Opinion
No. 2-387 / 01-1211
Filed November 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, L. VERN ROBINSON, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal from the district court's ruling on their action challenging the zoning decision of the City of Coralville. AFFIRMED.
Paul P. Morf of Simmons, Perrine, Albright Ellwood, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Terry J. Abernathy and Stephanie L. Hinz of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Heard by SACKETT, C.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Plaintiffs-appellants, NN Sanitation, Inc, and NN Environmental, Inc., (collectively, NN) appeal the district court's ruling on their action challenging the zoning decision of the City of Coralville (City) that their business activity of transferring garbage does not fall within the I-2 or "light industrial" zone. Plaintiff NN claims on appeal the district court erred in 1) finding the City's interpretation of the zoning code was not contrary to Iowa law; 2) finding the City's actions in connection with this interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause; 3) finding section 165.29 of the Coralville city zoning code was not void for vagueness; 4) finding the City was not estopped from declaring NN's land use in the I-2 zone improper; 5) finding NN's due process rights were not violated by the City. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
NN Sanitation collects solid waste from local businesses and residents in the Iowa City/Coralville area. After collecting this waste, NN Sanitation must haul it to a landfill. In 1998 the fee for dumping waste at the Iowa City landfill was approximately $50 per ton. In Illinois this fee would have been less than $16 per ton. Due to the cheaper Illinois fees, Nick and Nancy Yutzy, owners of NN Sanitation, concluded it would be more economical to dump waste collected in and around Iowa City/Coralville in Illinois. To accomplish this, the Yutzys formed a second business, "NN Environmental," located at 311 E. 11th Street, an area zoned "I-2 light industrial." The purpose of NN Environmental was to operate as a transfer and hauling facility. Garbage collected by NN would be
brought to this facility where garbage trucks, after picking up their garbage, would back into a semi-tractor trailer and dump their loads in the trailer. There is dispute as to how much trash falls on the ground during this transfer process. Plaintiff concedes that, especially when the last load is dumped in the trailer, part of that load spills on the ramp and concrete pad at the loading dock. There are approximately three to four of these "last loads" with spillage per day.
According to Garth Frable, runoff from the NN Environmental operation, may contain hazardous components, which may drain into the Iowa River, there is a noticeable odor and litter on site, and potential harmful impacts from this operation are vermin and fire hazards. It appears from the record that the environmental problems are potential; besides claims of odor and blowing pieces of trash, the listed environmental threats have not yet occurred.
In 1998, in order to set up the transfer business, Nick Yutzy applied for a loading dock permit and a scale, both of which were granted by the City of Coralville in March and April of that year. In approving the permits, Jim Kessler contends he was unaware that Yutzy intended the loading dock and scale for a garbage transfer business.
In August 1998, approximately three months after the NN Environmental transfer business began operation, Coralville official Rich Russell received complaints of an odor at the site. Upon discovering a garbage transfer operation, Russell notified plaintiff NN that it was in violation of its zoning ordinance.
Following appeal by NN, a public hearing was held before the Board of Adjustment. At the hearing, attended by four of the five members of the Board, NN asked the Board to table its decision for forty-five days so NN and Coralville could work together, independent of the Board, to find a solution that both satisfied Coralville's zoning regulations and kept NN in business. In early November 1998, NN was granted five months' time to find an alternative site for its operation, tolling the forty-five day period for the Board of Adjustment's decision. In the meantime NN continued operations. The five-month period expired on April 1, 1999. Following notification by the City, NN asked for another hearing, but this request apparently was denied. In April of 1999 the four members of the Board of Adjustment who were present at the public hearing voted on whether to reconvene over the matter. Two voted in favor of reconvening, two against. The one member who was not present at the hearing was not informed of the vote. As there was no majority vote to reconvene, the Board did not. Section 165.54 of the Coralville zoning ordinance provides that an appeal not acted upon by the Board of Adjustment within forty-five days of the public hearing is automatically denied.
Dan Shannon, the fifth member of the Board, did not attend. Testimony indicated he had received a letter from zoning administrator, Rich Russell, indicating he might have a conflict of interest in the matter. Apparently Mr. Shannon owned property near the NN operation and had signed a petition indicating "outrage" at the City's putting NN out of business.
City attorney Kirstene Diehl informed the members of the Board at the hearing that the Board did not have the authority at that meeting to grant a variance, that the sole issue was whether the zoning decision finding NN out of compliance was in fact correct.
NN brought an action challenging Coralville's zoning decision. On September 16, 1999, it obtained a temporary injunction pending final judgment by the court. A bench trial was held on April 16, 2001. The trial court similarly concluded NN was in violation of the Coralville zoning ordinance.
II. INTERPRETATION OF ZONING ORDINANCE
NN's first argument is that the City's interpretation of its zoning code as it applies to garbage transfer in an I-2 zone violates Iowa law because it expands the restrictive scope of the ordinance beyond its plain meaning in derogation of the free use of property. See City of New Hampton v. Blayne-Martin Corp., 594 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Iowa 1999). According to NN, the City's interpretation of the ordinance to exclude NN's transfer activity prohibits a use which would otherwise be expressly allowed in the I-2 zone, and is certainly not prohibited according to the plain language of the ordinance.
NN petitioned the district court for, among other forms of relief, a writ of certiorari. "A writ of certiorari is proper under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure [1.1401] when one `exercising judicial functions is alleged to have . . . acted illegally.'" Dressler v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 542 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Iowa R.Civ.P. [1.1401]). Our review of a district court certiorari ruling is at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; see City of Grimes v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 495 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Iowa 1993). An illegality is established if the board has not acted in accordance with a statute; if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or if its actions were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Norland v. Worth County Compensation Bd., 323 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1982) (citations omitted). We are bound by findings of the trial court if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)(a); Helmke v. Bd. of Adjustment, 418 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1988). "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion." Hasselman v. Hasselman, 596 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Iowa 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Dodgen, 451 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1990)). Although our standard of review concerning certiorari actions is generally limited to errors at law, our review is de novo as to the constitutional challenges raised. See Dressler, 542 N.W.2d at 564-65.
Plaintiff contends the district court's interpretation of the zoning ordinance unlawfully expands the definition of the "I-2 Light Industrial" zone beyond its stated parameters. We disagree and affirm the district court's legal interpretation, further finding the decision to be supported by substantial evidence.
Under section 165.29 of the Coralville zoning ordinance, "The I-2 Light Industrial District is a low impact industrial, business and research area set aside for the location of enterprises that have negligible environmental impacts beyond their property limits." Listed permitted uses include, among others, automobile services, beverage bottling, dry cleaning facilities, and truck terminals. Food processing facilities are provisional uses in the I-2 district, if they are granted a provisional use permit by the City Zoning Administrator and emit no odors.
Plaintiff argues his garbage transfer facility is a "truck terminal," and therefore qualifies as a permitted use in the I-2 district. Although I-2 does expressly permit "truck terminals," the stated function of I-2 is to permit only those enterprises with "negligible environmental impacts beyond their property limits." As garbage, in being garbage, does not conclusively have merely a "negligible environmental impact," we conclude the question of whether a truck terminal for garbage transfer fits under the "I-2" definition is subject to interpretation.
The district court's interpretation of the ordinance was that it did not include truck terminals where garbage was transferred. In reaching its conclusion, the court used the following reasoning:
During the truck-to-truck transfer process, blowing litter is possible, if not probable. Odors from solid waste are always a potential problem. There is liquid runoff from time to time. This runoff during heavy rain has the potential to drain toward the Iowa River which is south of the NN business site. Drainage may seep onto a park which is between the river and the loading site. A garbage transfer site will, by its very nature, pose a potential negative environmental impact. Such an operation has the potential dangers of fire, vermin, litter, and toxic liquids. The impact in such an area is not "negligible." It is apparent to the court that a solid waste transfer operation (truck-to-truck) is a use which is not contemplated nor allowed in Coralville's I-2 zone.
We conclude substantial evidence supports this conclusion. As the plaintiff conceded, the transfer of garbage includes some spillage. There was evidence that runoff from the site would potentially drain into the Iowa River. Evidence also showed this garbage would potentially have a detrimental environmental impact, both directly, in the pollution of land and water, and indirectly, in attracting vermin and posing a fire hazard. There was further evidence of a foul odor coming from the business. The only permitted use in I-2 with a similar potential for emitting foul odors is the food processing facility. Under the ordinance, that facility is allowed as a provisional use only, and to be allowed in the I-2 district it must emit no odors. In that the I-2 district is designed to permit light industrial activity with negligible environmental effects, we conclude the district court's decision that a garbage transfer operation is not a permitted use in this district was supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff additionally argues all of the environmental problems posed by the garbage transfer site are merely potential and that the district court failed to take into account means taken by NN to minimize these potential problems. Plaintiff offers no authority for the proposition that a potential hazard is insufficient to bar a particular use from a zoned area. As the purpose behind zoning ordinances is largely to prevent problems between conflicting uses of land before they occur, potential hazards caused by a certain use must be sufficient to bar it from a particular zone. Further, under the plain language of the ordinance, mitigating measures will not make permissible otherwise impermissible uses in the I-2 district. The I-2 district contemplates mitigating measures, but only in specific cases. For example, it allows food processing as a provisional use only if the odor can be eliminated. The I-2 district does not, however, make such exceptions in general. Mitigating measures as a general matter are contemplated in the I-3 district only. The stated purpose of the I-3 district is to "provide for uses [having negative environmental impacts] in the community and to properly insure their negative impacts are properly mitigated." We are therefore not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that mitigating measures make the garbage transfer permissible in the I-2 zone.
Plaintiff's final argument regarding the interpretation of the ordinance is that the district court's interpretation operates to limit land use beyond the plain meaning of the ordinance, in violation of established law favoring the free use of property. It is well established that zoning ordinances are considered extensions of the police power and must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property. See City of New Hampton v. Blayne-Martin Corp., 594 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Iowa 1999) (holding ordinance requiring that building be enclosed on all sides with fire-resistant materials could not be interpreted to require that all walls within the building must also be enclosed on all sides with fire-resistant material). A zoning restriction may not be extended by implication or interpretation. Id.; Steinlage v. City of New Hampton, 567 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (construing ordinance whose plain meaning — contradictory in separate subsections — both allowed and restricted multi-family dwellings in a C-2 district allowed these dwellings). However, it is also well-settled that an ordinance must be considered in its entirety, giving each section due regard so that the enactment, as a whole, is given its "natural and intended meaning." Blayne-Martin Corp., 594 N.W.2d at 45; Kordick Plumbing Heating Co. v. Sarcone, 190 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Iowa 1971). The list of permitted uses in the I-2 district is extensive. Nowhere does it permit or even mention solid waste or garbage. The stated purpose of the I-2 district is to provide a location for businesses with negligible environmental impacts beyond their property limits. Although "loading docks" are allowed in the I-2 district, given the stated environmental considerations for the I-2 zone, we must also consider the contents involved in the loading operation. Clearly, loading uranium would present a different problem than loading lumber, even if both utilized the same type of loading dock. Given the stated environmental considerations in I-2 and the absence in the detailed list of permitted I-2 uses of any provision for "garbage" or the like, we conclude the district court's interpretation did not unduly extend the zoning restrictions, but instead gave effect to their natural and comprehensive meaning.
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE
Plaintiff's second claim on appeal is that the City's decision violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution by imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce. The district court dismissed plaintiff's argument with the following justification:
The court concludes the municipality's determination that NN's truck-to-truck transfer of solid waste is in violation of its zoning ordinance does not prevent NN from transporting its loads into interstate commerce. NN is free to take the garbage it collects to out-of-state facilities. Coralville is merely enforcing its zoning ordinance which is a legitimate exercise of its police power for the general protection of the community and its citizens.
Plaintiff claims the court should have considered whether the ordinance discriminated against interstate commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect, rather than considering only whether the ordinance prevented NN from participating in interstate commerce. Plaintiff further argues its efforts at mitigation would promote just as effectively the City's environmental interests without burdening the plaintiff's own attempts at interstate travel.
We review this constitutional claim de novo. Dressler, 542 N.W.2d at 564-65. The United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation under the Commerce Clause:
When [an ordinance] directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined whether the [government] interest is legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.Iowa Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 420 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Iowa 1988) (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 2084, 90 L.Ed.2d 552, 559 (1986)).
In light of the fact that alternative zoning exists in Coralville where garbage transfer would be permissible, we conclude the purpose and direct effect of the I-2 ordinance making garbage transfer impermissible in the I-2 zone is not to discriminate against interstate commerce or favor in-state interests. We therefore analyze this case by determining whether the City's interest is legitimate and whether the local benefits of the zone are exceeded by its burden. In so doing, we conclude the City's interest, namely to make the I-2 zone a relatively environmentally protected area, is legitimate. We also conclude the burden of being barred from operating a trash transfer business in a particular zone in the City, especially given the availability of other land in the same City zoned specifically for this sort of heavy industrial operation, does not outweigh the benefits to the local community of protecting the environmental integrity of the community's land and water. We consequently conclude the district court's interpretation of the zoning ordinance did not violate the Commerce Clause.
IV. VAGUENESS
Plaintiff further contests the district court's interpretation of the ordinance as rendering it void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant argues plaintiff did not preserve this claim for our review, as the district court did not rule on the vagueness issue and defendant did not raise it in his Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) motion following trial. See Slater v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1983). Although defendant acknowledges plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process arguments in the amended petition, defendant refers us to Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Iowa 1981) for the proposition that a party may not make general reference to constitutional provisions in the trial court and then seek to develop the argument on appeal.
Even if this issue were preserved for our review, we conclude it is without merit. We review this constitutional claim de novo. Dressler, 542 N.W.2d at 564-65. When an ordinance is challenged on constitutional grounds, a presumption of constitutionality exists that can only be overcome by negating every reasonable basis upon which the ordinance could otherwise be sustained. Ackman v. Bd. of Adjustment for Black Hawk County, 596 N.W.2d 96, 104-05 (Iowa 1999) (citing Cyclone Sand Gravel Co., 351 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1984)). To sustain a challenge based on vagueness, the aggrieved party must show that the language in the ordinance does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of proscribed conduct, when measured by common understanding or practice. Id. In other words, when persons must necessarily guess at the meaning of the statute and its applicability, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 105 (citing Greenawalt v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 345 N.W.2d 537, 545 (Iowa 1984)).
Plaintiff claims the ordinance delegates a "standardless, discretionary determination" to City zoning officials making decisions regarding zoning violations. We disagree. The ordinance consists of a detailed list of more than twenty specifically permitted uses, more than five provisional uses with stated conditions, and an additional two conditional uses. Not only is there clear guidance as to use from the permitted uses listed, the ordinance has the stated guideline, which can be contrasted with the stated guidelines for the other zones, that it is only to contain enterprises with negligible environmental impacts. Further, one can glean a more precise understanding of "negligible" by perusing the list of permitted uses already determined to have a "negligible" environmental impact outside their boundaries. As the court found in Ackman, we similarly find that this ordinance is composed of standards "general enough to deal with unforeseeable circumstances that may arise and yet . . . not so specific that they defeat" the purpose of the ordinance to create a comprehensive land use plan. Ackman, 596 N.W.2d at 106. We affirm on this issue.
V. ESTOPPEL
Plaintiff also argues that the City was estopped from finding NN's land use was in violation of the zoning code. Plaintiff argues that the City's grant of loading dock and scale permits, and its failure to inquire as to their exact purpose, estopped it from subsequently finding plaintiff's use of the loading dock and scale for garbage transfer was in violation of the zoning code. Defendant responds that NN cannot claim estoppel due to its own failure to fully disclose the purpose behind the requested permits.
We review this claim in equity de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applied against a governmental body only under exceptional circumstances. City of Marshalltown v. Reyerson, 535 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). A municipality is generally not estopped from enforcing its zoning regulations. Id. (citing City of Lamoni v. Livingston, 392 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Iowa 1986)).
Section 165.45 of the Coralville code of ordinances instructs the zoning administrator, in issuing a zoning permit, to determine compliance with the zoning code based on the information provided by the applicant. Plaintiff, the applicant in this case, did not disclose to the administrator that the purpose of the loading dock and scale he was applying for permits to install, was for a new garbage transfer operation where part of the garbage would spill and thereby affect adjoining property. As the district court stated,
In this case, NN implies the city zoning administrator has a duty to interview an applicant to determine exactly what use is intended when a building permit is sought. NN was already the lessee of the premises at 311 East 11th Street in Coralville. Truck terminals and truck maintenance facilities were permitted in an I-2 zone. NN had stored and parked its garbage trucks on the property for many years. There was no reason for the city to deny the permit or, for that matter, conduct an investigation as to what use NN intended for the premises.
Plaintiff's only authority to support an estoppel theory against a municipality where the estoppel claim was successful was in a case where there was full disclosure as to the intended use of the land. See Crow v. Bd. of Adjustment of Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324, 328, 288 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa 1939). There simply was no disclosure by plaintiff of his intent to use the zoning permits for garbage transfer. Given the zoning ordinance's direction that zoning permits should be based upon information submitted by the applicant, as well as the lack of authority indicating it was the duty of the municipality to conduct independent investigations into permit applications, we see no merit to plaintiff's estoppel claim. We affirm on this issue.
VI. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Plaintiff's final argument is that the district court was in error to conclude that NN was not denied procedural due process of law. Plaintiff argues there were several problems with the zoning approval process: 1) one member of the Board of Adjustment, where NN appealed the zoning decision, was erroneously told not to participate because of a conflict of interest; 2) the City attorney gave erroneous advice to the Board regarding its authority to modify the decision; 3) misinformation caused the Board not to reconvene, causing the zoning decision erroneously to be affirmed by operation of law; 4) these procedural irregularities were unprecedented and prejudiced plaintiffs.
We review plaintiff's constitutional due process claim de novo. Dressler, 542 N.W.2d at 564-65. Due process must be afforded where state action threatens to deprive an individual of a protected liberty or property interest. Owens v. Brownlie, 610 N.W.2d 860, 870 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). The requirements of procedural due process are simple and well established: 1) notice; and 2) a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Blumenthal Inv. v. City of Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 264 (Iowa 2001). In concluding plaintiff's due process rights had been met, the district court stated the following:
There is no question but that NN was afforded procedural due process in this case. NN was given notice of the violation of the zoning ordinance. An opportunity to be heard was held before the Board of Adjustment. The Board voted two to two with one member abstaining. The decision was then tabled and ultimately the zoning administrator's decision was affirmed by operation of law. Further NN exercised its right to proceed to the district court and has had a full trial on all claims asserted.
NN points us to several facts which it claims demonstrates the failure of the City of Coralville to afford it its procedural due process rights. Before the public hearing was held, zoning administrator Rich Russell, the individual whose decision NN would be contesting at the hearing, wrote to Board of Adjustment member Dan Shannon, indicating he could have a conflict of interest in the matter. Dan Shannon owned land near NN and had demonstrated support for NN in a petition indicating his "outrage" that the City was trying to put NN out of business. Dan Shannon did not attend the public hearing.
At the hearing the Board was informed by city attorney Diehl that they did not have the authority at that meeting to grant a variance. Testimony at trial indicated the Board members had never faced a decision with the deep impact this one might have, namely putting a fifteen-year operation out of business. Because the Board members were under the impression from the City attorney that they could not grant a variance, which NN contends was an incorrect statement of law under section 414.2, and because they did not wish to make a quick decision with such a deep impact, they agreed to table the decision to better analyze the situation, and to allow NN and the City to attempt a compromise. NN contends the forty-five days, along with the City's five-month grace period, did not lead to a more informed decision, but instead allowed the Board members to forget the problem or conclude it had somehow been resolved. Testimony by at least one board member at trial indicated she believed the matter had been settled between the time of the hearing and the time she was asked to vote whether to reconvene to discuss it. The April vote by the Board regarding whether to reconvene was two votes in favor, two opposed. Board member Dan Shannon, who had not attended the public hearing and who had previously voiced support for NN, was not informed of the April vote. The Board's vote resulted in their affirming by default the same matter which six months earlier they had deemed too weighty to decide immediately.
NN faults the Board for never actually making a decision, and that although boards of adjustment can make decisions by operation of law, the full Board in this case, which included Dan Shannon, was never informed of the vote (to reconvene) resulting in the decision by operation of law because it was not affirmatively acted upon. Significantly, we note the district court was in error to state, "The Board voted two to two with one member abstaining. The decision was then tabled. . . ." In fact, the five-member Board never made a decision at the October hearing. Four of the members voted on whether to revisit the issue six months later in April. Because two voted not to, the Board did not consider the issue further. Due to these irregularities in the process, NN claims it was not afforded its due process right to a decision by the Board of Adjustment.
In spite of the claimed irregularities in the process, we find, as did the district court, that plaintiff had adequate notice and ample and meaningful opportunity to be heard. We affirm on this issue.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given our above conclusions, we affirm the district court's decision in this case.