Opinion
C. A. 2:21-cv-03641-RMG-MHC
08-28-2023
Stanton McDuffie, Plaintiff, v. City of Charleston Police Department a/k/a Charleston City Police and Charleston Police Department; City of Charleston; Victoria A. Rulon, William Belko, Louis Staggers, Judson L. Haithcock, Joseph H. Harvill, Timothy Dasher, Matthew R. Stubbs, and Luther T. Reynolds, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Stanton McDuffie (“Plaintiff”) originally filed his Complaint in state court on May 18, 2020, against Defendants Best Buy Co., Inc., and Daniel Paul Regan, alleging various state law causes of action. ECF No. 1-1. On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, wherein he brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of Charleston Police Department, City of Charleston, Victoria A. Rulon, William Belko, Louis Staggers, Judson L. Haithcock, Joseph H. Harvill, Timothy Dasher, Matthew R. Stubbs, and Luther T. Reynolds (collectively, “Defendants”), in addition to the claims against Best Buy Co., Inc. and Daniel Paul Regan. ECF No. 1-1 at 116-34. The case was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1441. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff has since resolved his claims against Defendants Best Buy and Regan, and those Defendants have been dismissed from the action. ECF Nos. 53, 58.
Before the Court are two Motions for Summary Judgment. First is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants Haithcock, City of Charleston, and City of Charleston Police Department. ECF No. 42 at 1. Defendants filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 51.
Defendants also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 46. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 54. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 55. The Motions are ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure, deliberate indifference, and violation of his due process rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States' Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested for shoplifting in 2019. ECF No. 1-1. The following facts are taken from the various filings presented to the Court.
On January 24, 2019, Defendant Rulon, an Officer of the Charleston Police Department, responded to a reported shoplifting at the Best Buy electronics store in Charleston, South Carolina. ECF No. 61-1. Upon arriving at the store, Defendant Rulon met with Best Buy Loss Prevention employee Paul Regan who advised that two white males had just stolen a cell phone case and left the area in a silver Dodge extended cab pickup truck. ECF No. 61-1 at 3. Mr. Regan told Defendant Rulon the males were looking at phone cases in the store when Mr. Regan observed one of them unpackage a case and place it on his own cell phone. ECF No. 61-1 at 3. Mr. Regan advised Defendant Rulon the male subject then replaced the cell phone case taken from the package with one from his pocket. ECF No. 61-1 at 3.
Mr. Regan informed Defendant Rulon that the same male that swapped the phone cases then purchased headphones at the register using a credit card. ECF No. 61-1 at 3; ECF No. 46-4 at 4; ECF No. 55-1 at 5. The name on the credit card was “Stanton M. McDuffie.” ECF No. 61-1 at 3; ECF No. 55-1 at 5. The male and his companion then left the store with the headphones (purchased) and cell phone case (not purchased). ECF No. 61-1 at 3. Defendant Rulon noted in her report that the suspected shoplifter:
was wearing khaki shorts, tall socks, a blue or black hoodie, and a baseball hat. He was accompanied by another male who did not appear to take anything from the store. R/O [Responding Officer] viewed the incident on surveillance camera and was able to observe the suspect switching the phone cases. The footage was unable to be burned at this time but is being saved for investigators.ECF No. 61-1 at 3.
Defendant Rulon testified that she stands by everything in her report. ECF No. 46-4 at 5. Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he was the described individual wearing a baseball hat. ECF No. 46-5 at 6-7.
Defendant Haithcock was assigned to investigate the shoplifting incident described above. ECF No. 46-6 at 4-5. On January 29, 2019, Defendant Haithcock went to the Best Buy store to speak with Mr. Regan and retrieve the surveillance video referenced in Defendant Rulon's report. ECF No. 46-6 at 5; ECF No. 61-2. Defendant Haithcock watched the surveillance video depicting the theft while he was present at the Best Buy location with Mr. Regan. ECF No. 46-6 at 6. Defendant Haithcock stayed at the Best Buy location watching the video for approximately twenty-seven minutes. ECF No. 46-6 at 6-7. Defendant Haithcock testified that the video he watched at Best Buy had multiple camera angles. ECF No. 46-6 at 7. He further testified that when he observed the surveillance video at Best Buy, the footage reflected a male with a baseball cap, khaki shorts, and high socks remove a cell phone case from its packaging and swap it with the case on his cell phone. ECF No. 46-6 at 12.
After watching the surveillance video at the store, Mr. Regan gave Defendant Haithcock a flash drive that was supposed to contain this footage. ECF No. 46-6 at 7. Defendant Haithcock testified that he believed the flash drive Mr. Regan provided him contained the same footage he had just watched with Mr. Regan, which depicted Plaintiff from point of entry to point of exit from the store. ECF No. 46-6 at 9. Defendant Haithcock took the flash drive back to his office, inserted the flash drive into his computer, and took screenshots of the two male individuals depicted on the footage for the purposes of putting out a BOLO (“Be on the Lookout”). ECF No. 46-6 at 7. Defendant Haithcock did not review the contents of the flash drive any further at that time. See ECF No. 42-1 at 14.
Defendant Haithcock obtained the telephone number for Allison McDuffie (Plaintiff's mother) through a law enforcement database, and he called her on February 21, 2019, as part of his investigation. ECF No. 61-2 at 2; ECF No. 46-8 at 3. Defendant Haithcock emailed Mrs. McDuffie a photograph of two individuals and asked her to identify the two individuals. ECF No. 61-2 at 2; ECF No. 46-8 at 5-6; ECF No. 61-3; ECF No. 61-4. Mrs. McDuffie did not identify the individuals for Defendant Haithcock at that time. ECF No. 46-8 at 5-6. However, on February 25, 2019, Mrs. McDuffie responded to Defendant Haithcock's email query and revealed that her son, Plaintiff Stanton McDuffie, had used his debit card to purchase a set of headphones at Best Buy. ECF No. 46-8 at 7; ECF No. 61-2; ECF No. 61-3. Mrs. McDuffie severed communication with Defendant Haithcock after this correspondence because her friend in law enforcement told her not to call him back. ECF No. 46-8 at 8. After Mrs. McDuffie ended communication with Defendant Haithcock, he believed she was no longer willing to assist with his investigation. ECF No. 61-2 at 2.
On February 26, 2019, Defendant Haithcock presented Judge Ellen Soffar Steinberg with an affidavit to secure Plaintiff's arrest for shoplifting pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-110. ECF No. 61-5. That same day Judge Steinberg signed a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. ECF No. 616. On March 5, 2019, Plaintiff turned himself in to the Charleston Police Department Warrants Division, and he was transported to the Charleston County Detention Center by Defendant Stubbs. ECF No. 61-7. Plaintiff was at the Detention Center for approximately nine hours before he was released on bond. ECF No. 46-5 at 4.
At some point after Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant Haithcock discovered that the flash drive given to him by Mr. Regan did not contain the full surveillance video he had observed at the Best Buy store. ECF No. 46-6 at 10. Mr. Regan testified at his deposition that Best Buy had been in possession of surveillance footage that depicted Plaintiff from three to four camera angles. ECF No. 46-16 at 4. Mr. Regan further testified that he failed to save the full three-to-four camera angle video, which violated Best Buy's policies and procedures regarding evidence preservation. ECF No. 46-16 at 4.
According to an April 17, 2019, email exchange between the City of Charleston Prosecutor, L.M. Byrd, and Plaintiff's criminal defense counsel, Austin Anderson, the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed because Best Buy decided not to pursue prosecution. ECF No. 61-8. Defendant Haithcock also testified that he believed part of the reason the city prosecutor did not move forward with the case was because the flash drive he had obtained from Best Buy did not contain the full surveillance footage. ECF No. 46-6 at 10. Plaintiff's shoplifting charges have since been expunged. ECF No. 46-5 at 5.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff and Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF Nos. 42, 46. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
III. DISCUSSION
With regard to the cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider “each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.'” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “When considering each individual motion, the court must take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable' to the party opposing that motion.” Id. (citation omitted).
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment only as to Defendants City of Charleston, City of Charleston Police Department, and Haithcock. ECF No. 42 at 1. Plaintiff bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for his motion and “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which [he] believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff has failed to show he is entitled to summary judgment as to these Defendants.
1. Defendants City of Charleston and City of Charleston Police Department
Plaintiff has not expressly identified the legal theory on which he contends Defendants City of Charleston and City of Charleston Police Department (“CPD”) are liable under § 1983, as his memorandum almost exclusively addresses his arguments that Defendant Haithcock arrested him without probable cause.
To the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a respondeat superior or vicarious liability claim against Defendants City of Charleston or CPD, those will not lie. The United States Supreme Court held in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (holding that although “Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies,” it is clear that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” (emphasis in original)).
Additionally-and as discussed more thoroughly below in addressing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment-to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a § 1983 municipal liability claim against Defendants City of Charleston or CPD, he has not established that the alleged constitutional violation in this case was directly caused by an official practice, policy, or custom of these Defendants. See id. at 691-94.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Defendants City of Charleston and CPD.
2. Defendant Haithcock
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against Defendant Haithcock, arguing that “Defendant Haithcock admits the store surveillance video he possessed at the time he executed his Affidavit establishes Plaintiff did not shoplift and that his Affidavit is false.” ECF No. 42-1 at 3-4. Plaintiff maintains that because “there is no dispute that Defendant Haithcock acted with a reckless disregard for the truth by having Plaintiff arrested when there was not probable cause to do so, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.” ECF No. 42-1 at 4.
Plaintiff focuses on video surveillance that Defendant Haithcock obtained from Best Buy, arguing that this video unequivocally shows that Plaintiff did not shoplift and that, therefore, Defendant Haithcock's reliance on that video in preparing his affidavit for the arrest warrant was in reckless disregard of the truth. As Plaintiff frames the facts, “Plaintiff did not shoplift and there never existed any video that indicated or supported the position that Plaintiff shoplifted.” ECF No. 42-1 at 8 (emphasis added). Plaintiff quotes deposition excerpts where it appears Defendant Haithcock admits that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on video evidence and that Defendant Haithcock's affidavit was false. See ECF No. 42-1 at 12-13.
Plaintiff did not provide this deposition evidence to the Court. See Local Civil Rules 5.01, 7.04, 7.06 (D.S.C.).
Defendants respond that Plaintiff's facts are incomplete, incorrect, and that he has muddied the record “by introducing misleading testimony in which Haithcock concedes there is no probable cause.” ECF No. 51 at 11. Upon review of the evidence of record, the Court agrees Plaintiff's framing of the facts in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment are somewhat misleading. Defendants present deposition testimony that either (1) squarely contradicts the “undisputed” nature of the facts as Plaintiff presents them, or (2) provides context and clarification for points which Plaintiff has omitted.
For example, Plaintiff's contention that there “never existed any video” showing Plaintiff shoplifting is disputed by the record evidence. The only testimony before the Court is that Best Buy was in possession of surveillance footage that depicted Plaintiff from three to four camera angles from point of entry to point of exit. ECF No. 51-3 at 3; ECF No. 46-6 at 7. Defendant Haithcock testified that when he observed this surveillance video at the Best Buy location with Mr. Regan, who also testified as to the surveillance video, the footage reflected a male with a baseball cap, khaki shorts, and high socks remove a cell phone case from its packaging and swap it with the case on his cell phone. ECF No. 51-6 at 10. Indeed, it was on this video that Defendant Haithcock based his affidavit.
Further, as Defendants clarify, the surveillance video Best Buy gave to Defendant Haithcock-and which he physically possessed at the time he executed his affidavit-was incomplete. Defendant Haithcock watched the surveillance video depicting the theft while he was present at the Best Buy location with Mr. Regan on January 29, 2019. ECF No. 51-6 at 5. Defendant Haithcock averred that, after watching the video but before he left the store, Mr. Regan provided him with surveillance footage on a flash drive. ECF No. 51-6 at 5-6. Defendant Haithcock testified that he believed the flash drive Mr. Regan provided him contained the same footage he had just watched with Mr. Regan, which depicted Plaintiff from point of entry to point of exit from the store. ECF No. 46-6 at 9; ECF No. 51-6 at 8. It was not until later that Defendant Haithcock discovered the video on the flash drive was incomplete. ECF No. 51-6 at 9.
Taking the above into consideration puts the deposition excerpts proffered by Plaintiff- where it appears Defendant Haithcock admits that there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff based on video evidence-in a different light. See ECF No. 42-1 at 12-13. In the fuller context, the limited deposition testimony proffered by Plaintiff merely reflects Defendant Haithcock conceding that the incomplete surveillance video, by itself, does not support probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for shoplifting.
For these reasons, and for the reasons more fully discussed below in considering Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Defendant Haithcock. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion be denied.
B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
As noted above, under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Id. at 322.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment for four reasons. Specifically, they argue that (1) Plaintiff has failed to show a municipality liability claim as to the City of Charleston and the CPD; (2) Plaintiff has failed to show any personal involvement as to several individual Defendants; (3) Plaintiff's arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and (4) the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As set forth more fully below, the Court agrees.
1. Liability of City of Charleston and the CPD
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to establish a § 1983 claim against the City of Charleston and the CPD under a theory of municipality liability. Specifically, they argue Plaintiff has shown no evidence that either the City of Charleston or the CPD had policies or customs in place at the time of these events that inflicted any injury on Plaintiff. The undersigned agrees.
As noted above, to maintain a § 1983 municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged constitutional violation was directly caused by an official practice, policy, or custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. “Municipal policy may be found in written ordinances and regulations, in certain affirmative decisions of individual policymaking officials, or in certain omissions on the part of policymaking officials that manifest deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens[.]” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Outside of these formal decision-making channels, “a municipal custom may arise if a practice is so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the Fourth Circuit has elaborated, a “policy or custom” of a municipality can manifest in four ways:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cnty. Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 533 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
Here, the alleged constitutional violation was Plaintiff's arrest without probable cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to remain free from unreasonable search and seizure. Plaintiff has not pointed to any written ordinances, regulations, policies, or customs of the City of Charleston or the CPD, nor has he alleged that any affirmative decisions by the City of Charleston or CPD policymakers caused the alleged harms in this case. Rather, the only policy identified by Plaintiff appears to be the CPD's General Order 29, which purportedly provides that “[a]n arrest must be based upon probable cause.” ECF No. 54 at 21. Plaintiff argues that Defendants “did not enforce the General Order and other policies dealing with ‘constitutional issues,' such as maintaining the proper chain of custody for evidence and disciplining officers for violating policies.” ECF No. 54 at 22. Plaintiff does not identify what the “other policies” are. Instead, Plaintiff vaguely asserts that “it was the custom and practice of Defendant CPD, Defendant City of Charleston, and Defendant Reynolds to not enforce existing policies and to not have policies in place concerning probable cause and evidence chain of custody.” ECF No. 54 at 25.
Plaintiff did not provide a copy of this policy to the Court, though there does not appear to be any dispute regarding its terms. See Local Civil Rules 5.01, 7.04, and 7.06 (D.S.C.).
Thus, it appears the basis for Plaintiff's Monell claim is not that Defendants had a policy that caused the constitutional harm, but, rather, that Defendants ignored those policies which were intended to safeguard from constitutional harm. That is, it appears Plaintiff is attempting to maintain a Monell claim under the third or fourth categories identified above. See Starbuck, 28 F.4th at 533. Plaintiff has not supported this argument with any evidence.
First, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging Defendants engaged in an unconstitutional omission of a policy via deficient training of officers, Plaintiff has not alleged or otherwise shown anything that supports liability under this theory. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (“Only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983.”). Plaintiff has not alleged or shown any facts setting forth the nature of the training that Defendants provide, that Defendants made any deliberate or conscious choices with regard to that training, that there was a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by inadequately trained employees, or that Defendant Haithcock's actions were caused by a failure to train. See Flaherty-Ortega v. Horry Cnty., S.C., No. 1:21-CV-02866-DCN-SVH, 2022 WL 3974190, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2022) (“For failure to train to rise to the level of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show either (1) a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by inadequately trained employees, or (2) a single violation of a federal right that is a ‘highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations.'” (citation omitted)).
Second, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging a “persistent and widespread” practice of ignoring internal policies, this theory-also known as a “condonation” theory-fails. See id. at *3 (“Generally, to prevail under a condonation claim, ‘[a] plaintiff must point to a ‘persistent and widespread practice of municipal officials,' the ‘duration and frequency' of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their ‘deliberate indifference.'” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff appears to base his Monell claim on policies or customs surrounding the handling of evidence at the CPD, making the conclusory statement that it is “undisputed that Defendant C[PD], Defendant City of Charleston, and Defendant Reynolds failed to have necessary and proper policies/General Orders in place regarding collection, handling, storage, and destruction of evidence directed at protecting a person's constitutional rights.” ECF No. 54 at 23.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's assertion that “chain of custody” policies are at the heart of his Monell claim does not bridge the gap between the alleged policy and the alleged constitutional harm in this case. Specifically, Plaintiff does explain how chain of custody or how checking evidence in and out at the CPD led to Plaintiff's arrest without probable cause. On this basis alone, Plaintiff's Monell claim fails. See Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 500 F.Supp.3d 454, 459 (D. Md. 2020) (noting “a viable § 1983 Monell claim consists of two components: (1) the municipality had an unconstitutional policy or custom; and (2) the unconstitutional policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights” (emphasis added)).
In any event, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that the CPD did not enforce policies as to evidence collection or storage. Plaintiff has not shown a pattern of chain of custody issues within the CPD, nor has he shown that a pattern of shortcomings associated with chain of custody have resulted in individuals being arrested without probable cause. Lastly, Plaintiff has not shown that policy makers within the CPD had actual or constructive knowledge of chain of custody issues and that the policy makers did nothing to end issues associated with chain of custody. Accordingly Defendants City of Charleston and the CPD are entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff references portions of the deposition of Evidence Custodian Brian Hinton, which indicates Defendant Haithcock did not follow the customs and practices of the CPD as he should have. See ECF No. 54 at 22. Indeed, Hinton indicated that evidence should be submitted by the end of an officer's shift, which Defendant Haithcock apparently did not do. See Id. At best, Plaintiff has shown Defendant Haithcock did not follow policies set in place as to evidence collection in this single instance, which falls short of showing that the CPD knew of and disregarded a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct. See Flaherty-Ortega, No. 1:21-CV-02866-DCN-SVH, 2022 WL 3974190, at *3 (noting sporadic or “isolated violations of rights will not give rise to Monell liability; only ‘widespread or flagrant' violations will” (citation omitted)). Defendants cannot be held liable merely because they employ Defendant Haithcock. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (holding that it is clear “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory” (emphasis in original)).
2. Personal involvement of Defendants Harvill, Dasher, Staggers, Stubbs, Belko, and Reynolds.
Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to show any personal involvement as to Defendants Harvill, Dasher, Staggers, Stubbs, Belko, and Reynolds. ECF No. 46-1 at 13-18. The Court agrees.
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show the individual Defendants' personal involvement for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”).
Here, Defendants Harvill, Dasher, Staggers, Stubbs, Belko, or Reynolds did not play a role in investigating the shoplifting incident. Specifically, as to Defendants Harvill, Dasher, Staggers, and Reynolds, Plaintiff has not shown, nor is there is anything in the record that reflects, that these Defendants played a role in the investigation of the alleged shoplifting whatsoever.
As to Defendant Stubbs, he did not play a role in establishing probable cause. ECF No. 46 18 at 5. Defendant Stubbs's only role, as Warrants Detective, was to make sure there were no administrative issues with the warrant and to transport Plaintiff to the Charleston County Detention Center after Plaintiff turned himself into the Warrants Division. ECF No. 46-18 at 4-5.
As to Defendant Belko, although he was on the scene of the reported shoplifting, he was there as backup: he did not play any role in speaking to witnesses or investigating the shoplifting. See ECF No. 46-19 at 4.
Consequently, Plaintiff has not shown these Defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)). Indeed, Plaintiff has not put forth any argument in response to Defendants' Motion as to these Defendants' personal involvement. See ECF No. 54. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not identified any evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim, these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendants Harvill, Dasher, Staggers, or Reynolds are vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of their subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not produced or pointed to any evidence showing any of these required elements.
3. Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Haithcock and Rulon
Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to remain free from unreasonable governmental search and seizure. To establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must show that Defendants decided to arrest him without probable cause. See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002); Wortman v. Spartanburg, 425 S.E.2d 18, 20 (S.C. 1992) (“The fundamental question in determining whether an arrest is lawful is whether there was ‘probable cause' to make the arrest.”).
“‘Probable cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in assessing the existence of probable cause, courts examine “the totality of the circumstances known to the officer” at the time of arrest. Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. Probable cause is an “objective standard of probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday life” that requires more than bare suspicion, but less than the evidence necessary to convict. Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gray, 137 F.3d at 769).
Plaintiff maintains that his arrest was unreasonable because it was based on an invalid arrest warrant. “An arrest warrant is invalid only if the officer preparing the affidavit included a false statement with reckless disregard for its truth and, after that statement is redacted, ‘the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause.'” Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Thus, to succeed on his claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant Haithcock “deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in his affidavit, or omitted from that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.” Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
To establish “reckless disregard,” Plaintiff must demonstrate, based on all available evidence, that Defendant Haithcock had “serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported” in his affidavit. Id. As to omissions from the affidavit, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant Haithcock failed to inform the magistrate of facts he knew would negate a finding of probable cause. Id. “A plaintiff's ‘allegations of negligence or innocent mistake' by a police officer will not provide a basis for a constitutional violation.” Id. at 627-28 (emphasis in original) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
Here, in the arrest affidavit, Defendant Haithcock averred:
On January 24th, 2019 the defendant, Mr. Stanton Michael McDuffie, entered the Best Buy located at 1987 Sam Rittenberg Blvd. The defendant proceeded to the headphone aisle. The defendant grabs a pair of headphones and walks over to where the cell phone cases are stored. The defendant picked out a gray in color Insignia cell phone case (value $20) and opened the package which contained the case. The defendant, then, placed the Insignia case on his cell phone, and replaced Insignia case that he had removed with an old cell phone case that he removed from his jacket. The defendant, then, proceeds to the register and pays for the headphones
that he had picked out with his Debit Card, but does not pay for the cell phone case. The defendant walks past all points of sale with the Insignia case still around his cell phone. The entire incident was captured on video surveillance. Inv. Haithcock spoke with the defendant's mother, Mrs. Allison McDuffie, who stated that the defendant had used his Debit Card at the Best Buy on 1/24/2019.ECF No. 61-5 at 2. Defendant Haithcock then averred that the “above is true and believable based on statements from the complainant Mr. Daniel Regan, the defendant's mother, Mrs. Allison McDuffie, and the investigations of Inv. J. Haithcock.” ECF No. 61-5 at 2.
Upon review of the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff has not shown Defendant Haithcock made any materially false statements deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth while preparing the arrest affidavit.
Plaintiff's limited focus on the surveillance video Best Buy gave to Defendant Haithcock- which he had in possession at the time he prepared the affidavit-is somewhat misleading. As Plaintiff frames it, Defendant Haithcock's entire probable cause finding was based on this video. And, because this video does not show Plaintiff shoplifting, Plaintiff argues Defendant Haithcock's warrant affidavit was invalid and not supported by probable cause.
However, Plaintiff's argument ignores the repeated testimony and evidence before the Court which reflects that the video Defendants Haithcock and Rulon observed at the Best Buy is different from the video that was ultimately handed over to Defendant Haithcock (and which is submitted into evidence before the Court, see ECF Nos. 47, 57). Specifically, in his deposition testimony, Defendant Haithcock testified that when he observed the surveillance video at the Best Buy location, the surveillance footage reflected a male with a baseball cap, khaki shorts, and high socks take a cell phone case and swap it with the cell phone case on his cell phone. ECF No. 46-6 at 12. He testified that when he was at the Best Buy location, he recalls observing surveillance footage demonstrating the individual with the baseball cap and khaki shorts approaching the register and making a purchase. No. 46-6 at 11-12. This footage depicted Plaintiff from three to four camera angles from point of entry to point of exit. ECF No. 51-3 at 3; ECF No. 46-6 at 7, 9. Further, Plaintiff's mother informed Defendant Haithcock that Plaintiff did purchase a pair of headphones at Best Buy. ECF No. 46-8 at 7; ECF No. 61-2; ECF No. 61-3.
Defendant Rulon's report echoes the sworn testimony in Defendant Haithcock's affidavit. Specifically, Defendant Rulon noted that the same male that took the phone case purchased the headphones at the register using a credit card. ECF No. 61-1 at 3. She described the suspect as wearing a baseball cap, khaki shorts, and high socks. ECF No. 61-1 at 3. Her report was based on information obtained from Best Buy employee Mr. Regan and her own observation of surveillance footage at the store. See ECF No. 61-1 at 3.
Further, Mr. Regan testified that Best Buy was in possession of surveillance footage that depicted Plaintiff from three to four camera angles. ECF No. 46-16 at 4. This is obviously different from the video footage that was provided to the Court. See ECF Nos. 47, 57. Mr. Regan testified that he failed to save the full three-to-four camera angle video, in violation of Best Buy's policies and procedures regarding evidence preservation. ECF No. 46-16 at 4. That is, there was a more complete video observed by Defendants Haithcock and Rulon at Best Buy. This more complete video is not “irrelevant” as Plaintiff attempts to argue. See ECF No. 54 at 26. Rather, Defendant Haithcock's probable cause finding was based, at least in part, on this more complete video witnessed at Best Buy.
Plaintiff's argument is somewhat confusing. His suggestion that a more complete video of an alleged crime is irrelevant makes little sense, especially when considering that the more complete video served, in part, as the basis for probable cause to arrest in this case.
Additionally, related to this idea, Defendant Haithcock never testified that his arrest affidavit was based solely on the incomplete surveillance video that has been submitted to this Court. Rather, Defendant Haithcock's probable cause finding was based on the review of the complete video depicting Plaintiff shoplifting the phone case, Mr. Regan's statements that the same individual who purchased the headphones also shoplifted the phone case, and confirmation from Plaintiff's mother that Plaintiff used his debit card at Best Buy to purchase the headphones.
Mr. Regan admitted under oath that he provided the CPD with the conclusive information that: “The same male that took the phone case purchased headphones at the register using a credit card. The name on the credit card was Stanton M. McDuffie.” ECF No. 55-1 at 5. Further, Defendant Rulon confirmed under oath that this information was provided by Mr. Regan. ECF No. 46-4 at 4.
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff's limited focus on the incomplete surveillance video misses the proverbial forest for the trees. A victim's statement (in this case, Mr. Regan) is enough to create probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991) (“It is surely reasonable for a police officer to base his belief in probable cause on a victim's reliable identification of his attacker. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause than an identification by name of assailants provided by a victim, unless, perchance, the officer were to witness the crime himself.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The complaint of a single witness or putative victim alone generally is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest unless the complaint would lead a reasonable officer to be suspicious, in which case the officer has a further duty to investigate.”); United States v. Beckham, 325 F.Supp.2d 678, 687 & n.16 (E.D. Va. 2004) (collecting cases). Consequently, “unless there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe the victim is lying, a victim's statement will constitute sufficient probable cause.” Battle v. Jones, No. 6:15-CV-4960-BHH-KDW, 2016 WL 7800306, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2016) (cleaned up) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 6:15-4960-BHH, 2017 WL 167930 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2017).
Here, even assuming there was no surveillance video at all, Defendant Haithcock had probable cause to arrest based on the statements from Mr. Regan and Plaintiff's mother. Specifically, Mr. Regan told Defendants Rulon and Haithcock that the same male that shoplifted the phone case purchased headphones at the register using a credit card, and Plaintiff's mother told Defendant Haithcock that Plaintiff did purchase a pair of headphones at Best Buy on that date. Moreover, there is nothing in the record, nor has Plaintiff shown, that there was an apparent reason for Defendant Haithcock to believe Mr. Regan was lying. Thus, Defendants Haithcock and Rulon are entitled to summary judgment. See, e.g., English v. Clarke, No. CV 3:19-2491-JMC-PJG, 2021 WL 4597184, at *7 (D.S.C. June 2, 2021) (“Even excising the purported false confession by English, Clarke had probable cause to arrest him based on the statements of the victim and other witnesses.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-CV-02491-JMC, 2021 WL 4398371 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-2232 (L), 2022 WL 1283185 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2022).
Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Haithcock's failure to view the incomplete video he obtained from Best Buy evinces a reckless disregard for the truth. The undersigned is unpersuaded by this argument. First, Plaintiff provides no case law that demonstrates that probable cause cannot be established unless an investigating officer rewatches surveillance video he has already seen. Second, although the incomplete surveillance video may have been insufficient to obtain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, the case law is clear that a victim's statement is enough to create probable cause to arrest-a much lower threshold. See Smith, 848 F.3d at 253 (noting probable cause requires less than the evidence necessary to convict).
Indeed, Defendant Haithcock testified that he believed part of the reason the city prosecutor did not go forward with the case was because the flash drive he had did not contain the full surveillance footage. ECF No. 46-6 at 10.
Finally, when determining the existence of probable cause, this Court is only concerned with the totality of the circumstances known to Defendant Haithcock at the time of arrest. See Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. As Defendant Haithcock testified, he was not aware that the surveillance footage provided on the flash drive by Best Buy was incomplete until after the warrant for Plaintiff's arrest was executed. ECF No. 46-6 at 10. Plaintiff has not disputed, nor pointed to any evidence in the record to dispute, this. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant Haithcock made statements in a reckless disregard for the truth in his affidavit, because Defendant Haithcock did not realize that he received the incomplete surveillance footage until after Plaintiff's arrest.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Haithcock and Rulon are entitled to summary judgment.
4. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity. The Supreme Court has held that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted above, Plaintiff has not shown Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a clear constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42) be DENIED and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 46) be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).