Opinion
Civil No. A2-98-123.
Filed May 7, 1999.
Summary : Plaintiff, the former UND wrestling coach, brought a gender discrimination claim under Title IX after UND terminated its wrestling program. Plaintiff alleged the program was terminated because he had recruited a female wrestler. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim for lack of standing. The court granted defendant's motion, holding that plaintiff, a male coach, was not alleging that he was discriminated against, but rather was asserting the rights of the female wrestler he had recruited. Since plaintiff was asserting third-party standing, his claim was dismissed.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this action under Title IX and the North Dakota Human Rights Act, alleging gender discrimination with regard to defendant's termination of its wrestling program. The court entered an order on March 23, 1999 dismissing plaintiff's state law claim for failure to provide timely notice of such claim to the proper state agency. (Doc. #8.) The court also requested the parties to brief the issue of whether plaintiff has standing to bring his remaining Title IX claim. In response to the court's request, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff does not have standing to assert a Title IX claim because he is asserting the rights of a third party and not his own. (Doc. #9, 10.) Plaintiff has responded, asserting that he meets all of the constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
Plaintiff, UND's wresting coach, alleges that in the process of recruiting wrestlers for UND's 1998 wresting team, he decided to offer a scholarship to a female wrestler, Dana Trickey. On May 1, 1998, plaintiff received permission from Assistant Athletic Director Pete Oliszczak to send out a scholarship offer to Ms. Trickey, along with four other scholarship offers, presumedly to male recruits. However, before the offers were signed by defendant's Financial Aid Director and sent to the recruits, Mr. Oliszczak found out that Ms. Trickey was female. Mr. Oliszczak then told plaintiff that he would have to get the scholarship offers approved by the Athletic Director, who would not be in until Monday, May 4, 1998. Mr. Oliszazak allegedly told plaintiff that he "was being `very deceitful' for trying to sign a girl to the Defendant's wrestling team." (Doc. #1, ¶ IX.) All of the scholarship offers were later withdrawn by defendant's Athletic Department. On June 20, 1998, plaintiff was notified that defendant was terminating its wresting program. Plaintiff claims that "Defendant eliminated the varsity wrestling program so it did not have to make additions to the women's athletic program at Defendant's Grand Forks campus." (Doc. #1, ¶ XI.) Plaintiff asserts defendant's action violates Title IX, and that he is entitled to maintain a cause of action under that statute.
The relevant portion of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Although it is clear that a private cause of action exists under § 1681(a), a plaintiff must nonetheless have standing to bring such a claim. There are three "irreducible constitutional minimum" standing requirements: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's actions, and; (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). In addition to the constitutional requirements, the courts have fashioned three "prudential" requirements for standing: (1) no third-party standing; (2) plaintiff's claim must fall within the "zone of interest" of the specific law invoked, and (3) no generalized grievances. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). It is the first two prudential standing requirements that are relevant to the instant action.
Defendant argues that plaintiff's Title IX claim must be dismissed because he is essentially asserting the rights of a third party, Ms. Trickey, and thus, absent special circumstances, does not have standing to maintain this action. This was also the court's concern upon initial review of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff, however, argues that he is not asserting Ms. Trickey's rights. Rather, plaintiff contends that because he seeks to recover only for the effect defendant's actions have had on his career and future earning capacity, and not any damages or other relief on behalf of Ms. Trickey, his claim is not barred by the third-party standing rule. The court disagrees.
A plaintiff must assert his own rights and not those belonging to a third party. Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 104-105 (1st Cir. 1995). Although plaintiff is clearly seeking damages for his own injury, his Title IX claim is based on violation of Ms. Trickey's rights. The essence of plaintiff's claim is that defendant discriminated against Ms. Trickey based on her gender when it terminated the wrestling program and her scholarship. Although plaintiff alleges he was injured as a result of the wrestling program being terminated, he is not alleging that he was discriminated against. The fact that plaintiff was injured as a consequence of defendant's allegedly discriminatory acts does not change the fact that it was Ms. Trickey's rights that were possibly violated, not plaintiff's. See id. (patients of doctor whose hospital privileges were terminated for allegedly discriminatory reasons did not have standing under § 1981 even though their injury was as a consequence of defendant's actions);Evans v. Kansas City, Mo. School District, 65 F.3d 98, 101 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that teacher did not have standing under § 1981 to challenge desegregation order since it was the students' rights that were affected by the order). As such, even though plaintiff seeks damages for himself, he is actually asserting the rights of a third party, and therefore does not have standing to maintain a Title IX claim.
Plaintiff does not specifically allege a retaliation claim under Title IX, and thus the court does not consider his claim as such.
Moreover, even assuming that plaintiff's claim is not barred by the prohibition against third party standing, his claim does not fall within the "zone of interest" of Title IX. To meet this requirement, "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Assoc. of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). As plaintiff indicates, Title IX is broad-ranging and was intended to provide a means for "redressing any grievance arising from a violation of federal civil rights by a educational institution." Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools, 91 F.3d 857, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1996). The only limitation on Title IX's scope, as expressly stated in § 1681(a), is that the discrimination must be based on sex. Thus, to fall within Title IX's "zone of interest," a plaintiff's claim must allege discriminatory acts based on his/her sex. As stated above, plaintiff alleges that defendant discriminated against Ms. Trickey based on her gender, but he does not allege that he was discriminated against based on his gender. Although plaintiff may have been injured as a result of defendant's allegedly discriminatory act, since the discrimination was not directed towards him because of his gender, plaintiff's claim does not fall within Title IX's zone of interest. Therefore, plaintiff does not have standing under this prudential requirement either.
In sum, since plaintiff does not allege that he was discriminated against based on his gender, but bases his claim on an alleged violation of Ms. Trickey's right to equal participation in UND's programs and activities, he does not have standing to assert a claim under Title IX. It is Ms. Trickey or other potential female wrestlers at UND who are the proper parties to challenge defendant's actions under Title IX.
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. (Doc. #9.) Plaintiff's complaint and cause of action are dismissed without prejudice.