Summary
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims in EMTALA case
Summary of this case from Landel v. Smyth Cnty. Cmty. Hosp.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 01-2021-CM
July 9, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs have sued defendants pursuant to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Plaintiffs also have asserted a cause of action for medical negligence under state law. This matter is before the court on defendant Paul Jaster's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) and defendant Harley Calvin's motion to dismiss (Doc. 17).
I. Background Facts
As set forth in plaintiffs' complaint, Justin Nelson, an infant, was taken to Salina Regional Health Center on January 16, 1999 with a medical condition. At the emergency room, Justin was seen by defendant Calvin. Defendant Calvin discharged Justin from the emergency room and sent him home with his parents. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Calvin discharged Justin without stabilizing Justin's medical condition and without performing appropriate screening and testing to determine the cause of Justin's illness. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Jaster approved of defendant Calvin's treatment plan. Twelve hours after his release, Justin died of fulminant meningoccemia.
II. Standards
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
III. Discussion
Defendants Calvin and Jaster first argue that they cannot be sued under EMTALA because, they claim, that statute provides a private cause of action only with respect to hospitals, not individual physicians. Plaintiffs do not respond to defendants' argument on this issue.
The Tenth Circuit already has decided this issue. In Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 393 (10th Cir. 1993), the court looked to the language of the statute's civil enforcement provision, which states, "Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2). The Tenth Circuit held that "the plain language of the Act indicates individuals can bring civil actions only against participating hospitals," but not against doctors. Delaney, 986 F.2d at 393. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot state a claim against defendants Calvin and Jaster under the EMTALA. Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted with respect to this issue.
With the dismissal of plaintiffs' EMTALA claims against Calvin and Jaster, defendants correctly point out that the sole basis for federal jurisdiction over them lies in the court's power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendants Calvin and Jaster next contend that this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims against them.
The court has original jurisdiction over the EMTALA claim against Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Once federal question jurisdiction exists, it is within the trial court's discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those state law claims that derive from a common nucleus of facts. United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to the claims within the court's original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, § 1367 further provides:
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if —
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, or
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Id. § 1367(c).
Defendants urge the court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because, they claim, plaintiffs' state law claims substantially predominate over the federal claim. However, the court finds that the state law claims against defendants Calvin and Jaster do not predominate over the EMTALA claim. Indeed, the EMTALA claim is "alive and well in the federal complaint." Martinez Rosado v. Instituto Medico Del Norte, No. Civ. 00-1748-JAF, 2001 WL 584195, at *3 (D. Puerto Rico May 21, 2001) (retaining supplemental jurisdiction over state law medical malpractice claim in case brought under EMTALA); see also Jones v. Garcia, 936 F. Supp. 929, 931 (M.D.Fla. 1996) (same).
Defendants also argue that requiring physicians to defend medical malpractice claims in federal court would federalize malpractice claims, an effect which is contrary to the purpose of the EMTALA. Repp v. Anadarko, 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994) ("the language of section 1395dd(a) precludes the adoption of a standard tantamount to a federal malpractice statute."). Defendants assert that this is an exceptional circumstance requiring the court to decline supplemental jurisdiction. However, merely because defendants Cavlin and Jaster may have to defend their state law claims in federal court does not "federalize" the medical malpractice action against them. The court does not view the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in these circumstances as having the effect of federalizing medical malpractice actions.
The court finds that the EMTALA and state law claims derive from a common nucleus of facts revolving around what happened on January 16, 1999. Moreover, it would be a waste of judicial resources to force the state malpractice claims to be tried separately in state court. Accordingly, the court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the state malpractice claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Paul Jaster's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) and defendant Harley Calvin's motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) are granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted with respect to plaintiffs' EMTALA claims against defendants Calvin and Jaster. Defendants' motions to dismiss are denied in all other respects.