Opinion
12637 12637A 12637 B12637C Index No. 159953/16 Case No. 2018-5397
12-15-2020
NEIMAN NIX et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL etc., et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Hagan, Coury & Associates, Brooklyn (Paul R. Golden of counsel), for appellants. Kobre & Kim LLP, New York (Steven G. Kobre of counsel), for respondents.
Hagan, Coury & Associates, Brooklyn (Paul R. Golden of counsel), for appellants.
Kobre & Kim LLP, New York (Steven G. Kobre of counsel), for respondents.
Renwick, J.P., Gische, Gonza´lez, Scarpulla, Mendez, JJ.
Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered June 22, 2018, and January 14, 2020, dismissing the complaint and awarding defendants costs and fees, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeals from orders, same court and Justice, entered June 29, 2018, and December 31, 2018, which granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint and for sanctions, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed, respectively, in the appeals from the 2020 and 2018 judgments.
Plaintiffs' tortious interference claims are precluded by the dismissal of their 2014 action asserting those claims in a Florida state court action (see Nix v. Major League Baseball, 190 So. 3d 79 [Fla. App. 2015] [recognizing plaintiffs' notice of dismissal] ) and the subsequent dismissal of their federal action in the Southern District of New York based on the same claims (see CPLR 3217[c] ; see generally Rojas v. Romanoff, 186 A.D.3d 103, 107–108, 128 N.Y.S.3d 189 [1st Dept. 2020] ). Although in the Florida state action plaintiffs did not expressly plead the alleged hacking of their PayPal account, they asserted tortious interference claims based on the alleged hacking of their social media accounts; the alleged hacking of their PayPal account occurred the day after they amended their complaint. The Florida state action was not dismissed until November 6, 2014, and, thus, plaintiffs could have raised the issue of the alleged hacking of their PayPal account in that litigation.
The defamation claims were also appropriately dismissed. The statement in the New York federal action that plaintiffs "admit[ted] to selling products purportedly containing at least one banned performance-enhancing substance (IGF–1)" was true, and the truth of the statement provides a complete defense to the defamation claims ( Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 39, 704 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept. 1999] ). At a minimum, the statement was a nonactionable "fair and true," i.e., "substantially accurate," report of the New York federal complaint ( Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianity v. New York Times Co., 49 N.Y.2d 63, 67, 424 N.Y.S.2d 165, 399 N.E.2d 1185 [1979] ; Civil Rights Law § 74 ). We agree with the motion court that plaintiffs' motion for reargument was intended to prolong the resolution of the action and/or to harass defendants, considering the circumstances under which it was made, and is therefore sanctionable ( 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 [c] ).