Summary
In Miner, the Duchess County Supreme Court ruled that New York statutory law prohibiting an inmate serving a life sentence from marrying rendered invalid the proxy marriage, legally officiated in Kansas, between a Kansas woman and a New York inmate serving a life sentence.
Summary of this case from Jennings v. City of Kansas CityOpinion
September 19, 1984
Robert F. Miner, Jr., petitioner pro se. Robert Abrams, Attorney-General ( James Gardner Ryan of counsel), for respondent.
In this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, petitioner seeks to sidestep the forfeiture provisions of section 79-a Civ. Rights of the Civil Rights Law by utilizing a novel approach: a proxy marriage performed in Kansas after his incarceration. Petitioner seeks an order annulling respondent's determination not to recognize petitioner's proxy marriage as valid for the purpose of participating in the Department of Correctional Services Family Reunion Program, directing respondent to recognize petitioner's proxy marriage as valid for the purpose of participating in said program and to permit petitioner and his spouse to participate in conjugal visitation under the auspices of the Family Reunion Program.
Respondent moves to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner is incapable of marrying and is civilly dead as he is serving a life sentence of imprisonment (Civil Rights Law, § 79-a) and thus has not satisfied the necessary criteria for participation in the Family Reunion Program.
On March 22, 1984, petitioner, an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility, serving a life sentence of imprisonment, executed a "Limited Power of Attorney for Proxy Marriage" appointing one Michael Foster as petitioner's agent for the purpose of entering into a marriage.
On March 30, 1984, petitioner, through his attorney in fact, married one Laurie Marion in Sedgwick County, Kansas.
Petitioner was informed by letter dated May 18, 1984 from the Southern Area Coordinator of Ministerial and Family Services for the Department of Correctional Services that the department would not recognize the legality of the marriage for the purpose of petitioner's participation in the Family Reunion Program. Petitioner contends respondent's decision is arbitrary and capricious.
An individual sentenced to imprisonment for life is deemed to be civilly dead and any marital relationship existing at the time of the sentence is terminated. (Civil Rights Law, § 79-a; see Matter of Eric J.B., 92 A.D.2d 917; Fuchs v Fuchs, 104 Misc.2d 1143. )
Pursuant to the provisions of section 79-a Civ. Rights of the Civil Rights Law, the State may constitutionally prohibit individuals sentenced to life imprisonment to marry. ( Johnson v Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377, affd sub nom. Butler v Wilson, 415 U.S. 953; Matter of Fitzpatrick v Smith, 90 A.D.2d 974, affd 59 N.Y.2d 916, cert den ___ US ___, 104 S Ct 399, reh den ___ US ___, 104 S Ct 749; Muessman v Ward, 95 Misc.2d 478.)
Petitioner contends that it is respondent's obligation to recognize a proxy marriage that is valid in the State where contracted, as valid in New York. Petitioner's claims are grounded upon the basic premise that he possessed the power to grant an attorney in fact a limited power of attorney to enter into a proxy marriage on petitioner's behalf.
It is a well-settled tenet of the law of agency, that a principal may only do through an agent those things that he may lawfully do personally. (Restatement, Agency 2d, § 17; 2 N Y Jur 2d, Agency, § 17.) The agent is merely the principal's instrument and the principal acts by and through the agent. ( Edwards v Dooley, 120 N.Y. 540; Corcoran v Scolaro, 46 N.Y.S.2d 278. )
If an individual lacks the power to enter into some legal relationship, he lacks the capacity to authorize an agent to enter into that legal relationship on the principal's behalf. (Restatement, Agency 2d, § 20.) An individual may not create an agent who has greater power than the individual himself possesses. ( Matter of Peters, 71 Misc.2d 662.)
In the instant case, due to the forfeiture provisions of section 79-a Civ. Rights of the Civil Rights Law, petitioner could not lawfully marry, and petitioner could not grant his attorney in fact the power to enter into a marriage, something petitioner could not do himself. Were it otherwise, the broad power of this State to set standards and procedures to control the institution of marriage (see People v Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 113), and the specific interest of this State in imposing a bar upon the marriage of life-term prisoners as an additional punishment for crimes of the most serious nature (see Johnson v Rockefeller, supra; Matter of Fitzpatrick v Smith, supra) could easily be thwarted.
In order to promote the uniformity of decision and to encourage harmony and cooperation among the States, the doctrine of comity represents a State's voluntary decision to defer to the policy of another. ( Ehrlich-Bober Co. v University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574. ) A State in which a proxy marriage is to be conducted involving a New York prisoner serving a life term should first recognize, under the doctrine of comity, that a power of attorney granted by such prisoner for the purpose of entering into a marriage is invalid in New York.
Inasmuch as the power of attorney which formed the basis of petitioner's proxy marriage in Kansas was a nullity, petitioner's marriage is void ab initio and invalid for the purpose of participating in the Family Reunion Program. The obligation of this State to recognize a proxy marriage which is considered valid in the State where contracted need not be addressed.
Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition is granted.