Opinion
Case No. 00-10361-BC
December 5, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Currently pending before the Court is petitioner Earl Metcalf's pro se application for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner is an inmate at the Thumb Correctional Facility in Lapeer, Michigan. The petition alleges that Metcalf's plea of nolo contendere was not voluntary because the trial court denied his request to appoint substitute counsel, and that his custody is therefore in violation of the laws of the United States. The Court disagrees, and will deny the petition.
I.
On January 29, 1998, a complaint and warrant was issued in Detroit, Michigan charging the petitioner with assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. The charges arose from allegations that the petitioner shot Marshall Kenneth Love in the head because Love told the petitioner that the neighbors did not want the petitioner selling drugs on the block. Love survived the shooting. The petitioner was arrested and arraigned on May 6, 1998, and attorney Coral Watt was appointed to represent him. Marshall Love testified at the preliminary examination and identified the petitioner as someone he knew for about six or seven years and as the person who shot him. The petitioner was bound over for trial in the criminal division of the Wayne County Circuit Court, where the state prosecutor filed an habitual offender information against the petitioner for the purpose of notifying him of the potential for an enhanced sentence.
Trial was scheduled to begin on December 7, 1998, at which time the petitioner appeared with his attorney before Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Terrence K. Boyle. The petitioner informed Judge Boyle that he would like to have a different attorney due to "ineffective counseling" and his lack of confidence in the attorney. He complained that his attorney had lied to him and his family about the case and that she was not representing him to the best of her ability. He also alleged that his attorney had lied to his witnesses, telling them that they were not needed in court. See Tr. 12-7/21-98, at 2-4, 6.
The trial court noted that the decision not to call certain alibi witnesses might be wise because the prosecution possessed evidence indicating that the petitioner had instructed the witnesses on how to testify. See id. at 3-4. Defense attorney Watt then stated that the petitioner had given her a list of three alibi witnesses. Of those three alibi witnesses, one witness had no address or telephone number, the second witness was the one who the petitioner allegedly instructed on how to testify, and the third witness had been subpoenaed. See id. at 5-6.
The trial court described the petitioner's motion as "palpable nonsense," but the petitioner then revealed that he had recently filed a grievance against his attorney with the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission. The trial court was unable to confirm that the petitioner had filed a grievance, but an employee of the Commission informed the trial court by telephone that the grievance may not have been processed yet. See id. at 8-12.
The petitioner provided a copy of the grievance to the trial court. The grievance was read into the record as follows:
I asked for medical, hospital records, evidence hearing, LEIN on witnesses. Furthermore she said she don't know how to defend me. From the start she have been trying to get me to take fifteen-year cop, plus out of three lawyer visits, that's all she talked about, me taking fifteen years, not about helping defending me. She has went [so] far as telling me on November 30th that if I didn't take [a cop] that she wasn't going to defend me to the best of her ability when I go to trial unless I paid her some money on the side. The case is very serious. I don't see how I would have [a fair trial] with Miss Watt sabotaging my case. I told Miss Watt that she was fired but she said I can't fire her as well as Judge Boyle. He said the same. Please help me. God bless you.
Id. at 12-13.
Ms. Watt responded that (1) she gave the petitioner everything in the file, but the petitioner told her a couple of days earlier that he lost his discovery; (2) she had written proof of her five visits to the petitioner in jail, and she discussed his case with him each time; (3) she had not tried to coerce the petitioner into making a plea, nor asked him for money; (4) she ran a LEIN on the complaining witness and discovered that he had no convictions; (5) she had spoken to the witnesses and explained to the petitioner that two of them would not have been able to contribute anything to the trial; and (6) she was prepared to go to trial. See id. at 13-15. When the trial court announced that the case would proceed to trial, the petitioner voluntarily left the courtroom and returned to the lockup. See id. at 15-17.
Ms. Watt then moved to withdraw on the basis of the petitioner's grievance against her. The trial court expressed confidence in defense counsel's ability to represent the petitioner and denied the attorney's motion. The trial court opined that the petitioner was unwilling to face the consequences of his conduct and that he was trying to manipulate the court and to avoid the proceedings. See id. at 3, 6, 8, 15-19, 25, 30.
While the trial court and the attorneys were discussing the matter, Ms. Watt received a message stating that the petitioner wanted to speak with her. She subsequently consulted with the petitioner in the lockup and announced that the petitioner wanted to enter a plea. The petitioner returned to the courtroom and agreed to a the following plea bargain: the petitioner would plead nolo contendere to assault with intent to commit murder and felony firearm. In return, the prosecutor would dismiss three felony drug cases against the petitioner and the supplemental information charging the petitioner as an habitual offender. The plea agreement also called for a sentence of two years in prison for the felony firearm conviction and a consecutive term of fifteen to thirty years for the assault conviction.
The petitioner proceeded to enter his nolo contendere plea.
Judge Boyle thoroughly explained the petitioner's rights and consulted the preliminary examination transcript to establish a factual basis. During the plea colloquy, Judge Boyle asked the petitioner if he believed it was in his "own best interest" to enter the plea. The petitioner responded that he was doing it because he "was going to get railroaded anyway." The trial court stated that he understood the petitioner's feelings, but noted: "I take that to be a choice that he's made on his own, and that's all that's required." See id. at 31-37. The court accepted the petitioner's plea and found him guilty of the charged crimes.
On December 21, 1998, the petitioner moved to withdraw his plea because he believed the trial court was biased for not appointing another attorney to represent him. The trial court denied that motion, and them sentenced the petitioner pursuant to the plea agreement. See id. at 39-41, 43-44. Later, both state appellate courts denied leave to appeal. See People v. Metcalf, No. 218541 (Mich.Ct.App. May 21, 1999) (denying leave to appeal for "lack of merit in the grounds presented"); People v. Metcalf, No. 114947 (Mich. Feb. 2, 2000) (denying leave to appeal because the court was "not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed"). The petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on October 2, 2000. His sole claim is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, due process of law, and a fair trial when the trial court denied his request for substitute counsel. More specifically, the petitioner alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by denying (1) his request for substitute counsel and his attorney's request to withdraw representation, and (2) his subsequent motion to withdraw the plea. The petitioner contends that, as a result of the trial court's denial of his motion for substitution of counsel, he was coerced into pleading nolo contendere. The respondent maintains that the failure to appoint substitute counsel did not render the petitioner's plea involuntary.
II.
Federal courts may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's adjudication of the petitioner's claim on the merits —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).
This deferential standard applies even if a state court fails to articulate its reasoning for a decision on the merits. Onifer v. Tyszkiewicz, 255 F.3d 313, 316 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 292 (2001). The question in such cases is "whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Ibid (quoting Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 947 (2001)).
Under state law, the decision to allow substitution of counsel in the midst of a criminal proceeding is committed to the trial court's discretion. See People v. Arguette, 202 Mich. App. 227, 231, 507 N.W.2d 824, 826 (1993); People v. Mack, 190 Mich. App. 7, 14, 475 N.W.2d 830, 835 (1991) ("An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that the attorney originally appointed be replaced. Appointment of a substitute counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Good cause exists where a legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel with regard to a fundamental trial tactic." (citations omitted)).
An abuse of that discretion generally is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. See Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no authority for the proposition that, when a state court abuses its discretion in denying a defendant's motion to withdraw a waiver of jury trial, the result violates the United States Constitution); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 871 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[q]uestions of degree — like questions about the proper use of `discretion' — lack answers to which the labels `right' and `wrong' may be attached" and that, "[w]hen the subject is painted in shades of grey, rather than in contrasting colors, a responsible, thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment"), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
The petitioner, nevertheless, maintains that the trial court should have granted his motion for substitution of counsel and his attorney's motion to withdraw. The petitioner contends that his attorney's lack of loyalty toward him and his filing of a grievance against the attorney demonstrated a conflict of interest.
"The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that `[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'" Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 158 (1988). "[T]hose who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts." Caplin Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989); see also Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that an accused's right to choose counsel "is not absolute"). There is no constitutional right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). When reviewing a court's decision to deny defense counsel's motion to withdraw, this Circuit considers "(1) the timeliness of the motion [to withdraw or substitute counsel], (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into the matter, (3) the extent of the conflict between the attorney and client and whether it was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense, and (4) the balancing of these factors with the public's interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice." United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
In this case, the record demonstrates that the petitioner moved for substitution of counsel on the day of trial. The trial court made an adequate inquiry into the petitioner's request and defense counsel's motion. The petitioner and his attorney disagreed on some aspects of trial strategy, but the conflict apparently was not so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. There is no basis in the record to conclude that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective, that there was a conflict in interest, or that she did not have the petitioner's interests in mind. The petitioner's apparent attempt to stall the proceedings tipped the balance in favor of the public's right to the prompt and efficient administration of justice.
Although this Court might have ruled differently, the trial court's decision to deny the motions to withdraw or substitute counsel was justifiable. The record suggests that the trial judge detected a dilatory motive behind the petitioner's request, and the court desired to move forward with the matter, which had been pending for over six months. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). The trial court's decision was not unreasonable, and the state appellate court's denial of leave to appeal "for lack of merit in the ground presented" was not contrary to federal law, an unreasonable application of clearly established law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts.
The petitioner's only other argument is that the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw the nolo contendere plea. The petitioner contends that his plea was coerced by the trial court's refusal to appoint a different attorney. He also contends "that he did not understand the enormity of his actions in offering a no contest plea." Mem. at 8.
The Sixth Circuit has summarized relevant Supreme Court decisions by stating that
[a] plea is valid if it is entered voluntarily and intelligently as determined under the totality of the circumstances. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1970). The constitution requires the circumstances to reflect that the defendant was informed of all the direct consequences of his plea. Id. A plea may be involuntary if the defendant does not understand the nature of the constitutional rights he is waiving, or unintelligent if the defendant does not understand the charges against him.
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n. 13 (1976). United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, there is no constitutional right, or absolute right under state law, to withdraw a plea. United States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1970); Freeman v. Muncy, 748 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D.Va. 1990); People v. Bencheck, 360 Mich. 430, 432, 104 N.W.2d 191, 191-92 (1960); People v. Harris, 224 Mich. App. 130, 131, 568 N.W.2d 149, 149 (1997). Once again, it is within the trial court's discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea. Scott, 429 F.2d at 109.
In Michigan, a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing in the interest of justice "unless withdrawal of the plea would substantially prejudice the prosecutor because of reliance on the plea." Mich. Ct. R. 6.310(B). A trial court must permit the defendant to withdraw the plea before sentencing if there was an error in the plea proceeding that would entitle the defendant to have the plea set aside. Mich. Ct. R. 6.311(B).
As previously explained, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion to substitute counsel because it believed the petitioner's motion was motivated by his desire to delay the proceedings. The trial court subsequently informed the petitioner that the case would proceed to trial. The petitioner complained that he was being "railroaded" into taking a plea, but he summoned his attorney while the attorneys and the trial court were discussing the impact of the petitioner's request for substitution of counsel. Then the petitioner announced that he wanted to plead nolo contendere, and he signed the plea form. See Tr. 12-7/21/98, at 31-32.
The trial court proceeded to explain the terms of the plea agreement and the maximum penalties to the petitioner, who responded by stating that he wanted to plead nolo contendere. The petitioner also stated that he understood the rights that he was waiving, that he was not promised anything other than the plea agreement, and that no one threatened him into pleading nolo contendere. See id. at 33-36. These "solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). When the petitioner said that he was pleading nolo contendere because he "was going to get railroaded anyway," the trial court understood the petitioner to be saying that he was exercising a choice made on his own. See Tr. 12-7/21/98, at 37.
Likewise, at the sentencing on December 21, 1998, the petitioner indicated that he wanted to withdraw his plea for the reasons listed above. He claimed that he did not understand the law on sentencing. The trial court denied the motion in light of the delays in the case and the fact that the petitioner had elected to accept the plea offer during a break in the earlier proceedings. See id. at 39-41, 43-44.
The record establishes that the petitioner was informed of the direct consequences of his plea and the charges against him, and he claimed to understand the constitutional rights he was waiving. The trial court's finding that the petitioner's motion to substitute counsel was a ploy to delay the proceedings is entitled to a presumption of correctness because the petitioner had not rebutted the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The petitioner also has not shown that his plea was involuntary or unintelligent. Therefore, the state appellate court's denial of leave to appeal "for lack of merit" did not contravene or unreasonably apply federal law.
III.
The state court decisions in this case were not contrary to federal law, an unreasonable application of clearly established law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.