Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:99CV157-SAA
March 2, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The court has before it defendant's motion to dismiss the above styled case pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust state administrative remedies, his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is barred by res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. In addition, defendant seeks dismissal on the ground that the allegations of racial discrimination in the plaintiff's complaint are conclusory and fail to state a claim with sufficient particularity to overcome the invocation of the defendant's qualified immunity defense. Lastly, defendant asserts that he is entitled to both absolute and Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Plaintiff responds that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel are applicable, and dismissal is not warranted on any of the defendant's other asserted grounds.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case, including any order for entry of final judgment. After review of the pleadings and briefs of the parties, the court concludes that the defendant's motion is not well taken and shall be denied.
A rule 12(b)(6) motion is disfavored and rarely granted. Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986); Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), the court accepts as true those well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortgage Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). "Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to the relief it seeks," dismissal is proper. C.C. Port, 61 F.3d at 289. It must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (alterations and citations omitted). "However, `the complaint must contain either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial."' Campbell, 43 F.3d at 975. (citation omitted).
On the other hand, dismissal is never warranted because the court believes the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on the merits. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Even if it appears an almost certainty that the facts alleged cannot be proved to support the claim, the complaint cannot be dismissed so long as the complaint states a claim. Clark, 794 F.2d at 970; Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1984). "To qualify for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) a complaint must on its face show a bar to relief." Clark, 792 F.2d at 970; See also Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1980). If a required element, a prerequisite to obtaining the requested relief, is lacking in the complaint, dismissal is proper. Id.; See also Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss"). While dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily determined by whether the facts alleged, if true, give rise to a cause of action, a claim may also be dismissed if a successful affirmative defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings. Clark, 794 F.2d at 970; Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
RES JUDICATA/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Defendant's first ground for dismissal rests on the fact that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not seeking judicial review of the alleged wrongful denial of promotion with the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board (EAB) before filing suit under § 1983. Because of the plaintiff's failure to first seek relief from the EAB, defendant argues, the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel should bar the plaintiff's existing § 1983 claim as a matter of law. In support of his argument, defendant cites Hood v. Mississippi Dept. of Wildlife Conservation, 571 So.2d 263, 268 (Miss. 1990).
Defendant's argument is flawed in several respects. First, defendant is incorrect in asserting that § 1983 requires administrative remedies be exhausted before suit can be filed under § 1983. In fact, the Supreme Court has held the opposite to be true. In Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 512 (1982), the Court held that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a cause of action under § 1983. Second, since plaintiff did not ever take his employment grievance to the EAB for review, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel cannot apply to bar his claim under § 1983. Because plaintiff elected to not pursue his claims through the EAB, there was no valid final judgment on the merits to trigger res judicata. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1961); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 968 (2nd Cir. 1968). Nor were there any issues actually litigated and determined by the EAB to warrant collateral estoppel. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313-16 (1983). Finally, defendant's reliance on Hood is misplaced. In Hood, the plaintiff actually took his grievance before the EAB, but failed to appeal its decision to the circuit court. The plaintiff then filed a separate § 1983 suit in chancery court, which the Mississippi Supreme Court barred on the basis of res judicata due to the prior un-appealed EAB decision. Hood is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In this case, unlike Hood, the plaintiff chose to forego EAB review of his employment grievance and elected to file suit directly under § 1983. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 512. Consequently, as stated above, because plaintiff never went before the EAB, res judicata cannot act as a bar to his existing § 1983 claim.
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
The defendant next argues that dismissal is proper because the allegations of racial discrimination contained in the plaintiff's complaint are conclusory and thus failed to state a claim under § 1983 with sufficient particularity to overcome the defendant's asserted qualified immunity defense. Defendant's argument on this point appears to be that because defendant is being sued in his individual capacity, the plaintiff must anticipate the defendant's invocation of the qualified immunity defense and must plead facts that show that defendant's conduct was not objectively reasonable and that he violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982); Coleman v. Houston Ind. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1997); Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1994). Defendant asserts that the plaintiff must also plead the facts alleging racial discrimination "with a level of particularity" to warrant the relief sought. Burns-Toole, 11 F.3d at 1274. According to defendant, because the plaintiff's allegations that defendant was motivated by racial discrimination in failing to promote the plaintiff are "mere conclusory statements" based only on "personal belief" rather than "specific facts that would warrant the relief he seeks," the plaintiff has failed to overcome his qualified immunity defense, and the case should be dismissed.
The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff's complaint does in fact state a claim with sufficient particularity to overcome the defendant's invocation of the qualified immunity defense at this stage in the litigation. In the plaintiff's complaint, he alleges that he was the best qualified applicant for the position at issue. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendant, Regional Director of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, acted under the color of state law in causing him not to receive the promotion through his attempt to keep the plaintiff from applying for the position by timing its announcement "so that the Plaintiff would not know about the vacancy." Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the defendant, who is black, caused another less qualified applicant, who is also black, to meet the minimal qualifications for the position in order to be considered. Finally, plaintiff charges that the defendant selected the black applicant instead of the plaintiff, even though the successful applicant was not eligible for the position because she had not completed the minimal requirements for the position at the time the application process began. These actions by the defendant, if found to have been taken, could reasonably be found to have deprived plaintiff of his right to be free from racial discrimination guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The allegations, which are accepted as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), are pled with sufficient particularity to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under both Title XII and § 1983. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Guillory v. Saint Landry Parish Police Jury, 802 F.2d 822, 824 (5th Cir. 1986); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980). In addition, these allegations, accepted as true, could result in a finding that the defendant's actions were not objectively reasonable, and that he violated the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination. See Coleman, 113 F.3d at 532-33. Nor is it required that the plaintiff plead facts in anticipation of the defendant's invocation of the qualified immunity defense at the risk of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir. 1995). Under S chultea, the court may, upon the defendant's motion or on its own, "require the plaintiff to reply" to the qualified immunity defense in detail. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433. However, the defendant did not by motion request the court for such a "reply," and the court is of the opinion that the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently address the qualified immunity issue. Consequently, the plaintiff's complaint does state a claim with sufficient particularity to overcome the defendant's qualified immunity defense.
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT/ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Defendant also claims in his motion to dismiss that dismissal is proper on the grounds that he is entitled to absolute immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. However, the defendant offers no authority for the proposition that an official employed in an executive or administrative capacity like that of the defendant, who served as the Regional Director of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, is entitled to absolute immunity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that officials employed in an executive or administrative capacity, like the defendant, are not entitled to absolute immunity, only qualified immunity. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243-45 (1974). The defendant's self-proclaimed right to Eleventh Amendment immunity is also groundless. Eleventh Amendment immunity is only afforded to state officials sued in their official capacity, not to officials sued in their individual capacity. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991). Therefore, defendant's additional grounds for dismissal are not well taken and should be denied.
Defendant did not address either of these two grounds in his memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. However, out of an abundance of caution, the court will address these issues on its own accord.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is
ORDERED
That the motion of the Defendant John Brinson to dismiss is hereby denied.
ORDER
Pursuant to the memorandum opinion issued by the court this day, it isORDERED:
That defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.