Opinion
Case No. 2D20-734
05-14-2021
Marcel Louis MELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Brittney A. Davis of Robert Harris Law Firm, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James Hellickson, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Brittney A. Davis of Robert Harris Law Firm, Fort Myers, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James Hellickson, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
Marcel Louis Melton appeals his convictions and sentences on count one for trafficking in amphetamine/methamphetamine, count two for possession of drug paraphernalia, and count four for trafficking in synthetic cannabinoids. He raises two issues on appeal, and we affirm as to the second issue without discussion. As to the first issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm Melton's conviction and sentence on count two. However, because the trial court should have granted Melton's motion for judgment of acquittal on counts one and four, we reverse his convictions and sentences on those counts and remand for discharge.
The State nolle prossed counts three and five.
It appears that Melton has already served his sentence on count two.
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At trial, three officers from the Hardee County Sheriff's Office testified. Detective Lake testified that he conducted an investigation and obtained a search warrant for narcotics at a particular residence on Honeysuckle Street in Wauchula. The warrant permitted the search of the residence, curtilage, outbuildings, and vehicles on the property. On March 6, 2019, he executed the search warrant on the residence as well as a car, a shed, and a camper/trailer on the east side of the property. Detectives Williams and Hart were also involved in the execution of the warrant. In addition to Melton, two other people were found on the premises during the search. A woman named Heather Morrow was found in the trailer. Melton's grandmother was found in the main house, where it was believed that she resided. One woman named in the search warrant was not on the premises. The officers recovered synthetic cannabis and rolling papers from the car and narcotic pills and a hookah-style bong from the trailer. From the shed, the officers recovered methamphetamine, synthetic cannabis, a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine, and a bong made from a plastic Fanta bottle.
Detective Lake was familiar with the property and knew Melton was connected with the property. Over a ten-year period working for the sheriff's office, Detective Lake saw Melton at the property "[m]any times." Detective Lake testified that Melton "was staying" in the trailer. Inside the trailer was a "medication monograph" with Melton's name on it. Detective Lake knew that Melton had lived at another address off Jean Drive before March 6, 2019. But Detective Lake said with respect to the Honeysuckle address that they "knew where [Melton] lived." Detective Williams testified that she had seen Melton connected with the searched property on numerous occasions. She had seen Melton perform "activities that a normal person that lives in a location would do," like "sitting in their yard or mowing the lawn or doing some work," on a "[j]ust about daily" basis.
When Detective Lake arrived at the property to execute the warrant, he saw Melton near the car parked on the east side of the house. The hood of the car was up, and it appeared that he was working on the car. "The engine wasn't on, but the key was turned forward so the music was playing." No one else was in the vicinity of the car.
When Detective Hart arrived, Melton "was under the hood of a vehicle that was parked beside his camper." He was "actively engaged" with the car. The car door was open, and "the key was forward with the radio playing." No other individuals were around the car or the shed. Melton was "readily accessible" to the car and the shed, and it did not appear that anyone else had control over the area "at that moment."
With respect to the areas searched, only a protective sweep was done of the main house to look for other individuals and weapons because the grandmother was not the target of the investigation. Nothing was found in the main house. Detectives paid more attention to the search of the car, shed, and trailer.
Detective Lake estimated that the car, shed, and trailer were all within twenty-five yards of each other. The shed was ten to twenty yards away from the car. A search of the car revealed rolling papers in an open center console, and one of the photographic exhibits reflects that this open package of rolling papers was in plain view. On the front passenger seat was a closed pillowcase. Inside the pillowcase was a clear bag with a large quantity of synthetic cannabis in it.
The officers found the shed open and unoccupied, and the doors to the shed were open. The shed had a couch, TV, and air conditioner in it, and the photographic evidence indicates that someone was spending time in it. The officers found a black bag in the shed on the ground near the door. In the black bag were a clear bag with just over seventy-seven grams of methamphetamine and a clear bag with a large quantity of synthetic cannabis. The bag of synthetic cannabis was sticking out of the top of the black bag. The glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine was found on the couch in the shed. On the floor was the homemade Fanta bong.
In the trailer where Morrow was found, the detectives discovered narcotic pills, the paper with Melton's name on it, and a hookah-style bong. The drugs found in the trailer were not introduced into evidence. Morrow was also arrested.
At the close of the State's case, Melton made a motion for judgment of acquittal and argued that the State had failed to prove a prima facie case as to all three counts and had only proved mere proximity to the contraband. The trial court determined that there was more than mere proximity with respect to the items found in the car and that Melton was controlling the car. With respect to the shed, the trial court determined that "in the light most favorable to the State there is just enough to prove his control over the area where the drugs were found." The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Melton testified on his own behalf. On the date of the search, he resided at 2016 Jean Drive, he did not live at the Honeysuckle Street residence, and he was just visiting his grandmother. The car was not his, and he did not have a car. He had no knowledge of the synthetic cannabis found in the car or of the methamphetamine and synthetic cannabis found in the shed. He had no knowledge of any of the items of paraphernalia found in the car, shed, or trailer, including the glass pipe, the glass bong, the Fanta bong, and the rolling papers.
According to Melton, his brother, sister, and her boyfriend resided on the property. Melton's grandmother rented his former trailer to Morrow. When asked about the shed he said that he was nowhere near the shed and that he never spent time in the shed. He did admit that he had been in it before, but he did not know why there was a TV, a couch, and an air conditioner in the shed. The couch belonged to his brother.
At the close of the defense case, Melton renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial judge ruled as follows:
And at least two out of the three law enforcement witnesses affirmed that that is where Mr. Melton lives, and that they found Mr. Melton working on the car. He had control of the car and the shed was steps away. It was wide open. And the giant bag of drugs w[as] near the opening of the shed in plain view.
I will stand by my original ruling that he was in control of that area.
The jury found Melton guilty of all three charges. He now appeals.
This court conducts a de novo review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. Thomas v. State, 269 So. 3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). The standard to be employed for all criminal cases regarding the sufficiency of the evidence "is simply whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict." Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020) (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1271, 209 L.Ed.2d 11 (2021). This same standard applies in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. See Jeror v. State, 313 So. 3d 178, 179–80 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 12, 2021) ; Carter v. State, 303 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). While viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, this court must determine "whether 'a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Bush, 295 So. 3d at 200 (quoting Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019), receded from on other grounds by Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544, 548 (Fla. 2020) ).
A person's possession of contraband may be actual or constructive. Sundin v. State, 27 So. 3d 675, 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). "Possession is actual when the contraband is (1) in the defendant's hand or on his person, (2) in a container in the defendant's hand or on his person, or (3) within the defendant's 'ready reach' and the contraband is under his control." Sanders v. State, 210 So. 3d 246, 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Sundin, 27 So. 3d at 676 ). On appeal, the State argues that the pillowcase that contained synthetic cannabis found on the passenger seat of the car was within Melton's ready reach. We reject that argument.
Typically, items within "arm's reach" of a defendant are within ready reach. See Sundin, 27 So. 3d at 676 ; Sanders, 210 So. 3d at 248. In contrast, a gun and bags of marijuana found "jammed under the back seat" were not within the ready reach of a defendant who was in the driver's seat. See Towns v. State, 259 So. 3d 291, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).
Here, the pillowcase on the passenger's seat was not within arm's reach of Melton. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State—that Melton was standing directly next to the car and leaning in under the hood—he would have had to walk to the passenger door and bend down into the car to make the pillowcase within his reach. Melton was not within ready reach of the pillowcase and thus was not in actual possession of it. See Sanders, 210 So. 3d at 248.
To support a conviction based on constructive possession of contraband, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had (1) knowledge of the contraband and (2) the ability to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. Thomas, 269 So. 3d at 683. When a person is in exclusive control of the vehicle or the premises in question, knowledge and dominion and control can be inferred. See Nugent v. State, 275 So. 3d 721, 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ; Byers v. State, 17 So. 3d 825, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
But if "contraband is found in a location that was accessible to more than one person, a defendant's knowledge of its presence and ability to exercise dominion and control will not be inferred; these elements must be established by independent proof." Santiago v. State, 991 So. 2d 439, 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Wagner v. State, 950 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ). In the situation of a jointly occupied premises, the State can establish knowledge by proof that contraband in common areas was in plain view. Sims v. State, 285 So. 3d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ; see also Brown v. State, 8 So. 3d 464, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (affirming convictions concerning drugs and paraphernalia that were in plain view on the dining room table and the kitchen counter when the defendant had left the residence "mere moments before the search"). When contraband is in the defendant's plain view, it is sufficient to demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the contraband. Jiles v. State, 984 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("This is not a case in which the drugs were concealed within a container."). And when a premises is jointly occupied, a defendant's constructive possession of one contraband item is legally insufficient to prove the "defendant's knowledge of or dominion and control over another item of contraband in the same premises." Tucker v. State, 198 So. 3d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Mere proximity to contraband is insufficient to establish constructive possession. Santiago, 991 So. 2d at 443.
In Thomas, officers searched a house that the defendant and at least two others occupied. 269 So. 3d at 684. Heroin, cocaine, and paraphernalia were found in a bedroom dresser drawer and inside a case that was on the dresser. Id. at 682. Although items connected to Thomas were found in the room, women's clothing was also found in the room. Because multiple people had access to the room, evidence of knowledge and dominion and control had to be established by independent proof. Id. at 684. "Generally, independent proof can be established by the admission into evidence of a pretrial statement made by an accused, by witness testimony, or by scientific evidence." Id. at 684 (quoting Santiago, 991 So. 2d at 442 ). This court reversed the possession convictions and explained that "the State's evidence proved only that Thomas was one of multiple individuals who had access to a room containing drug contraband." Id. at 685.
Here, as to the car, the State did not establish that Melton had exclusive control over the car. The State did not present any evidence as to who owned the car or who typically used the car. Someone who owned the car may have given Melton the key so he could open the car and work on it. Even if Melton had been in possession of the key, with the key in the ignition and the door open, anyone on the premises could have had access to the car. Detective Hart testified that the car was parked next to the trailer. Morrow was found on the premises in the trailer. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the State established Melton was in exclusive control of the car.
Although the State did not prove exclusive control, the State did present independent proof to show that Melton was exercising dominion and control over the car. The testimony revealed that a car door was open and that the key was in the ignition and turned forward so that music was playing. Detective Hart saw Melton "under the hood" and "actively engaged" with the car. No one else was seen outside at that moment. This evidence demonstrated that Melton was the only person close to the car and was actively exercising dominion and control over it.
The State however, failed to present independent proof of Melton's knowledge of the synthetic cannabis hidden in the pillowcase. The synthetic cannabis was not in plain view, so knowledge could not be inferred. See Brown, 8 So. 3d at 465-66. By failing to prove the element of knowledge, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with competent, substantial evidence that Melton was in constructive possession of the synthetic cannabis found in the pillowcase in the car.
In contrast, the open package of rolling papers was in plain view in the center console. Thus, knowledge of the contraband's presence could be inferred. Having shown knowledge and dominion and control, the State presented sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury on the rolling papers in the car. See id.
As to the shed, it had a couch, TV, and air conditioner in it, and the photographic evidence indicates that someone was spending time in it. The State did not introduce any evidence that any items with Melton's name or items associated with Melton were found in the shed. The State presented no evidence as to any other residents or visitors who might have been in the shed. No testing for fingerprints had been done. There was no evidence that Melton was the exclusive occupant of the shed, that he was an occupant of the shed, or that he had recently been in the shed. In fact, Detective Hart testified that Melton was living in the trailer, and a paper with Melton's name on it regarding medication was found in the trailer.
The State established that the doors to the shed were open; thus, the shed was accessible to anyone on the property. The State also established that items found were out in the open, including the glass pipe on the couch, the Fanta bong on the floor, and the synthetic cannabis sticking out of the black bag on the floor. The methamphetamine at the bottom of the black bag was not in plain view.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the shed was a separate structure on a jointly occupied property. Because the shed was accessible to other people, we cannot infer Melton's knowledge of the contraband and dominion and control over it. See Santiago, 991 So. 2d at 442. The State proved only that Melton was in the general proximity of the shed. The State presented no evidence that Melton was ever in a position where he could have seen the black bag in the shed and no evidence that he had been in the shed. Although the State and the trial court characterized Melton's position by the car as being "steps away" from the shed, Detective Lake testified that the shed was anywhere between ten and twenty yards from the car—thus between thirty and sixty feet away. Although it is "steps" away, it is a significant number of steps. This is too tenuous a connection when nothing associated with Melton was found in the shed and others had access to it. Thus, we conclude that the State failed to prove that Melton had knowledge or dominion and control over the methamphetamine, synthetic cannabis, and paraphernalia found in the shed.
Therefore, the trial court should have granted Melton's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case on the counts concerning methamphetamine and synthetic cannabis, counts one and four, respectively. Because the evidence supported the paraphernalia charge as to the rolling papers in the car, Melton was not entitled to a judgment of acquittal on count two. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and sentence on count two for possession of drug paraphernalia. We reverse the convictions and sentences on counts one and four based on insufficient evidence and remand for discharge on those counts.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for discharge.
NORTHCUTT and SMITH, JJ., Concur.