Opinion
CIVIL NO. CCB-07-2690.
January 20, 2009
MEMORANDUM
Now pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the defendants") against plaintiff Jimmy Mullins ("Mr. Mullins"). Mr. Mullins alleges that the defendants discriminated him based on his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The issues in this motion have been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Mullins has been a Baltimore City employee in the Department of Public Works ("DPW") Fleet Management division ("Fleet Management") since 1998, when he was hired as an automotive body repairer. He was hired to perform major and minor repair work on city vehicles housed at Baltimore City Central Garage ("Central Garage"). His immediate supervisor was Jim Wilburn ("Mr. Wilburn"), the automotive body shop supervisor ("supervisor").
Soon after he began his employment with Baltimore City, Mr. Mullins became the unofficial lead mechanic and assistant supervisor for Central Garage. In this capacity, he performed supervisory duties such as assigning vehicles for repair, interacting with city vendors, and supervising other employees. After three years, Mr. Mullins requested to return to his position of repairer because he had not received any additional pay or an official title, which he claimed were repeatedly promised to him. Soon after, Robert Brown ("Mr. Brown"), a Baltimore City employee since 1981, took over the unofficial supervisory role and remained there until 2006 when Mr. Wilburn retired.
Both the plaintiff and Mr. Brown applied to replace Mr. Wilburn as supervisor. The Department of Human Resources identified five applicants, including Mr. Mullins, as having the minimum qualifications for the supervisor position. Four of the applicants were interviewed for the position: Mr. Mullins, Deborah Mullins, Jeffrey Gibson, and Mr. Brown. Interviews were held on May 15, 2006 before a three-member panel of Baltimore City employees: Barbara Neale ("Ms. Neale") from human resources; Edward Shelley, a motor equipment maintenance supervisor for Fleet Management; and Anthony DelBarto, an equal opportunity officer. The panel asked the applicants the same ten questions and scored them using model answers as guides. The panel also scored the applicants on their education and experience, based on their resumes, and on their overall communication skills presented during the interview. The scores of the interviews were as follows: Mr. Brown, 321; Jeffrey Gibson, 306; Mr. Mullins, 245; Deborah Mullins, 233. The panel sent the interview scores to Charles Krysiak ("Mr. Krysiak"), the chief of Fleet Management, who selected Jeffrey Gibson for the supervisor position. Mr. Brown then filed an internal grievance alleging Jeffrey Gibson was selected as supervisor because his uncle, Robert Gibson, was the assistant chief of Fleet Management. In response, Thomas Burgess ("Mr. Burgess"), DPW's human resources director, reviewed the interview scores and directed Mr. Krysiak to fill the position with the highest-ranked applicant — Mr. Brown. At the time Mr. Brown was selected for the position, he was forty-four years old, Mr. Mullins was fifty-four years old, and Jeffrey Gibson was fifty-one years old.
Deborah Mullins is the plaintiff's wife. She has also filed a complaint in this court alleging, inter alia, that she was not selected for the supervisor position due to gender discrimination and in retaliation for a lawsuit she filed against Baltimore City in state court.
According to Mr. Mullins, the interview process was flawed because, inter alia, Mr. Brown falsified his resume, which the defendants failed to verify, and was unqualified for the position. On November 3, 2006, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Maryland Commission on Human Rights and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming he was denied a promotion due to his age. On October 4, 2007, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging a violation of the ADEA. He seeks back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On June 30, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff alleges Mr. Brown falsified his resume by claiming he was the "Assistant Supervisor" at Central Garage, when in fact no such official title exists.
ANALYSIS
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court has clarified this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility," Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
The ADEA prohibits a covered employer from failing or refusing to hire an individual who is at least forty years old because of the individual's age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). Because Mr. Mullins does not present direct evidence of age discrimination, the court will analyze his claim under the three-pronged burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII burden-shifting framework in ADEA context). Under this framework, Mr. Mullins must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. If he succeeds in carrying this initial burden, then "the burden shifts to the employer . . . `to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.'" Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) ( en banc)). Once such a reason is provided, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the given reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the denial of a promotion, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied for the position in question; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Evans v. Technologies Applications and Service, 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1996). It is undisputed that Mr. Mullins is over forty years old, that he applied and was qualified for the supervisor position, and that despite those qualifications he was not selected for the position. The defendants contend that Mr. Mullins has failed to show that the circumstances of his non-selection give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Mr. Mullins alleges that the interview panel had no experience in automotive body repair, that the defendants failed to verify Mr. Brown's qualifications, and that the interview panel failed to question the candidates about the core skills required for the supervisor position. Regardless of the wisdom of the selection process, however, the Fourth Circuit has noted that "Title VII is not a vehicle for substituting the judgment of a court for that of the employer," thus courts "do[] not sit as a kind of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by firms charged with employment discrimination." DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). It is undisputed that all candidates who applied for the position went through the same application process: applicants who met the minimum qualifications for the position were invited to interview for the position; they were scored in the interview based on their experience and education, answers to the questions, and overall communication skills; and those scores were sent to the final decision maker.
While Mr. Mullins may believe the selection process was flawed, he has failed to identify any aspect of the interview process that even suggests a decision maker discriminated against him based on his age. In his deposition, the plaintiff accuses only Robert Gibson and Mr. Krysiak of discrimination and relies solely on his intuition and beliefs to substantiate these claims. He does not allege that either man ever made any age-related comments or treated him differently from younger employees. Moreover, the evidence shows that Robert Gibson did not participate in the selection process because his uncle, Jeffrey Gibson, was applying for the position, and Mr. Krysiak originally selected Jeffrey Gibson, who is only three years younger than the plaintiff, to fill the supervisor position. Further, when Mr. Burgess directed Mr. Krysiak to hire the candidate with the highest score, he relied only on the tally sheet from the interview, which did not indicate the applicants' ages. The record strongly suggests that Mr. Mullins cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Nonetheless, the defendants have articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Mr. Mullins for the supervisor position: the interview panel scored him significantly lower than Mr. Brown, the ultimate choice for the position. In an attempt to show that the defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons for his non-selection are pretextual, Mr. Mullins relies on the allegedly flawed interview process and his own opinion that he was more qualified than Mr. Brown.
As noted above, there is no indication that the selection process was applied any differently to Mr. Mullins than to the other candidates, and there is no evidence that the process operated invidiously against him based on his age. While Mr. Mullins claims that the defendants failed to verify Brown's resume, which would have uncovered his alleged falsification and identified the plaintiff as the more qualified candidate, he offers no evidence that this oversight was based on discriminatory animus. Rather, Ms. Neale testified in her deposition that the human resources department routinely does not verify the information on candidates' resumes in order to hasten the hiring process. And the plaintiff's contention that the subjective nature of the interview is evidence of pretext fails in light of his inability to offer any evidence that the interview process was discriminatory. See, e.g., Obi v. Anne Arundel County, Md, 142 F.Supp.2d 655, 669-70 (D. Md. 2001). As discussed above, where a hiring process, even a flawed one, is not discriminatory, it is not the province of the courts to sit in judgment of that process. Moreover, as to Mr. Mullins's allegedly superior qualifications, the Fourth Circuit has noted that "it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff." Evans, 80 F.3d at 960-61 (quotations and alterations omitted). It is undisputed that Mr. Brown had a longer tenure with Baltimore City and, prior to the promotion, was acting as the unofficial assistant supervisor under Mr. Wilburn. The plaintiff offers no evidence that any member of the interview panel or any other decision maker considered him to be more qualified yet selected Mr. Brown instead. Rather, all of the panel members scored Mr. Mullins's experience lower than Mr. Brown's.
In light of the plaintiff's inability to establish pretext, the court will grant the defendants's motion for summary judgment. A separate order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. the defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket entry no. 16) is GRANTED; and
2. the Clerk shall CLOSE this case.