Opinion
Case No. 02-2135-JWL
November 22, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter is presently before the court on defendants Gil Crouse and Susan Hadl's motion to dismiss complaint of Curtis A. Kastl, II (Doc. 138). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
On October 3, 2002, defendants Gil Grouse and Susan Hadl filed a motion to dismiss complaint of Curtis Kastl. Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 6.1(e)(2), a party has 20 days to respond to a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.4, "[i]f a respondent fails to file a response within the time required by Rule [6.1(e)], the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further notice."
On November 1, 2002, after plaintiff Kastl failed to respond to defendants' motion, this court issued an order directing plaintiff Kastl to show cause in writing to the court, on or before November 12, 2002, why he failed to respond to defendants' motion within the period of time dictated by Rule 6.1 and directing plaintiff Kastl to respond to defendants' motion to dismiss on or before November 12, 2002. In that order, the court cautioned plaintiff Kastl that if he failed to respond to the motion on or before November 12, 2002, then the motion would be considered and decided as uncontested, and ordinarily would be granted without further notice pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.4.
Plaintiff Kastl failed to file a response to the court's show cause order and defendants' motion to dismiss on or before November 12, 2002. Thus, the court considers defendants' motion to dismiss as uncontested and, accordingly, grants the motion. In so holding, the court specifically concludes that certain aggravating factors present in this case outweigh the judicial system's strong predisposition to resolve cases on their merits. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1998) (prior to outright dismissal for failure to comply with local court rules, court must consider the degree of actual prejudice to the respondent; the amount of interference with the judicial process; and the culpability of the litigant).
Specifically, the court notes that plaintiff Kastl, as of the date of this order, has still not responded to defendants' motion nor has he contacted the court in any way regarding this case. Plaintiff Kastl's failure to respond to defendants' motion in any way and his failure to contact the court in any way demonstrates that his culpability is quite high. Compare id. (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where petitioner mailed his response more than three days prior to the deadline, demonstrating "little or no culpability on his part in causing the delay") and Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir. 1988) (petitioner herself was not guilty of any dereliction where petitioner's counsel overlooked motion and, therefore, failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly). Moreover, in such circumstances, denying defendants' motion would prejudice defendants in terms of continued time spent and expenses incurred on a case in which plaintiff Kastl has shown no interest even after ample notice from the court. Similarly, denying defendants' motion would interfere with the judicial process in terms of docket management and the need for a finality to litigation. In other words, the court should not have to continue to manage this case on its docket when plaintiff Kastl himself has taken no initiative to keep the case on the court's docket. Compare Murray, 132 F.3d at 611 (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where petitioner's response to motion was received one day after the 15-day deadline and no prejudice to respondents could have resulted from this delay, nor could it have caused interference with the judicial process) and Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (where petitioner's counsel overlooked motion and, thus, failed to respond (resulting in delay of nearly two weeks) but, once discovered, responded promptly, respondent would not have been prejudiced in any legal or equitable sense by court's consideration of response and any inconvenience to the court did not justify dismissal).
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss. If plaintiff Kastl feels aggrieved by this ruling, he may file a motion to reconsider pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60. D. Kan. Rule 7.3(a); Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (court abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration following dismissal as uncontested motion).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 138) is granted.