Opinion
Civil Action No. 8:19-cv-3212-HMH-KFM
11-04-2020
Willie Ray McDonald, Plaintiff, v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office and Scott Hill, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 25). The plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, gross negligence, supervisory liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a burglary of Stop-A-Minit, a convenience store located in Anderson, South Carolina, that occurred on January 28, 2016 (doc. 26 at 1). According to the supplemental incident report, Deputy Alex Williams ("Williams") reviewed Stop-A-Minit's security camera footage subsequent to the burglary and noted:
The suspect was wearing a black ski mask with a white skull mask over his face. The suspect was dressed in full woodland
camouflage BDU clothing. The suspect's neck is exposed for a short period and the suspect appeared to be a white male. The suspect was seen entering the store from [a] smashed in window pane and jumping over the front counter. The suspect then grabbed multiple packs of cigarettes and cigarette lighters and placed them into a plastic bag. The suspect then exited the store from the window pane and left the incident location. . . . [The owner of Stop-A-Minit] located a purple colored packet of White Owl Cigarillos that appeared to have dried blood on the wrapper. The wrapper was placed into evidence and a laboratory analysis form was submitted.(Doc. 26-2 at 2-3, incident report). In addition, Corporal Chris Pridemore ("Pridemore") noted in a supplementary report that he "collect[ed] two gel lifts of shoe impressions from off the floor near the entry point" and that "[t]he gel lifts were entered into evidence" (doc. 26-3, suppl. report). Officials received a Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS") hit to the plaintiff, an African American male, from the blood found on the White Owl Cigarillos at the scene of the burglary (doc. 28-4, CODIS match memo).
Defendant Officer Scott Hill ("Hill") obtained a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest and testified that the basis for the warrant was the CODIS hit (doc. 25-2 at 5, Hill dep.). Hill also testified that White Owl Cigarillos are kept behind the counter at Stop-A-Minit, which is the same location where the suspect was located when he was stealing items in the store (id. at 5-6). Moreover, while Hill testified that he could not "remember verbatim" what he shared with the magistrate judge to obtain the arrest warrant, he was "sure" that he told the magistrate judge that there was "a break-in, that blood was found on the scene, and the blood matched Willie Ray McDonald, and that the blood was found on a pack of cigarillos" (doc. 26-1 at 2, Hill dep.). When asked if he informed the magistrate judge about what "Williams said and Pridemore had deduced" in their reports, Hill testified that "I probably would have mentioned what was in the original incident report. I normally do, but, again, that's . . . four years ago or so, and we don't record those" (id.).
The arrest warrant reads as follows:
That on January 28, 2016 in the County of Anderson, one Willie Ray Mcdonald did enter Stop a Minit located at 220E. Shockley Ferry Rd., Anderson, SC without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein. Upon entry tobacco products were stolen. There is forensic evidence placing the defendant at the scene.(Doc. 25-4, arrest warrant). On October 31, 2016, the plaintiff was arrested and detained at the Anderson County Detention Center (doc. 26 at 1). The plaintiff was bonded out of jail on July 3, 2017, and the case was disposed of on May 15, 2018 (id. at 2).
On October 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed the instant matter in state court, alleging claims of false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983, supervisory liability pursuant to § 1983, and state law claims for malicious prosecution, gross negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (doc. 1-1). The defendants removed the matter based on federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1 at 1). On September 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (doc. 25). The plaintiff filed a response on September 29, 2020 (doc. 26). On October 6, 2020, the defendants filed a reply (doc. 28). In addition, the defendants filed an affidavit on October 23, 2020, and the plaintiff filed an affidavit on October 24, 2020, both in regard to the motion for summary judgment (docs. 30, 31).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.
2. Section 1983 Claims
A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
a. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
The defendants argue that summary judgment should be entered in their favor regarding the plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims because there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant (doc. 25-1 at 1-3). The plaintiff, however, argues that summary judgment should not be granted because evidence in the record raises questions of material fact concerning whether probable cause existed (doc. 26 at 4-12). As set forth below, the undersigned finds that probable cause existed and summary judgment should be entered for the defendants on these claims.
Section 1983 claims premised on false arrest or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment."); Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (analyzing a plaintiff's § 1983 claim for false arrest as a claim for an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment). To succeed on either claim, a plaintiff must show that the seizure was effected without probable cause. See Brown, 278 F.3d at 367 (noting that to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show that the officers arrested him without probable cause); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) ("The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause."). Probable cause means that the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge [ ] are sufficient to warrant a prudent person . . . in believing . . . that the suspect has committed . . . an offense." United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (4th Cir. 1993). Evidence sufficient to convict a suspect is not required. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Ordinarily, due to the existence of probable cause, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant." See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). However, an officer's material false statements or material omissions in obtaining the warrant can negate a finding of probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cty., MD, 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007). To succeed on these claims, a plaintiff arrested pursuant to a warrant must show that an officer "deliberately or with a reckless disregard for the truth made material false statements in his affidavit or omitted from that affidavit material facts with the intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "With respect to omissions, reckless disregard can be established by evidence that a police officer failed to inform the judicial officer of facts [he] knew would negate probable cause." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, "[a] plaintiff's 'allegations of negligence or innocent mistake' by a police officer will not provide a basis for a constitutional violation." Id. at 627-28 (emphasis in original).
Here, while it is undisputed that the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant, the plaintiff argues that probable cause did not exist because Hill has admitted that he did not give an accurate account of the evidence when seeking the warrant (doc. 26 at 4). Specifically, the plaintiff argues that Hill did not discuss several issues with the magistrate judge: the security camera's footage, Williams' statement that the perpetrator appeared to be a white male, that there was no blood found on the shards of glass from the smashed window pane, and that there were gel lifts of shoe impressions from the floor (id.).
However, despite the plaintiff's allegations to the contrary, Hill has not admitted that he did not give an accurate account of the evidence. Rather, as set out above, Hill could not "remember verbatim" what he told the magistrate judge in obtaining the warrant, but he was "sure" that he indicated that there was "a break-in, that blood was found on the scene, and the blood matched Willie Ray McDonald, and that the blood was found on a pack of cigarillos" (doc. 26-1 at 2, Hill dep.). Moreover, Hill testified that he "probably would have mentioned what was in the original incident report" and that he "normally give[s] the judge what the original deputy says" (id.; doc. 28-1 at 5, Hill dep.). Moreover, specifically regarding Williams' statement, Hill testified that he watched the security camera's footage for himself and could not discern the race of the perpetrator (doc. 28-1 at 5-6, Hill dep.). Therefore, the plaintiff has presented nothing but bare allegations and his own conjecture that Hill omitted material information. Without more, the plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding Hill deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, omitting material facts in obtaining the arrest warrant to negate probable cause. See Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition, the undersigned finds that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff. As noted, forensic evidence placed the plaintiff at the scene of the burglary through the CODIS hit matching the plaintiff to the blood found on the White Owl Cigarillos package. Moreover, tobacco products were the type of items that were stolen in the burglary, and the White Owl Cigarillos were located in the same area of Stop-A-Minit as where the perpetrator was located when he was stealing items. The defendants were not required to obtain evidence sufficient to convict the plaintiff, and considering the facts and circumstances within Hill's knowledge, the undersigned finds that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a prudent person in believing that the plaintiff had committed an offense.
The plaintiff also argues that probable cause did not exist because Hill did not provide the plaintiff's counsel with a copy of a recording of Hill's "talk" with the plaintiff after the plaintiff's arrest, no photo of the bloodied wrapper was submitted to the public defender, and no further investigation was made after obtaining the White Owl Cigarillos package (doc. 26 at 6). Further, the plaintiff appears to allege that he is not guilty of the burglary by attempting to provide an alibi and an explanation as to why his blood was found at the scene (doc. 26 at 7-12). However, here, the issue is not whether the plaintiff could be found guilty of the crime at trial but rather is whether there was probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest. Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff and further recommends that summary judgment be entered for the defendants on the plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims.
b. Supervisory Liability
The plaintiff also asserts a claim for supervisory liability against the defendant Anderson County Sheriff's Office ("ACSO") pursuant to § 1983 (doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 43-52). The defendants argue that summary judgment should be entered in their favor on this claim because the plaintiff has not set forth any policy or custom responsible for his injury and there are no underlying constitutional violations (doc. 25-1 at 7). The undersigned agrees.
To impose liability on a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must "identify a municipal 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999). Here, the plaintiff has failed to set forth any policy or custom. Moreover, without an underlying constitutional violation, there is no supervisory liability. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 697 (4th Cir. 1999) ("As there are no underlying constitutional violations by any individual, there can be no municipal liability."). Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that summary judgment be entered for ACSO on the plaintiff's supervisory liability claim.
3. State Law Claims
As an initial matter, the defendants argue that Hill is not a proper party to any of the plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA") (doc. 25-1 at 12). The plaintiff did not respond to this argument in the response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (see generally doc. 26). In South Carolina, "[t]he [SCTCA] is the exclusive remedy available for any tort committed by a government entity, its employees, or its agents, except as provided in § 15-78-70(b)." Health Promotion Specialists, LLC v. S.C. Bd. of Dentistry, 743 S.E.2d 808, 814 (S.C. 2013). The exception to this exclusive remedy rule provides:
Nothing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b). Moreover, the SCTCA states that "a person, when bringing an action against a governmental entity . . . , shall name as a party defendant only the agency or political subdivision for which the employee was acting . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c). "In the event that [an] employee is individually named, the agency or political subdivision for which the employee was acting must be substituted as the party defendant." Id.; see Kinard v. Greenville Police Dep't, C.A. No. 6:10-cv-03246-JMC, 2011 WL 3439292, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2011) ("[W]hen an entity is sued because of the alleged tort of an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, the [SCTCA] provides that only the agency shall be named as a party.").
Here, the plaintiff specifically alleged in his complaint that "[a]t all times relevant, Defendant Hill was acting . . . in the course and scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer with ACSO" (doc. 1-1 at ¶ 3). Accordingly, Hill "may only be held individually liable for Plaintiff's state law claims if Plaintiff can show that [his] conduct 'constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.'" Coats v. Pope, C.A. No. 1:17-CV-02930-TLW, 2019 WL 5586871, at *8 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2019) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b)). Here, summary judgment is appropriate for Hill on the plaintiff's gross negligence claim as the claim does not include the required elements under § 15-78-70(b). Id. at *9 (finding gross negligence claim did not include the element of "intent to harm," and thus the claim could not be asserted against state employees in their individual capacity under the SCTCA) (citations omitted). Further, the plaintiff's state law claims against both defendants fail for the reasons discussed below.
The plaintiff named Hill as a defendant "in his individual and professional capacities" (doc. 1-1 at 2).
a. Malicious Prosecution
To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: "(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in [the] plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting in injury or damage." Pallares v. Seinar, 756 S.E.2d 128, 131 (S.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As set out above, the plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding a lack of probable cause, an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. Consequently, the undersigned finds that summary judgment should be entered for the defendants on this claim.
b. Gross Negligence
The defendants further argue that summary judgment should be granted on the plaintiff's gross negligence claim because it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in SCTCA (doc. 25-1 at 5-6). The plaintiff, however, argues that his gross negligence claim was brought under § 1983, and thus, a three-year statute of limitations controls (doc. 26 at 17-18).
While § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, the plaintiff brought his gross negligence claim pursuant to state law. In his complaint, the plaintiff only referenced South Carolina law regarding this claim (doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 37-42). Moreover, § 1983 claims must be based on "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Morris v. Dewitt, C.A. No.: 5:12-cv-3177-RMG, 2014 WL 12637910, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2014) ("[A] claim based purely on state tort principals cannot state a claim under Section 1983.").
For tort claims against governmental entities and their employees in South Carolina, the statute of limitations is two years and begins to run on "the date the loss was or should have been discovered." See Health, 743 S.E.2d at 814 ("The [SCTCA] is the exclusive remedy available for any tort committed by a government entity, its employees, or its agents, except as provided in § 15-78-70(b)"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (providing that any action brought pursuant to the SCTCA "is forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been discovered"). It is undisputed that the plaintiff was arrested on October 31, 2016, and did not file the instant matter until October 7, 2019, over two years after the date of the arrest. The court finds that, based on the plaintiff's assertions that he did not commit the crime for which he was arrested, the plaintiff knew or should have known of his claims at the time of his arrest. Consequently, the undersigned recommends that the district court find that the plaintiff's gross negligence claim is time barred.
Because the court finds that the plaintiff's gross negligence claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, it need not address the defendants' argument that the plaintiff also failed to state a claim.
c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleged against the ACSO and Hill in his official capacity is barred by the SCTCA. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(f) (noting that the term "'[l]oss' . . . does not include the intentional infliction of emotional harm."); Poloschan v. Simon, C.A. No. 9:13-1937-SB-BM, 2014 WL 1713562, at *13 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2014) ("[C]laims for outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress against a governmental entity (including an individual government employee in their official capacity) are barred by the [SCTCA].").
As the plaintiff's "state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress does require a showing of actual malice and intent to harm[,] . . . the SCTCA does not bar state employees being held individually liable." Coats, 2019 WL 5586871, at *9 (citations omitted). To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish that "the conduct was so 'extreme and outrageous' as to exceed 'all possible bounds of decency' and must be regarded as 'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (S.C. 1981) (quoting Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979)). The evidence presented by the plaintiff is insufficient to establish that the conduct at issue was "so extreme and outrageous," and, therefore, summary judgment should also be granted to Hill in his individual capacity.
4. Qualified Immunity
The defendants further argue that Hill is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity (doc. 25-1 at 9-11). The undersigned agrees. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id.
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a district court must determine if a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all and whether the particular right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) (per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). "The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, because there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff and Hill did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights, Hill is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Now, therefore, based upon the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. 25) be granted.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge November 4, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice of the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).