Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
SUZANNE H. SEGAL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 2017, Norris Dajon Miller ("Plaintiff"), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint"). Plaintiff summarily alleges that Deputy District Attorney George Morris is liable for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 6) (continuous pagination).
Congress mandates that district courts perform an initial screening of complaints in civil actions where a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) . This Court may dismiss such a complaint, or any portion thereof, before service of process if the complaint (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (1-2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). For the reasons stated below, the Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
A magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without the approval of a district judge. See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) .
II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
The only Defendant sued in this matter is Deputy District Attorney Morris. (Complaint at 4) . Morris is sued in his individual capacity only. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff states that in an underlying state criminal matter, he was assaulted by a man named Thomas Brown and "was put in jail for it" on February 10, 2016, even though Plaintiff was acting in self-defense. (Id. at 4). Morris "falsely accused" Plaintiff of a crime (or crimes) he did not commit, which Plaintiff does not specifically identify. (Id.). On June 20, 2016, Morris dismissed the charge(s) against Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff states that he was "falsely imprisoned" for four months and ten days as a result of those charges, i.e., from the day he was arrested to the day the charges were dismissed. (Id.) . Plaintiff seeks $63,000,000 in monetary damages for "emotional stress, heartache, [and] pain and suffering, " as well as "false imprisonment." (Id. at 5).
In another malicious prosecution action brought by Plaintiff in this Court, filed on the same day as the instant Complaint, Plaintiff raised similar claims against another prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Lily Keenan. See Miller v. Keenan, CD. Cal. Case No. 17-2969 SJO (SS) (the "Keenan Complaint") . The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's other cases pending in this Court. See In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 685, 689 n.l (9th Cir. 2011) (a court may take judicial notice of a court's own records in other cases and the records of other courts).
III. DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must dismiss the Complaint due to pleading defects. However, the Court must grant a pro se litigant leave to amend his defective complaint unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed below, it is not "absolutely clear" that at least some of the defects of Plaintiff's Complaint could not be cured by amendment. The Complaint is therefore DISMISSED with leave to amend.
A. The Complaint Fails To State A Claim For Malicious Prosecution
A claim of malicious prosecution is generally not cognizable under section 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012). California law recognizes the common law tort of malicious prosecution, although such claims are "disfavored." Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958, 966 (2004) . To state a claim for malicious prosecution under California law, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the defendant and legally terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) was brought without probable cause, and (3) was initiated with malice." Seibel v. Mittlesteadt, 41 Cal.4th 735, 740 (2007) . Malicious prosecution is also actionable under state law where the defendant "continu[es] to prosecute a lawsuit discovered to lack probable cause." Zamos, 32 Cal.4th at 970.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a civil rights plaintiff may bring a federal claim for malicious prosecution under section 1983 when certain conditions are met. To state a federal claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish not only that a claim, brought without probable cause and initiated with malice, terminated in plaintiff's favor, but also that the prosecution was conducted "for the purpose of denying [the accused] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.'" Lacey, 693 F.3d at 919 (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). Malicious prosecution actions "are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may [also] be brought . . . against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
However, not every action taken by a prosecutor in an abandoned or unsuccessful prosecution will subject the prosecutor to suit, even when the act is "malicious or dishonest." Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2005). The doctrine of "[p]rosecutorial immunity applies to § 1983 claims." Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016) . Pursuant to that doctrine, "[s]tate prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 actions when performing functions 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, ' [Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)], or, phrased differently, 'when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.'" Gannon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997)).
Accordingly, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for "'initiating a prosecution' and 'presenting a state's case, ' and during 'professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial . . . after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.'" Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)); see also Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Initiating a prosecution has consistently been identified as a function within a prosecutor's role as an advocate."); Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Filing charges and initiating prosecution are functions that are integral to a prosecutor's work."). A prosecutor is also protected by absolute immunity in the "preparation of an arrest warrant, " during "appearances before a grand jury, " "in a probable cause hearing, " and at trial. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 933 (citing cases); see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1012 ("Appearing in court to argue a motion is a quintessential act of advocacy.").
Absolute immunity applies even if it "'leave[s] the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.'" Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 432) . However, prosecutors are entitled only to "qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when they perform administrative functions, or 'investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer.'" Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126) .
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In analyzing whether qualified immunity applies, a court must determine "whether, taken in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], Defendants' conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, and . . . whether or not the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Bull v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original).
Courts look to the "nature of the function performed" when determining if a prosecutor's actions are those of an advocate, which are protected by absolute immunity, or of an administrator or investigator, which are not. Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269) . For example, "decisions to hire, promote, transfer and terminate" employees, "which do not affect the prosecutor's role in any particular matter, " are generally deemed administrative functions not protected by absolute immunity. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 931. Similarly, "[a]bsolute immunity does not apply when a prosecutor Ogives advice to police during a criminal investigation, ' 'makes statements to the press, ' or 'acts as a complaining witness in support of a[n arrest] warrant application.'" Garmon, 828 F.3d at 843 (quoting Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (brackets in original; emphasis added)); see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1101 (filing a false crime report is not protected by absolute immunity). Absolute immunity also does not apply if a prosecutor knowingly fabricates evidence by soliciting falsehoods from others, such as by obtaining false statements from purported witnesses or "shopping for a dubious expert opinion." Id.
Here, Plaintiff's only allegation against Morris is that he "falsely accused" him of a crime or crimes he did not commit. It is unclear from the Complaint what role Morris had in Plaintiff's prosecution, or what he did in the performance of that role. The Complaint does not explain how Morris falsely accused Plaintiff, or when, or whether Plaintiff would have been entitled to release from custody if Morris had dismissed the charges earlier. For example, the Complaint does not state whether Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant that Morris may have prepared, when or how he was charged, whether Morris was the only prosecutor who appeared in his case, or whether Morris had a more limited role.
Depending on the "nature" of the acts Morris allegedly committed, Morris may or may not be protected by absolute immunity. For example, it is possible that Plaintiff believes that Morris "falsely accused" him simply by filing charges against him to initiate the underlying criminal action. If so, such "judicial" actions would appear to be protected from suit by absolute prosecutorial immunity. However, it is also possible that Plaintiff may have grounds to assert a claim against Morris that would not be subject to absolute immunity.
Additionally, even if Plaintiff were able to allege facts that would support a malicious prosecution claim against Morris that would not be barred by absolute immunity, the Complaint does not allege any facts showing that the prosecution was for the purpose of denying Plaintiff equal protection or some other constitutional right, as required for a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 919. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend. Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not allege claims for which he has no factual or legal basis.
B. The Complaint Fails To State A Claim For False Imprisonment
In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Morris for "false imprisonment, " although he does not explain why or how he believes that Morris is liable for his pretrial detention. As with Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, whether Morris is protected by absolute immunity for his acts will depend on the nature of those acts. Furthermore, because Plaintiff's pre-trial detention here fully overlapped with his detention on charges for which he was eventually convicted in the Keenan matter, it seems doubtful that Plaintiff will be able to show that he suffered any damages by his pre-trial incarceration. Even if Plaintiff had not been detained on the counts that Morris dismissed, he would still have been lawfully incarcerated pre-trial on the four counts for which he was ultimately convicted in the Keenan matter.
"False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) . "To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [Plaintiff] would have to demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him." Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) . Following arrest, "a [pretrial] detainee [also] has 'a constitutional right to be free from continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.'" Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The "loss of liberty caused by an individual's mistaken [pretrial] incarceration 'after the lapse of a certain amount of time' gives rise to a [false imprisonment] claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Lee, 250 F.3d at 683 (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 145). However, "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted -- indeed, for every suspect released, " which it does not. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).
Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim against Morris, to the extent that he is attempting to assert one, is largely intertwined with his malicious prosecution claim, as is the extent of Morris's entitlement to absolute prosecutorial immunity. If the basis for the false imprisonment claim is simply that Morris filed criminal charges in reliance on evidence provided by the police, the charging decision would appear to be protected from suit by absolute immunity. However, if Plaintiff is able to allege facts showing, for example, that Morris knowingly fabricated or solicited false evidence to keep Plaintiff in custody prior to trial, and that but for that fabrication, there was no other impediment to Plaintiff's entitlement to release from pre-trial custody, it is possible that such acts may not be protected by absolute immunity. In light of the convictions arising from the actions at issue in the Keenan Complaint, and the fact that the pre-trial period of which Plaintiff complains here is entirely encompassed by the period at issue in the Keenan Complaint, the Court doubts that Plaintiff will be able to assert a false imprisonment claim. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend. Plaintiff is cautioned that he may not allege claims for which he has no factual or legal basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order within which to file a First Amended Complaint. In any amended complaint, the Plaintiff shall cure the defects described above. Plaintiff shall not include new defendants or new allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims asserted in the original complaint. The First Amended Complaint, if any, shall be complete in itself and shall bear both the designation "First Amended Complaint" and the case number assigned to this action. It shall not refer in any manner to any previously filed complaint in this matter.
In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should confine his allegations to those operative facts supporting each of his claims. Plaintiff is advised that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a), all that is required is a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should identify the nature of each separate legal claim and make clear what specific factual allegations support each of his separate claims. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to keep his statements concise and to omit irrelevant details. It is not necessary for Plaintiff to cite case law, include legal argument, or attach exhibits at this stage of the litigation. Plaintiff is also advised to omit any claims for which he lacks a sufficient factual basis.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint or failure to correct the deficiencies described above, will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed with prejudices for failure to prosecute and obey court orders pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff is further advised that is he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (1) . A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiffs convenience.
It is unclear whether the state court criminal proceedings at issue in the instant action and the Keenan Complaint are related, identical, or entirely separate. However, in the Keenan Complaint, as here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested on February 10, 2016 and held continuously in custody thereafter. (See Keenan Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, at 4). According to the Keenan Complaint, a jury ultimately convicted Plaintiff of three counts of assault (against victims Thomas Sotiriadis, Karen Sotiriadis, and Michael Haynes) and one count of resisting an executive officer (City of Hawthorne Police Officer John Dixon). The same jury acquitted Plaintiff of one count of attempting to rob Haynes and of one count of resisting City of Hawthorne Police Officer Sean Judd. (Id. at 10-11) .
Plaintiff is suing Keenan in that parallel action for "falsely accus[ing] [him] of crimes that [he] did not commit, " i.e., the two counts that resulted in acquittals. (Id. at 3) . Plaintiff further claims that he was wrongfully held in jail pending trial on those counts for four months and nineteen days, from February 10, 2016 to June 29, 2016. (Id. at 5) .
The Court cannot determine from the meager facts alleged in these two actions whether Brown's alleged assault on Plaintiff occurred during the same incident in which Plaintiff assaulted Thomas and Karen Sotiriadis and Hayes. However, the period of incarceration at issue in this action is entirely encompassed by the period of incarceration at issue in the Keenan Complaint.