Opinion
No. 3-964 / 03-0858
Filed March 10, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Dale E. Ruigh, Judge.
Belinda Merritt appeals from the district court order granting summary judgment on her sex discrimination action against the Iowa Department of Transportation. AFFIRMED.
Thomas P. Graves and Thomas Jackowski of Jackowski, Krell Graves, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Belinda Merritt appeals from the district court order granting summary judgment on her sex discrimination action against the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) and four of its employees. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Merritt has been an employee of the DOT since 1974, working in the right-of-way office since 1978. In February of 2000 she applied for a promotion to the position of Right of Way Agent IV. The position for which she applied had been deemed "underutilized," meaning it belonged to a category for which women, minorities and disabled people were statistically under-represented. A three-member team consisting of Don Muessigmann, Scott Henning, and Sharon Dumdei was to conduct the interviews. Interviewees were required to take a written test and respond to verbal questioning; they were then ranked independently by each of the interviewers. Each of the interviewers ranked Merritt fourth, behind two males and one female. The averaged scores for the top three individuals were 95.7 (out of a possible 120), 91.7, and 90.3, while Merritt scored 84.3. Only the top three ranked individuals were asked to return for a second interview. Eventually David Younie, who had worked for the DOT since 1991 and who had been ranked the highest by all of the interviewers, was hired for the position.
After filing a gender-based discrimination in employment charge with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunity Commission and receiving her administrative right to sue letter, Merritt filed a petition at law under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), see Iowa Code § 216.6 (2001), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2001), against the DOT and alleging sex discrimination in the denial of a promotion. The DOT later moved for summary judgment, alleging Merritt was unable to produce evidence sufficient to support a verdict that her sex played a role in the DOT's employment decision. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Merritt's action in its entirety. Merritt appeals from this ruling.
The petition also named Muessigmann, Henning, Dumdei, and Scott Dockstader as defendants, although for ease of reference we will refer to DOT throughout as the defendant.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review the district court's summary judgment rulings for correction of errors at law. Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Iowa 2002). The court views "the factual record in the light most favorable to the resisting party, affording that party all reasonable inferences." Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 2000). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). If the conflict in the record concerns only "the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, or from facts viewed most favorably toward the resisting party," the matter is properly resolved on summary judgment. City of Akron v. Akron-Westfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 659 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 2003).
III. Sex Discrimination.
The purpose of Title VII is to ensure "persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex." Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544, 91 S.Ct. 496, 497-98, 27 L.Ed.2d 613, 615 (1971). Because the ICRA is modeled after the federal legislation, Iowa courts have traditionally looked to federal law for guidance in interpreting it. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999). Iowa courts, however, are not bound by federal law, despite consistent utilization of the federal analytical framework. See Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).
Two avenues exist by which a plaintiff can attempt to prove intentional employment discrimination. First, a plaintiff can rely upon the standard set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, if the plaintiff produces direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion, such as gender, "played a motivating part in [the] employment decision." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1787, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 284 (1989). Once the plaintiff establishes such direct evidence, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer would have reached the same employment decision absent any discrimination. Id. at 109 So. Ct. at 1787, 104 L. Ed.2d at 284. If the employer fails to meet this standard, the employee prevails.
Alternatively, a plaintiff can proceed under the three-stage, burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir. 1996). Once a prima facie case is established, a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption disappears and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. A. Direct Evidence " Price Waterhouse " Analysis.
Direct evidence may exist in the form of statements by persons involved in the decision-making process which tend to show a discriminatory attitude of sufficient weight that would allow the fact finder to conclude that a discriminatory animus was the motivating factor in the employment decision. Yates v. Rexton, Inc., 267 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must show a link between the challenged employment action and the alleged animus. Brown v. President Riverboat Casino — Missouri, 139 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1998).
Here, Merritt points to a variety of pieces of evidence which she claims constitute "direct evidence" of discrimination. She claims evidence shows that Muessigmann, who supervises the person hired for this position, harbored discriminatory animus and had a history of favoritism in the hiring process. She points out that under his management, the percentage of women in the office decreased and that he has not personally undertaken action to specifically increase the number of women. Muessigmann stated that he has only a few employees under his supervision, and due also to downsizing, he has had only limited opportunity to hire anyone. In Merritt's deposition she stated she had heard Muessigmann talked and acted inappropriately toward certain women, but this asserted hearsay was completely unsubstantiated.
Merritt also points to statements made by Scott Henning, which she claims prove he was hostile to women and disabled individuals. When asked whether any discussions occurred about the underutilization of the position and about the fact they secretly intended to offer the position to a white, non-handicapped male, Henning responded:
No. That was actually Don's call. I know — If I recall correctly — and this is the only way I would participate in an interview — is I'll give you my thoughts and my recommendations who I think the best person is, period. That's all — That's what I'll do. I won't be involved with something if you wanted it manipulated for someone else to fit. I don't do that.
. . .
If there would have been something that said, "Okay. Sit down. And we want you to be on the interview team, but we need to hire a woman or we need to hire a handicapped person," I wouldn't have been on the interview team because I don't work that way.
We do not find reasonable Merritt's interpretation of Henning's comments regarding the hiring process. See Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1146 (7th Cir. 1994) (party opposing summary judgment is only entitled to reasonable inferences). Henning's straightforward statement reveals that he was not inclined to manipulate the hiring process in any fashion. Further, none of the statements or other evidence is sufficiently linked to the challenged employment decision to support an inference that the decision was more likely than not motivated by gender discrimination. See Walton v. McDonnell Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1999). We agree with the district court's conclusion Merritt failed to provide sufficient evidence to survive a summary judgment motion on this issue.B. Burden Shifting Test of McDonnell Douglas.
Using a separate analysis, the District court determined, and the DOT concedes on appeal, that Merritt made out a "prima facie" case of discrimination in that she is a female, she was qualified for the position, and a male was hired for the position. See Gentry v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 250 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2001). The burden thus shifted to the DOT to produce evidence that Merritt was rejected, or someone else preferred, for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Smith v. Eaton Corp., 195 F. Supp.2d 1079, 1093 (N.D. Iowa 2002). The presumption of discriminatory hiring was rebutted when the DOT produced evidence that David Younie was determined to be the most qualified for the position by all members of the hiring committee, acting independent of each other.
For Merritt's obligation to then produce evidence that the DOT's reason to hire Younie was just a pretext, Merritt asserts that she was "clearly the most qualified person for the position." Merritt relies heavily on this self-appraisal to support her claim. However, in a failure to promote case, a plaintiff cannot prove pretext by simply showing that she was better qualified than the individual who received the position that she wanted. See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant's employment decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by sex. See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff may not establish that an employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons, at least not where . . . the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer." Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, we conclude Merritt's own self-assessment that she was the most qualified does not suffice to create an issue of material fact on the pretext issue. This is especially clear here where all members of the interview committee, independent of each other, ranked Merritt fourth and Younie, who was eventually hired, as first.
Next, Merritt maintains the district court improperly failed to take into consideration the fact the Right of Way Agent IV position was "underutilized." She believes it is reasonable to infer a discriminatory motive, essentially, from the failure to hire her, as a woman for this type of position. We disagree. We find it significant in this regard that one of the three finalists for the position was, indeed, a woman. In addition, as the State aptly pointed out, Merritt must still prove the decision makers did not give the promotion to Merritt because she is a woman, and that the failure to give a preference on account of sex is not evidence of discrimination or pretext. See, e.g., Yatvin v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1988).
We conclude Merritt has produced no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude the DOT's stated reason for not hiring her was "so lacking in merit as to call into question its genuineness." Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988). First, all three members of the hiring committee ranked Merritt fourth amongst the candidates. In her interview, Merritt was described as being defensive and argumentative. She questioned the validity of some questions posed to her while giving curt answers to others. In addition, she hesitated before answering some questions, while Younie did not. Moreover, of the three finalists offered a second interview, one of them was a female. Further, Fran Rout, the DOT's Affirmative Action Officer, although initially indicating concern over the fact a member of a "protected class" was not hired, later clarified that she did not believe the decision-makers were biased against women, that she was satisfied the hiring process was done pursuant to DOT policy, and that she gave approval to the hiring of Younie. We agree that none of Merritt's assertions creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether DOT's reason for hiring Younie was pretextual.
IV. Conclusion.
Merritt failed to present evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment on the issue of "direct evidence" of discrimination. Nor does Merritt's evidence create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DOT's proffered reason for hiring Younie rather than Merritt was pretextual. We therefore affirm the district court order granting summary judgment on Merritt's claim.