Summary
In Matter of Tandem Holding Corp. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Hempstead (43 N.Y.2d 801, 802) the court noted that "[s]tandards governing issuance of special exceptions [uses] may not be so general or tautological as to allow unchecked discretion on the part of the zoning board".
Summary of this case from Matter Shepard v. Bd. of AppealsOpinion
Argued November 14, 1977
Decided December 19, 1977
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, WILLIAM J. SULLIVAN, J.
W. Kenneth Chave, Jr., Town Attorney (Eugene Kirby Ferencik of counsel), for appellant.
Vincent J. De Rosa for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
Order of the Appellate Division reversed, with costs, and the determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals reinstated.
The determination of the board, that petitioner's application did not nor could not, through the imposition of reasonable conditions, meet the standards in the ordinance governing the granting of special exceptions, is sufficiently supported in the record. There was proof that development of a private parking lot in a residential district abutting a proposed shopping center in a business district would significantly alter the character and quality of the surrounding residential area, diminish property values, and increase traffic congestion.
Of course, characterization of a parking lot as a special use or exception permitted with board approval precludes the board from arbitrarily denying applications, and denial solely because there is a general objection to the special use or exception would be arbitrary (Matter of Pleasant Val. Home Constr. v Van Wagner, 41 N.Y.2d 1028; see Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals of Inc. Vil. of Thomaston, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 243-245). It does not follow, however, that requests for special exceptions must always be granted subject only to the imposition of reasonable conditions.
Entitlement to a special exception is not a matter of right (Matter of Lemir Realty Corp. v Larkin, 11 N.Y.2d 20, 24). The stated standards in the ordinance guiding the board's consideration of special exception applications condition availability of a special exception, and compliance with those standards must be shown before any exception can be secured (e.g., Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Oaks, 55 A.D.2d 809; Matter of C G Developers v Granito, 53 A.D.2d 612; Matter of Klein v Seigel, 47 A.D.2d 924; see 2 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice [2d ed], § 19.01; 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, pp 54-1-54-30; see, also, ALI, Model Land Development Code, § 2-207, subd [2]). In the North Shore case (supra), resolution of the problem was both simpler and different from this case only because the ordinance there involved stated no elaborated standards.
One caveat is appropriate. Standards governing issuance of special exceptions may not be so general or tautological as to allow unchecked discretion on the part of the zoning board (see 2 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice [2d ed], § 19.11; 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, pp 54-14-54-30). No such infirmity has been demonstrated to exist in the instant ordinance.
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur in memorandum.
Order reversed, etc.