Summary
finding that for preclusion purposes, "[d]ismissal of an action with prejudice, or without leave to amend, is considered a final judgment on the merits."
Summary of this case from Wade v. Roper Indus., Inc.Opinion
No. 10-17234 D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00714-MEJ
01-26-2012
OLUCHI NNACHI, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant - Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maria-Elena James, Chief Magistrate Judge, Presiding
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Before: LEAVY, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Oluchi Nnachi appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Nnachi's ADEA claim as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Nnachi raised, or could have raised, his age discrimination claim in his prior Title VII action that involved the same defendant and an identity of claims, and was decided on the merits. See Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Res judicata . . . bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nnachi's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.