Opinion
NO. 4:01CV030-D-B
March 11, 2002
OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the court is the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
A. Factual Background
The Plaintiffs in this action are seven individuals from various counties across the state who worked for the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce ("Department of Agriculture"). Around March of 1996, Plaintiffs were individually told that they were being temporarily laid off because of budget deficiencies. Within two to three months, the Plaintiffs were terminated. Plaintiffs Joe McLaurin, Ruby McDaniel, Charles Wansley and Thomas Luke were all sixty (60) years old or older at the time. Plaintiff John Hogue was fifty two (52), Plaintiff Richard Gray was forty six (46), and Plaintiff Marty Welch was forty (40) years old.
After filing charges with the EEOC, Plaintiffs filed the current suit against the Department of Agriculture and Commissioner Lester Spell, both individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce, on February 5, 2001. Plaintiffs allege that they were laid off and subsequently terminated because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. Additionally, Plaintiffs McLaurin and Welch allege that they were laid off and subsequently terminated because of disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12007 et. seq. Plaintiffs requested various relief, including back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, reinstatement and declaratory judgment. In August of 2001, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay discovery. Plaintiffs have not responded. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
B. Standard for Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take as true the well-pled allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mtg. Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). Taking the plaintiff's allegations as true, the court should dismiss a complaint only when it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle them to the relief requested. C.C. Port, Ltd., 61 F.3d at 289. Dismissal is never warranted solely because the court believes the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on the merits. Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992).
C. Discussion
1. Claims against the Department of Agriculture
Defendants argue that, by virtue of sovereign immunity, this suit is barred and should be dismissed. The Eleventh Amendment, while textually extending sovereign immunity only to suits against a State by citizens of another state, also confirms that the Constitution's grant of judicial power did not contemplate suits against the sovereign States without their consent. Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001). "[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damage action against a State [or one of its agencies] in federal court." United States v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F. Supp.2d 374, 376 (S.D.Miss. 2001) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). As discussed more fully below, sovereign immunity generally is not a bar to suits for injunctive relief against state officials. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 976 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). In the present case, there is no evidence or argument that Defendants have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. Amend. XI.
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when it "both unequivocally intends to do so and `act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.'" Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 977 (footnote omitted). It is now settled that Congress may not act to abrogate state sovereign immunity through any of its Article I enumerated powers, but may abrogate state sovereign immunity through a proper exercise of its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)). As a result, States may only be sued under the ADA and ADEA to the extent that those statutes, inasmuch as they are directed at unconstitutional discrimination by the States, are appropriate exercises of the § 5 power.
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to . . . refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-80, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the Supreme Court held that while the ADEA contained a clear statement of Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity, the statute was not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity and extend liability to the states. The Court noted the limits of Congress' power and stated Congress cannot "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. . . . It has . . . the power `to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (citation omitted). There "must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id. The Court concluded that the requirements the ADEA imposed on state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could targeted by the Act. Id. at 83.
After Kimel and less than one month after Plaintiffs filed this case, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits for money damages under Title I of the ADA. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 967-68, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). The ADA prohibits certain employers, including the States, from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . the . . . advancement, or discharge of employees." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360-61 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7)). The Act requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the . . . business." § 12112(b)(5)(A). As in Kimel, the Court reiterated that:
Title I, which is applicable in this case, deals with discrimination in employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 to 12117. Title II, which is not applicable here, forbids discrimination against the disabled in "services, programs, or activities of a public entity". 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. Since the disabled, like the elderly, are not members of a suspect class, the court concluded that to uphold the ADA's application to the State's would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law announced by the Court in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Id. Thus, the Court in Garrett held that suits in federal court by private citizens to recover money damages based on the state's failure to comply with the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id.
The Cleburne Court held that mental retardation did not qualify as a "quasi-suspect" classification for equal protection purposes. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435, 105 S.Ct. 3249.
Because suits in federal court for money damages against a state or state agency are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and any claims for injunctive relief must be against the proper official (which is discussed more fully below) all claims against the Defendant Department of Agriculture shall be dismissed.
2. Official Capacity Claims Against Commissioner Spell
Only States and state officers acting in their official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Buckhannon Bd. Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Res., 531 U.S. 1004, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). The Supreme Court has also made clear that a suit for damages against individual officers in their official capacities is treated like a suit against the state itself. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997). Thus, any claims for money damages against Commissioner Spell in his official capacity are dismissed.
The complaint requested, inter alia, reinstatement and declaratory relief. The Defendants did not specifically address this or the claims against Defendant Spell, but merely asserted that the suit should be dismissed based on the Eleventh Amendment. The Fifth Circuit has stated "a gaping hole in the shield of sovereign immunity" created by the Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court is the doctrine of Ex parte Young. Saltz v. Tennessee Dep't of Employment Sec., 976 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Ex parte Young doctrine holds that acts by state officials which are contrary to federal law cannot have been authorized or be ratified by the state; and suits seeking to enjoin such wrongful and unauthorized acts are not suits against the state. Saltz, 976 F.2d at 968. As such, a federal court's injunction against such wrongful acts is not a judgment against the state itself. Id. The essential ingredients of the Ex parte Young doctrine are that a suit must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect. Id. In Saltz, the plaintiff sought "declaratory and injunctive relief" against his former employer and state employment authorities after he was fired. Id. at 967. The court did not expressly state whether the injunctive relief sought was reinstatement, but stated that the nature of the relief sought would qualify as part of the Ex parte Young doctrine. Id. at 968. However, the plaintiff in Saltz did not sue any individual state officials in their official capacities. Id.
As mentioned above, the Court in Garrett dealt with suits in federal court by private citizens to recover money damages against a state agency or arm of the state. The Court, in dicta, stated:
Our holding here . . . does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, n. 9.
Recently, our sister court in the Southern District stated that it interpreted the dicta from Garrett literally, and as such, private citizens can sue states for violations of individual rights under the ADA for injunctive relief. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F. Supp.2d at 377. However, in that case, the only named defendant was the Department of Public Safety. Id. at 378. The court stated that "the [plaintiff] has not claimed that any official with the Mississippi Department of Public Safety violated Collins' rights under the ADA. . . . Without a named state official, the claim of the Plaintiff for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young must fail." Id.
The plaintiffs in Reickenbacker also stated a claim for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. However, for similar reasons as in Mississippi Dep't of Public Safety, the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief was dismissed. Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 976. The Fifth Circuit in Reickenbacker noted:
In the face of a statutory argument that the ADA did not permit suits against individuals, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to remove the state officials as defendants. It is axiomatic that Ex parte Young does not provide an exception to sovereign immunity when a State (or its agency) is the defendant. The fact that the plaintiffs' original complaint named the "correct" defendants does not alter our determination that the Ex parte Young exception is unavailable in the case now before us.
Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 976, n. 9 (citation omitted). See also Daigle v. Louisiana Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. Civ.A.01-2154, 2002 WL 126647 (E.D.La. Jan. 31, 2002) (district court within this circuit held that Ex parte Young claims may proceed against properly named officials under the ADA).
The Court in Kimel did not make express reference to Ex parte Young. However,
it appears that the Court only struck down the portion of the ADEA that provided state employees a private cause of action for money damages. Furthermore, the fact that the Garrett Court subsequently
mentioned Ex parte Young, and that the analysis was very similar in both cases leads the court to believe that such claims may be brought under the ADEA as well the ADA.
Upon being convinced that certain claims for injunctive relief may proceed without violating the Eleventh Amendment since Commissioner Spell is named as a defendant in his official capacity, the court must examine whether reinstatement is the type of "prospective injunctive relief" that Ex parte Young and its progeny permits.
Ex parte Young only allows prospective injunctive relief designed to end the illegal action, not retroactive relief that results in a raid on the state treasury. See Edelman, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662. The Supreme Court in Edelman stated that the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. The Court noted that some cases authorizing equitable relief will have an impact on the state treasury. Id.
Other district courts within this circuit have held that claims for reinstatement could proceed when the proper state official was named. Berrigan v. Louisiana Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. Civ.A.97-0210, 1998 WL 2359, at *5 (E.D.La. Jan. 5, 1998) ("Plaintiff's [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983] claim for reinstatement is injunctive and therefore permissible under Ex parte Young."); Owens v. Bd. of Regents of Texas S. Univ., 953 F. Supp. 781, 792 (S.D.Tex. 1996) (where the district court cited Saltz, 976 F.2d at 968, and further allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint in order to assert her claims for injunctive relief or reinstatement against the president of the University under the doctrine of Ex parte Young). While the court could not find any direct Fifth Circuit precedent, Courts of Appeals outside this circuit have found that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement. See Conforth v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1129, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that reinstatement of former secretary at state school would eviscerate its Eleventh Amendment immunity and stating such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is permissible under Ex parte Young); Thomson v. Harmony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1320-21, (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that prospective relief of reinstatement to job, future support in research and expungement of personnel record would only cause minimal and ancillary expense to the state treasury); Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
Based on the foregoing, claims for prospective relief under Ex parte Young may proceed. As such, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied at this time as to the claims for injunctive relief against Commissioner Spell in his official capacity.
3. Individual Capacity Claims Against Spell
Commissioner Spell is also sued in his individual capacity. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an "employer" to discriminate on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Under the ADEA, the term "employer" means a person "engaged in an industry affecting who has twenty or more employees for each working day. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). The Fifth Circuit has made clear that the ADEA provides no basis for individual liability for supervisory employees. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 2001); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996).
The court is of the opinion that the same reasoning also bars ADA claims against Commissioner Spell in his individual capacity. See Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798, n. 5 (7th Cir. 1999) (the ADA provides only for employer, not individual liability); Johnson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., No. Civ.A.99-1562, 2000 WL 282789, at *2 (E.D.La. Mar. 13, 2000) (discussing Fifth Circuit precedent of the term "employer" under the ADEA and Title VII and concluding that the plaintiff's ADA claims against supervisor as an individual must be dismissed).
As such, Defendants' motion to dismiss shall be granted as to these claims against Commissioner Spell in his individual capacity.
C. Conclusion
In sum, Defendants' motion to dismiss shall be granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion is granted as to the claims against Defendant Mississippi Department of Agriculture based on its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. For the same reasons, Defendants' motion is also granted as to claims against Defendant Spell in his official capacity, to the extent Plaintiffs seek money damages. Defendants' motion is denied as to the Ex parte Young claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against Defendant Spell in his official capacity. Defendants' motion is also granted as to the claims against Defendant Spell in his individual capacity. The court wishes to make clear that it is not offering any opinion as to the merits of the underlying ADEA and ADA claims at this time, but only as to what is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
(1) the Defendants' motion to dismiss (docket entry 6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
(2) the motion shall be GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs' claims against the Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce, and those claims are hereby DISMISSED;
(3) the motion shall be GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs' claims against Lester Spell in his individual capacity; and those claims are hereby DISMISSED;
(4) the motion shall be GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs' claims against Lester Spell in his official capacity to the extent that they seek money damages; and those claims are hereby DISMISSED; and
(5) the motion shall be DENIED as to the Plaintiffs' claims against Lester Spell in his official capacity for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief.
SO ORDERED.