Opinion
Case No. CIV-17-53-M
04-04-2017
CHRISTIAN BRETT MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. FCI EL RENO, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Christian Brett Martinez, a federal inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging violations of his civil rights. (ECF No. 1). United States District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). A review of the complaint has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Based on that review, the Court should DISMISS the complaint.
"An action arising under Bivens . . . provides a means by which a prisoner may challenge the conditions of his or her confinement." Powell v. Fleming, 27 F. Appx' 970, 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997)).
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court must review each complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court likewise must review each case brought by a prisoner with respect to prison conditions and each case in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
II. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Martinez' lawsuit stems from an incident wherein he refused to "go back to [the] yard" after having been in the segregated housing unit at the Federal Correctional Institution at El Reno. (FCI-EL Reno). (ECF Nos. 1:7, 1-1:1). Apparently, Plaintiff was afraid to return to general population because he had previously filed a lawsuit against members of the Oklahoma City Police Department who had become employees at FCI-El Reno. (ECF No. 1-1:1). Mr. Martinez also apparently refused to go back to the yard where he would be made to work for $5.00 per month, arguing that to do so would violate the 13th Amendment which prohibits slavery. (ECF Nos. 1-1:1-2). As a result of his refusal to return to the yard, he alleges that prison officials: (1) issued various disciplinary infractions, (2) poisoned him, (3) denied him medical care, and (4) denied him "legal access." (ECF Nos. 1-1:2-3, 1-2:3-6).
In the complaint, Mr. Martinez has alleged:
• A denial of medical care,
• A denial of "legal access,"
• A violation of the 13th Amendment,
• A violation of the "1932 Triad Pact,"
• A violation of the Freedom of Information Act,
• A violation of the "Freedom From BTU Ammendment [sic],"
• He was poisoned,
• Retaliation,
• Blackmail,
• Entrapment, and
• Inhumane Conditions of Confinement. (ECF Nos. 1:3, 6, 7, 8, 1-1:1-3, 1-2:3-6).
III. DISMISSAL BASED ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In the complaint, Mr. Martinez has named the following Defendants:
• FCI-EI Reno,
• "FCI El Reno Staff Grandy,"
• "Antolle Warden,"
• "Case Manager,"
• "C.O.s,"
• "Staff Members," and
• "Numerous Workers." (ECF No. 1:4, 6).
Mr. Martinez sues the Defendants in their official capacity only and seeks monetary relief. (ECF No. 1:4, 7). The Court should conclude that the claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
In addition to requesting monetary relief "up to whatever amount," Mr. Martinez also seeks to "have every employee In El reno Arrested[.]" (ECF No. 1:7). The undersigned recognizes that a potential claim for injunctive relief may exist in a Bivens lawsuit. See Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 2005) (sovereign immunity does not bar a claim for injunctive relief against federal prison officials). However, Mr. Martinez' requested relief in the form of an arrest would not be available. See Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (affirming denial of arrest warrants against prison guards whom allegedly beat inmates, holding that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of other persons). --------
The Supreme Court has recognized "an implied private right of action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights." Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). However, this right only allows a cause of action against the offending officer in his individual capacity. Id. Any claims seeking monetary damages against the offending officer in his official capacity are treated as claims against the United States, which is protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id,; see also Weaver v. United States, 98 F.3d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 1996) (claim for damages against a federal defendant in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the United States). This immunity also prohibits official capacity claims for monetary damages asserted against an agency of the United States and their employees. See Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) ("A Bivens action may not be brought against federal agencies or agents acting in their official capacities."); Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons 413 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) ("a Bivens claim lies against the federal official in his individual capacity—not . . . against officials in their official capacity").
A court will find that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity only when its consent to be sued is "unequivocally expressed." United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only Congress can waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, id., and Congress has not extended the Bivens remedy to federal agencies or the United States. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72. Moreover, any statutory text purporting to waive governmental immunity is strictly construed "in favor of the sovereign." Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). "If waiver is not unequivocal from the [statutory] text, the government retains its sovereign immunity. Legislative history cannot supply the necessary unequivocal expression." United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co. of Utah, 81 F.3d 922, 929-30 (10th Cir. 1996).
Thus, to pursue his claims against any of the Defendants, Mr. Martinez must prove an unequivocal waiver. See Merida Delgado v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 916, 919 (10th Cir. 2005) (burden of proof regarding a waiver of sovereign immunity). Plaintiff has not met this burden and the Court should dismiss the complaint, in its entirety, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The dismissal should be without prejudice. See Rural Water Sewer and Solid Waste Management, District No. 1, Logan County, Oklahoma v. City of Guthrie, 654 F.3d 1058, 1069 n. 9 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that a dismissal based on sovereign immunity should be without prejudice).
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is recommended that the Court DISMISS the complaint without prejudice.
The parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by April 21, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The parties are further advised that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
ENTERED on April 4, 2017.
/s/_________
SHON T. ERWIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE