Opinion
File No.: CN16-07080 Petition No: 16-39192
03-07-2017
RE: N------- W----- v. C------ W-----
William P. Brady, Esq.
240 North James Street, Suite 106
Wilmington, DE 19804 N------- W-----
--- ---- -------- ------
Apartment Unit ----
N-----, DE ----- LETTER, DECISION AND ORDER Petition to Set Aside Pre-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements Dear Counsel and Ms. W-----:
Before the Court is a Petition to Set Aside Pre-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements (hereinafter "Petition") filed on December 21, 2016 by N------- W----- (hereinafter "Wife"), who is self-represented, against C------ W----- in her capacity as Executrix of the Estate of K------ R. W----- (hereinafter "Respondent"), represented by William P. Brady, Esq. Respondent, through her attorney, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on January 18, 2017, asserting that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the herein matter. Petitioner filed an Answer to Respondent's Motion on January 23, 2017.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner and K------ W----- were married in Kiev, Ukraine on or about May 27, 2010. Prior to the marriage, Petitioner executed a Prenuptial Agreement on March 1, 2010, a copy of which was attached to her Petition. On August 14, 2012, Petitioner executed a Post-Nuptial Agreement, a copy of which was also attached to her Petition. Petitioner and K------ W----- were married for approximately six (6) years, until Mr. W-----'s death on May 27, 2016.
Mr. W----- executed a Last Will and Testament dated August 12, 2012 in which he made a cash bequest to Petitioner. No other property or assets were left to Petitioner under his Will. On October 20, 2016, Petitioner filed an action in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware seeking an elective share of Mr. W-----'s Estate. On December 20, 2016, Respondent filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in which she raised the Pre and Post Nuptial Agreements as Affirmative Defenses to the request for an Elective Share and requested a Declaratory Judgment that those Agreements were enforceable against Petitioner.
On December 23, 2016, Petitioner filed the herein Petition in this Court seeking to set aside the Pre and Post Nuptial Agreements. On or about the same date, Petitioner filed a Response in the Court of Chancery to Respondent's Answer and Counterclaim which questioned the jurisdiction of that Court to determine the validity of the nuptial agreements. In response, Respondent filed a Motion to Strike, asking that the Court of Chancery order Petitioner to file a proper Answer to the Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment. The Court of Chancery granted Respondent's Motion to Strike on February 1, 2017 and directed Petitioner to file a proper Answer to Respondent's Counterclaim.
On January 18, 2017, Respondent filed the herein Motion to Dismiss with this Court, asserting that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the herein Petition. Petitioner filed an Answer to Respondent's Motion on January 23, 2017. A Call of the Calendar was held on February 6, 2017, for which both parties were present. At the hearing, the Court directed Respondent to file a Memorandum of Law in support of her Motion to Dismiss with relevant supporting case law and statutory provisions. Respondent timely filed her Memorandum of Law on February 20, 2017; Petitioner timely filed her Response on February 22, 2017; and, Respondent timely filed her Reply to the Response on March 2, 2017.
DISCUSSION
Before considering the merits of Petitioner's Petition to Set Aside the Nuptial Agreements, the Court must first consider, pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, whether the Court has jurisdiction in this matter. Respondent asserts that the Court lacks jurisdiction due to the well-settled cleanup doctrine of the Court of Chancery, which provides that "when equity obtains jurisdiction over some portion of [a] legal controversy it will decide the whole controversy and give complete and final relief, even though that involves the grant of a pure legal remedy." The record reflects that Petitioner filed for an elective share of her late husband's estate in the Court of Chancery prior to filing the herein Petition in Family Court. Respondent seeks to enter the nuptial agreements executed by Petitioner as a defense to Petitioner's request for an elective share in the Court of Chancery. Accordingly, Respondent alleges that the cleanup doctrine affords the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to determine the validity of those agreements. Respondent further asserts that the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction over this matter prior to the Family Court, and that Petitioner herself chose that jurisdiction by filing for the elective share in the Court of Chancery.
Wilmont Homes, Inc. v. Weiler, 202 A.2d 576, 580 (Del. Supr. 1964).
Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that the Family Court has jurisdiction because it has jurisdiction over "marital property." In support of her claim, Petitioner cites 10 Del. C. §342, which provides that the Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State.
Delaware case law suggests that an action seeking to determine the distribution of assets from a decedent's estate is solely within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, even when the case regards the distribution of marital property between a deceased husband and his widow. In In re Estate of Farren, for example, the Court of Chancery held that any action against a decedent's estate shall proceed solely in the Court of Chancery. In Farren, a Wife sought to enforce a support Order against her deceased Husband's estate in Family Court. However, as the Court of Chancery stated, "If the party subject to the support order is alive, this Court logically should defer to the Family Court. Once a support obligor is dead, however, the ability to grant relief falls within the sole province of the Court of Chancery." The case at bar, likewise, involves a widow seeking to nullify an agreement made between herself and her now deceased husband. Because her husband is deceased and her claim regards his estate, the ability to grant relief rests solely with the Court of Chancery.
In re Estate of Farren, 131 A.3d 817 (Delaware Court of Chancery, 2016).
However, in Farren, the Court noted an exception to this general rule. The Court of Chancery stated that one situation in which the Court of Chancery would defer to the Family Court would be if the issues in the case implicated the Family Court's specialized expertise of family law. If a case implicated novel issues of family law, both Family Court and the Court of Chancery would share concurrent jurisdiction, and those novel issues would be decided in Family Court and then issues against the estate would be resolved in the Court of Chancery.
The Court finds that the Petition at hand does not involve unique issues of family law that would require the specialized expertise of the Family Court. The Petition at hand merely seeks to determine the validity of a contract. Our colleagues in the Court of Chancery are fully able to determine issues of contract validity, even the validity of contracts made between a widow and her now deceased husband.
Moreover, the Court of Chancery has exercised jurisdiction in the past over matters concerning the validity and enforceability of nuptial agreements. In In Matter of Estate of Massello, the Court of Chancery found that it had jurisdiction to determine the validity of nuptial agreements as it relates to claims against a decedent's estate. In Massello, the Court of Chancery determined it has "jurisdiction over the distribution of assets of the estates of decedents" as well as "to construe the rights of any person interested under a contract, including the determination of the contract's validity."
In Matter of estate of Massello, 1997 WL 89091 (Delaware Court of Chancery, 1997).
Therefore, the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over the distribution of estates and under the cleanup doctrine has the authority to determine the validity of the nuptial agreements pursuant to the request for the elective share in this matter. The Court of Chancery has exercised jurisdiction over this issue in the past and have already exercised jurisdiction over the herein matter.
Additionally, the Court finds that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the herein matter. 13 Del. C. §507 provides that the Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of marital agreements between "spouses and former spouses." However, this case involves neither spouses nor former spouses, but a widow and her husband's estate. The distribution of estates is solely within the purview of the Court of Chancery. If Petitioner's husband was alive and she was seeking to set aside the nuptial agreements, then the Family Court would be the proper court to seek the requested remedy. However, in the case at bar, because the Petitioner's husband is deceased, the Court of Chancery is the proper forum to exercise jurisdiction over this matter.
13 Del. C. §507 provides, in part:
(a) The Family Court of the State shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising under this chapter. The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the construction, reformation, enforcement and rescission of agreements made between future spouses, spouses and former spouses concerning the payment of support or alimony, the payment of child support or medical support, the division and distribution of marital property and marital debts and any other matters incident to a marriage, separation or divorce. The Court shall have jurisdiction to resolve any issues resulting from the construction, reformation, enforcement or rescission of an agreement.
In re Estate of Farren, 131 A.3d 817 (Delaware Court of Chancery, 2016).
The Court further finds that litigating this matter in the Family Court goes against the well-settled cleanup doctrine, which affords the Court of Chancery jurisdiction to determine all related issues in a dispute, even if those issues are purely legal rather than equitable. This doctrine promotes expediency, "limits costs to litigants and the public and serves to decrease the risk of inconsistent verdicts." There is nothing in this case that requires the specialized knowledge of the Family Court that would entitle the Court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter. Moreover, the Court of Chancery has already begun to exercise jurisdiction in this matter by granting Respondent's Motion to Strike and directing Petitioner to file a proper Response to Respondent's Counterclaim.
Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. and Michael A. Pittenger, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY, §2-4 at 2-65 (2006). --------
Without question, Petitioner's claim is against the estate of a decedent. The Court of Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to matters relating to a decedent's estate. Accordingly, the Court finds the issue of validity of a contract between Petitioner and her husband's estate should be resolved in the proceeding pending in the Court of Chancery.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that jurisdiction is properly within the Court of Chancery. This action should proceed in the Court of Chancery, which has already exercised jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss shall be GRANTED. The Petition shall be DISMISSED. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. C------ W-----'s Motion to Dismiss N------- W-----'s Petition to Set Aside Pre-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements for lack of jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED. The Petition is hereby DISMISSED. This action shall proceed in the Court of Chancery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 7, 2017
Date Written Order Issued /s/ _________
ARLENE MINUS COPPADGE, JUDGE AMC: cap Cc: File
Parties Date Order mailed to attorney: Date Order mailed to parties: