Opinion
No. 6:21-CV-00001-H
2021-03-03
Carlos German Lema NOGALES, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Respondents.
Carlos German Lema Nogales, Eden, TX, pro se. Ann Cruce-Haag, US Attorney's Office, Lubbock, TX, for Respondents.
Carlos German Lema Nogales, Eden, TX, pro se.
Ann Cruce-Haag, US Attorney's Office, Lubbock, TX, for Respondents.
ORDER
JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX, United States District Judge
Petitioner Carlos German Lema Nogales, an immigration detainee proceeding pro se, filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking immediate release from detention in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. He also filed two requests for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to secure his immediate release from detention, as well as two motions for a hearing. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 11, 16, and 20.) Petitioner was detained in the Eden Detention Center (EDC), within the jurisdiction of this Court, when he filed the original petition.
As explained below, the Court finds that Petitioner's requests for TRO must be denied because he has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Additionally, the habeas petition must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1. Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador. (Dkt. Nos 1, 10.) He was detained following his completion of a 120-month federal prison sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine. (See Dkt. Nos. 1 at 1–2; 10 at 12.) Because of his controlled substance conviction, he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (See Dkt. No. 10 at 17.) The immigration judge denied Petitioner's request for release on bond on January 13, 2021. (Id. )
Petitioner alleges that he has underlying health conditions that place him at an increased risk of serious illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. Specifically, he alleges that he suffers from high blood pressure, obesity, and he has a history of tuberculosis. It appears that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted an independent custody review on January 12, 2021 to determine if Petitioner should be released based on his underlying health condition in light of the pandemic. (Dkt. No. 17 at 13.) DHS determined that Petitioner should remain detained, finding that his criminal history involving drug trafficking poses a threat to public safety. (Id. )
Petitioner claims that EDC is "old, dirty, outdated, and lacks adequate sanitation as cleaning supplies are scarce and there is even no soap available sometimes." (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) But he asserts that he is not challenging the specific conditions at EDC, nor is he challenging the mitigation measures that EDC is implementing. (Dkt. No. 17 at 2.) He argues that he is entitled to immediate release because "there are no conditions of confinement that are sufficient to prevent irreparable constitutional injury given the facts presented in his individual case." (Dkt. No. 17 at 4.)
The Court ordered expedited briefing on this case, which is now complete. Respondents filed a response along with relevant records. (Dkt. Nos. 9, 10.) Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Petitioner's requests for a temporary restraining order should be denied. Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner's complaints about the conditions of his confinement are not cognizable in a habeas petition, his mandatory detention pending the resolution of his immigration proceedings is lawful, and that even if the Court had jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's constitutional claims, he failed to show any violation. Petitioner filed two replies. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 17.) Among other things, he alleges that the records provided by Respondent are inaccurate, and he disputes certain facts related to the conditions at EDC.
2. Standards Applicable to Temporary Restraining Orders
"An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should not issue except upon a clear showing of possible irreparable injury." Lewis v. S.S. Baune , 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976). A party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order must prove four elements:
1. a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case;
2. a substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury;
3. that the threatened injury outweighs any harm that the injunctive order might cause the defendant; and
4. that the injunction is in the public interest.
Women's Med. Ctr. v. Bell , 248 F.3d 411, 419 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001). Injunctive relief will be denied if the movant fails to prove any of these four elements. Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana , 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985). A federal court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party only if "specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts must "affirmatively ascertain subject-matter jurisdiction before adjudicating a suit." Nianga v. Wolfe , 435 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (N.D. Tex. 2020). "A party seeking a TRO cannot establish a ‘substantial likelihood of success on the merits’ of his claim if the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim altogether." Id. ; see also Obaretin v. Barr, No. 3:20-CV-2805, 2020 WL 5775822 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2020), rec. accepted , 2020 WL 5761085 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2020).
3. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims
Federal law provides two distinct avenues to relief for complaints related to confinement: the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the civil-rights action for equitable or monetary relief. Muhammad v. Close , 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004). Habeas is reserved for "[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration," while civil-rights actions are typically used to attack conditions of confinement. Id. (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ).
"Which statutory vehicle to use depends on the nature of the claim and the type of relief requested." Poree v. Collins , 866 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2017). The "core issue" is "whether the prisoner challenges the ‘fact or duration’ of his confinement or merely the rules, customs, and procedures affecting ‘conditions’ of confinement. Cook v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice Transitional Planning Dep't , 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994).
A petitioner may seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Habeas exists solely to "grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose." Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976). "Simply stated, habeas is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention." Id. at 935. "The Fifth Circuit follows a bright-line rule: ‘If a favorable determination ... would not automatically entitle [the detainee] to accelerated release, ... the proper vehicle is a [civil rights] suit.’ " Sacal-Micha v. Longoria , 449 F. Supp. 3d 656, 662 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (quoting Carson v. Johnson , 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997) ).
Fifth Circuit precedent provides that unconstitutional conditions of confinement—even conditions that create a risk of serious physical injury, illness, or death—do not warrant release. Spencer v. Bragg , 310 F. App'x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Carson , 112 F.3d at 820–21 ). Even allegations of mistreatment that amount to cruel and unusual punishment do not nullify an otherwise lawful incarceration or detention. Cook v. Hanberry , 596 F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir. 1979). Rather, the proper remedy for unconstitutional conditions of confinement should be equitable—to enjoin the unlawful practices that make the conditions intolerable. See id. Thus, "allegations that challenge the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought in habeas petitions, while allegations that challenge rules, customs, and procedures affecting conditions of confinement are properly brought in civil rights actions." Schipke v. Van Buren , 239 F. App'x 85, 85–86 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Spina v. Aaron , 821 F.2d 1126, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1987) ).
A demand for release does not convert a conditions-of-confinement claim into a proper habeas request. "[A] prisoner may not transform a civil rights action involving the conditions of his confinement into a § 2241 petition merely by seeking sentencing relief in a manner not connected to his substantive claims." Rios v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks , 100 F. App'x 706, 708 (10th Cir. 2004). Stated differently, "tacking a traditional habeas remedy on to a prototypical conditions-of-confinement claim does not convert that classic civil rights claim into a habeas claim." Archilla v. Witte , 2020 WL 2513648, at *12 (N.D. Ala. May 15, 2020). For example, a petitioner's allegations that he was exposed to asbestos and mold in prison could only be pursued as a civil-rights complaint, and his request for a reduction in his sentence did not make habeas review available. See Springer v. Underwood , No. 3:19-CV-1433, 2019 WL 3307220, at *2 (N.D. Tex., Jun. 28, 2019), rec. accepted , 2019 WL 3306130 (N.D. Tex., Jul. 22, 2019). It is well established in this circuit that a detainee is not entitled to habeas relief if he raises civil-rights claims related to the conditions of his confinement. Sanchez v. Brown , No. 3:20-CV-00832, 2020 WL 2615931, at *12 (N.D. Tex., May 22, 2020) (collecting cases).
In sum, a detainee's fear of contracting COVID-19 does not entitle him to release. See United States v. Thompson , 984 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2021). Likewise, the fact that he "might more likely be exposed to COVID-19 during confinement, and that he may have certain common underlying health conditions, taken together do not impugn the underlying legal basis for the fact or duration of his confinement." Rice v. Gonzalez , 985 F.3d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 2021).
4. Analysis
After carefully reviewing Petitioner's pleadings, Respondent's answer, and the relevant records, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve the Petition and accompanying requests for TRO. See United States v. Tubwell , 37 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1994) ("An evidentiary hearing is not required if the record is complete or the petitioner raises only legal claims that can be resolved without the presentation of additional evidence.").
Petitioner has not demonstrated an immediate risk of irreparable injury, loss, or damage. Moreover, the facts that he alleges do not show that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. He seeks habeas relief, but his claims are not cognizable under the habeas corpus statute. As a result, he has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim and he is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy he seeks.
A. Petitioner cannot show that he is likely to succeed on the merits because the Court lacks jurisdiction over his conditions-of-confinement claims in the habeas context.
Given the above precedent, Petitioner's complaints are not cognizable under Section 2241. Petitioner attempts to characterize his complaints as a challenge to the fact of his detention; however, the fact that there is an ongoing pandemic does not nullify an otherwise lawful detention. Indeed, "[i]f a challenge to the ‘fact’ of detention merely required that a detainee claim some circumstance of their detention was unconstitutional or illegal, any condition of confinement claim would be cognizable under habeas." Francois v. Garcia , 509 F.Supp.3d 668, 674 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2020). Petitioner's complaints about the threat of infection and the conditions at EDC are unrelated to the cause or duration of his detention.
Additionally, Petitioner's allegations, if true, would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release. Rather, Petitioner raises the types of conditions-of-confinement claims that are more properly considered in a civil-rights action, and, if proven, would naturally lead to an injunctive remedy to correct the unlawful practices rather than his release. Thus, under established Fifth Circuit law, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the conditions claim in a habeas context.
Petitioner's demand for release does not bring his civil-rights claims within the scope of habeas review. He cannot circumvent the well-established limitations outlined above through a conclusory assertion that there is no possibility of narrowly tailored relief. He seeks release—and only release—without addressing any less drastic corrective measures. Petitioner's allegations alone fall well short of supporting the extraordinary remedy he seeks.
Petitioner's complaints about the risk of infection and the inadequate protections in place at EDC are attacks on the conditions of his confinement that do not entitle him to release. His conditions of confinement—even if shown to be dangerous and unconstitutional—do not nullify an otherwise lawful detention. This conclusion is consistent with established Fifth Circuit law.
See Pierre v. United States , 525 F.2d 933, 936–37 (5th Cir. 1976) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The majority holds only that habeas has its boundaries; the writ does not permit us to roam the judicial range in a farfetched effort to grant declaratory or injunctive relief unrelated to the question of custody."); Rourke v. Thompson , 11 F.3d 47, 48–49 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that Petitioner could not use a habeas petition to seek injunctive relief from conditions of confinement—denial of medical care and imposition of arbitrary disciplinary sanctions—that were unrelated to the cause of his detention); Cook v. Hanberry , 596 F.2d at 660 (holding that the appropriate remedy for conditions that constitute cruel and unusual punishment is to enjoin the practices or require correction of the conditions); Lineberry v. United States , 380 F. App'x 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a prisoner's allegations that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, even if proven to be true, would not result in his accelerated release and affirming the district court's dismissal without prejudice based on a determination that the prisoner must seek relief in a civil-rights action instead); Spencer v. Bragg , 310 F. App'x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding petitioner's claims of exposure to asbestos, lack of proper medical treatment, retaliation, and loss of legal notes would not result in his accelerated release and were thus not the proper subject matter for habeas review).
In sum, Petitioner attacks his conditions of confinement independent of any question related to the fact or duration of his detention. These claims are not cognizable in habeas review. Instead, his claims fit squarely into the scope of a civil-rights action. Moreover, the fact that he seeks release does not transform his civil-rights claims into a proper habeas action. See Springer , 2019 WL 3307220, at *2 ; Sanchez , 2020 WL 2615931, at *12. His conditions of confinement, even if proven to be constitutionally deficient, do not warrant his immediate or accelerated release. Thus, he has not met his burden to show the likelihood of success on the merits. The Court concludes that the request for TRO must be denied and the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Even if the Court construed the underlying claims in a civil-rights context, Petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Even assuming that the Court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner's conditions-of-confinement claim, he has failed to demonstrate a violation of his civil rights. "[T]he fact that ICE may be unable to ... fully guarantee [Petitioner's] safety does not amount to a violation of his constitutional rights and does not warrant his release." Sacal-Micha , 449 F. Supp. 3d at 665–66.
As an immigrant detainee awaiting removal proceedings, Petitioner's constitutional rights equate to those of a pretrial detainee and stem from the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Edwards v. Johnson , 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000). There is no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs such as reasonable safety and medical care. Hare v. City of Corinth , 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996). Officials "must provide humane conditions of confinement ... and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates." Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
Unlike convicted prisoners, civil detainees are entitled to be free from conditions that amount to punishment. Bell , 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861. However, not all discomforts associated with detention amount to punishment in the constitutional sense, even restrictions that the detainee would not experience if he were released. Id. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Courts should not underestimate the difficulties of operating a detention center. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington , 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012) (citing Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 84–85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) ). "A detention facility's protocols for isolating individuals, controlling the movement of its staff and detainees, and providing medical care are part and parcel of the conditions in which the facility maintains custody over detainees." Sacal-Micha , 449 F. Supp. 3d at 663.
"[T]he incidence of diseases or infections, standing alone, [cannot] imply unconstitutional confinement conditions, since any densely populated residence may be subject to outbreaks." Shepherd v. Dallas Cty. , 591 F.3d 445, 454 (5th Cir. 2009). "Rather, a detainee challenging jail conditions must demonstrate a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs; any lesser showing cannot prove punishment in violation of the detainee's Due Process rights." Id. This requires a showing that either "serious injury and death [a]re the inevitable results of the [institution's] gross inattention to the needs of inmates with chronic illness," id. , or that a specific rule or policy "caused ... extreme suffering or resulted in adverse medical outcomes serious enough to establish a constitutional violation." Cadena v. El Paso County , 946 F.3d 717, 728 (5th Cir. 2020).
Here, Petitioner has not shown a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs. Petitioner relies primarily on the fact of the pandemic to establish his claim. He alleges that there is a "major outbreak" at EDC right now. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) But he admits that he does not know how many confirmed or suspected COVID-19 cases there are or have been at EDC. (Id. ) According to the records provided by Respondents, there was only one detainee at EDC under isolation or monitoring for COVID-19 at the time of briefing. (Dkt. No. 10 at 7.) Now, there are two detainees under monitoring. And fortunately, no detainees at EDC have died after testing positive for COVID-19.
See https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
See Id.
Petitioner has failed to allege any facts that show either that serious injury or death are the inevitable results of EDC's failings or that any policy has caused extreme suffering or resulted in adverse medical outcomes serious enough to establish a constitutional violation. As a result, Petitioner has failed to show a likelihood of success on his claim that the conditions of his confinement at EDC violate his due process rights. Thus, the emergency motion for TRO must be denied.
This Finding is limited to the analysis of Petitioner's request for a TRO and does not prejudice his right to refile his claims in the context of a civil-rights complaint seeking appropriate relief.
5. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, and based on the facts and law set forth in Respondents' thorough and well-reasoned answer, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, his motions for temporary restraining order must be denied, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Any other pending motions are denied.
So ordered.
The Court will enter judgment accordingly.