Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0332-11T2
04-11-2013
M.C., Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the briefs). Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Lucadamo, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Waugh and St. John.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development.
Stanley G. Sheats argued the cause for appellant (Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys; Mr. Sheats, on the briefs).
Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Lucadamo, on the brief). PER CURIAM
This appeal arises out of the denial of an extension of M.C.'s temporary rental assistance (TRA) under the supportive housing assistance (SHAP) program. The Passaic County Board of Social Services (PCBSS), which administers those State programs, terminated M.C.'s benefits. It did so because M.C. had reached the maximum time limit and was ineligible for an exemption or an extension. M.C. contested the decision, arguing that she was still entitled to receive benefits under applicable statutes and regulations.
After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that M.C. was not entitled to an extension of emergency assistance (EA) in the form of SHAP and had failed to otherwise demonstrate her eligibility. The ALJ's decision was adopted by the Division of Family Development (DFD) of the New Jersey Department of Human Services. M.C. now appeals.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the final administrative decision denying EA benefits to M.C. under SHAP.
I.
We briefly summarize the relevant procedural history and the facts based on the record before us.
M.C. receives Work First New Jersey (WFNJ)/General Assistance (GA) benefits and supplemental nutritional assistance through PCBSS. She receives GA cash assistance at the level afforded to an employable, single adult without dependant children. See N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.4 and -3.5. She also received EA from PCBSS. N.J.S.A. 44:10-51; N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1 to -6.10.
Among other relief, EA may be granted in the form of TRA. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.3(a). EA shall be provided by PCBSS when "an actual or imminent eviction from prior housing, and the assistance unit is in a state of homelessness or imminent homelessness due to circumstances beyond their control or the absence of a realistic capacity to plan in advance for substitute housing" and the PCBSS determines that the provision of housing is necessary for health and safety. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1(c). Any emergency assistance granted shall be limited to twelve cumulative months, with limited extensions for "extreme hardship" provided the recipient has taken all reasonable steps to resolve the emergent situation but the emergency nonetheless continues or a new emergency occurs, which causes extreme hardship to the family. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b).
Background concerning the interplay between Federal and New Jersey legislation is also helpful to an understanding of the DFD's decision.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.); M.F. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. Of Family Dev., 395 N.J. Super. 18, 25 (App. Div. 2007). In
response to PRWORA, New Jersey enacted the Work First New Jersey Act. N.J.S.A. 44:10-55 to -70; Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 327 (2003). The Legislature recognized that PRWORA provided an opportunity to the "state to establish and design its own welfare program," N.J.S.A. 44:10-56(a), and "working individuals . . . needing temporary assistance should have the transitional support necessary to obtain and keep a job in order to be able to avoid cycling back onto public assistance[,]" N.J.S.A. 44:10-56(c). In Sojourner A., the Court recognized that "the primary purpose of [WFNJ] is to encourage employment, self-sufficiency and family stability." Supra, 177 N.J. at 327.
The WFNJ program is established in the Department of Human Services, N.J.S.A. 44:10-58(a); however, it is administered at the municipal and county levels, N.J.S.A. 44:10-59(c). The Commissioner of the Department of Human Services is authorized to establish regulations governing eligibility and other requirements for the WFNJ program. N.J.S.A. 44:10-59(e). Pursuant to this authority, the Commissioner has adopted rules governing the WFNJ program, including availability of emergency housing assistance. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.1 to -6.10. Any EA granted shall be limited to twelve cumulative months, subject to certain exceptions. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4.
Once the EA housing assistance is exhausted, assistance was available under SHAP if the applicant met certain requirements. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.9. In July of 2011, the then existing SHAP program extended "EA benefits for WFNJ recipients who otherwise qualify for [TRA]" and "whose emergency assistance benefits terminated due to the 12 cumulative-month lifetime limit on receipt of EA benefits and who are experiencing a new housing crisis." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.9(b).
The SHAP program was rescinded effective October 20, 2011, by DFD Instruction No. 11-10-06. The instruction provided that no new applications are to be taken, however, applications may be taken for EA extensions. Current SHAP recipients were not to be terminated unless "there is evidence of non-compliance with EA service plan or other WFNJ program requirements."
SHAP has been replaced by the Housing Hardship Extension (HHE) pilot project effective July 2, 2012. See 43 N.J.R. 2715(a), 44 N.J.R. 1897(a).
M.C. requested a hearing and the DFD transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13 where it was filed for determination as a contested case.
The evidence at the hearing showed that the facts are not in dispute. M.C. resided in Paterson with her father and they shared the $761 monthly rent. Her share of the rent was $380.50, which was paid through the TRA program. She received TRA from July 2009 to June 2011. She applied for a SHAP extension which was denied by notice dated July 13, 2011. The denial notice advised M.C. that she had exceeded the time limit for EA. In June, 2011, M.C. was served with a landlord tenancy complaint for non-payment of rent. M.C. was in compliance with all WFNJ work activities. At her court appearance on July 26, she signed a consent agreement with her landlord agreeing to pay her rental arrears. At her hearing before the ALJ, M.C. sought a reversal of the denial of payment of her SHAP and rental arrears.
The ALJ noted that the SHAP pilot program was established to extend and expand on the provisions of extended EA, provided the applicant seeking SHAP continued to need EA and was otherwise eligible. "One purpose of the program is to extend EA benefits to those [whose] benefits terminate due to the 12 cumulative month lifetime limit of EA benefits and who are experiencing a new housing crisis." The ALJ set forth the positions of the parties. "The agency contends that a cessation of TRA/EA benefits based on the regulatory maximum time limit does not constitute a new housing crisis. [M.C.] asserts a pending eviction for nonpayment of rent is a new housing crisis."
In her initial decision, the ALJ determined that M.C.'s "housing crisis is a continuation of the crisis that gave her EA/TRA benefits and placed her in her current apartment." The ALJ decided that, based on the regulation in effect at that time, it is only after eviction "that a new housing crisis exists and that [M.C.] will be eligible for SHAP." Therefore, the ALJ affirmed the determination of DFD to deny SHAP to M.C.
The Director, in her decision and order dated August 12, 2011, considered the initial decision and the August 7, 2011 exceptions submitted by M.C., and accepted and adopted the conclusion and recommendation contained in the ALJ's initial decision. It is from that decision that M.C. appeals.
Subsequent to the decision, M.C. requested an Emergency Hardship Housing Stay. Finding that M.C. had not demonstrated that she is likely to prevail on the merits, the Director denied the requested stay.
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On appeal, M.C. contends that the agency and the ALJ erred in denying an extension of temporary rental assistance to her under SHAP on the grounds that she was not experiencing a new housing crisis. We disagree.
II.
Our scope of review is limited. "An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).
As the Supreme Court noted in Herrmann, "[t]hree channels of inquiry inform the appellate review function[.]" Id. at 28. They are:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors."When an agency's decision meets [these] criteria, then a court owes substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Ibid.
[Ibid. (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
Additionally, "[i]t is settled that [a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference." Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 307 N.J. Super. 93, 102 (App. Div. 1997)).
The pivotal issue before us is whether the DFD erred in concluding that M.C. was not experiencing a "new housing crisis." The pertinent regulation at the time of her denial adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services does not define the term "new housing crisis."
As previously noted, EA shall be limited to twelve cumulative months, subject to an extension of EA based on extreme hardship, examples of which are set forth in the regulations.
The following listing is not intended to be exhaustive, nor should it be interpreted as preventing county or municipal agencies from considering other situations not specifically mentioned in the list. Nevertheless, the agency shall confer with DFD if individual and/or family circumstances which are offered as a reason for extending EA represent a departure from the categories provided herein. An extension of emergency assistance based on extreme hardship shall be provided when:
i. There is the danger of a loss of employment or a bona fide offer of employment by a recipient adult;
ii. There is imminent danger of the immediate breakup of the family unit, with children needing to be placed in foster care;
iii. The recipient adult or child is in imminent physical danger or at risk of abuse and neglect;
iv. There is danger of serious harm to persons who are clinically/medically
diagnosed as mentally and/or physically incapable of caring for themselves, thereby possibly leading to inpatient hospital care or institutionalization; or
v. The request for additional EA arises directly out of a substantial loss of shelter, food, clothing, household furnishings and/or essential utilities incurred as a result of a natural disaster.
[N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b).]
There are no published cases addressing what the term "new housing crisis" means in the context of N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.9(b). However, the result asserted by M.C. conflicts with the goals of PRWORA and WFNJ to provide working individuals needing temporary assistance with transitional support. It is uncontroverted that M.C. has received almost two years of EA. M.C.'s contention that she is entitled to additional EA conflicts with the concept of "temporary" assistance and "transitional" support. Simply stated, WFNJ is intended to be a temporary program, not a long term one. The Supreme Court has also underscored that "the primary purpose of WFNJ is to encourage employment, self-sufficiency and family stability . . . [t]oward that end, WFNJ contains mechanisms designed to promote independence and decrease long term reliance on welfare payments." Sojourner A., supra, 177 N.J. at 327.
Given these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the agency's rejection of M.C.'s claim of a "new housing crisis" was "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable[.]" Herrmann, supra, 192 N.J. at 27. Duly bearing in mind the agency's expertise, we sustain the DFD's determination that M.C. did not experience a "new housing crisis" under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.9(b) and therefore was not entitled to an extension of SHAP benefits.
Although we understand the difficulties that M.C. faces, we cannot conclude that terminating her benefits after almost two years was contrary to the legislative purposes of the program. The DFD's final agency decision was sound and entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of the applicable statutes and regulations.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION