Opinion
SA-21-CV-793-FB (HJB)
05-15-2022
LILLY MERRILL, Plaintiff, v. COASTAL TRANSPORT SERVICES, Defendant.
To the Honorable Fred Biery, United States District Judge:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Henry J. Bemporad, United States Magistrate Judge.
This Report and Recommendation concerns the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant. (Docket Entry 6.) Dispositive motions in this case have been referred to the undersigned for recommendation. (Docket Entry 10, at 2.) For the reasons set out below, I recommend that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 6) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs suit presents a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), et. seq. (Docket Entry 1, at 1.) This Court has jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. I have authority to issue this recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
II. Background.
Plaintiff Lilly Merrill was employed by Defendant from April 27, 1992, until May 10, 2021, as a dispatcher. (Docket Entry 1, at 1.) She alleges that she regularly and routinely worked in excess of 40 hours a week without overtime pay, as required by her immediate supervisor. (Id. at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that she would fill in when other dispatchers were sick and that she would work nights and weekends outside of her regularly scheduled hours. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed suit under the FLSA on August 25, 2021. (Docket Entry 1.) Defendant moved to dismiss. (Docket Entry 6.) Plaintiff responded (Docket Entry 7), and Defendant replied (Docket Entry 8).
III. Legal Standard.
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a cause of action in a complaint when it fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). For a claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
IV. Analysis.
Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on two grounds: (1) that she failed to allege the amount of overtime hours she worked, and (2) that she failed to allege facts sufficient • to support a claim of willfulness. (Docket Entry 6, at 1.) Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
A. Amount of Overtime,
To state a prima facie overtime-pay claim under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) that an employer-employee relationship existed during the time that she worked in excess of forty hours per week; (2) that she engaged in activities covered by the FLSA; (3) that the employer violated the FLSA's overtime-wage requirements; and (4) the amount of overtime-pay due. White v. U.S. Corrs., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 2021). Defendant disputes whether Plaintiffs allegations satisfy the fourth element. (Docket Entry 6, at 3-5.)
As to this element, Plaintiff alleges that she “work[ed] in excess of 40 hours in a workweek on a regular and recurring basis during numerous workweeks.” (Docket Entry 1, at 4.) She claims that, for 29 years, her “regular schedule was from 7:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday” but that she was “also on call Saturday and Sunday” and would “regularly perform her dispatch duties at her home on weekends and nights.” (Docket Entry 1, at 1, 4.)
The Fifth Circuit has held pleadings similar to Plaintiffs to be sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie claim. In White, the Court found it sufficient when the plaintiff “allege[d] that she worked ... from June 2018 to January 2019 and that during her employment, she ‘regularly' worked in excess of forty hours per week.” 996 F.3d at 309. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she worked for Defendant for a much longer period, between 1992 and 2021 (Docket Entry 1, at 4); however, depending on the relevant limitations period (see Part IV(B), infra), this would provide either a two- or three-year window during which Plaintiff regularly worked more than 40 hours, specifically nights and weekends outside of her set hours. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 255 (providing applicable limitations periods). Therefore, Plaintiff s pleadings set out a discrete time period, allege that she regularly worked in excess of 40 hours a week, and give an indication of when these hours occurred. Under the analysis in White, she has pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim under the FSLA, and her claim should not be dismissed. 996 F.3d at 309.
B. Claim for Willfulness,
Section 255 generally provides a two-year statute of limitations, but it extends the period to three years for a cause of action arising out of a willful violation of the FLSA. To plead willfulness, a plaintiff must allege that an employer “knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” Hoenninger v. Leasing Enters., Ltd., 803 Fed.Appx. 756, 760 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1988)). A negligent violation is not a willful violation, and an unreasonable violation does not necessarily constitute a willful one. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135 n. 13; Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1416 (5th Cir. 1990)).
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that “Defendant repeatedly and willfully violated ... the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to compensate Plaintiff at a rate not less than one and one-half times her regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek, ” and that “Defendant either knew about or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA and failed to act diligently with regard to its obligations as employers under the FLSA.” (Docket Entry 1, at 4-5.) These allegations are no more than a boilerplate recitation of the elements of a claim, without additional factual detail to render such a claim plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Without more, such conclusory allegations do not satisfy the pleading standard. Id. Accordingly, Defendant's motion should be granted as to the issue of willfulness. If Plaintiff wishes to go forward on her willfulness claim, she must amend her complaint to present additional factual allegations in support of the claim. Cf. Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (“district courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal”).
V. Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 6) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Before Plaintiff may proceed on her claim of a willful violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff should be required to amend her complaint to allege sufficient facts in support of her claim.
VI. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object.
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party shall file the objections with the clerk of the court, and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. UnitedServs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).