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Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc
Sep 11, 1951
54 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1951)

Summary

In Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 54 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1951), the court held that a city had no authority to pledge its share of the taxes funded by s. 336.59(2), supra, to aid in the construction by the county of a bridge and tunnel program.

Summary of this case from AGO

Opinion

September 11, 1951.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Broward County, George W. Tedder, J.

Patterson, Freeman, Richardson Watson, Jacksonville, George H. Gore, Elbert B. Griffis, Fort Lauderdale, and Giles J. Patterson, Jacksonville, and Saunders, Buckley O'Connell, and Rogers, Morris Griffis, all of Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

John U. Lloyd and Thomas O. Berryhill, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.


Account of the similarity of the two cases, the questions raised, and the procedure employed, we have considered this as a companion case to City of Hollywood v. Broward County, 54 So.2d 205, opinion filed this date. Both cases were instituted by bill for declaratory decree. In the last cited case the bill prayed for determination of whether or not the action of the Board of County Commissioners requesting the State Improvement Commission to construct certain roads, bridges and tunnels in different parts of the county at a cost of $15,000,000 and in the manner proposed, was a valid exercise of the power vested in the County Commissioners.

This suit was instituted by taxpayers of the City of Fort Lauderdale by bill for declaratory decree, seeking to have a resolution of the City Commission declared invalid, to enjoin the issue of certain proposed road and bridge bonds until approved by the freeholders, as required by Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution, F.S.A., and to enjoin the City from pledging its share of road and bridge taxes accruing under Section 343.17, F.S.A. for the purpose of aiding in the bridge and tunnel program referred to in City of Hollywood v. Broward County. A motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint was granted and the plaintiffs appealed.

The point for determination is whether or not the city of Fort Lauderdale is authorized to pledge its share of road and bridge funds accruing under Section 343.17, F.S.A. for a period of 30 years to aid in the bridge and tunnel program throughout the county in cooperation with State Improvement Commission and the State Road Department. Section 343.17, F.S.A. is as follows:

"The board of county commissioners shall levy a tax of not to exceed five mills on a dollar on all property in said county each year for road and bridge purposes; and the same, when collected, shall be paid over to the county depository and kept in a separate fund, which fund shall not be expended for any other purpose than for work on the public roads and bridges in the several counties, and for the payment of the salaries of employes engaged in road and bridge work, and in providing the necessary tools, materials, implements and teams, and for the necessary work on said road and bridges; provided, however, that one-half the amount so realized from said special tax on the property in incorporated cities and towns, shall be turned over to said cities and towns, to be used in repairing and maintaining the roads and streets thereof, as may be provided by the ordinances of such cities and towns."

Casual inspection discloses that the purpose of this act was to provide a dependable sum annually for road and bridge purposes and for no other purpose, except that one-half the amount collected in cities and towns "shall be turned over" to them "to be used in repairing and maintaining the roads and streets thereof" as may be provided by ordinance. The whole tenor of the act has to do with the repair and maintenance of roads, streets and bridges. Tunnels were not contemplated. Street, road and bridge repair is one of the most urgent necessities of every county and municipality in the state and is one of the most consistent drains on their tax program. Section 343.17 makes possible a definite sum annually for that purpose. The legislature in terms required that it be kept in a separate fund and so allocated it, and any attempt to divert it for a period of 30 years to a different purpose would be in direct contravention of the statute.

The resolution of the City Commission, brought in question, attempts to give the city's portion of the taxes accruing under Section 343.17, F.S.A. to the County for a period of 30 years, for the payment of revenue bonds therein described. It is obvious that if this can be done, and the county likewise pledges its share of said taxes for the same purpose, both the city and the county will be compelled to impose other ad valorem taxes to repair and maintain their roads and streets. The order of the chancellor dismissing the original and the amended petition in effect approved this feature of the resolution of the City Commission, contrary to the statute.

To this extent the judgment appealed from was error and is reversed. Other questions raised are ruled by City of Hollywood v. Broward County, opinion filed this date.

Reversed in part, affirmed in part.

SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.

ADAMS and ROBERTS, JJ., not participating.


Summaries of

Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale

Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc
Sep 11, 1951
54 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1951)

In Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 54 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1951), the court held that a city had no authority to pledge its share of the taxes funded by s. 336.59(2), supra, to aid in the construction by the county of a bridge and tunnel program.

Summary of this case from AGO
Case details for

Nelson v. City of Fort Lauderdale

Case Details

Full title:NELSON ET AL. v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE ET AL

Court:Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc

Date published: Sep 11, 1951

Citations

54 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1951)

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