Opinion
G063289
04-16-2024
MAHNAZ KEYVANJAH MOINFAR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FARIMAN MOINFAR, Individually and as Trustee, etc., Defendants and Respondents.
Tritt & Tritt, James F. Tritt; Law Offices of James W. Tritt and James W. Tritt for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Valerie Ross, Valerie Ross; Law Offices of Jonathan T. Tasker and Jonathan T. Tasker for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. CIVDS1825253 John M. Tomberlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Tritt & Tritt, James F. Tritt; Law Offices of James W. Tritt and James W. Tritt for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Valerie Ross, Valerie Ross; Law Offices of Jonathan T. Tasker and Jonathan T. Tasker for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
Mahnaz Keyvanjah Moinfar filed a lawsuit against her former romantic partner, Fariman Moinfar, in which she sought, inter alia, compensation for services and contributions she claimed she made during their relationship "towards the purchase and growth of [certain] assets and investments." Following a bench trial, the trial court rejected Mahnaz's claims and entered judgment in Fariman's favor.
We refer to the parties by their first names for clarity; we intend no disrespect.
Mahnaz contends the trial court committed (1) structural error by following incorrect procedures in issuing its statement of decision and judgment; and (2) prejudicial legal error in denying her relief on her quantum meruit claim.
For the reasons we will explain, Mahnaz's contentions of error are without merit. We therefore affirm.
This summary of facts is based on the trial court's findings in its final statement of decision.
Fariman, who was 83 years old at the time of trial, and Mahnaz, who was 62 years old at the time of trial, "resided together for three years as a couple" until Mahnaz left the relationship in 2013. The parties stipulated their relationship did not constitute a legal marriage under California law. In 2015, Mahnaz found herself with no place to live and returned to Fariman "as a tenant only."
Mahnaz did not pay Fairman rent and did not otherwise "br[ing] finances to the relationship." She testified she cleaned, cooked, and did laundry. Fairman provided Mahnaz access to bank accounts to make withdrawals; she accessed thousands of dollars in cash and gifts.
Before, during, and after his relationship with Mahnaz, Fariman was engaged in the business of buying, renovating, and selling or renting real property. Mahnaz testified she was never trained and had no prior experience in remodeling and "'flipping' homes." Mahnaz was never a co-owner of Fariman's properties. She testified she cleaned properties being remodeled.
In 2013, before Mahnaz left, Fariman conveyed a residence to Mahnaz by grant deed (the Fence Rider property), subject to partial repayment to Fariman in the amount of $120,000. The Fence Rider property is currently worth $350,000 to $400,000.
In 2018, the parties engaged in a physical altercation; both parties suffered injuries and this litigation ensued.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND THE CROSS-COMPLAINT
In September 2018, Mahnaz initiated the instant action and filed and recorded a notice of lis pendens as to 12 of Fariman's properties. Mahnaz filed a first amended complaint (complaint) against Fariman as an individual and as trustee of the Moinfar Family Trust dated July 11, 2013 (Trust).
The complaint alleges "[t]his case is about . . . Moinfar deceitfully rendering his long term partner and spouse homeless, and his scheme to now deny her one half of their joint properties and assets to which they previously agreed and relied on." The complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and battery against Fariman as an individual, and claims for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, "partition of real and personal property by sale or quiet title" (capitalization, boldface, and underscoring omitted), and quantum meruit against Fariman, both as an individual and as trustee of the Trust.
Fariman filed a cross-complaint against Mahnaz, asserting claims for elder abuse, slander of title, intentional infliction of emotional distress, declaratory relief, invasion of privacy, and trespass.
II. POSTTRIAL STATEMENT OF DECISION DISCUSSION
After a five-day bench trial and closing argument, the trial court engaged in conversation with the parties' counsel regarding next steps. Initially, the court inquired if the parties wished for the court to "tell you what I'm going to do or do you want to have a written statement?" or "Do you want to waive that and let me rule?"
When asked by Fariman's counsel whether "the [c]ourt is ready to render its ruling right now?" the court stated: "I'm ready to give you a tentative decision. Then you all can say whatever you want . . . I'm ready to rule.... I can have you each prepare a written tentative decision for me. And I can review that. And then I can adopt one and send it back to you, and then you can state objections to it however you want to. I mean, there's a formal way of doing this. And because of it's more than a day's trial you have a right to request a written statement of decision." In response, Mahnaz's counsel asked for a written decision.
The court inquired how long the parties needed to submit proposed statements of decision. When Mahnaz's counsel indicated a date two weeks from then might work, the trial court indicated "that's not going to be a hearing date. I'm going to then give you another week each to file objections to each other's proposed tentative statement. And that would be the 7th. And we'll come back here for the 21st. [¶] . . . [¶] We'll -- actually, that's when I'll -- that's when I'll issue a ruling. It will stand submitted as of the 21st of July, and if anybody needs to come in and give oral argument on the objections, you may."
After addressing some clarifying questions from counsel, the trial court stated, "Actually, here's -- let me change this around. Here's what I'm going to do. I'm going to make the -- I have you filing your objections on the 7th. Why don't you do this. File the reply in opposition to the objections, right. Somebody says -- you say the cleric testified; Mr. Tasker says, oh, yes, on such and such day, right. So he responds to your -- respond to each other's objections. And that will be on the -- that will be by the 14th of July. . . ." After both counsel indicated they understood the trial court's instructions, the court stated, "And as of the 14th of July the case will stand submitted, and I will be making a written statement of decision at that time." When Fariman's counsel asked, "So we have the 30th, the 7th, the 14th and then our hearing?" The court responded, "Well, we're not even -- I'm not going to set a hearing. What I'm going to do is I'm going to give you a written statement of decision. I have 60 days to make that. I doubt I'll take that 60 days. And my written statement of decision will be the decision unless somebody requests an oral hearing."
In response, Mahnaz's counsel asked, "So we're set on the 30th of June?" and the trial court responded, "That's for you to give me a tentative statement of decision. 7th for objections to evidence that's included in your behalf. 14th for reply to the objections. And it will stand submitted as of the 14th. And I'll be submitting a written ruling." When asked by the trial court if they agreed to this, both counsel responded in the affirmative.
III. THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULES MAHNAZ'S OBJECTIONS TO FARIMAN'S PROPOSED STATEMENT OF DECISION WHICH IT ADOPTS AS ITS INTENDED STATEMENT OF DECISION
On July 7, 2021, Mahnaz and Fariman each filed a response to the other's proposed statement of decision and each filed objections to the other's proposed statement of decision. At a hearing on July 21, 2021, the trial court addressed Fariman's counsel only as Mahnaz's counsel did not appear at the hearing. Fariman's counsel indicated he had not heard from Mahnaz's attorney. Fariman's counsel "thought everything was over as of the 14th, and we would just get the decision" as he believed "that's what was on the minute order." In response, the trial court stated, "I suppose what I am going to do is now adopt your proposed judgment as my tentative judgment -tentative ruling and submit that in that same form to [Mahnaz's counsel]. And then what does he have, 30 days or something like that?" When Fariman's counsel responded, "Something like that[,]" the trial court stated, "And see what his next move is. I read his papers as well I read his objections. I'm overruling those objections." The trial court indicated it would not be allowing further briefing and stated it would be adopting Fariman's counsel's "judgment as proposed." A status conference was calendared 60 days from that date.
IV. THE COURT'S INTENDED STATEMENT OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT
In a minute order dated July 23, 2021, the trial court ruled: "STATEMENT OF DECISION is granted. [¶] Court rules as follows: [¶] Court adopts Defendant's proposed Statement of Decision. [¶] See intended statement of decision signed and filed on today's date. [¶] Counsel of record to be mailed a copy of intended statement of decision. [¶] Court confirms Status Hearing date of 9/20/21 at 8:30 a.m."
The court's intended statement of decision, both signed by the trial court and filed on July 23, 2021, provided: "The Intended Statement of Decision shall become the Statement of Decision and Judgment pursuant to Rules of Court Section 3.1590 unless within 15 days after service either party files objections to the Statement of Decision/Judgment. [¶] This matter is an action by Mahnaz . . . (hereinafter 'Plaintiff or Cross-Defendant') against Fariman . . . as an individual [and] as trustee of Moinfar Family Trust (hereinafter 'Defendant or Cross-Complainant'). Defendant has filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff. [¶] The Court Orders Judgment for the Defendant who is the prevailing party in this suit and orders Plaintiff takes nothing as she has failed to meet the burden of proof on any cause of action." (Italics added.)
In the intended statement of decision, the court explained Mahnaz failed to prove the existence of any express or implied contract between the parties and Fariman's testimony was more credible than Mahnaz's testimony because the latter "was highly inconsistent with her discovery responses" which "cast[] doubt on all of her testimony."
The court further explained Mahnaz failed to prove a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because the parties were never legally married under California law and never entered into a contract with each other.
The court found Mahnaz failed to meet her burden of proof Fariman battered her, noting "[f]rom the testimony received the Court believes it more likely that [Mahnaz] was the aggressor and any injury [Mahnaz] may have received was as a result of [Fariman] attempting to avoid further altercation and injury to himself." As for the accounting claim, the court stated "there was no evidence presented to define or identify an accounting" (capitalization and underscoring omitted), and while Mahnaz offered a Zillow "'Profile and Appraisal of Properties'" she provided "no testimony as to authentication, debt versus value or other evidence of income or lack thereof." The court rejected the claim for partition because "partition is barred in a spouse or putative spouse claim and as to a non-owner." (Capitalization and underscoring omitted.)
As for the quantum meruit claim, the trial court concluded Mahnaz failed to prove she was owed any amount for the value of her services beyond what she already received through Fariman's conveyance of the Fence Rider property to her.
The court rejected Fairman's claims in the cross-complaint, aside from ordering Mahnaz to return any of Fariman's "private documents, letters, mementos, photos, etc." in her possession or in any other place known to her, as well as "any keys, codes or access tools of any kind, which enable entry, access or permissions to properties, safe deposit boxes, bank accounts or financial institutions solely belonging to [Fariman]."
The record includes a declaration of service of the intended statement of decision on the parties' counsel on July 23, 2021.
V. MAHNAZ'S OBJECTIONS TO THE INTENDED STATEMENT OF DECISION
On August 5, 2021, Mahnaz filed an "objection to court's intended statement of decision" (capitalization omitted) in which she stated the court erred by finding, inter alia, she presented no competent evidence she contributed any resources to pool with Fariman in support of her breach of contract claim and by crediting Fariman with the current value of the Fence Rider property in rejecting her quantum meruit claim. Fariman filed a "reply" to Mahnaz's objections and on September 3, 2021, Mahnaz thereafter filed a "surrebuttal/opposition to defense reply." (Capitalization omitted.)
VI. THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULES MAHNAZ'S OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTS THE INTENDED STATEMENT OF DECISION AS THE FINAL STATEMENT OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT
At the hearing on September 20, 2021, the trial court informed Mahnaz's counsel the court had received her objections to the intended statement of decision, the objections were overruled, and the court was entering judgment as indicated. The court told Mahnaz's counsel that "[t]his really isn't a time to reargue the case" but that the court would give counsel the opportunity to address the court if he thought it necessary. The following colloquy ensued:
"[MAHNAZ'S COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, again I thank you for the accommodation. I don't know what else to say other than what I put in my paper. The only thing is my client will be inclined to -- I think she would want to have some other, you know, look at this.
"THE COURT: And I appreciate that. One of the problems, [Mahnaz's counsel], that you can express to her is that in a court trial the judge becomes the trier of fact, the determiner of fact. And there is one thing that someone is always going to have to consider in revisiting that is this, credibility is what you placed in my hands when you have chosen to go to a bench trial as opposed to have the determinations made by the people who are here in the jury box. And your client's credibility compared to the credibility of [Fariman] and no one is -- no one is perfect and I didn't expect perfection from anyone. But I felt that she was less credible than he.
"[MAHNAZ'S COUNSEL]: And the Court is right. The Court is right, once we put that in your hands, you have to make a determination one way or the other. The -- you know, this is not for me to reargue the case. So I'm constrained in what I say. But I hope the Court took a -- took in consideration the fact that over time there's three years of litigation and this pattern of credibility and lack of credibility that's always went in my client's favor until the trial, which the Court took so graciously for, you know, the trial for the first time.
"So based on that, there are some -- I can understand why the Court may misconstrue some things and then we are left in a difficult place to be able to explain those things because the Court doesn't have the benefit of the antecedence of the case so I can understand that. The only thing that bothers us big time is the fact that the issue of credibility here hangs on something that is not even, in our mind, falsehood on truthfulness.
"[FARIMAN'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if I may, are we here to argue again? We tried this once.
"THE COURT: Well, [Fariman's counsel], you walked in just a few minutes after I told [Mahnaz's counsel] that I wanted him to understand that it has nothing to do with his presentation of the case.
"[FARIMAN'S COUNSEL]: Yes.
"THE COURT: It was a factual determination, and . . . anytime somebody brings a trial to me, I feel obligated to make sure that when they leave my courtroom, win, lose or draw that I have heard them and that's what's going on right now." (Italics added.)
After Mahnaz's counsel concluded his arguments challenging the court's credibility assessment and the breadth of the order contained in the intended statement of decision requiring Mahnaz to return various items belonging to Fariman, the court stated, "I'm going to order judgment as proposed."
The court confirmed its adoption of the intended statement of decision as the court's statement of decision and judgment after court trial. Fariman served notice of entry of judgment on Mahnaz on September 23, 2021.
Mahnaz filed a notice of intention to move for a new trial which the court denied. Mahnaz appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. MAHNAZ'S CONTENTIONS OF PROCEDURAL ERROR IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE STATEMENT OF DECISION AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ARE WITHOUT MERIT
In her opening brief, Mahnaz argues "the statement of decision process was so defective that it amounted to a denial of a fair trial and thus constituted structural error." (Capitalization and boldface omitted.) For the reasons we will explain, the statement of decision procedures employed by the trial court here were consistent with the statement of decision procedures set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and rule 3.1590 of the California Rules of Court (rule 3.1590).
A. The Court Considered Mahnaz's Objections to the Intended Statement of Decision and Proposed Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 632 and Rule 3.1590
In her opening brief, Mahnaz argues the statement of decision was defective because the trial court refused to prepare a final judgment, and thereby deprived her "not only of the right to file objections to the judgment, but also literally of the right to a complete trial." She contends the defective procedure constituted structural error mandating reversal per se. The record belies Mahnaz's contention.
In a bench trial, any party may request a statement of decision which must explain the "factual and legal basis for [the court's] decision as to . . . the principal controverted issues at trial." (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) "The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. (Ibid.) After a party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of the statement of decision. (Ibid.) Rule 3.1590 establishes a procedure for issuing a statement of decision.
Here, following trial, the court did not announce its tentative decision, but invited both parties to first submit proposed statements of decision for the court's consideration; each party submitted a proposed statement of decision. (Rule 3.1590(f).) They thereafter submitted objections to each other's proposed statement of decision. (Rule 3.1590(g).) The court adopted Fariman's proposed statement of decision as its intended statement of decision and proposed judgment and again afforded Mahnaz the opportunity to file objections to it as well as present argument regarding the intended statement of decision and proposed judgment at a hearing. (See rule 3.1590(g), (j), (k).)
Not until after the trial court considered and overruled Mahnaz's objections to the intended statement of decision and proposed judgment did the court adopt the intended statement of decision as its final statement of decision, and the proposed judgment encompassed within was entered accordingly.
While the court's failure to immediately announce its tentative decision before inviting the parties to submit proposed statements of decision was unorthodox (see rule 3.1590(a) ["On the trial of a question of fact by the court, the court must announce its tentative decision by an oral statement"], the parties agreed on the record to the procedure proposed by the court (see Code Civ. Proc., § 632 ["[t]he statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the parties appearing at trial agree otherwise"], italics added).
It is of no moment, given the circumstances of this case, that the trial court skipped the step of announcing its tentative decision before ordering the parties to submit proposed statements of decision because such a tentative decision, had it been announced, would have been simply that-tentative and not at all binding. Under rule 3.1590(b), an announced tentative decision "does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on the court" and, in the event it were modified or changed, the clerk must thereafter serve the parties with a copy of such modification or change. In her appellate briefs, Mahnaz does not challenge this aspect of the court's procedures, much less argue she was prejudiced by the court's failure to initially announce a tentative decision before ordering the parties to prepare proposed statements of decision.
Furthermore, Mahnaz did not argue in the trial court and does not argue on appeal she was provided an insufficient opportunity to object to the intended statement of decision and proposed judgment before it became the final statement of decision and judgment of the court. That Mahnaz was provided a full opportunity to raise objections is further evidenced by the transcript of the hearing at which the court announced it would adopt the intended statement of decision as the final statement of decision and judgment. At that hearing, the court provided Mahnaz's counsel the opportunity to address the court regarding the ruling it had announced, to which counsel initially responded, "I don't know what else to say other than what I put in my paper." Mahnaz has not identified any objections she was unable to make to the intended statement of decision and proposed judgment pursuant to rule 3.1590 because of any alleged defective procedure, or otherwise. We find no error.
B. The Final Statement of Decision Was Not Defective
Mahnaz argues the statement of decision failed to explain the factual and legal bases for the court's decision as to each of the principal controverted issues. First, she argues, although the court stated in the statement of decision it found "'no evidence of a contract, written, oral or by implication,'" the court erred by neither discussing "the conduct of the parties in managing and operating the business, nor explain[ing] why that conduct could not be viewed as evidence of an implied contract." Second, she argues while the trial court asserted an accounting should be denied because there was "'no marriage, no express agreement, and no definitive request,'" the court "fail[ed] to consider [an] implied contract based upon conduct and equitable relief." Finally, in deciding the quantum meruit claim, "[t]he trial court did not acknowledge [Mahnaz's] testimony concerning the duration and scope of services she provided."
In her opening brief, Mahnaz asserts: "The trial judge in fact directed [her] to shorten her testimony." She does not argue the trial court erred in any manner by doing so.
Mahnaz's challenges to the final statement of decision fail because the trial court was only required to state ultimate facts. (Rojas v. HSBC Card Services, Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 887, fn. 19; see Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1380 [court is "not required to respond point by point to the issues posed in a request for statement of decision" and its statement of decision "is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court's determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case"].)
As to Mahnaz's claim for breach of contract, the statement of decision explains the trial court's determination as to the ultimate facts as follows: "[Mahnaz], failed to prove the existence of a contract between [her] and [Fariman]. [Mahnaz] testified that she and [Fariman] entered into an oral agreement to pool their resources together and share the profits half and half. [Fariman] adamantly denied making any such agreement. [Mahnaz] presented no competent evidence that she contributed any resources to 'pool' with [Fariman]. [Fariman] presented evidence that he was in the business of buying, renovating, and selling or renting real properties before, during, and after his affair with [Mahnaz]. The Court has evaluated all the evidence and testimony presented at trial including the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. The Court finds the testimony of [Fariman] to be more credible than the testimony of [Mahnaz]. [Mahnaz]'s testimony was highly inconsistent with her discovery responses regarding the circumstance of her claimed marriage. The Court found her to have been untruthful in either her testimony or her discovery responses on matters of significance casting doubt on all of her testimony. The Court finds [Mahnaz] has failed to meet her burden of proof of the existence of such a contract whether express or implied."
As to Mahnaz's accounting claim, in the complaint she alleged Fariman and the Trust "secreted, improperly withheld and fraudulently hidden from [sic] the assets and properties belonging to both parties, and must be required to give full accounting of all the assets and properties, real and personal, they acquired during the time of the parties' relationship." A claim for an accounting cause of action "requires a showing of a relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, such as a fiduciary relationship, that requires an accounting or a showing that the accounts are so complicated they cannot be determined through an ordinary action at law." (Fleet v. Bank of America N.A. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413.)
In the statement of decision, the trial court explained the ultimate facts underlying its rejection of Mahnaz's claim for an accounting: "[Mahnaz]'s Exhibit #8, offered Zillow 'Profile and Appraisal of Properties' subject of this action. There was no testimony as to authentication, debt versus value or other evidence of income or lack thereof. There being no marriage, no express agreement and no definitive request, the request for an 'accounting' is denied."
Finally, as to Mahnaz's claim for damages under a theory of quantum meruit, which we discuss in detail post, the trial court's failure to acknowledge Mahnaz's testimony regarding the duration and scope of services she claimed to have provided does not render the statement of decision defective or incomplete. The trial court repeatedly and thoroughly explained in the statement of decision that it did not find Mahnaz's testimony to be credible.
Mahnaz does not argue insufficient evidence supports any of the trial court's findings of ultimate facts in the statement of decision. We find no error.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY FINDING THAT EVEN IF MAHNAZ MIGHT HAVE HAD A VIABLE QUANTUM MERUIT CLAIM, SHE HAS BEEN MADE WHOLE
Mahnaz argues the trial court erred in its resolution of her quantum meruit claim. She initially argues "the trial court did not reject appellant's claim of quantum meruit but rather accepted it." The trial court, however, in its final statement of decision and judgment states: "The Court Orders Judgment for [Fariman] who is the prevailing party in this suit and orders [Mahnaz] takes nothing as she has failed to meet the burden of proof on any cause of action." (Italics added.) In addition, the court stated "[w]hile there may be a quantum meruit claim" (italics added), based on the evidence discussed post, she failed to show she was owed any amount for the value of her services beyond what she had already received.
We therefore turn to Mahnaz's argument the court erred in denying her recovery in quantum meruit. In order to recover for quantum meruit for services provided, Mahnaz was required to establish (1) services were requested by Fariman, (2) the services were provided by Mahnaz, (3) Mahnaz did not provide the services gratuitously, and (4) there was a mutual expectation Fariman would compensate Mahnaz for providing the services. (Strong v. Beydoun (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1404; Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794; CACI No. 371.)
In the complaint, in support of her quantum meruit cause of action, Mahnaz sought, as an alternative to her other causes of action, "damages and compensation for the value of the services and contributions she made towards the purchase and growth of the said assets and investments which [Fariman] knowingly received and benefited from; and which otherwise would amount to unjust enrichment."
In the final statement of decision and judgment, the trial court explained its findings relevant to Mahnaz's quantum meruit claim as follows:
"[Mahnaz]'s only claim was [her] Exhibit # 6, a collection of handwritten notes some dated in 2010. The testimony indicated [Mahnaz] made notes as reminders for her and Fariman as to supplies needed for individual homes. Fariman testified those were most probably created by [Mahnaz] as dictated in the car by him, between [s]ites. This was while Fariman drove as Mahnaz had no driver's license. [Mahnaz] testified she had no training or prior experience in remodeling and 'flipping' homes.
"[Mahnaz] testified as to cleaning the homes during remodel. Additionally, [Mahnaz] called Sail Flores, a described handyman, who[] worked for [Fariman] during these times. Mr. Flores testified that [Mahnaz] cleaned and provided water to Fariman during the remodel process.
"The testimony reflected the parties resided together for three years as a couple. Thereafter, following [Mahnaz] leaving the relationship in 2013, and returning in 2015 as a tenant only, until the 2018 altercation. [Mahnaz] testified that in the home she would clean, cook and do laundry.
"While there may be a quantum meruit claim, [Mahnaz] testified she paid no rent, Fariman provided bank access for her withdrawals, and grant deeded a home to her, (Fence[ R]ider property), subject to partial repayment. The home pursuant to Defense Exhibit is 219 and testimony of [Fariman], is currently worth $350,000.00 to 400,000.00. Even as [Fariman] believes [Mahnaz] understood she owed him $120,000.00, the equity is far beyond the quantum meruit she might have claimed. [Mahnaz] fails to prove that she is owed any amount for the value of her services beyond which she received from [Fariman]'s grant deed of the Fence[ R]ider property." (Italics added.)
Mahnaz argues: "The error of the trial court was in making an assumption that [Mahnaz]'s services would have a value of approximately $400,000, and that would be satisfied by [Mahnaz]'s retention of the Fence Rider property. As discussed [Mahnaz] was the sole owner of Fence Rider, and had been since December 12, 2012, while her services extended through May 31, 2018. The property [Mahnaz] received in 2012 obviously could have no connection with unknown future services of an unknown duration subsequent to December 12, 2012. Moreover, [Mahnaz]'s own property cannot be used to satisfy her quantum meruit claim against the adverse party. Further, there was no evidence the home was intended as a form of payment for services."
Mahnaz's argument is without merit. First, the trial court did not assume that Mahnaz performed services worth $400,000. To the contrary, the court concluded the amount the Fence Rider property appreciated since Fariman deeded that property to Moinfar was "far beyond the quantum meruit she might have claimed."
Second, Mahnaz does not provide any analysis or cite to any relevant legal authority in support of her argument that the value of the Fence Rider property, which was conveyed to her by Fariman, cannot be taken into account by the trial court in evaluating whether Mahnaz was owed compensation for services performed under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding Fariman did not make a gift of that property to Mahnaz, but expected her to pay him $120,000 for it. She did not pay him for that property and not only owns it, but has enjoyed its appreciation to the tune of $280,000 since the conveyance. Although the trial court stated it largely disbelieved Mahnaz's testimony, the court stated the amount she might claim she was owed could not come close to the value of the Fence Rider property, and that is without taking into account the years she lived rent free with access to cash in Fariman's bank accounts. Moinfar does not address how she would not be unjustly enriched were the court to have ignored the value of this significant asset in evaluating her quantum meruit claim.
We conclude the trial court did not err by crediting Fariman the amount Mahnaz has enjoyed in the appreciation of property she has owned since December 2012, but has not paid for, in determining whether Fariman owes Mahnaz compensation for services she performed to date. (See Vacco Industries, Inc. v. Van Den Berg (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 34, 52 ["It is settled law that one who seeks equity must do equity"].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J., GOODING, J.