Opinion
Argued October 15, 1975
Decided November 19, 1975
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, JOSEPH J. KUNZEMAN, J.
Adrian P. Burke, Corporation Counsel (Leonard Koerner and L. Kevin Sheridan of counsel), for appellants.
Milton E. Jacobowitz for respondent.
MEMORANDUM. Order of the Appellate Division reversed, with costs, and the petition dismissed.
Petitioner, designated a tentative sponsor of an urban renewal project, is not entitled, as a matter of constitutional due process, to an evidentiary hearing, findings of fact, and reasons for the determination before withdrawal of that designation. To be sure, if threatened governmental action involves a deprivation of a vital personal or economic right, due process would require notice and an opportunity to be heard (see, e.g., Sniadach v Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-342; Slochower v Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559; Escalera v New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861, cert den 400 U.S. 853). In the instant case, however, the very tentative and contingent nature of petitioner's beneficial interest in purchasing the property and developing the project belies any claim of deprivation of such an important right (cf. Board of Regents v Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-578). As the Supreme Court stated in Board of Regents v Roth ( 408 U.S. 564, 570, supra), "the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite".
This is not to say, however, that petitioner may be subjected to arbitrary action by the commissioner. Petitioner, as the direct subject of administrative action, is entitled to the "assurance, implemented by the right to a hearing which need consist of no more than an opportunity to deny or explain, that the [commissioner] has not acted arbitrarily or capriciously" (Matter of Fuller v Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 318). Petitioner was given ample notice and opportunity to explain the internal conflicts, about which there is no dispute, which produced the dissatisfaction of the commissioner and the eventual withdrawal of its tentative sponsorship. That is all petitioner, as only a tentatively designated sponsor, was entitled to receive. This means that the commissioner's action is not subject to the kind of review associated with quasi-judicial action; rather, the scope of review is the limited one appropriate to the review of purely administrative action (Matter of Fuller v Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 318, supra; Matter of Colton v Berman, 21 N.Y.2d 322, 329).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur in a memorandum.
Order reversed, etc.