Opinion
Case No. 02-70758
September 29, 2003
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding liquidated damages. On May 12, 2003, this Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff summary judgment on liability for her claims of interference and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Plaintiff now seeks judgment that she is entitled to liquidated damages as provided by the FMLA. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
The facts underlying Plaintiff's FMLA claims are set forth in detail in the Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for [partial] Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and need not be repeated in full here. Briefly, Plaintiff, Lisa Ann Miller, suffers from Type One diabetes and depression. She was employed by Defendant, GB Sales Service Inc., until absences due to her medical condition caused Defendant to terminate her employment. In granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for interference with her FMLA rights, the Court ruled:
GB was aware that Miller suffered from diabetes and depression and Miller informed GB that her absences were medically related. The FMLA and the regulations then placed the burden on GB to request and/or gather the information necessary for it to determine whether her absences were due to those serious health conditions and thus qualified as FMLA-leave. The court therefore finds that Miller provided sufficient notice under the FMLA and is entitled to summary judgment on her interference claim.
Order, at 15.
As to her retaliation claim, the Court held:
Miller clearly demonstrates that she engaged in an activity protected by the FMLA. GB knew or should have known that at least the majority of Miller's absences were protected under the Act, as they were necessitated by serious medical conditions, GB admits that it terminated Miller for "excessive absenteeism" and that it made no effort to determine whether any of her absences were protected by the FMLA. Miller therefore is entitled to summary judgment on her retaliation claim.
Order, at 17-18,
II. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
The court must believe the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. See id. at 255. The inquiry is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could "reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." See id.
III. Analysis
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) provides:
Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title [interference with FMLA rights] shall be liable to any eligible employee affected —
(A) for damages equal to —
(i) the amount of —
(I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation . . .
(ii) the interest on the amount described in clause (i) calculated at the prevailing rate; and
(ii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (i) and the interest described in clause (ii), except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act was not a violation of section 2615 of this title, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest determined under clauses (i) and (ii), respectively. . . .
The amount of liquidated damages is generally twice the compensatory damages. Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 929 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Doubling of an award is the norm under the FMLA, because the Plaintiff is awarded liquidated damages in addition to compensation lost, The district court's discretion to reduce the liquidated damages must be exercised consistently with the strong presumption under the statute in favor of doubling."),
As the statute expressly states, to avoid liquidated damages, Defendant has the burden to prove both its (1) good faith and (2) reasonable reliance. In Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am., 283 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to reduce a jury's award of FMLA liquidated damages, In that case, the plaintiff took an overdose of pills, and was hospitalized for one week under the care of a psychiatrist. Id. at 821. She kept in contact with the plant manager during that week, who agreed to place her on paid medical leave, Id. Her immediate supervisor, the personnel manager, learned of her overdose and decided that he could no longer trust the plaintiff as his assistant after her "irresponsible" act of overdosing on pills, and he accordingly terminated her employment Id. The plaintiff tried her FMLA claim before a jury, which found the defendant liable, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, Id. at 822.
Regarding the issue of liquidated damages, the Sixth Circuit first adopted the standard set forth under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to analyze the remedial provisions of the FMLA. Id. at 827, The court then ruled that even if the defendant had a good faith belief that the plaintiff was not covered by the FMLA, that belief was unreasonable because the person who fired the plaintiff had no experience with the FMLA, he did not inquire into the plaintiff's leave request, and the decision to terminate her was based on an eight minute conversation with the plant manager, See also Taylor v. Invacare Corp., No. 01-3824, 2003 WL 21212674 (6th Cir. May 21, 2003) (finding that the defendant acted unreasonably, and was subject to liquidated damages, where the defendant's actions were in clear violation of a federal regulation governing the FMLA).
Based on Chandler, even if Defendant's belief that it was complying with the FMLA was in good faith, it was not reasonable. The decision to terminate Plaintiff was made by Defendant's owner, Gregory Blackwood, Plaintiff's supervisor, Dale Duke, and Defendant's Comptroller/Human Resources Director, Roger Runyan. Mr. Runyan described the decision to terminate Plaintiff as follows:
Q: And did Mr. Duke recommend that she be terminated?
A: Mr. Duke brought the problem of not having an employee come to work everyday and trying to fill that position and get the work done in that position, He brought that to the owner of the company and the owner asked for me to be present in that meeting,
Q: So you were essentially an observer?
A: I was there to give my opinion or advice.
Q: So did Mr. Duke recommend that she be terminated?
A: I don't remember if he recommended it.
Q: So he presented it as a problem that she was not coming to work daily and that was creating a problem for him in running his department?
A: Of course.
Q: And did he tell you that during that meeting she consistently had doctor's notes?
A: We were aware, yes. I say we, Greg [Blackwood] and I were aware of the doctor's notes, yeah.
Q: So what else did Mr. Duke say during that meeting?
A: I don't remember.
Q: So who made the decision to terminate Ms. Miller?
A: The ultimate decision was Greg Blackwood's.
Q: Did you agree with that decision?
A: I agree with that decision.
Q: Was there any discussion of the FMLA at that meeting?
A: No, we did not discuss the FMLA.
(Runyan Dep. at 74-75, Pl. Ex. 3.)
Mr. Blackwood, the ultimate decision maker, testified that he "never gave the FMLA any thought," nor did he consult a professional about employment law or about firing Plaintiff:
Q: Have you ever had any training in any of the seminars pertaining to the FMLA. Family Medical Leave Act?
A: No.
Q: When you have employment issues arise that may relate to any of the these statutes, do you consult with somebody?
A: No.
Q: Well, how do you handle these issues, sir, generally?
A: I can't answer that question, I don't know. I don't know how to answer that question.
Q: Well, are you aware of the Family Medical Leave Act, sir?
A: I've heard of it.
Q: Were you aware of it before Ms. Miller raised it after she was fired? Have you ever heard of that statute before March 5th of 2001?
A: I've heard of it, yes, prior to that.
Q: What is your understanding of what this statute is, how it impacts your business?
A: Never gave it any thought.
* * *
Q: What is your understanding of what the FMLA is sir?
A: I don't have an understanding. I never thought about it.
* * *
Q: Do you know whether or not the FMLA applied to Ms. Miller?
Mr. Paxton: Objection. Foundation.
The Witness: I can't answer that.
Q: Why can't you answer it, sir?
A: I don't know about that policy at all or that law or whatever it is.
Q: So you don't know whether it applied to her?
A: Correct.
Q: During the discussions with Mr. Duke and Mr. Runyan about terminating Ms. Miller, was the FMLA ever brought up?
A: I don't recall.
(Blackwood Dep. at 7-12, 66, 82-83, Pl. Ex. 4.)
Mr. Duke testified that he didn't know if he had ever asked anyone about Ms. Miller's rights under the FMLA before terminating her. (Duke Dep. at 201, Pl. Ex. 2.)
Based on this undisputed evidence, Defendant has not met its burden to show that it thought it had complied with the FMLA in good faith or that it had reasonable grounds for believing that it complied with the FMLA. Mr. Blackwood could not have had either subjective good faith belief that Plaintiff's termination complied with the FMLA or an objective reasonable belief because Defendant has not provided any evidence that he held any belief regarding the FMLA's bearing on Plaintiff's situation. He simply did not consider the issue at all, and a person who did not have any belief regarding the FMLA could not have a good faith belief that he complied with it.
Furthermore, even if the absence of bad faith somehow equals good faith, his belief was not reasonable in the absence of any effort to ascertain the law regarding Plaintiffs termination.
The employer bears the responsibility of determining whether an employee's request for leave is FMLA-qualifying. 29 C.F.R. § 825, 208 (1996). Defendant introduced no evidence at trial of any reliance on agency regulations or administrative or judicial interpretations, nor of any attempt by its President to seek legal advice before making the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment instead of granting her request for leave. Good faith requires some duty to investigate potential liability under the Act. An employer cannot claim good faith when it "blindly operate[s] a business without making any investigation as to [its] responsibilities" under the FMLA. Successfully establishing reasonable grounds for the conduct taken generally requires a showing that the employer relied on a reasonable, although erroneous, interpretation of the Act or its implementing regulations.Morris v. VCW, Inc., No. 95-0737-CV-W-3-6, 1996 WL 740544, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 26, 1996) (some internal citations omitted).
As the Sixth Circuit stated in an FLSA case, "[a]t the very least, to avoid the assessment of liquidated damages, a defendant must show `an honest intention to ascertain what the Act requires and to comply with it.'" Reich v. LaPatisserie, Inc., No. 93-5639, 1994 WL 102956, at *1 (6th Cir. March 25, 1994). In this case, Mr., Blackwood testified that no effort was made to determine the FMLA's applicability or to comply with it, Therefore, Defendant could not have reasonably relied on the FMLA because it did not even consider the FMLA.
Defendant's argument against summary judgment is essentially that "Defendant failed to follow the guidelines of the FMLA, but had a reasonable belief that it did not have to do so." (Def. Br. at 5.) Defendant argues why it would have been reasonable to conclude that it was in compliance with the FMLA, Defendant does not, however, cite any evidence that it actually considered the FMLA and believed it was in compliance when it terminated Plaintiff, Even if Defendant is correct that a hypothetical employer faced with Defendant's same situation would have reasonably believed that its actions complied with the FMLA, Defendant has no evidence that it reasonably believed that its own actions complied with the FMLA,
Defendant relies on Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000), where the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant acted with good faith and reasonable reliance In denying the FMLA plaintiff's request for liquidated damages. There, however, the defendant was liable under a law that had only been in effect six months, and the owner and president of the defendant company had made efforts to get a copy of the new law. Id. at 383. Moreover, on a previous motion before the district court, the court had granted summary judgment for the defendant, which demonstrated that the defendant's belief was at least reasonable. Id. See also Hoge v. Honda of Am., No. 2:00-CV-995, 2002 WL 1584274 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (refusing to impose liquidated damages after awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff on her FMLA claim because the defendant acted in good faith and relied on the reasonable belief that it did not violate the FMLA when it took time to assess whether its actions would violate the FMLA).
Defendant also argued at the oral arguments that because it did offer Plaintiff leave at some point, albeit without referring to the leave as FMLA leave, the Court should not find that it lacked good faith, Defendant apparently was referring to a statement in its brief for summary judgment as to the merits of Plaintiff's FMLA claims, in which it stated without citing any evidentiary support that "Mr., Duke suggested that the plaintiff take some time of in order to fully recover from her medical condition." Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 3. Even ignoring the lack of evidentiary support for the statement, the real issue is whether Defendant made a good faith effort to comply with the FMLA, and the mere fact that it offered Plaintiff a leave has no bearing on whether Defendant did so in a good faith effort to comply with the FMLA. Indeed, as the deposition testimony quoted above demonstrates, Defendant made no effort to consider the FMLA at all, and Defendant has not submitted any evidence that indicates the offer of leave was made as a good faith effort to comply with the FMLA.
IV. Conclusion
Being fully advised in the premises, having read the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby orders as follows:
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liquidated damages is GRANTED.