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observing that immunity analysis "rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant," and that from a functional standpoint, the government's expert witness "on the witness stand performs the same functions as any other witness" and should be entitled to the same immunity for his testimony
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Civil Action No. 99-3019 SECTION "N" (2)
June 26, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Karon Metoyer, sued several defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, alleging that defendants withheld exculpatory evidence concerning his criminal trial and conspired to prosecute him maliciously. The only remaining defendant is Ian Angel, M.D., allegedly a state employee who worked at a hospital owned and operated by the State of Louisiana. This matter was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon the written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 24.
The other defendants were the State of Louisiana, the Orleans Parish district attorney and two assistant district attorneys. The district attorney defendants were voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff, while the State was dismissed on its motion based on sovereign immunity. Record Doc. Nos. 6, 9, 12.
Dr. Angel filed a motion to dismiss, claiming absolute immunity from suit or, alternatively, qualified immunity. He also argues that plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Record Doc. No. 18. Plaintiff filed a timely opposition memorandum and attached the statement required by Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995). Record Doc. No. 20. Defendant received leave to file a reply memorandum, which was captioned as another motion to dismiss. Record Doc. No. 26. Plaintiff filed a second opposition memorandum, which adopted and reurged the arguments of his first memorandum. Record Doc. No. 27.
Having considered the complaint, the record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion. In February 1997, Metoyer was convicted in the Criminal District Court for Orleans Parish of the attempted manslaughter of Jourdan Wilson. Plaintiff served 22 months of his sentence in prison. His conviction was reversed on appeal based on newly discovered evidence, and his case was remanded for a new trial. State v. Metoyer, 720 So.2d 148, 153 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1998), writ denied, 740 So.2d 648 (La. 1999). The district attorney decided in September 1999 not to try him again.
Metoyer and Wilson had been involved in a fight in June 1996 during which Metoyer shot and injured Wilson. Metoyer testified at his criminal trial that he shot Wilson accidentally in the head when Wilson came toward him with a knife and Wilson's head hit the gun that Metoyer was holding. Id. at 151. Wilson testified to the contrary that he had turned his back on Metoyer and was walking away when Metoyer shot him from behind. Id. at 150.
Dr. Angel, the neurosurgeon at Charity Hospital in New Orleans who performed a craniotomy on Wilson, testified at trial that the bullet's entrance wound was on the victim's neck and the exit wound was near the top of the skull in the back of his head. Id. This testimony was consistent with Wilson's testimony that he had been shot from behind.
The newly discovered evidence on which the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal based its reversal of Metoyer' s conviction consisted of Dr. Angel's operative report, which Dr. Angel had dictated immediately after the surgery. The operative report had never been transcribed and was therefore not included in the medical records that the hospital had provided to the parties before trial. In contradiction of Dr. Angel's trial testimony, the operative report stated that the bullet's entrance wound was on the top of Wilson's head and the exit wound was on his neck. Id. at 152. The operative report was therefore consistent with Metoyer's testimony of how the shooting had occurred and inconsistent with Wilson's testimony. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that a factfinder probably would conclude, based on the new evidence, that Metoyer did not have the requisite specific intent to kill Wilson. Id. at 153.
According to Metoyer's memorandum, his appeal counsel hired a former Charity Hospital nurse to review Wilson's medical records. The nurse noticed a "deficiency code" in the records, indicating that the operative report had not been transcribed, and she was able to locate the dictation tape and have it transcribed.
In his complaint in this Court, Metoyer contends that Dr. Angel conspired with the district attorney to prosecute him maliciously, to give false testimony and to withhold exculpatory evidence in the State's possession, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Plaintiffs Schultea statement clarifies his contention that Dr. Angel, a State employee and an expert witness for the State at trial, was a member of the prosecution team before trial. Plaintiff alleges that defendant himself failed to disclose the operative report, which Dr. Angel himself had dictated. He asserts that the operative report supported plaintiff's theory of his innocence and that Dr. Angel himself, as a member of the prosecution team, had an obligation to disclose it. Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Angel gave false testimony at trial that supported the prosecution's theory of Metoyer's guilt. Dr. Angel admitted at the hearing in state court on Metoyer's motion for a new trial that he had testified at trial based on his memory and that his operative report contradicted his trial testimony. State v. Metoyer, 720 So.2d at 152.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court must take the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve any ambiguities regarding the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiffs favor. Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss. The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n. Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pliots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1993)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1997).
Defendant's arguments in support of his motion to dismiss concerning plaintiff's Section 1983 claims assert two kinds of absolute immunity, which are available only to particular kinds of persons when performing particular functions, in addition to the separate defense of qualified immunity, which is available to all state actors. Each of defendant's immunity arguments must be analyzed separately, since each entails somewhat different standards. His argument concerning dismissal of the Section 1985 claim has merit without reference to any immunity defense.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Conspiracy Claim Under Section 1985
Dr. Angel has moved to dismiss plaintiffs conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because plaintiff alleges none of the required elements of such a claim. Section 1985 provides for liability for conspiracy to: (1) prevent a federal officer from performing his or her duties; (2) interfere with any federal court proceedings or with state court proceedings with the intent to deny equal protection based on race or class; and (3) based on race or class, deprive persons of equal protection, interfere with the ability of state officials to provide equal protection or deprive persons of the right to vote in a federal election. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985; Galloway v. State, 817 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987); Daigle v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 794 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1986); Ernest v. Lawentritt, 690 F.2d 1198, 1202 (5th Cir. 1982); Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators Paper Hangers, 308 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
Metoyer makes no argument in opposition to defendant's argument. Accordingly, this portion of defendant's motion to dismiss is deemed to be unopposed, and it appearing to the Court that defendant's arguments have merit, Dr. Angel's motion to dismiss is granted in part as to plaintiff's conspiracy claim under Section 1985.
C. Defendant Has Absolute Witness Immunity for Trial Testimony
It is undisputed that Dr. Angel acted under color of state law. Citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), plaintiff concedes in his opposition memorandum that Dr. Angel is entitled to absolute immunity for his trial testimony.
Section 1983 provides for liability for persons who deprive others of constitutional rights while acting under color of state law:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court in Briscoe held that nongovernmental witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their trial testimony for two reasons: (1) their testimony is not given under color of law and (2) such immunity was well established at English common law and was not abrogated by Section 1983. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 329-34. The Court referred to this doctrine as witness immunity, which, at common law, made no distinction between private citizens and public officials. Id. at 336 n. 15.
On the specific issue before it, the Supreme Court held that police officers, who act under color of state law, are absolutely immune for their trial testimony either because of witness immunity or because an officer "may be regarded as an official performing a critical role in the judicial process, in which event he may seek the benefit afforded to other governmental participants [i.e., judges and prosecutors] in the same proceeding." Id. at 335-36. After examining the common law, the legislative history of Section 1983 and the public policy underlying absolute immunity for nongovermental witnesses, judges and prosecutors, the Court refused to carve out an exception to absolute immunity in the case of police officers who commit perjury at trial, noting that such an exception would probably have to apply "to other government officials and experts, including coroners, medical examiners, psychiatric experts, and social workers." Id. at 341-42 n. 27. The Court stated: "[O]ur cases clearly indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional categories, not on the status of the defendant. A police officer on the witness stand performs the same functions as any other witness. . . ."Id. at 342.6
Some courts have extended absolute immunity to court-appointed physicians or other experts who evaluated Section 1983 plaintiffs in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and reported to the court in writing. Such court-appointed experts "perform functions essential to the judicial process" and their reports, even in the absence of their testimony, are analogous to testimony that would be protected by witness immunity. Morstad v. Department of Corrections Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984); Yates v. Cunningham, 70 F. Supp.2d 47, 51 (D.N.H. 1999); Di Costanzo v. Henriksen, No. 94 Civ. 2464 (MGC), 1995 WL 447766, at 2 (S.D.N Y July 28, 1995); Rindley v. Gallagher, 890 F. Supp. 1540, 1557-58 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
As to governmental witnesses, Briscoe addressed only the absolute immunity of police officers testifying at trial. Leading constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has stated that, following Briscoe, the immunity of other witnesses remains an unresolved question. E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6, at 472 (Little Brown 2d ed. 1994) (citing Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1398-1401 (10th Cir. 1992) (lay witness receives absolute immunity for grand jury testimony; complaining witness/deputy sheriff receives qualified immunity for grand jury testimony when considering malicious prosecution claim)); accord Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1447 (6th Cir. 1997); Curtis, 48 F.3d at 284; Enlow v. Tishimongo County, 962 F.2d 501, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1992).
I find that Briscoe and its progeny foreclose plaintiff's claim against Dr. Angel based on his trial testimony. I reach this interpretation ofBriscoe in light of the Supreme Court's holding that all nongovernmental witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity and that the same policy reasons apply to immunizing trial testimony by police officers as to all other witnesses. Like other lower courts, the Fifth Circuit has broadly stated that "[w]itnesses, including police officers, are . . . shielded by absolute immunity from liability for their allegedly perjurious testimony." Enlow, 962 F.2d at 510 (citing Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 346). From a functional standpoint, Dr. Angel "on the witness stand performs the same functions as any other witness" and should be entitled to the same immunity for his testimony. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342.
Therefore, Dr. Angel's motion to dismiss is granted in part as to Metoyer's claim against defendant under Section 1983 concerning his trial testimony.
D. Defendant Does Not Have Absolute Witness Immunity for Plaintiff's Conspiracy Claims Under Section 1983
Dr. Angel has moved to dismiss Metoyer's conspiracy claim under Section 1983. Considerable case law holds that a Section 1983 plaintiff may not circumvent absolute witness immunity by alleging that the witness conspired with government officials to present false testimony.
We are persuaded that allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the Briscoe rule by alleging a conspiracy to present false testimony would undermine the purposes served by granting witnesses absolute immunity from damages liability under § 1983. Absolute witness immunity is based on the policy of protecting the judicial process and is necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation. As the Court stated in Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 334-35, "[a] witness's apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two forms of self censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of subsequent liability." Moreover, . . . any other holding would eviscerate absolute immunity since a witness rarely prepares her testimony on her own.Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted); accord Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999); Bombliss v. County of Lee, 23 F.3d 410, 1994 WL 117970, at 2 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 1994) (unpubl. opin. avail, on Westlaw); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1993); McArdle, 961 F.2d at 1085-86; Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1562 (10th Cir. 1991); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1987); Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173, 1174 (6th Cir. 1987).
Although the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the effect of allegations of conspiracy on a witness's immunity, the Court has held that absolute judicial immunity may not be voided by allegations of a conspiracy between the judge and a staff member or the judge and an outside party.Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985). Judicial immunity in such cases protects the judge and extends to the staff member who assists the judge in carrying out the latter's judicial functions. Mitchell, 944 F.2d at 230 (citing Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that allegations of conspiracy cannot be used to abrogate at least one established immunity.
However, neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has held that witness immunity can never be abrogated by allegations of conspiracy to present false testimony. The Supreme Court in Briscoe raised the possibility "that nongovernmental witnesses could act `under color of law' by conspiring with the prosecutor or other state officials. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the `color of law' analysis to consider whether private witnesses may ever be held liable for damages under § 1983." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330 n. 7 (citations omitted).
In this case, Metoyer's allegations against Dr. Angel go beyond merely alleging conspiracy to give false testimony at trial. Instead, Metoyer also alleges a conspiracy to conceal exculpatory evidence pretrial and to prosecute him maliciously, an actionable constitutional tort under Section 1983, which goes beyond conspiracy to present false testimony. See Keko v. Hingle, No. 98-2189, 1999 WL 508406, at 3-4 (E.D. La. July 8, 1999) (Berrigan, J.), aff'd w/out opin., 207 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (prosecution's expert witness not absolutely immune for allegedly conspiring before trial to violate plaintiffs constitutional rights, although witness was immune for trial testimony);Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 813 F. Supp. 1262, 1264-67 n. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 1994) (citingEnlow, 962 F.2d at 511) (plaintiffs' allegations that City and City officials conspired to deprive them of constitutional right of access to courts by concealing evidence and testifying falsely in depositions in prior civil action not barred by absolute immunity); cf. Quirk v. Mustang Eng'g, Inc., 143 F.3d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1998) (expert medical witness not entitled to absolute immunity for evaluating plaintiff before any adjudicatory action was contemplated).
It should also be noted that the Fifth Circuit recognizes claims for civil conspiracy, malicious prosecution and concealing exculpatory evidence under Section 1983, rights that were clearly established at the time of Metoyer's arrest in 1996. Brady, 373 U.S. at 83; Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 480 n. 11 (5th Cir. 1999); Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339, 340 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995); Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994)). "The elements of civil conspiracy are (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and (2) actions taken in concert by the defendants with the specific intent to violate the aforementioned right." Id. at 340. Plaintiff has alleged violation of his rights to receive exculpatory evidence and to be free from malicious prosecution and that defendant conspired with others to violate that right.
Therefore, the Court finds that Metoyer has stated a claim against Dr. Angel for conspiracy under Section 1983 for which defendant does not have absolute witness immunity. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss these claims on grounds of absolute witness immunity is denied.
E. Defendant Does Not Have Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity for Plaintiff's Claims That His Nontestimonial Actions Violate Section 1983
As the discussion above indicates, Metoyer asserts two claims under Section 1983: (1) Dr. Angel was a member of the "prosecution team" who had an individual obligation to disclose Brady material and (2) Dr. Angel conspired with the district attorney to prosecute Metoyer maliciously by concealing the exculpatory operative report. Defendant argues that he is immune from these claims because, if he is a member of the prosecution team, he enjoys the same immunity as prosecutors for their prosecutorial functions.
"Prosecutors enjoy absolute immuneity for those activities `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'" Kerr, 171 F.3d at 336 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). "A prosecutor's absolute immunity will not be stripped because of action that was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 337 n. 10 (quotations omitted) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510 (1978)).
The district court in Shakur v. United States, 32 F. Supp.2d 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), described the difficulty in defining the boundaries of "the prosecution team" as follows.
[T]he Brady obligation extends only to material evidence that is known to the prosecutor. . . . Absent prosecutorial knowledge, by definition known there can have been no governmental suppression of evidence. But the boundaries of the government's knowledge — actual or constructive, real or presumed, direct or imputed — are not drawn with precision. It is well settled that those boundaries extend beyond the individual prosecutor or prosecutors who obtain the indictment and conduct the trial. The individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with the government's investigation. . . .
Nonetheless, knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor, for the imposition of an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office on the case in question would inappropriately require [the Court] to adopt a monolithic view of government that would condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.Id. at 658 (quotations omitted) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998);United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir. 1995)).
None of the cases cited by the parties and none that I have located in my research establishes that a physician employed by a state hospital, who operates on a crime victim and subsequently testifies favorably to the prosecution at the criminal trial, is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor's office is single entity; knowledge of one assistant United States Attorney is attributable to others in same office); Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 877-78 (7th Cir. 1984) (declining to decide whether state prosecutor, state police and federal Drug Enforcement Agency each had constructive knowledge of information known by others, but noting in dicta that joint federal-state drug investigations raised responsibility for prosecutor to keep informed of "decisions made by other members of the team"); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecution team includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel); Shakur, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 662, 664 (refusing to impute to Federal Bureau of Investigation and United States Attorney the knowledge of City police department gained in separate investigation of plaintiff; imputation of knowledge of police officers to federal prosecution team "would, as a practical matter, impose an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosector's office on the case") (quotation omitted).
Accepting as true for purposes of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's allegation that Dr. Angel was a member of the prosecution team, the Court must examine Dr. Angel's function as a member of that team before trial. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342. It appears from the allegations in the complaint, unsupported by evidence at present, that defendant's function was to gather and interpret evidence in the course of performing a craniotomy on Wilson. In that role, Dr. Angel is analogous at best to a police officer or other official when he or she is investigating a crime. It is well established that such persons are not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because they are obtaining evidence, not performing traditional prosecutorial functions, such as deciding which prosecutions to bring and conducting them in court.Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993); Burge, 187 F.3d at 478; Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 440 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on different grounds by Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127-28 (1997), as recognized in Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. Beck v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 636-38 (5th Cir. 2000) (investigator for state board who gathered information and performed neither prosecutorial nor adjudicative functions not entitled to absolute immunity).
Dr. Angel is not a prosecutor, was not performing traditional prosecutorial functions and cannot benefit from prosecutorial immunity, even if he engaged in some activities as a member of the prosecution team. Absolute immunity, which derogates from the truth-seeking process, has been extended sparingly by the Supreme Court, and the person asserting it must demonstrate his clear entitlement to it. Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1160 (2000) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991); Hill v. City of N.Y., 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995)); Anthony, 955 F.2d at 1399 (citing Burns 500 U.S. at 486-87; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988)). In the absence of controlling Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court will not extend absolute prosecutorial immunity to a state-employed physician who was gathering and interpreting evidence for the prosecution. Thus, Dr. Angel cannot be absolutely immune from liability for his alleged violation of Section 1983 in failing to disclose or conspiring to fail to disclose the exculpatory operative report.
F. Qualified Immunity
At this stage of the litigation, defendant has asserted the defense of qualified immunity via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Therefore, I must accept as true for purposes of the pending motion plaintiffs allegation that Dr. Angel was a member of the prosecution team.
The case law does not foreclose the possibility that Dr. Angel might be found to have been so closely involved with the prosecution that he had an obligation to disclose the operative report to Metoyer. Dr. Angel failed before trial to locate or review the operative report, which he knew existed and which contradicted the prosecution's theory of the case, and he testified consistently with the prosecution's theory of the case at trial. As an evidence gatherer and interpreter for the prosecution team, however, Dr. Angel may be entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual liability for performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1997); Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
A qualified immunity defense is analyzed under a two-step process. The first step is to determine whether plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right under currently applicable constitutional standards. The second step requires the Court to determine whether defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law existing at the time of the alleged deprivation.Colston, 130 F.3d at 99 (citing Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994)).
In the instant case, the obligation of the prosecution team to disclose exculpatory material was at the time of plaintiffs arrest and is now a clearly established constitutional right. Brady, 373 U.S. at 83; Burge, 187 F.3d at 480 n. 11; Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992). The prosecutor clearly has the obligation to learn and to disclose to the criminal defendant all information known to members of the prosecutor's team. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421, 432, 437-38; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Brady, 373 U.S. at 83; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 ("disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as the representative of a sovereignty whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done") (quotation and ellipses omitted). But it is also clear that theinvestigative members of the team must disclose exculpatory evidence at least to the district attorney, if not directly to the criminal defendant, and their failure to do so may subject them to Section 1983 liability. See Burge, 187 F.3d at 480 (police officer who allegedly hid evidence in the trunk of his car and suborned perjury, without disclosing such information to prosecutor, not entitled to summary judgment on basis of qualified immunity); Sanders, 950 F.2d at 1162 (police officer's "deliberate failure to disclose . . . patently exculpatory evidence to the prosecuting attorney's office plainly exposes him to liability under § 1983").
Whether Dr. Angel was in fact a gatherer and interpreter of evidence as a member of the prosecution team, such that he had an obligation to disclose his operative report, and whether his actions were objectively reasonable will depend on the development of evidence not yet known to the Court. This is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true, it cannot be said that Metoyer can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. It also cannot be concluded, on the current record, that Dr. Angel is clearly protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. He is free to assert the defense later in these proceedings, via motion for summary judgment or at trial, supported by evidence establishing whether he was or was not a member of the prosecution team to such an extent that he had or did not have a legal obligation to disclose the exculpatory operative report and, if he did, whether his actions were objectively reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to plaintiff's conspiracy claim under Section 1985 and as to his Section 1983 claims based upon defendant's trial testimony. The motion is DENIED in all other respects. The remaining claims are all claims under Section 1983 concerning (1) defendant's alleged pretrial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and (2) his alleged conspiracy pretrial to conceal exculpatory evidence and to prosecute plaintiff maliciously.