that there was extensive damage to two large dockside cranes, and that another crane was completely destroyed. (Pl. Br. at 6). Plaintiff states that the two damaged cranes have yet to be restored to full operational capacity (Wagner Aff. ¶ 22).
Plaintiff filed an insurance claim with Defendant for property damage incurred in connection with Plaintiff's shipping operations in San Juan, for business interruption losses allegedly suffered by Plaintiff in New Jersey, and for extra expense losses suffered in New Jersey and elsewhere. (Pl. Rep. at 5) (Wagner Aff. ¶ 6). Subsequent to Georges, Plaintiff and Defendant each retained consultants to calculate Plaintiff's losses and to settle its claims. (Pl. Rep. at 6). Insurance adjustment companies, accounting firms, and crane experts ("Outside Sources") were retained by both parties to assess and supervise the evaluation of Plaintiff's claims. (Pl Rep. at 7) (Def. Mot. at 4).
Plaintiff claims losses for $42.5 million, the full amount of coverage provided by the Policy. (Def. Mot. at 3). After receiving allegedly partial proofs of loss from Plaintiff, Defendant made two partial payments to Plaintiff. (Def. Mot. at 5). The first payment made on October 22, 1998 was for $5 million, and the second payment was made on December 30, 1998 for $3 million. (Id.) To date, no other payments appear to have been made.
D. Commencement of Litigation
On January 14, 2000, Plaintiff initiated this action in the District of New Jersey. Plaintiff primarily seeks damages and declaratory relief for both breach of contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Complaint, 1-2). On August 25, 2000, Defendant moved to transfer venue to the District Court for District of Puerto Rico, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
II. DISCUSSION A. Motion to Transfer Venue
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Section 1404(a) motions are considered procedural matters and therefore are governed by federal law. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995).
The purpose of § 1404(a) is "to prevent the waste of `time, energy, and money' and to `protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.'" Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quoting Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1960)).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is warranted and must submit "adequate data of record" to facilitate the Court's analysis. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 (1981);Ricoh v. Honeywell, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 473, 480 (D.N.J. 1993). Analysis of whether transfer is appropriate does not necessarily require extensive investigation. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988). The moving party must demonstrate that the proposed alternative forum is not only adequate, but also more convenient than the present forum. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Additionally, the balancing inquiry may be resolved by an examination of the affidavits submitted by the parties.Honeywell, 817 F. Supp. at 480. Unless the balance of factors is strongly tipped in favor of the defendant seeking transfer, the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed. Id. However, when the plaintiff's choice of forum has little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit, the usual deference to plaintiff's choice of forum is curbed.NCR Credit Corp. v. Ye Seekers Horizon, Inc., 17 F. Supp.2d 317, 321 (D.N.J. 1998).
B. Factors Guiding the Court's Transfer Determination
No rigid rule governs a transfer determination; a § 1404(a) analysis is flexible and turns on the unique facts of each case. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988). When "ruling on § 1404(a) motions, courts have not limited their consideration to the three enumerated factors in § 1404(a) (convenience of parties, convenience of the witnesses, and interests of justice)." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
The various factors that guide a court's analysis under § 1404(a) were first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The Gulf Oil factors were subsequently developed by the Third Circuit and fall into two categories: the private interests of the litigants and the public's interest in fair, efficient administration of justice. See Jumara, at id. Private interests have included plaintiff's preferred forum, the relative physical and financial condition of the parties, and the relative ease of access to the sources of proof. Id. Public interests have included the trial judge's familiarity with the applicable state law, the local interest in adjudicating disputes at home, court congestion in the two fora, the fairness of placing the burden of jury duty on the citizens of the state with the greater interest in the dispute, and "practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive". Id. Neither list of factors is exhaustive, and certain factors may be more or less relevant in particular cases. Biard, 486 U.S. at 528-29.
Since then, courts routinely apply these factors to a § 1404(a) determination. E.g . , Honeywell , 817 F. Supp. at 479-488.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the submissions of both parties in connection with the present motion contain factual claims that frequently, and at times substantially, conflict. A number of Defendant's statements are not substantiated by adequate proof (e.g. affidavits), thus impeding Defendant's ability to meet its burden of persuasion. In spite of this, after reviewing both parties' submissions, and upon balancing the pertinent private and public interests, the Court finds that the interests of justice would be better served by a transfer of Plaintiff's suit to the District of Puerto Rico and hereby grants Defendant's motion to transfer.
C. Private Interest Factors 1. Plaintiff's Choice of Forum
As a general matter, plaintiff's choice of forum is given great weight in the § 1404(a) analysis. E.g., Lony v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 886 F.2d 628,633 (3d Cir. 1989). A Plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, unless the balance of the factors is strongly in favor of the defendant. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.3d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988). See Piper, 454 U.S. at 235 (1981) (recognizing a "strong presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum.") The Third Circuit has stated that it is settled law that a plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is the leading consideration in a determination of a transfer request. See, Park Inn Int'l v. Moody Enter., 105 F. Supp.2d 370, 377 (D.N.J. 2000). However when the central facts of a lawsuit occur outside of the chosen forum, plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less weight. Honeywell, 817 F. Supp. at 481; NCR, 17 F. Supp.2d at 317 citing, S.C.Johnson Son, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 571 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (N.D.Ill. 1983) ("[A]s a general rule, the preferred forum is that which is the center of gravity of the accused activity.") Furthermore, courts accord a greater deference to a plaintiff's choice of forum if the plaintiff is a resident of the chosen forum. See Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Supp.2d 442, 452 (D.N.J. 1999).
The outcome of Defendant's transfer motion turns on whether New Jersey is the "center of gravity" of this matter. Defendant contends that New Jersey has little connection to the operative facts of the lawsuit, and thus, that deference to Plaintiff's choice should be limited. (Def. Mot. at 15). Defendant alleges that the Policy was initially brokered in Puerto Rico, most of the assessment activity took place in Puerto Rico, payments under the Policy were received by Plaintiff in Puerto Rico, and that Puerto Rican law governs the Policy. (Taylor Aff. ¶ 9) (Def. Mot., 4-5, 11) (Def. Reply at 7). Defendant contends that these substantial facts provide evidence that Plaintiff's choice of forum should be accorded less weight, and that this action should be transferred accordingly.
The relevant affidavits indicate that Plaintiff maintained its home office in New Jersey, and organized, out of that location, its network of shipping activities. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 2). Plaintiff states that the loss to its business resulting from Georges and the "ripple effect" was felt in its New Jersey headquarters. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 6). Plaintiff reasons that while the property damage did occur in Puerto Rico, it tipped off a disruption of the entire network of Plaintiff's operations which resulted in a loss in overall corporate profitability. (Wagner Aff. ¶¶ 24,25) ( emphasis added). It further asserts that it is mainly seeking recovery of business interruption and extra expense losses, which it asserts, were not incurred in Puerto Rico. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 6). Moreover, Plaintiff states it relied almost exclusively on its New Jersey personnel to assess and present the alleged business interruption and extra expense losses, the significant portion of Plaintiff's claimed loss. (Pl. Rep. at 7) (Wagner Aff. ¶¶ 6,10). Thus alleges Plaintiff, the impact of Georges was felt primarily in New Jersey, thereby significantly connecting New Jersey to this lawsuit.
This included making presentations to Defendant at Plaintiff's New Jersey headquarters (Complaint at 8), as well as making on-site inspections in San Juan. (Complaint at 8) (Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 9,10).
Plaintiff's unrebutted assertions aside, Defendant's contention that Puerto Rico is the center of gravity of the suit is persuasive. While Plaintiff undoubtedly felt the impact of lowered profitability as a result of Georges in New Jersey, this is merely the underlying factual basis which led to Plaintiff's insurance claim. It is the breach of the Policy, not the underlying damages allegedly suffered, which must be considered in determining where the center of gravity of this litigation is.
The wrong allegedly committed by Defendant, namely breach of contract, occurred at Defendant's San Juan office, when Defendant allegedly refused to live up to its contractual obligations. See SMI-Owen Steel Co v. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins., 113 F. Supp.2d 1101, 1106 (S.D.Tex. 2000);Evangelical Lutheran Church in America v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 973 F. Supp. 820, 823 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (Parties disputed the site of material events and the court found that the underlying event was defendant's decision to deny coverage based on its interpretation of the insurance policies, which was a decision made in its corporate offices);Nobel Ins. Co. v. Acme Truck Line, Inc., 2000 WL 298908 (N.D.Tex. 2000) (refusing to transfer an insurance case to the division where the underlying accident took place because operative facts took place in the other forum as well); AVEMCO Insurance Company v. GSV Holding Corporation, 1997 WL 566149 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting a motion to transfer where the pivotal issue in a suit for recovery under an insurance policy was the interpretation of the policy between the parties, which occurred in transferee forum).
The Court is hard pressed to see how the operative facts tie this breach of contract claim to New Jersey. Plaintiff does not refute that the Policy was issued, negotiated, paid out and cashed, and signed by both Parties, in Puerto Rico, and according to the laws of Puerto Rico. This coupled with the fact that the alleged breach of contract occurred in Defendant's Puerto Rican office, demonstrates that the operative facts of this matter arise in Puerto Rico. Therefore, Plaintiff's choice of forum will be accorded significantly less weight in the Court's § 1404(a) analysis.
2. Convenience and Financial Condition of Parties
"If the transfer would merely switch the inconvenience from the defendant to plaintiff, the transfer should not be allowed." Market Transition Facility v. Twena, 941 F. Supp. 462, 467 (D.N.J. 1996); see,e.g., Jumara, at 879.
New Jersey, obviously, is inherently more convenient to Plaintiff than the transferee forum, since it is Plaintiff's home forum. See NCR, 17 F. Supp.2d at 321. Defendant is primarily based in Puerto Rico so transfer would clearly be more convenient for Defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendant has many more ties to the New Jersey area than Defendant purports to have, specifically, that Defendant's operations are directed by their parent corporation in New York. (Pl. Rep. at 2). The Court declines to pass judgment on the merits of this contention. In spite of this, the Court is of the opinion that a transfer to Puerto Rico would not merely shift the inconvenience from Plaintiff to Defendant, given the other factors in support of transfer.
Plaintiff has important ties to Puerto Rico by virtue of conducting business there. By Plaintiff's own account those ties are so important that disruption in San Juan was felt across Plaintiff's entire company. (Pl. Rep. at 6) (Wagner Aff. ¶ 24). While Plaintiff undoubtedly will be inconvenienced by transfer to Puerto Rico, asking Plaintiff to litigate its claims in a forum where Plaintiff has substantial business operations is not unreasonable.
Similarly, the relative financial condition of the parties does not substantially hinder Defendant's case for transfer. While it appears that Plaintiff is, at least marginally, less able to fund litigation in Puerto Rico than Defendant is to fund litigation in New Jersey, Plaintiff's financial circumstances do not appear so dire as to present a bar to transfer.
3. Access to Proof — Witnesses and Documents
Defendant submits that access to proof necessitates transfer to Puerto Rico, because the relevant activity (from purchase of the policy to on-site damage inspections) took place in Puerto Rico, because witnesses and documents are more accessible from Puerto Rico than from New Jersey, and because Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice by transfer of the action there. (Def. Mot. at 12) (Def. Rep., 8-11). Defendant further adds that Plaintiff's employees in Puerto Rico possess the bulk of relevant knowledge, and that Plaintiff has been haled into court there on a pending action. (Def. Mot. at 12) (Def Reply, 7-8).
The Court notes that Defendant's motion contains numerous vague, unsubstantiated assertions regarding the location of witnesses and documents (e.g. Plaintiff, "presumably has a substantial number of employees in Puerto Rico who may possess relevant knowledge about the facts involved in this action. . .") (Def. Mot. at 12).
a. Witnesses
Motions to transfer must identify inconvenienced witnesses whom the defendant proposes to call and contain a general statement of what their testimony will encompass. See Hillard v. Guidant Corp., 76 F. Supp.2d 566, 571 (M.D.Pa. 1999). The Court must focus on the nature and quality of the testimony, not merely the number of potentially inconvenienced witnesses. See AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Hagenbarth, 296 F. Supp. 1142, 1143-44 (E.D.Pa. 1968) (denying a motion to transfer where the defendant failed to "fully set out the testimony of the proposed witnesses as to enable the trial judge to pass on the materiality of such proposed testimony.") Additionally, under § 1404(a), analysis of this factor often involves consideration of whether transfer will significantly enhance the parties' access to non-party witnesses' testimony. See, e.g., National Property Investors VIII v. Shell Oil Co., 917 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.N.J. 1995).Defendant submits that the relevant activity by Outside Sources (the adjusters, accountants, and crane experts), as well as meetings between both parties, almost wholly occurred in Puerto Rico. (Def. Mot., 4-5) (Lugo Aff. ¶¶ 6,7) (Taylor Aff. ¶ 9). Defendant further contends that many Outside Sources are willing and able to travel to Puerto Rico in connection with the litigation. (Def. Mot. at 13). Defendant then adds that unnamed, additional Puerto Rican witnesses will be needed on a number of issues, and that many of these will be unwilling witnesses. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that the significant proportion of experts and intended witnesses (of both parties) are not based in Puerto Rico, but instead that they are situated in the continental U.S., and the services they perform are mostly done out of their respective offices. (Pl. Br., 6-8) (Wagner Aff. ¶¶ 7-16).
By Defendant's own admission, there was substantial activity by potentially key non-Puerto Rican witnesses. Numerous experts and intended witnesses, including non-party witnesses, are based in a close radius to New Jersey. For example, Philadelphia-based Young Adjustment Company, Inc. ("Young"), a non-party, was retained to assist in the adjustment of Plaintiff's claims. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 11) (Pl. Resp. to First Set of Interrogatories at 28). Norbert Taylor, retained by Defendant to handle adjustment of Plaintiff's claim, is headquartered in California. (Taylor Aff. ¶¶ 1,3). He will be a critical non-party witness. Similarly, none of the crane consultants are from Puerto Rico, nor are any of Defendants' assessment experts. (Def. Initial Disclosure at 4) (Wilson Aff. Exhibit G. ¶ 2). The Connecticut offices of the accounting firm Quintana and Lewis ("QL") handled, in large part from Puerto Rico, calculations of Plaintiff's claims. (Wilson Aff. Exhibit G, ¶ 2). It is clear, thus, that a substantial number of important non-party witnesses are not in Puerto Rico. Id.
As to the witnesses from Puerto Rico, the Court remains unclear on whether Underwriters Adjustment Co., Inc. is a party witness, since Defendant refers to Mr. Lugo as a `Mr. Lugo of AIICO'. (Def. Rep. at 8) (Lugo Aff. at ¶¶ 1,4). Aside from this, only Mr. Baco, who was involved in brokering the Policy, and Ms. Gracia are based in Puerto Rico.
While convenience would be better served by those three or four Puerto Rican witnesses traveling to New Jersey, as opposed to requiring numerous non-party witnesses to travel to Puerto Rico, Plaintiff has not indicated that there are any witnesses it intends to call in New Jersey that could not be brought to Puerto Rico.
Although, this factor does not support transfer to Puerto Rico, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's ability to call witnesses in Puerto Rico would not be so prejudiced as to justify denying Defendant's transfer motion based on this factor alone.
b. Documents
Documents relevant to this action exist in both the New Jersey area, and in Puerto Rico. Defendant asserts that the bulk of relevant documents are located at Plaintiff's Puerto Rico office, as well as at Defendant's headquarters (Def. Mot. at 14) (Picon Aff. ¶ 13). Defendant further argues that most of the documents originated in Puerto Rico. (Def. Rep. at 11). Plaintiff's initial disclosures and response to interrogatories state that almost all its relevant documents are currently located at its counsel's office in Pennsylvania, and not in Puerto Rico. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 19) (Pl. Mot. at 15).
Regardless of where the relevant documents are located, neither party has indicated that the records or other documents to be utilized at trial are so voluminous that shipping them to New Jersey would create an undue burden. See NCR, 17 F. Supp.2d 317, 323.
Defendant's point that most of the documents originated in Puerto Rico is irrelevant to the transfer analysis. To the extent that the location of documents should bear on a court's transfer analysis, neither party has established that transfer to Puerto Rico will greatly impact the burden of collecting and assessing documentary evidence. As a result, this is a neutral factor in the Court's transfer analysis.
The parties' discussion of where the documents originated misapprehends the nature of the transfer analysis. The Court must generally assess where the documents are currently located, where they are best marshaled, and where they can be most effectively processed in adjudicating this claim.
4. Other Factors Relating to the Expeditious and Efficient Adjudication of the Dispute a. Possibility of a Jury View of the Premises
Defendant argues that according to case law the possibility of a jury's viewing the premises weighs in favor of transfer. See e.g., Gulf Oil at 508; Tischio v. Bontex, 16 F. Supp.2d 511, 520 (D.N.J. 1998). While Defendant concedes that a view of the shipping facility may not be essential to the presentation of the claims and defenses, it claims that by viewing the facility the jury would be better equipped to assess the damages allegedly sustained by Plaintiff as a result of the hurricane. (Def. Mot. at 15).
The possibility of viewing the premises, if viewing the premises would be appropriate to the action, is a factor in the § 1404(a) analysis.Gulf Oil, at 508-09. This factor is merely one of many that may relate to "private interests" of the parties in the context of the litigation.Tischio at id. The Court feels that in this case a view of the premises should not be necessary for several reasons. First, it appears that the property damage has been largely repaired, and the facility restored to working condition. Second, photographs and other visual media have been preserved to document the condition of the facility after the hurricane. (Wagner Aff. ¶ 22). Should the jury need to view the damage, these would likely be more helpful than access to the now repaired shipping facility.
Regardless, however, it may become apparent that a jury view of the premises would be beneficial. To that limited extent, it would be in the interest of economy and efficiency to have a jury based in Puerto Rico.
b. Delay in Bringing Motion to Transfer
Plaintiff claims that Defendant's filing of the transfer motion is untimely. (Pl. Rep., 10-11). Plaintiff argues that this delay weighs against transfer. See Staats v. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc., 1989 WL 16071 (D.N.J.) Plaintiff further asserts that discovery is substantially complete. (Pl. Rep. at 15). Plaintiff's larger point is that significant inconvenience and inefficiency will result if a transfer is allowed to take place at such an advanced stage of proceedings.
The motion to transfer is timely. A motion to transfer is preferably brought early in the litigation. See e.g., Staats, at 4. This motion was brought in August 25, 2000, eight months before the scheduled date of the pretrial conference. A trial date has yet to be set. Id. Moreover Defendant's answer, filed on March 7, 2000, asserted as an affirmative defense that transfer to Puerto Rico was necessary. (See Def. Rep. at 3). Furthermore, Defendant notes that its intent to file for transfer was announced at the scheduling conference before Magistrate Cavanaugh on April 11, 2000. (Id.) Defendant also convincingly asserts that discovery is not nearly completed. (Def. Rep. at 3). Numerous depositions have yet to be taken, and a number of documents discovered. (Id.) Defendant, thus, has sufficiently refuted Plaintiff's allegations of untimeliness in moving for transfer.
D. Public Interest Factors 1. Forum's Familiarity with the Applicable Law
"Justice requires that, whenever possible, a diversity case should be decided by the court most familiar with the applicable state law." NCR, 17 F. Supp.2d at 23 (quoting Heller Fin., Inc. v. Shop-A-Lot, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D.Ill. 1988)). A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. On Air Ent. Corp. v. National Indem. Co., 210 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, New Jersey choice of law rules govern Plaintiff's claims. According to those rules, the law of the state with the most significant connections to the parties and the action applies. See Gilbert Spruance v. Pennsylvania Man., 134 N.J. 96, 102-103 (1993).
Puerto Rico clearly has a stronger interest in this case because the complained of activity arose directly out of Defendant's alleged breach in San Juan, of an insurance policy negotiated in Puerto Rico to which Puerto Rican law applies. Furthermore, Puerto Rico has strong connections with both Parties, not just with Defendant. Although New Jersey also has a strong interest in this case, namely protecting a resident corporation from the alleged wrongful acts of a non-resident corporation, see NCR, at 323, it is not a sufficient connection to warrant application of New Jersey law. Accordingly, this factor favors transfer.
2. Relative Court Congestion
The docket congestion of the two fora at issue in this case weighs marginally against transfer to Puerto Rico. In 1999, the District of Puerto Rico had 270 filings, and 402 pending cases per judge, while the District of New Jersey had 415 filings, and 363 pending cases per judge. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1999 Federal Court Management Statistics, 40, 56 (2000). The average period from filing to disposition for civil motions in the District of Puerto Rico is eleven months, versus seven months in the District of New Jersey. Id.
The District of New Jersey appears to be more efficient in handling its cases than the District of Puerto Rico (at least on a statistical level). Mindful that docket congestion is not accorded great weight in a § 1404(a) consideration, Micheel v. Haralson, 586 F. Supp. 169, 172 n. 5 (E.D.Pa. 1983) citing, Residex Corp. v. Farrow, 374 F. Supp. 715, 721 (1974) aff'd mem., Residex Corp. v. Farrow, 556 F.2d 568 (1977), this factor is not dispositive of the Court's analysis.
3. Local Interest and Nexus to the Controversy
Puerto Rico possesses a strong interest in adjudicating claims having to do with an alleged breach of contract by an insurance company organized and existing under the laws of Puerto Rico. New Jersey's interest in protecting resident corporations, under these circumstances, is insufficient to override the interest of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, any litigation resulting from Georges is undeniably tied to Puerto Rico, which is where the hurricane struck.
Puerto Rico is the nexus of this controversy, since Plaintiff's claims arose there, upon the alleged breach of contract by Defendant. Substantially all activity relating to negotiation of and performance under the Policy took place in Puerto Rico. Plaintiff has substantial business operations in Puerto Rico. Witnesses are not unable or unwilling to travel to Puerto Rico (although it would be somewhat inconvenient for them to do so). A jury view of the facility in San Juan may become necessary. Furthermore, court proceedings are not so far along that it would be in the interest of convenience to keep this action here. Lastly, the people of New Jersey should not be burdened with adjudicating a contractual dispute arising out of an insurance contract entered into in Puerto Rico which paid out for a loss to a Puerto Rican facility. (The burden of jury duty should not be placed on citizens with remote connection to a lawsuit). See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09. All these factors support transfer, and for these reasons the Court will grant Defendant's request for transfer.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant's motion to transfer this action to the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). An appropriate order follows.