Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. GIC847605, Richard E. L. Strauss, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
Linda McDaniel appeals a judgment denying her petition for writ of mandate challenging the denial of her application for service-related disability retirement benefits by the San Diego County Employees' Retirement Association Board of Retirement (Board). She contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's judgment because it concluded: (1) her incapacity was not permanent; and (2) her employment with the County of San Diego (County) did not substantially contribute to her incapacity.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1984 McDaniel began working for County as a clerk in the probation department. In 1994, she was diagnosed with breast cancer and did not work for approximately one year while she received treatment.
During her tenure with County, McDaniel was promoted from time to time to the positions of intermediate typist, legal procedures clerk, legal support clerk, and legal support assistant.
On May 16, 1996, while working as a legal support assistant for County's District Attorney's Office, McDaniel apparently sustained injuries to her neck, shoulder, and right arm when she pulled out a drawer in a filing cabinet, causing the filing cabinet to fall forward. After initially trying to push it back up, she jumped out of the way and it landed on a desk. She took a few days off work after the incident until a physician told her she was physically able to return to work. She continued to work for County until December 4, 1997.
On February 4, 1999, McDaniel filed an application with the Board for service-connected disability retirement. She described her disability as: "On 5/16/96 applicant injured by falling filing cabinet. Neck, shoulder and right arm. Applicant also developed carpal tunnel syndrome over a period of time." On July 5, 2001, the Board denied her application, finding she "is not permanently incapacitated physically for the performance of her duties in the service." On October 25, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment denying her petition for writ of mandate challenging the Board's decision.
The record does not show McDaniel filed a notice of appeal challenging that judgment, which presumably is now final. That judgment is not the subject of the instant appeal.
On September 19, 2001, McDaniel filed a second application with the Board for service-connected disability retirement. She described the nature of her injury, illness or disease causing her disability as: "Post traumatic stress disorder, migraine, and tension headaches, shoulder pain, stress[-]related chest pains, and problems with the occupational environment." She stated the dates of her injuries or onset of her illness or disease were "all periods of employment up to 12/04/97." In describing how her injury occurred, she stated: "experienced a near fatal accident at work (5-16-96) in which [I] was almost crushed to death."
In 2004, an administrative hearing was conducted by a hearing officer appointed by the Board. In addition to receiving various medical reports and other exhibits, the hearing officer heard the testimonies of McDaniel, her supervisor at work, Edward L. Murray (her treating psychologist), and Stephen F. Signer, M.D. (the Board-appointed psychiatrist who evaluated McDaniel). In addition to describing the May 1996 filing cabinet incident, McDaniel testified about two other incidents that purportedly caused her service-connected disability. During one incident, a jail inmate tried to attack her while she served a restraining order on him. During the other incident, she heard that an inmate on whom she served a restraining order had subsequently shot his wife. Both incidents apparently occurred in 1992 or earlier when she was working for County's Marshall's Office. She did not miss any work or receive any treatment at the time of those two incidents. Murray's report concluded McDaniel was permanently disabled because of her employment with County. In contrast, Signer's report concluded McDaniel was not permanently disabled and her County employment was not a substantial cause of any disability. Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued a proposed decision pursuant to which the Board would grant McDaniel's application for service-connected disability retirement. However, on March 3, 2005, the Board issued its decision denying McDaniel's second application for service-connected disability retirement.
The Board also submitted the 1998 report of psychologist Robert Zink and the 1999 report of psychiatrist Davis Suskind, M.D., both of whom concluded (in connection with McDaniel's workers' compensation claim) that McDaniel's disability was only temporary and not permanent.
On May 17, 2005, McDaniel filed the instant petition for writ of mandate challenging the Board's decision denying her second application for service-connected disability retirement (Petition). After reviewing the administrative record and considering the parties' written arguments, the trial court issued a tentative ruling denying the Petition. That tentative ruling stated:
"Under the independent judgment test, the weight of the evidence supports [the Board's] decision. [¶] . . . The Court finds that [McDaniel] has failed to meet that burden [to show the Board's findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence]. Of significance to this Court was the fact that [McDaniel's] treating psychologist, Edward L. Murray, III, Ph.D., reached his diagnosis of [McDaniel] without relying on any of [McDaniel's] medical records, which stands in sharp contrast to the physical and psychiatric evaluations conducted by Drs. Signer, Zink, and Suskind. The Court found the latter's findings and diagnosis highly credible, while Dr. Murray's testimony and findings lacked credibility."
After hearing the parties' oral arguments on the tentative ruling, the trial court confirmed that ruling. On November 15, 2006, the trial court entered judgment denying the Petition. McDaniel timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Standards of Review
"[I]f the order or decision of the agency substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the [trial] court, in determining under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the [agency's] findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence." (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 44.) An employee's or former employee's right to receive a service-connected retirement benefit affects a fundamental vested right. (Id. at p. 45.) Therefore, when a petition for writ of administrative mandate is filed challenging an administrative denial of that benefit, the trial court is required to exercise its independent judgment. (Id. at pp. 44-46; Levingston v. Retirement Board (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000-1001.) "[A]n exercise of independent judgment does permit (indeed, it requires) the trial court to reweigh the [administrative hearing] evidence by examining the credibility of witnesses." (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658; see also Levingston, at p. 1000 [trial court independently reviews the administrative record and may reweigh the evidence].)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b) provides that a trial court's inquiry "shall extend to the questions . . . whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c) provides: "Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. . . ."
"In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence." (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) Nevertheless, "[b]ecause the trial court ultimately must exercise its own independent judgment, that court is free to substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency's findings." (Id. at p. 818.)
On appeal, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence test "[e]ven when . . . the trial court [was] required to review [the] administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review." (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824.) In applying the substantial evidence test, "our review of the record is limited to a determination whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions and, in making that determination, we must resolve all conflicts and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the party who prevailed in the trial court. [Citations.]" (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 659-660.)
"It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact [e.g., the trial court]. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment. Even in cases where the evidence is undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence[,] this court is without power to substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law specifying the inference to be drawn. . . . [Citations.]" (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) "[E]ven if the [finding] of the trial court is against the weight of the evidence, we are bound to uphold it so long as the record is free from prejudicial error and the [finding] is supported by evidence which is 'substantial,' that is, of ' "ponderable legal significance," ' ' "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value . . . ." ' [Citations.]" (Ibid.) The testimony [or declaration] of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) Nevertheless, substantial evidence " 'is not synonymous with "any" evidence.' " (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)
"Moreover, we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility. [Citation.] '[N]either conflicts in the evidence nor " 'testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion . . . justif[ies] the reversal of a judgment [or order], for it is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.' " [Citations.] . . . ' [Citation.]" (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)
"Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence. [Citations.]" (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 651.) Furthermore, " '[w]here different inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidence, the conclusion of the [trier of fact] must be accepted by the appellate court.' " (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 301.) "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record. [Citation.]" (Roddenberry, at p. 652.)
II
Government Code Section 31720Government Code section 31720 sets forth the requirements for a qualifying County employee to receive service-connected disability retirement benefits:
"Any member permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty shall be retired for disability regardless of age if, and only if:
"(a) The member's incapacity is a result of injury or disease arising out of and in the course of the member's employment, and such employment contributes substantially to such incapacity, or
"(b) The member has completed five years of service, and
"(c) The member has not waived retirement in respect to the particular incapacity or aggravation thereof . . . ." (Italics added.)
In applying for service-connected disability retirement benefits under Government Code section 31720, the applicant has the burden to prove that his or her incapacity is both permanent and service-connected. (Rau v. Sacramento County Ret. Bd. (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 234, 238; Lindsay v. County of San Diego Ret. Bd. (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 156, 160-162.) Accordingly, the agency does not have the burden to prove that either of those two requirements was not satisfied. (Rau, at p. 238; Lindsay, at pp. 161-162.)
The parties have not cited, and we have not found, any cases interpreting the term "permanently incapacitated" under Government Code section 31720. Regarding the meaning of the unqualified term "incapacity" (whether permanent or temporary), we assume, without deciding, it means the substantial inability of the applicant to perform his or her usual duties. (Cf. Mansperger v. PERS (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 873 [interpreting "incapacity" under Government Code section 21022 (regarding Public Employees' Retirement System) (PERS)].)
Regarding the second requirement, the applicant's permanent incapacity must be the result of injury or disease arising out of and in the course of his or her employment and that employment must "contribute substantially" to his or her permanent incapacity. (Gov. Code, § 31720.) For an applicant's employment to contribute substantially, there must be "substantial evidence of a 'real and measurable' connection between the disability and employment . . . ." (Bowen v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 572, 578.)
III
Permanency of McDaniel's Incapacity
McDaniel contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that her incapacity was not permanent under Government Code section 31720.
For purposes of this opinion, we assume the trial court found McDaniel was incapacitated, albeit only temporarily and not permanently.
A
On October 4, 2002, Signer examined McDaniel in person in the course of the Board's consideration of her second application for service-connected disability retirement. He also reviewed McDaniel's medical records. Based on his experience as a board-certified psychiatrist, his experience with clinical treatment of similar patients, his review of McDaniel's records, and his examination of her, Signer stated:
"In my medical opinion, [McDaniel's] condition is not permanent. She requires psychotherapy and a medication regimen which, if prescribed appropriately and with her compliance, would provide, in my medical opinion, significant improvement in her psychological functioning." (Italics added.)
He further stated:
"In my medical opinion, [McDaniel] is not permanently unable mentally to substantially perform the usual and customary duties of her job. Presently, she is unable substantially to perform her usual and customary duties; however, this would only be temporary until adequate psychotherapy and medication be achieved to allow her to function in the workplace." (Italics added.)
He explained:
"In my medical opinion, at this time, her working ability is very limited. She has a significant systemic disorder which has been inadequately treated and without appropriate treatment, would not allow her to work effectively and correctly during an eight hour workday. It is also my medical opinion that this is temporary. Once treatment and a medication regimen are implemented, that would allow her to effectively function in the workplace as well as in her non-work environment." (Italics added.)
Signer's diagnosis of McDaniel was that she had a chronic low-grade depression and did not have either a major depression or an anxiety disorder. He further believed McDaniel had a histrionic personality disorder, resulting in her exaggeration of symptoms and descriptions of events.
At the administrative hearing, Signer explained McDaniel "has had anxiety and depressive symptoms that have waxed and waned." He further explained the treatment McDaniel had received since 1997 was inadequate. She had received only one type of antidepressant medication (at a low-average dose). He noted there were six other classes of antidepressants and four or five other SSRI molecules (i.e., other types of her prescribed class of antidepressant) available to treat McDaniel's condition, either singly or in combination. Also, he could see no reason why the dosage of the medication she had been prescribed had not been increased.
B
Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude Signer's testimony constituted substantial evidence to support the finding that McDaniel's incapacity was not permanent. As noted above, the testimony and/or declaration of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 614.) Furthermore, the trial court expressly found Signer's findings and diagnosis highly credible.
The record also includes the reports of two other experts supporting the finding that McDaniel's incapacity was not permanent. At the administrative hearing, the Board submitted the 1998 report of psychologist Robert Zink and the 1999 report of psychiatrist Davis Suskind, M.D., both of whom concluded (in connection with McDaniel's workers' compensation claim) her incapacity was temporary and not permanent. Although those reports were not as current as those of Signer and Murray and were issued in connection with McDaniel's workers' compensation case, the trial court nevertheless could, and expressly did, reasonably conclude those other two experts' opinions were credible and presumably added weight to Signer's opinion. The court stated: "The Court found the latter's [i.e., Signer, Zink, and Suskind] findings and diagnosis highly credible, while Dr. Murray's testimony and findings lacked credibility." In particular, the court noted Murray "reached his diagnosis of [McDaniel] without relying on any of [her] medical records, which stands in sharp contrast to the physical and psychiatric evaluations conducted by Drs. Signer, Zink, and Suskind." In so doing, the trial court properly exercised its independent judgment, weighing the administrative hearing evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.) On appeal, we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility because it is the exclusive province of the trial court to determine the credibility of a witness. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) We decline to "second-guess" the trial court's determination regarding the credibility (and weight) of the witnesses' testimonies.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support that finding by the court. At the administrative hearing, Murray was asked: "Did you rely on any medical records in forming your diagnosis of Ms. McDaniel?" Murray answered: "No, I did not." In contrast, Signer, Zink, and Suskind all considered McDaniel's medical and other records.
In arguing the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implicit finding that her incapacity is not permanent, McDaniel notes Murray, her long-time therapist, concluded her incapacity was permanent. In his 2001 report in connection with McDaniel's second application for service-connected disability retirement, Murray concluded: "There is little question that [McDaniel] is permanently disabled from her previous work." He further concluded: "[McDaniel] is permanently mentally incapacitated for the performance of her duties." Based on a written psychological test, Murray diagnosed McDaniel with a posttraumatic stress disorder. In her opening brief, McDaniel argues: "Despite Drs. Zink, Suskind and Signer's feeling[s] that [McDaniel's] disability was temporary and that her condition would improve, the reality of the record shows that Dr. Murray's diagnosis of permanent incapacity was more accurate, as Ms. McDaniel has continued to be disabled for a significant period of time following her 1997 separation from the County." By so arguing, McDaniel misconstrues and/or misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review. She essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence in the administrative record and reach a conclusion different from the trial court. We decline to reweigh the evidence. (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.)
Murray apparently had been McDaniel's treating therapist since 1997.
Although, based solely on a review of Murray's file, Eke F. Wokocha, a psychologist practicing in the same office as Murray, concurred with Murray's conclusion that McDaniel was disabled, Wokocha did not state any opinion on whether her disability was permanent.
Furthermore, there is nothing in Murray's reports or testimony that shows the opinions of the other three experts could not constitute substantial evidence in support of a finding that McDaniel's incapacity was not permanent. Although Murray apparently had been treating McDaniel since 1997, that long history did not require the trial court to accept his opinion and reject the more credible opinions of the nontreating experts. Similarly, the fact McDaniel apparently had been incapacitated since 1997 does not conclusively show her incapacity was now permanent and not temporary. As noted above, Signer concluded that if McDaniel is given appropriate treatment (i.e., psychotherapy and medication), she would experience significant improvement in her psychological functioning. He essentially stated she would no longer be incapacitated if she received appropriate psychotherapy and medication. Furthermore, Signer stated it was his medical opinion that McDaniel has been able mentally to perform her usual and customary duties since she last worked in 1997. Signer cited Zink's report that he (Zink) "believed the [file cabinet] incident could have provoked some mild anxiety but was certainly not a life-threatening or severely traumatic circumstance and that she went back to work and continued to work with file cabinets month after month after the injury." Therefore, assuming arguendo that an incapacity under Government Code section 31720 is permanent if it is of an extended and uncertain duration, as McDaniel argues (citing Gov. Code, § 20026 [regarding disability under PERS]), there is substantial evidence to support a finding that her incapacity was not of an extended and uncertain duration because, with appropriate psychotherapy and medication (according to Signer), McDaniel would no longer be incapacitated. Furthermore, the record supports a finding that appropriate psychotherapy and medication was, in fact, available to her. Signer stated McDaniel "would be able to seek treatment at County Mental Health [that] would be provided for free to her and, therefore, there is no preclusion to treatment based on income . . . ."
Although Murray believed McDaniel had been receiving appropriate psychotherapy and medication, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence and/or credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's determination that Signer's opinion was more credible than Murray's on that issue. Signer's opinion on this issue was not "pure . . . speculation."
McDaniel does not cite any evidence showing County denied her appropriate treatment. In any event, any such denial does not preclude the Board from denying her application for service-connected disability retirement or the trial court from upholding that denial. McDaniel does not show otherwise.
Finally, McDaniel apparently argues that, as a matter of law, Signer's opinions are not credible because of a purported inconsistency in his reports. In his January 2003 report, Signer stated:
"In my medical opinion, she is not permanently unable mentally to substantially perform the usual and customary duties of her job. Presently, she is unable substantially to perform her usual and customary duties; however, this would only be temporary until adequate psychotherapy and medication be achieved to allow her to function in the workplace." (Italics added.)
In his March 2003 supplemental report, Signer explained:
"Regarding the question as to whether Ms. McDaniel has been unable mentally to perform her usual and customary duties since she last worked in 1997, it is my medical opinion that she has been able to do so. Her symptoms are grossly exaggerated in response to the alleged precipitant of her difficulty and have been promoted and amplified during her treatment under her psychologist. . . .
"In terms of the type of treatment that she received, it is my medical opinion that her counseling was predicated to exaggerate and worsen her symptoms. She had consulted a psychiatrist who prescribed paroxetine, a standard serotonin specific reuptake inhibitor [SSRI] antidepressant. It had been her only medication and she was prescribed a low average dose. It is not clear why no other antidepressant was tried nor why the dosage was not increased, especially since she claims that there are symptoms that have not responded to that medication or dosage, which clearly does not make sense. She could be tried with any of the four or five other SSRI molecules or the other six classes of antidepressants. The time to respond depends on tolerance of an adequate amount of medication but this is usually achieved within two or four weeks and response may be predicated on another two weeks to determine whether it achieved an [e]ffect. . . ." (Italics added.)
Signer's two reports can reasonably be interpreted as consistent. His first report stated that McDaniel was "[p]resently" unable substantially to perform the usual and customary duties of her job. His supplemental report explained that McDaniel "has been able to" perform the usual and customary duties of her job since 1997. Interpreting those two statements favorably to support the judgment, it can be reasonably inferred Signer was merely explaining that because of the inappropriate treatment McDaniel had received, she was (as of January 2003) presently unable to perform her job duties, but she had been able to do so at times since 1997. That interpretation is also consistent with Signer's testimony at the administrative hearing during which he stated McDaniel's symptoms had "waxed and waned" over time. In any event, assuming arguendo Signer's two statements may have been inconsistent, the trial court nevertheless could conclude his specific opinion that her incapacity was not permanent was credible. We decline to "second guess" the trial court's determination of Signer's credibility, especially because McDaniel has not shown his opinion on that issue is inherently incredible. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 658; Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.)
McDaniel unpersuasively argues in her reply brief that because of that purported inconsistency in Signer's reports, "it is clear that Dr. Signer's opinions are not based upon and therefore not supported by the record evidence."
IV
Substantial Contribution to McDaniel's Disability
McDaniel contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implied finding that her employment with County did not substantially contribute to her incapacity.
After concluding McDaniel's incapacity was not permanent, Signer further concluded in his January 2003 report: "In my medical opinion, her complaints do not arise out of and in the course of her employment [with County] as she claims and her work is not a substantial cause of her psychiatric complaints." In his March 2003 supplemental report, Signer explained:
"It is my medical opinion that [McDaniel's] condition did not arise out of or in the course of her employment, except as the stage upon which she played out histrionic and hypochondriacal symptoms, again referring the reader to my summary of the original notes of Dr. Zink. She additionally had substantial nonindustrial stressors, both medical and domestic, that were responsible for her anxiety and depressive symptoms."
At the administrative hearing, Signer testified McDaniel's work for County was not a substantial cause of her symptoms. He explained that neither the file cabinet incident nor her purported contentious work environment satisfied the diagnostic and statistical manual's (DSM) criteria for Murray to diagnose McDaniel with posttraumatic stress disorder. Furthermore, McDaniel had returned to her job after the file cabinet incident and worked around file cabinets without any "trigger" of her purported posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Signer noted that McDaniel had suffered many other non-work-related events (e.g., breast cancer, difficulties with her son, influenza, ulcer, blood pressure problems, death of a friend, etc.) that she projected onto her work situation. Signer stated that regardless of the diagnosis for McDaniel's condition (e.g., anxiety versus depressive disorders) he did not believe her condition was due to her work environment.
Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude Signer's testimony constituted substantial evidence to support the finding that McDaniel's employment with County did not substantially contribute to her incapacity. As noted above, the testimony and/or declaration of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 614.) Furthermore, the trial court expressly found Signer's findings and diagnosis highly credible.
The record also included the report of another expert supporting the finding that McDaniel's employment with County did not substantially contribute to her incapacity. At the administrative hearing, the Board submitted Zink's 1998 report, in which he stated: "It is not psychologically reasonable or plausible that Ms. McDaniel would respond to the above-noted file cabinet incident on a psychological basis with symptoms of depression, anxiety, emotional fatigue, and multiple hypochondriacal complaints two years later." Zink concluded: "I have no data which would suggest that this [file cabinet incident] would be seen as a substantially traumatic psychological event, nor any data which indicates that Ms. McDaniel suffered any significant physical disorder as a result of a file cabinet falling forward."
Although the Board also submitted Suskind's 1999 report in which he concluded McDaniel's depression was predominantly caused by her neuromuscular symptoms (e.g., carpal tunnel), which was employment-related, the trial court presumably was not persuaded by that conclusion. The trial court could, and implicitly did, reasonably conclude the opinions of Signer and Zink on that issue were credible and more persuasive than the opinion of Suskind. In so doing, the trial court properly exercised its independent judgment and reweighed the administrative hearing evidence by independently determining the credibility of the witnesses. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.) On appeal, we defer to the trial court on issues of credibility because it is the exclusive province of the trial court to determine the credibility of a witness. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) Accordingly, we decline to "second-guess" the trial court's determination regarding the credibility of the witnesses' testimonies.
In so concluding, Suskind relied on the opinion of an orthopedist (William J. Previte, D.O.) that McDaniel's orthopedic symptoms were caused by her employment with County.
In arguing the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's implicit finding that her employment with County did not substantially contribute to her incapacity, McDaniel notes Murray, her long-time therapist, concluded her incapacity was caused by her employment with County. Murray stated: "The cumulative exposure to stressful work circumstances, combined with the acute effects of the trauma of the filing cabinet nearly falling on her (as well as the subsequent response of staff and coworkers to the incident) acted together in a powerful manner to bring about her condition." However, by apparently arguing that the opinions of Murray and Suskind on that issue were more credible than the opinions of Signer and Zink, McDaniel misconstrues and/or misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review. As noted above, it is not our function on appeal to reweigh the evidence or "second guess" the trial court's determinations on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. (Barber v. Long Beach Civil Service Com., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 658; Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.)
Because there is substantial evidence to support findings that McDaniel's incapacity was not permanent and her employment with County did not substantially contribute to her incapacity, the trial court properly denied the Petition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Board is entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., HUFFMAN, J.