Opinion
No. A08-0348.
Filed December 30, 2008.
Appeal from the Washington County District Court File No. K0-02-2092.
John Remington Graham, Quebec GOAS 1Z0 Canada (for appellant).
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN and Douglas H. Johnson, Washington County Courthouse, Stillwater, MN and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In 2002, appellant Rodney Mattmiller was convicted in Washington County of eight counts of tax evasion, filing false or fraudulent tax returns, and failure to pay motor vehicle taxes. In this appeal from an order denying his second petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that this petition was identical to his first petition and by denying it without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant claims that the Hennepin County assistant attorneys who prosecuted his case under a power-sharing agreement between Washington and Hennepin Counties, lacked authority to do so, and that this defect was jurisdictional. Because any defect in the appointment of the assistant county attorneys was technical and not jurisdictional, and because the claim is procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), we observe no abuse of discretion in the postconviction court's summary denial of appellant's petition.
DECISION
"This court will reverse a postconviction decision only for an abuse of discretion, and while we give de novo review to its legal determinations, we will reverse its factual findings only if clearly erroneous. The district court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law." State v. Jedlicka, 747 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.App. 2008) (citations and quotation omitted).
First, appellant's petition fails on the merits. In State v. Abbott, 356 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Minn. 1984), the supreme court rejected a defendant's claim that he was denied due process when the attorney who prosecuted his case "was not properly appointed an assistant county attorney." There, the court held that "even if the prosecutor's appointment was technically defective, the defect did not prejudice defendant or deprive him of a fair trial." Id.
Appellant relies on State v. Persons, 528 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Minn.App. 1995), where this court vacated a criminal conviction on direct appeal, ruling that the district court erred by refusing to dismiss a criminal complaint that was initiated by a prosecuting attorney who lacked statutory authority to prosecute the case. But in Persons, the prosecutor lacked authority because he charged the defendant with a violation that occurred in another venue, one where the prosecutor had no authority. Id. at 279. Here, appellant was charged in the proper venue and the prosecutor acted under the authority of an apparent 1970 power-sharing agreement between Washington and Hennepin Counties, which granted Hennepin County prosecutors authority to prosecute cases in Washington County in the case of conflicts. See Mattmiller v. State, No. A04-2157, 2005 WL 1389902, at *1 (Minn.App. June 14, 2005), review denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2005). This court addressed and relied on Abbott and Persons in its opinion affirming the first postconviction court's rejection of appellant's claim that the assistant county attorney lacked legal authority to act on behalf of Washington County. See id. at *2.
We again conclude that at most, appellant raised a technical defect to prosecution of his case by the assistant county attorneys and that this technical defect did not prejudice appellant or deprive him of a fair trial. Because we conclude that this is a technical, rather than jurisdictional, defect, appellant's reliance on State v. Johnson, 653 N.W.2d 646 (Minn.App. 2002), is misplaced. In Johnson, we stated that certain defects cannot be waived, such as the prohibition against double sentencing. Id. at 650-51. No such prohibition exists against waiver of a non-prejudicial, technical defect.
Second, appellant's petition is procedurally barred. Once a petitioner has directly appealed a conviction, "all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741; see Quick v. State, 757 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Minn. 2008) (recently reaffirming Knaffla rule); see also Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. 2002) (stating that petition for postconviction relief is collateral attack on judgment, which carries presumption of regularity). There are two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: when "(1) a claim is so novel that the legal basis was not available on direct appeal, or (2) the interests of justice require review." Perry v. State, 731 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2006) (codifying rule). This claim is not novel because we have already ruled on this issue; nor do we conclude that review is necessary in the interests of justice.
The postconviction court correctly rejected appellant's petition in accordance with Knaffla. Appellant raised the identical issue in his first postconviction appeal, and the issue was decided adversely to him by this court in Mattmiller, 2005 WL 1389902, at *2. The supreme court denied appellant's petition for further review. Under these circumstances, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's second petition for postconviction relief that was based on an issue raised and rejected in his first postconviction petition. See El-Shabazz v. State, 754 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 2008) (affirming summary denial of postconviction petition when petitioner who filed three prior postconviction petitions raised issue that was procedurally barred); Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 450 (Minn. 2006) (affirming summary denial of second petition for postconviction relief as not an abuse of discretion when issues raised in petition were procedurally barred); see Jones v. State, 671 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 2003) (stating that generally failure to raise issue in prior postconviction petition precludes review in subsequent postconviction proceedings).
Finally, because appellant raised an issue that was procedurally barred under Knaffla, the district court did not err in summarily denying appellant an evidentiary hearing on his second postconviction petition, given this procedural history. See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2006) (permitting postconviction court to summarily deny a petition without an evidentiary hearing if it is the second or successive petition requesting the same or similar relief by the same petitioner or if it raises issues that have been decided previously by an appellate court in the same case); see Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 2006) (stating that postconviction petitioner entitled to evidentiary hearing only if facts alleged would entitle petitioner to relief requested).
Affirmed.