Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 98-1656 SECTION: "K" (1)
May 15, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
For the reasons discussed below, the renewed motion of the plaintiff, Al Morris ("Morris") for an award of attorneys' fees is granted in part and denied in part and Morris is awarded attorneys' fees of $37,695.00.
BACKGROUND OF REQUEST FOR FEES
On March 26, 2001, the plaintiff, Al Morris ("Morris"), and the sole remaining defendant, Harry Lee, Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, in his official capacity ("Sheriff Lee"), stipulated that: (1) the determination of attorneys' fees would be deferred pending appeal of the substantive issues; (2) the undersigned Magistrate Judge would preside over Morris' request for attorneys' fees; (3) the parties waived all rights to appeal the undersigned's determination; and (4) Morris' request for attorneys' fees for the appeal would be resolved by the undersigned on the same basis. Rec doc. 132. On July 31, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment affirming the District Court's decision. Rec. doc. 142. Morris filed a renewed motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Rec. doc. 143. Sheriff Lee submitted an opposition. Rec. doc. 149. The parties submitted supplemental memoranda. Rec. docs. 148, 150, 152 and 154.
Morris seeks an award of attorneys' fees of $78,531.25, which is comprised of the following:
15,995 7,050 15,706
Attorney Activity Hours Rate Total Williams Fees through post trial motions 265.20 150 39,780 Williams Fees for appeal 91.40 175 Subtotal 55,775 Wiggins Trial preparation and assistance with trial 70.50 100 Subtotal 62,825 Upward adjustment for results obtained (25% of 62,825) Total fee award sought by Morris 78,531 Sheriff Lee makes no objection to the rate sought by Morris for either Dale Williams (Williams) or Frazilia Wiggins (Wiggins). Sheriff Lee contends that: (1) Williams' hours should be reduced because Morris did not prevail on his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law; (2) Wiggins' hours should be eliminated for the same reason as well as her limited participation at the trial; and (3) Morris should not receive any upward adjustment for the results obtained. Morris responds that: (1) he succeeded on his retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; (2) all of his claims arose out of a common core of facts and were based on related theories; and (3) pursuant to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940-41 (1983), there should be no reduction for his lack of success on all but one of his claims.The following description of the facts and procedure is found in the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion:
Morris was hired by Sheriff Lee in 1988. Two former supervisors reported that Morris never received written reprimands while under their supervision. One testified, however, that Morris and several others were habitually late, but that Morris was never late often enough to warrant a suspension.
While on First District day watch from February 1996 until the Fall of 1997, Morris witnessed a series of events, which he characterized as homosexual harassment, directed against Deputy Jeffrey Picone by Sergeant James Schanbein (their supervisor). These events included unwelcome, public sexual advances, sexual comments during roll call prior to the beginning of day watch, and false statements to third parties concerning Picone's sexual orientation. Morris confronted Sergeant Schanbein, which resulted in Sergeant Schanbein's becoming upset, screaming at Morris, and storming out of district headquarters.
Morris complained to James Cavalier, Sergeant Schanbein's immediate supervisor, about Sergeant Schanbein's harassment during August or September 1996, but Lieutenant Cavalier did nothing. Morris did not complain, however, to Lieutenant Joseph Torres, Morris' watch commander.
Following these complaints, during the fall of 1996: Morris received several suspensions and reprimands for tardiness and unsatisfactory performance; Sergeant Schanbein would "return every report that [Morris] filled out"; and Sergeant Schanbein routinely screamed at Morris about problems with his reports.
Morris then complained about the harassment to Lieutenant Cavalier's immediate supervisor, Major Lawrence Juster, on 2 December 1996. At that meeting. Lieutenant Cavalier accused Morris of having a "mental problem". The next day, Morris was ordered to DePaul Psychiatric Hospital for three weeks. (Had Morris refused to go, he probably would have been fired.) Morris contends being ordered to DePaul was for no particular reason, and doctors found no medical necessity for his being there.
Sergeant Schanbein's harassment of Deputy Picone continued during the early part of 1997, with Deputy Picone filing an internal affairs report against Sergeant Schanbein that April. That May, Morris' supervisor, Major Sue Ellen Monfra, recommended Sergeant Schanbein's being suspended for ten days, but no one ever told Major Monfra that Morris witnessed or complained of Sergeant Schanbein's harassment. Chief Craig Taffaro later increased Sergeant Schanbein's punishment to a 30-day suspension and demotion.
Morris followed Deputy Picone's complaint in April 1997 with his own complaint to Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (IPSO) Internal Affairs that June. This complaint was filed several days after Morris was reassigned from the day to the midnight watch.
Morris claims his personnel files were "doctored" to reflect poor work; at trial, however, he could not specifically identify what was changed. Following his Internal Affairs complaint, Morris, in August 1997, received letters confirming his suspensions for incidents of tardiness that occurred in October 1996. (Morris claims, throughout his brief here, that he was "suspended" multiple times for the same incidents. However, it appears that the second "suspensions" were confirmations of earlier imposed suspensions.) Morris was also put on probation for an automobile accident and other minor incidents.
Morris filed his first discrimination charge with the EEOC on 3 November 1997, claiming retaliation for complaining about same-sex harassment. Shortly thereafter, on 12 November, he received another letter of reprimand confirming his suspension for tardiness in October 1996.
Morris initially filed this action against JPSO in June 1998, claiming retaliation in violation of Title VII in the form of reprimands, suspensions, poor performance reviews, and the psychiatric evaluation's being ordered. In July, he amended his complaint to add Sheriff Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Jefferson Parish. (The district court subsequently granted an unopposed motion to dismiss JPSO because, under Louisiana law, that entity lacks the legal capacity to sue or be sued.)
Following Morris' second EEOC charge in October 1998, he was investigated for aggravated rape and weapons violations, which included a search of his home. In February 1999, he was required to give a statement concerning an incident involving use of his JPSO automobile by his friend Paulette Doyle, who was involved in other incidents, discussed below.
In March 1999, Morris was investigated for criminal extortion and conspiracy to commit murder. On March 16, he was questioned about the conspiracy allegations and was suspended indefinitely, pending investigation into the criminal charges. (Morris asserts throughout his brief that he was charged with conspiracy to commit murder; his trial testimony confirms he was never charged with that crime by the District Attorney.)
That April, Morris filed his third charge of discrimination with the EEOC. He claims the investigations were a part of ongoing retaliation.
Morris was terminated on 20 May 1999, after the District Attorney accepted for prosecution the criminal extortion charge. (In Morris' subsequent unemployment compensation hearing, Sheriff Lee admitted Morris was fired because of the pending felony extortion charge.) Morris was arrested that June.
That August, Morris amended his complaint in this action. He added false arrest claims against several IPSO officers involved in investigating the extortion charges and added a false imprisonment claim for the incident concerning the psychiatric hospital.
Morris was acquitted in an October bench trial on the extortion charge. Nevertheless, Sheriff Lee refused to rehire him.
The criminal allegations against Morris from late 1998 through 1999 (aggravated rape, weapons violations, conspiracy to commit murder, and extortion) involved the same individuals. At that time, Eric LeBlanc shared a security apartment with Morris and his wife, Dawn Morris. LeBlanc was involved in an extra-marital affair with Paulette Doyle, the above-named friend of Morris and his wife. Morris believes Shawn Doyle, Paulette Doyle's husband, instigated the rape complaint against Morris because Shawn Doyle was upset with Morris' role in facilitating LeBlanc's affair with Shawn Doyle's wife, Paulette Doyle.
The conspiracy to commit murder complaint (which, as noted, was never pursued beyond the investigative stage) arose because Morris: allegedly made violent threats against Shawn Doyle; and believed Paulette Doyle might be taking nude photographs of Morris' child while she was babysitting.
The extortion charge involve Morris' alleged attempt to extort concessions from a woman in the process of adopting a child fathered by LeBlanc. The biological mother was Paulette Doyle. Morris' conversation with the woman, in which Morris revealed he was IPSO deputy and mentioned his colleagues knew how to wrest custody of a child away from others, was recorded and provided to JPSO by the Volunteers of America (the adoption agency).
This civil action was tried over five days in mid-2000. Kevin Nardelle, a friend of the Morrises, Doyles and LeBlanc, testified JPSO officers coerced him into giving a false statement concerning Morris' involvement in a conspiracy to commit murder. However, Nardelle admitted Morris told him that he (Morris) would defend himself if Doyle ever threatened him.
In Sheriff Lee's defense, Deputy Jeffrey Galpin testified Sergeant Schanbein was obnoxious and picked on all of the deputies. Two officers investigating the conspiracy to commit murder allegations flatly denied coercing Nardelle and testified Nardelle admitted to being afraid of Morris. Further, Deputy Chief James Miller testified he knew nothing of Morris' complaint of workplace sexual harassment when he (Deputy Chief Miller) was first informed of the potential extortion charge against Morris.
Finally, Chief Newell Normand testified he was the person who declined to rehire Morris following his acquittal, with the sole reason for not rehiring him being Morris' attempt to interfere with the adoption. Chief Normand conceded on cross-examination that Morris' complaint for this civil action had to have come across his desk because he (Chief Normand) has the sole authority to assign attorneys to defend against discrimination actions.
At the close of Morris' case in chief, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), Defendants (Sheriff Lee and the individual officers) moved for judgment as a matter of law (JML) on all claims. The court dismissed all federal and state claims for false imprisonment stemming from Morris' psychiatric treatment and dismissed, on qualified immunity grounds, the false arrest claims against the individual officers. The court deferred ruling on the Title VII claim.
Sheriff Lee renewed his Rule 50(a) motion at the close of all of the evidence. The motion was denied.
Following the jury verdict and award of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $47,000 in back pay, the district court entered judgment on August 28, 2000. Because Schanbein no longer worked for JPSO and Morris had little contact with those making employment decisions, the court ordered his reinstatement rather than front pay.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, Sheriff Lee moved for a new trial and, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment to remit the back pay award by any earnings realized by Morris during the relevant time period. But, Sheriff Lee did not make a post-verdict motion for JML pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Following a hearing on the Rule 59 motion (in which no argument concerning JML was made), the court denied the motion.
Rec. doc. 142 at pp. 2-8.
DISCUSSION
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983), the Supreme Court stated:
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the results obtained. This factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed "prevailing" even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief. In this situation two questions must be addressed. First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one lawsuit distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. In such a suit, even where the claims are brought against the same defendants — often an institution and its officers, as in this case — counsel's work on one claim will be unrelated to his work on another claim. Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.
It may well be that cases involving such unrelated claims are unlikely to arise with great frequency. Many civil rights cases will present only a single claim. In other cases the plaintiffs claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.Id. at 1940. See also Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2002), and Williams v. Trader Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 481, 491 (5th Cir. 2000).
Under Hensley the first step is to determine whether Morris failed to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded. Morris filed the original complaint on June 4, 1998. Rec. doc. 1. In six spare paragraphs he alleged: (1) his complaint was brought under Title VII and he was employed by Sheriff Lee; (2) he had an exemplary record; (3) in October, 1996 he witnessed same-sex harassment of a fellow officer and he complained; (4) since then he was subjected to retaliatory action, including suspensions, probation, admission to a psychiatric hospital and poor evaluations; (5) Sheriff Lee's reasons were pretextual; (6) the retaliatory action effectively ended his career; and (7) he timely filed a complaint with the EEOC and received a right to sue letter. Rec. doc. I.
More than a year later Morris filed an amended complaint, which is divided into three counts. Under count one Morris repeats verbatim the same allegations found in the original complaint, except he alleges his employment ceased on March 18, 1999. Rec. doc. 18. Count two is captioned as a Section 1983 claim. It states, "[n]ow, for a completely separate and distinct cause of action, non-parallel and unrelated to the first count, Morris claims relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added). In count two, Morris alleges that: (1) Sheriff Lee and other officers subjected him to false arrest and imprisonment on March 16, 1999 on the extortion charge; and (2) in the alternative, he was fired in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. In count three, Morris alleges a claim for false imprisonment under Louisiana law. Morris re-alleges and re-avers all of the allegations of fact in count two but does not do so for the allegations in count one. Morris alleges that he was falsely imprisoned: (a) in 1996, when he was forced to go to DePaul Hospital for psychiatric evaluation; and (b) on June 2, 1999, when he was imprisoned for five hours. Rec. doc. 18. The fact that Morris describes count two (Section 1983) and count three (Louisiana false imprisonment) as unrelated to count one (Title VII) is sufficient to demonstrate that the claims on which Morris failed to prevail were unrelated to the claim on which he did prevail.
Assuming Morris' description of his claims is insufficient, the next pleading of importance is the pretrial order. The pretrial conference was held on October 27, 1999. A joint pretrial order was submitted and signed by the District Court in which Morris described three legal theories in the following order: (1) false imprisonment claims for: (a) his 1996 confinement at DePaul; and (b) his June 2, 1999 arrest on the extortion charge; (2) a Section 1983 claim for his 1996 confinement at DePaul's; and (3) a Title VII claim that was substantially the same as the claim in the original and amended complaint. Morris described the adverse employment actions as including termination. Rec. doc. 39 at pp. 7-10.
There were continuances and the trial was reset for July 31, 2000. Rec. docs. 56, 58 and 61. On July 11, 2000, there was a further pretrial conference and the pretrial order was amended in part but there were no changes to the description of Morris' legal theories. Rec. doc. 66. The record does demonstrate that, by June 30, 2000, the parties intended to introduce evidence that Sheriff Lee refused to rehire Morris after he was acquitted on the extortion charges. Rec. doc. 65. Morris submitted proposed jury charges on: (a) Title VII — retaliation; (b) Section 1983 — unlawful arrest and superior officers; and (c) compensatory damages. Rec. doc. 70. On July 24, 2000, seven days before the start of the trial, an unsigned joint statement of the case was filed in the record, which appears to have been prepared by Morris. Morris claimed: (1) he was discharged in 1999 because of his protests against same-sex harassment; (2) in retribution for his protected actions he was confined at DePaul Hospital and falsely accused of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted forcible rape, assorted weapons violations and extortion; and (3) he was falsely imprisoned on the charge of extortion before he was acquitted of that charge. Rec. doc. 73. On the eve of the trial, Morris did not contend that his Title VII claim arose from Sheriff Lee's refusal to rehire him after his acquittal, yet this is the only claim on which Morris prevailed.
At the conclusion of the third day of the trial, the District Judge stated he needed to know which defendants were subject to which claims. Rec. doc. 137 at p. 728. Morris stated that: (1) Sheriff Lee was the only defendant on his Title VII claim ( Id. at 728-29); (2) there was no evidence to support a Section 1983 claim concerning his 1996 confinement at DePaul against any defendant ( Id. at 729-30); (3) his Section 1983 claim of false arrest and imprisonment regarding the extortion charges was against Sheriff Lee, Miller, Ulmer and Monie ( Id. at 730-31); and (4) his state law false imprisonment claim for the 1996 confinement in DePaul was against Sheriff Lee ( Id. at 731). Sheriff Lee argued that this last claim was prescribed under Louisiana law and Morris agreed. Id. at 735.
At the beginning of the fourth day of trial, Morris rested and the defendants presented their Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 motions. For the Title VII claim, the defendants argued that if there was a valid arrest in March, 1999 that triggered the termination, then the defendants' action could not be viewed as retaliatory. Rec. doc. 138 at 748. The District Court noted that the validity of the arrest impacted both the Title VII claim and the Section 1983 claim. Id. at 748. The defendants argued that there were two independent findings of probable cause before Morris was arrested: (1) by the District Attorney; and (2) by the Magistrate. Id. at 750. With probable cause for the charge of extortion, the defendants argued there was no basis for a retaliation claim. Id. at 753.
The District Court directed the argument to the consequences of a validly issued warrant and the fact that under such circumstances there can be no false arrest. Id. at 755. The District Court asked Morris to explain how he connected the complaints about the sexual harassment to the decision to prosecute him on the extortion charge when the genesis of the extortion charge was a complaint by a representative of the Volunteers of America concerning Morris' statements about an adoption conducted by that agency. Id. at 759. Morris described the events and stated, "[w]e are — our attention this morning is obviously focused on the discharge of my client." Id. at 761. After further discussion, Morris stated, "the Sheriff . . . can't fire a trouble maker if the trouble that is being made is protected by federal law." Id. at 769. Even after Morris rested, he persisted in his contention that his Title VII claim was based on the defendants' decision to terminate him based on the pretext of the extortion charge.
On the fourth day of trial, the defendants' re-urged their motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Counsel for defendants asked, "[h]as the Court seen any causal connection?" Id. at 855. The District Court responded:
Let me give you an example. Chief Normand has seen the lawsuit (Morris' federal court complaint) prior to the extortion charge. The extortion charge was certainly pursued with great vigor and passion. . . . One could then argue . . . why wasn't he rehired after he was acquitted by the jury?Id. at 855. This appears to be the first time that anyone articulated the theory on which Morris prevailed. The District Court granted the Rule 50 motion on Morris' Section 1983 claims. Id. at 846-47. The District Court determined that the arrest warrant was sufficient. Id. at 848. All defendants except Sheriff Lee were dismissed. Id. at 850. Morris argued that a claim remained for false imprisonment under Louisiana law for his incarceration at the time of his arrest on the extortion charge, but the District Court dismissed that claim on the basis of the lawful arrest. Id. at 851-52.
The pretrial proceedings, including Morris' amended complaint, and the arguments on the Fed.R.Civ.P.50 motions demonstrate that the Morris' claims are unrelated. If Morris had correctly understood the only basis on which he was to recover, the hours for his counsel would have been less. Morris' response to Sheriff Lee's appeal presented similar deficiencies. The Fifth Circuit commented that although he asserted throughout his brief that he was charged with conspiracy to commit murder, Morris' trial testimony confirmed he was never charged with that crime. The Court also noted that Morris claimed that he was suspended multiple times but it appeared that these were only confirmations of earlier imposed suspensions. Morris' misstatements of the record on appeal increased the hours spent on the appeal and the burden on the Court of Appeals.
The undersigned carefully reviewed Morris' time entries and compared them with the pleadings in the record. The only entries that can be identified entirely with claims on which Morris did not prevail are: (1) the preparation and filing of the second amended complaint on July 8, 1999; (2) the review of the answer to the second amended complaint on August 25, 1999; and (3) the preparation of jury instructions on November 5, 1999. These three entries only account for a total of 5.00 hours. There are many other entries, however, where at least part of the time was spent on the claims on which Morris did not prevail. These entries include the preparation of pleadings, for example the pretrial order (Rec. doc. 39). They also include preparation for the trial and the trial itself. For example, much of Morris' argument on the defendants' motions under Fed R. Civ. P. 50 was related to claims on which he did not prevail.
This review also indicates that Morris exercised some billing judgment by not submitting a time entry for each pleading reflected in the record. For example, there is no entry for the preparation of Morris' motion for leave to file third amended complaint. Rec. doc. 22. This would have been inappropriate as the District Court denied the motion because the District Attorney, who Morris sought to add, enjoyed absolute immunity. Id.
The only cause of action on which Morris' prevailed did not arise until he was acquitted of the extortion charge in October, 1999. Morris, however, filed his complaint in March, 1998. By this measure some of the hours expended on Morris' behalf prior to his acquittal were without value. Morris' seeks reimbursement for 43.50 hours from March, 1998 through September, 1999. Some of this time, for example the deposition of Schanbein, was spent in furtherance of the claim on which Morris prevailed. However, some of the time spent by Morris after the acquittal was spent on claims on which he did not prevail.
Morris' time records do not permit an easy division between the claims. The second inquiry in Hensley is of assistance in these circumstances. It asks whether Morris achieved a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award. 103 S.Ct. 1940.
A preliminary issue under the second inquiry is whether it is appropriate to include Wiggins' time. The transcript of the proceedings demonstrates that Williams made the opening statement for Morris and questioned him. Wiggins conducted the examination of Joseph Torres, Frank Hibbs, Antoinette Ulmer and Darren Monie. The record also reveals that the defendants employed two counsel throughout the trial of the case. Given the effort put into the defense of Morris' claims, it is unreasonable to make a blanket rejection of Wiggins' time.
In Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff sought an award of $25,000 in back pay and punitive and compensatory damages of $300,000. The plaintiff was awarded $7,233.32 in back pay and $5,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 1048. The district court awarded fees of $81,000. Although the district court reduced the lodestar amount by ten percent, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not give adequate consideration to the eighth Johnson factor, the amount involved and the result obtained. Id. at 1047-48. The Fifth Circuit held that:
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
[W]here a plaintiff achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiffs claims were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.Id. at 1048 (Citations and quotation marks omitted).
By his own admission, Morris' claims were not related, and one of his claims was clearly prescribed. Morris achieved: (1) $5,000 in compensatory damages; (2) $47,000 in back pay; and (3) reinstatement. In his closing argument, Morris urged that he be awarded punitive damages, but none were awarded. Rec. doc. 138 at pp. 896 and 919. Morris contends that 427.10 hours were reasonably expended for these results. These hours, the equivalent of nearly ten weeks of full time activity for an attorney, are excessive compared to the results obtained. The results achieved on the Title VII claim standing alone do not support such an award of hours and Morris' lodestar must be reduced.
Sheriff Lee argues that Morris failed on two out of three claims, and accordingly Morris' lodestar should be reduced by two thirds. This is based on the assumption that Morris' counsel spent equal amounts of time on each claim. Sheriff Lee also contends that Morris' fee request is outsized compared to the damages awarded Morris. Morris responds that a value must be assigned to his reinstatement to make any meaningful comparison between the damages awarded and the fees requested. In Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hospital LLC, 217 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit held that, "a low damages award is one factor which a district court may consider in setting the amount of attorneys' fees [and] this factor alone should not lead the district court to reduce a fee award." Id. at 392.
The primary factors that argue for a reduction in the lodestar sought by Morris are: (1) his failure to prevail on his Section 1983 and state law claims; and (2) the premature filing of his Title VII claim; and (3) his inability to describe a viable basis for his Title VII claim until after he put on his case at trial. Morris' damage award is a lesser factor. In order to account for these factors the hours sought by Morris will be reduced by fifty percent for all aspects of the case, including the time spent on the appeal. Under these circumstances, there is no merit to Morris' request for an enhancement. Accordingly, the fee award in this matter is computed as follows: 7,050.00 31,412.50
Attorney Hours Rate Total Williams 265.20 150 39,780.00 Williams 91.40 175 15,995.00 Wiggins 70.50 100 Lodestar sought by Morris 62,825.00 Less reduction in lodestar of 50% Fees Awarded to Morris $31,412.50 Morris' request for legal interest on this award from the date of entry of the District Court's judgment on August 28, 2000 will be granted pursuant to Louisiana Power Light Company v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1995).CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Morris' renewed motion for an award of attorneys' fees (Rec. doc. 143) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART and Morris is awarded attorneys' fees of $31,412.50 with legal interest from August 28, 2000, the date of the entry of the judgment in this matter.