Opinion
CASE NO. 8:08-cv-1677-T-23TBM.
September 17, 2008
ORDER
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant moves (Doc. 3) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responds (Doc. 5) in opposition. The defendant, a debt collection agency with its principal place of business in Marietta, Georgia, contends that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the claims asserted is inconsistent with both Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, as evidenced by a September 33, 2008, affidavit of Steven R. Koepke (Doc. 4-2), (a) "all telephone calls placed from Focus Receivables, LLC to Mr. Mould originated out of [the defendant's] Marietta, Georgia call center to a telephone number located in Tennessee," and (b) "Mr. Mould's account was never worked in its Tampa, Florida office, therefore no calls were made from that location." However, the defendant concedes that the defendant holds a consumer collection license in Florida and maintains a branch office in Hillsborough County, Florida, and the defendant provides no reason to doubt the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant regularly conducts business from that office — and consequently no reason to doubt that the defendant "engages in substantial and not isolated activity within this state," see Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, or that the defendant's contacts with Florida are continuous and systematic. In short, even the facts admitted by the defendant appear to show that the defendant is subject to jurisdiction under Florida's general jurisdiction statute, Section 48.193(2), for a claim asserted against the defendant, "whether or not the claim arises from" the defendant's Florida activities, and that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant is consistent with due process under Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Accordingly, the motion (Doc. 3) is DENIED.
See also Doc. 3 at 4 n. 1 ("Defendant does maintain a consumer collection license in the State of Florida and has a branch office in Hillsborough County, Florida, however, none of the collection activity occurred out of the State of Florida.").
See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) ("A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity."); Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("The general jurisdiction statute does not require connexity [sic] between a defendant's activities and the cause of action.")
See Woods, 739 So. 2d at 620 (stating that because Florida courts interpret "substantial and not isolated activity" in Section 48.193(2) as "continuous and systematic general business contact" with Florida, activities sufficient to confer general jurisdiction under Section 48.193(2) also satisfy due process under traditional minimum contacts analysis); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Florida courts have held the term `substantial and not isolated activity' used in § 48.193(2) means `continuous and systematic general business contact' with Florida, a term used by the Supreme Court inHelicopteros to determine whether general jurisdiction was permissible under the Due Process Clause."); Ahern v. Pac. Gulf Marine, Inc.. No. 8:06-cv-2068-T-27MSS, 2008 WL 706501, *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2008) ("The `substantial and not isolated activity' requirement for general jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute is the functional equivalent of the `continuous and systematic contact' requirement under the Due Process Clause.").
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida.