Opinion
06-19-1908
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. HAMILTON et al.
Conover English, for complainant. Frank E. Bradner and George A. Douglas, for Nannie B. Hamilton. A. B. Cosey, for Mary Dennis.
Bill of interpleader by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company against Nannie B. Hamilton and Mary Dennis. Heard on rule for injunction to stay pending suits. Relief granted conditionally.
The complainant is a New York corporation engaged in the business of life insurance. On January 21, 1897, it issued a policy of life insurance on the life of Charles B. Dennis for the sum of $500, making the same payable to his then wife, Ellen F. Dennis. In the application for insurance he stated his age to be 30 years. Ellen F. Dennis, the beneficiary under this policy, died on July 23, 1902, and some time thereafter he married a second time. This second wife, Mary Dennis by name, is still living. On August 10, 1906, the complainant issued another life insurance policy on the life of Charles B. Dennis for $1,000, which was made payable to Nannie B. Hamilton, who is described in the policy as the intended wife of the assured. In the application for this policy he represented himself to be 39 years of age. He died leaving two policies in force on January20, 1908. He left a will by which he gave all his estate to the said Nannie B. Hamilton, and appointed her sole executrix thereof. During his lifetime he made application to the complainant to change the beneficiary under the $500 policy. He desired to have it made payable to Nannie B. Hamilton, but died before any change was made. Both policies provide (1) that, in case the assured shall have understated his age in his application for the policy, the policy on its maturity shall be adjusted to the amount of insurance that he would have been entitled to according to the company's tables at his actual age; (2) that, in case the assured should survive the beneficiary, the insurance money should be payable to the personal representatives of the assured. After the death of the assured, Nannie B. Hamilton submitted proofs of death under the $500 policy in her capacity of executrix of the will of the deceased, and likewise submitted proofs of death under the $1,000 policy as the beneficiary named therein. Mary Dennis, the widow of the deceased, made claim on the complainant for the insurance money on both policies. On May 14, 1908, Nannie B. Hamilton brought suit against the complainant on the $500 policy, and on May 19, 1908, Mary Dennis brought suit in this court to reform the $3,000 policy by striking out the name of Nannie B. Hamilton as beneficiary and inserting her own name. The complainant was made a party defendant to this suit. The complainant, being thus harassed by suits brought by rival claimants on these two policies, and considering itself in danger of being compelled to defend these claims and the actions thereon, filed the bill of complaint in the case now before the court, alleging the understatement by the deceased of his age in the applications for the policies and the rival claims for the money due thereon, and praying (1) that the insurance money might be adjusted to the true age of the deceased; and (2) that Nannie B. Hamilton and Mary Dennis should interplead before this court in respect to the moneys found due upon the policies after their readjustment, and offering to pay into court for this purpose the sums of money due under the respective policies on the basis of the true age of the insured. It prays also (3) that Nannie B. Hamilton and Mary Dennis be enjoined from prosecuting their suits with respect to the insurance moneys. The motion now before the court is for a preliminary injunction to stay the two pending suits.
Conover English, for complainant.
Frank E. Bradner and George A. Douglas, for Nannie B. Hamilton. A. B. Cosey, for Mary Dennis.
HOWELL, V. C. (after stating the facts as above). The first question that arises under this bill is whether the complainant has any equity arising out of the facts above recited which justifies it in filing its bill. The bill is not a bill of strict Interpleader. A bill of strict interpleader is one in which the complainant asserts his possession of some fund, or something in which he claims no personal interest, but in which other persons whom he makes defendants set up conflicting claims, and the complainant cannot safely determine to which claim he should yield. The fact that the complainant in this case seeks independent affirmative relief on his own behalf differentiates this case from cases of strict interpleader. The complainant maintains that its bill belongs to that class of original bills in equity which are known to the profession by the name of bills in the nature of bills of interpleader, and refers to several cases in this court in which the distinction has been pointed out and settled. The cases are collected in the opinion of Chancellor Magie in Carter v. Cryer, 68 N. J. Eq. 24, 59 Atl. 233, a case which is similar in principle to the one at bar, and the authority of which I shall follow in this case. There the owner of real estate found a machine upon his premises, title to which or liens on which were claimed by various persons. The complainant also claimed that he had a lien upon the same machine for storage charges, and he filed his bill for the purpose of having (1) his claim for storage charges adjusted, and (2) a decree adjudging to which of the rival claimants the property belonged or on which they had liens. Objection was made to this bill by a motion to dismiss it under the rules, a proceeding equivalent to a demurrer, upon the ground that it was not a bill of interpleader, and that it therefore was without equity. The bill was sustained upon the ground that it was a bill in the nature of an interpleader bill. I have come to the same conclusion in this case. The parties defendant here claim under the same policies. These policies contain a provision for an adjustment of the insurance money to the correct age of the assured in case it shall be proved that there was any understatement of his age in the applications for the policies. The defendants, claiming under these policies, are bound by all the provisions and conditions thereof, including the provisions just referred to. Complainant claims the benefit of these stipulations, and, if the defendants have made claims which the complainant must recognize as apparently valid claims, it certainly has an equity to have the adjustment made in the same suit in which the rival claimants must litigate.
It is contended on behalf of Nannie B. Hamilton that the claim of Mary Dennis is apparently so baseless that no court would recognize any validity in it, and that it is therefore the duty of the complainant to absolutely reject it without investigation, and to take upon itself the burden of defending against it in any action at law or in equity which may be based upon it. The rule is that the danger of a double vexation must be real, and that a mere suspicion of a risk willnot be sufficient to support a bill. Blair v. Porter, 13 N. J. Eq. 267; Fitch v. Brower, 42 N. J. Eq. 300, 11 Atl. 330; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 691; Crane v. McDonald, 118 N. Y. 648, 23 N. E. 991, the last case holding that the complainant must show that he is unable to ascertain without hazard to himself to which of the claimants the money belongs. There are now pending two suits, one on each of the policies, one in a commonlaw court, the other in this court, and to each suit the complainant is a party defendant. In my opinion claims prosecuted in this way under the solemn sanction of legal proceedings in the courts are claims which the complainant has a right to regard as hazardous to its financial interests. I do not think that the complainant should be put to the risk and the expense of defending these actions separately, but, on the contrary, that they are sufficiently brought to its notice and bear on their face sufficient evidence of strength and validity to entitle it to call upon them to interplead.
Another objection to the bill is that there exists a separate cause of action on each policy, and that the complainant has theretofore filed a multifarious bill. The rule against multifariousness is very largely a rule of convenience, and, if the objection is urged, the court will endeavor to ascertain whether it is possible or even convenient to make one decree which shall do justice to all the parties. I see no reason why that course cannot be taken in this case. If it should turn out on final hearing that there are two causes of action, I think it will be quite possible to separate them in the decree.
It cannot be determined on this motion how much reduction in the amount of the insurance money the complainant is entitled to, or, in fact, whether it is entitled to any reduction. This is a question of fact, which will be considered on the final hearing. The complainant should be required, as a condition upon which the injunctive relief goes, to pay into court the full amount of insurance money, without deductions, and, if on final hearing the complainant shall establish the fact that a deduction should be made, it can be adjusted on the distribution of the fund.