Opinion
No. 3-040 / 02-0035.
Filed May 29, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, WILLIAM J. PATTINSON, Judge.
Postconviction relief petitioner, Dominick Ronald Marcott, challenged the method of calculating credit for time spent in county jails prior to commencing consecutive prison sentences. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey Lipman and Charles Hendricks of Lipman Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and James Scheetz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by HUITINK, P.J., and HECHT, J., and BROWN, S.J.
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
The issue in this postconviction relief action is the proper method of calculating the credit for time spent in jail prior to the commencement of multiple consecutive prison sentences. The petitioner, Dominick Ronald Marcott, contends each of the sentences he received should be credited with the amount of time spent in jail following arrest for that offense and prior to incarceration by the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC). The State's position is that he should be credited once with the total amount of jail time against the combined consecutive sentences. We believe the State's position is correct and therefore affirm.
I. Background facts and proceedings.
In May 1998 and November 1998, following guilty pleas, Marcott was sentenced on a total of six counts in three separate cases to two concurrent prison terms and four consecutive prison terms. The concurrent terms were for two years and one year. Following that, consecutive five, two, one, and one year terms were imposed. Ultimately, it was determined these sentences would be considered one eleven-year term of imprisonment under Iowa Code section 901.8 (1997).
First case: Story County, Iowa #AGCR025909, two counts. Sentenced on May 19, 1998, to two years prison for driving while barred, and one year for driving under suspension, to be served concurrently.
Second case: Story County, Iowa #OWCR026676, three counts. Sentenced on November 18, 1998, to five years for OWI, third-offense, two years for driving while barred, and one year for possession of controlled substances. These sentences were to run consecutively, both to one another and to the concurrent sentences in #AGCR025909.
Third case: Story County, Iowa FECR026854, one count. Sentenced on November 18, 1998, to one year for theft, fourth offense, to run consecutively to OWCR026676 and AGCR025909.
Before being received by the DOC on October 29, 1999 to commence serving the sentences, Marcott was in and out of jail in Story County and Polk County, Iowa on these charges and also in Rock Island, Illinois on unrelated charges in that state. During that period he spent a total of 146 days in the Story and Polk County jails and 100 days in the Rock Island jail. The State now agrees he should receive credit for the 100 days in Rock Island, but the amount of credit for the Iowa jail time is disputed. Marcott understandably wishes to be credited for the maximum county jail time available against his prison incarceration.
The problem arises because the jail time on the various charges overlaps. Marcott contends he should receive credit for the amount of time he spent in the county jails against each individual sentence for all periods he was detained beginning on the day he was arrested on each charge until he was received by the DOC. In his brief Marcott calculates he should receive 247 days credit against the first case, AGCR025909; 240 days credit against the second case, OWCR026676; and 202 days against the third case, FECR026854.
AGCR025909 — arrested Feb. 14, 1998
The DOC calculated the allowable credit to be 135 days and this was the amount apparently incorporated into the sentence. See Iowa Code § 901.6. Marcott commenced this postconviction relief action under Iowa Code chapter 822, alleging his sentences were illegal in that he was not given proper jail credit and was therefore illegally incarcerated. Challenges to illegal sentences are not subject to ordinary error preservation rules. Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Iowa 2001); Iowa R.Crim.P. 2.24(5) (illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). The postconviction court calculated the credit to be 246 days (which includes the 100 days in the Illinois jail, as agreed) to be applied to the aggregated eleven-year prison term, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion.
A. Statutory basis. The resolution of this problem is a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, "the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature." Wellsburg-Steamboat Rock Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Dep't of Ed., 523 N.W.2d 749, 751 (Iowa 1994).
We consider not only the language of the statute, but also its subject matter, the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of various interpretations. We will not construe a statute in a way that would produce impractical or absurd results. Finally, when searching for legislative intent, we look at the whole statute and not the separate parts.
United Fire Cas. Co. v. Acker, 541 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Iowa 1995).
The rules of statutory construction come into play only if the applicable statutes create an ambiguity. Iowa West Racing Ass'n v. Racing Gaming, 546 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa 1996). Ambiguities may arise when two reasonable minds might disagree on the meaning of a specific term, or on the overall meaning of a statute when its provisions are considered altogether. Miller v. Marshall County, 641 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 2002). However, if the meaning of the statute is clear on its face, statutory construction is unnecessary. Iowa West, 546 N.W.2d at 900.
The relevant parts of those statutes bearing on the problem are set forth below. The term "good conduct time" has now been replaced by "earned time," but we will quote the statutes as they were in 1997. The italicized parts are relied on by Marcott in support of his position.
Since January 1, 2001 "good conduct time" is referred to as "earned time." Earned time, or good conduct time, reduces an inmate's sentence, but may be lost for disciplinary offenses and, in the case of earned time, for failure to participate in programs. Prior to January 1, 2001, good conduct time was calculated as of the date the inmate was admitted to the institution and revised annually. He was given one day credit for each day served, plus limited credit for participation in programs, and it was presumed he would earn the maximum credit available. Thus a "tentative discharge date" was calculated initially which would later be adjusted if good conduct time credits were taken away.
After January 1, 2001, earned time accrues at the rate of 1.2 days for each day served and is credited as it is earned. Thus the inmates discharge date is recalculated monthly as earned time accrues. For those inmates incarcerated both prior to and after January 1, 2001, the credits were converted to the present system so that all sentence reduction credits are now accrued under the new system. 2000 Iowa Acts, ch. 1173, effective January 1, 2001; Iowa Department of Corrections Earned Time, November 2000.
Respecting consecutive sentences Iowa Code section 901.8 provides:
If a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first or succeeding sentence. . . . If consecutive sentences are specified in the order of commitment, the several terms shall be construed as one continuous term of imprisonment.
Iowa Code § 901.8 (emphasis added). The application of this section resulted in the combined eleven-year term for Marcott.
Iowa Code section 903A.5 first authorizes credit for good conduct time earned and not forfeited that will reduce the length of the sentence. It then also provides for similar credit for jail time. It states in relevant part:
An inmate shall be deemed to be serving the sentence from the day on which the inmate is received into the institution. However, if an inmate was confined to a county jail or other correctional or mental facility at any time prior to sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case having been decided on appeal, because of failure to furnish bail or because of being charged with a nonbailable offense, the inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon the term of the sentence.
Iowa Code § 903A.5 (emphasis added).
Section 903A.7 deals with credit for good conduct time for consecutive sentences. It states:
When an inmate is committed under several convictions with consecutive sentences, they shall be construed as one continuous sentence in the granting or forfeiting of good conduct time.
Iowa Code § 903A.7 (emphasis added).
B. Analysis. Marcott contends the phrase "term of imprisonment" in section 901.8 has a different meaning than the phrase "term of sentence" in section 903A.5. He argues since section 903A.5 provides credit for jail time which reduces the "term of sentence," while section 901.8 provides consecutive sentences are considered as one continuous "term of imprisonment," the individual "term[s] of sentence[s]" retain their separate character, including their individual credits for time served. They are then combined to constitute a continuous "term of imprisonment," with each term of sentence retaining its own credit for time served. He contends this result is buttressed by the use of "several terms" in section 901.8, which must refer to the several individual "term[s] of sentence[s]." He urges this is the plain, unambiguous meaning of the statute.
Nevertheless, Marcott incorporates statutory construction rules in his argument. He refers to the rule that meaning should be given to the legislature's choice of two different phrases, citing State v. Huan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984) ("When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we avoid construction which renders a part of the statute superfluous or redundant, and instead presume that each part of the statute has a purpose.").
Our court has recently considered the issue of multiple credits for jail time for consecutive sentences and rejected the contention that the language of section 903A.5, which provides "the inmate shall be given credit for the days already served upon the term of the sentence," plainly requires multiple credits. State v. Dunson, No. 99-2003, 2001 Iowa App. LEXIS 719, at * 6 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 28, 2001). The court held that section 903A.5, when read together with section 901.8, entitled the inmate only "to credit for time served against the aggregate of his consecutive sentence." Id. at * 6-7. As the court noted, the rationale for this interpretation is uniformly recognized as an effort to equalize the period of incarceration for those offenders who are unable to post bail with those who are fortunate enough to be released on bail while their cases are pending or on appeal after conviction. Id.; accord, State v. Tauiliili, 29 P.3d 914, 918 (Haw. 2001) ("Statutes giving credit for presentence confinement were designed to ensure equal treatment of all defendants whether or not they are incarcerated prior to conviction."); Commonwealth v. Carter, 411 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1980) ("[T]he statutory purpose of the provisions was to afford relief to persons who because of inability to obtain bail were held in custody."); In re Perry, 400 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Vt. 1979) (purpose of statute is to provide equal sentencing treatment for those who make bail and those who do not). "Some courts have held that credit for presentence time served is constitutionally required." Nissel v. Pearce, 764 P.2d 224, 226 (Or. 1998). The concept is, at bottom, a matter of fundamental fairness.
In Nissel, which collected many cases on the subject, the Oregon court observed it had "found no case involving similar facts in which the prisoner was credited for presentence time served against each of his or her consecutive sentences." Nissel, 764 P.2d at 228. Ironically, were we to accept Marcott's reasoning in this case, instead of penalizing an offender who could not make bail, an offender faced with multiple consecutive sentences who had been out on bail at all times before commencing serving the sentences would serve significantly more total time incarcerated than would Marcott with his multiple jail credits.
Assuming an ambiguity arises from the use of the phrases "term of sentence" in section 903A.5 and "term of imprisonment" in section 901.8, we believe the two statutes can be harmonized, and do not lead to the result urged by Marcott. See State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Iowa 1996) (statutes relating to same subject matter or to closely allied subjects, are in pari materia and must be construed in light of their common purpose and intent so as to produce harmonious body of legislation). We believe "term of sentence," as used in section 903A.5, refers to a situation in which a single sentence is contemplated and has no application to the multiple consecutive sentences dealt with by section 901.8. The specific statute directed toward consecutive sentences, section 901.8, should be preferred over the more general credit statute, section 903A.5. See e.g. Kelly v. State, 525 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1994) ("When a general statute is in conflict with a specific one, the more specific statute generally prevails, .").
Marcott further cites to the language of section 903A.7 that specifically provides consecutive sentences are to be construed as one continuous sentence "in the granting or forfeiting of good conduct time." Iowa Code § 903A.7 (emphasis added). By limiting this provision to good conduct time, Marcott contends this demonstrates the legislature knew how to deal with consecutive sentences respecting good conduct time, but chose not to include jail time credits.
However, we believe the credit for jail time is embraced within the good conduct time credit provision, and that credit should be granted in the same fashion. Iowa Code section 903A.2, entitled "Good conduct time," sets out the general scheme for the reduction of sentences for accrued good conduct time. It provides that "[c]omputation of good conduct time is subject to the following conditions: (1) Time served in jail or other facility, credited by the clerk of court prior to actual placement in a correctional institution, shall accrue for purposes of reduction of sentence under this section." Iowa Code § 903.2(1) (emphasis added). In harmonizing the two statutes, and keeping in mind the purpose of jail credit provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that jail time credit is considered the same as good conduct time credit, both of which are calculated as provided in section 903A.2.
Marcott also contends that since Iowa Code section 901.6 requires a sentencing court to include the days of credit in the sentence at the time sentence is pronounced, it would not be possible for the court to sort out which credits go with which sentence. He urges, then, that all time served in county jails from the commencement of the charges until received by the DOC should be credited against each sentence. He also feels it is significant that the sentencing court ordered that he was to receive credit for time served when pronouncing each sentence, even though those sentences were to run consecutively.
However, the trial court is not required to include the number of days of jail credit in the sentence when pronounced. The statute requires that "a statement of the days credited pursuant to section 903A.5 [jail credit] shall be incorporated into the sentence." Iowa Code § 901.6 (emphasis added). This means that the credit is to be calculated later, when all the information is available, and then made a part of the sentence. State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Iowa 2000) (rejecting contention that "trial court must, at sentencing or as part of a written judgment entry, announce the credit to which the defendant is entitled for time served."). Also, the fact the court indicated in the several sentences that Marcott was to be given credit for time served is superfluous; the appropriate credit is mandated by statute. Id.
Finally, he cites to the amendment in 2000 to section 903A.5 to include "[h]owever, if a person commits any offense while confined in a county jail or other correctional or mental health facility, the person shall not be granted jail credit for the offense." Iowa Code § 903A.5 (Supp. 1999). Marcott contends there would be no need for this amendment if the State's position were correct.
Again, we think Marcott's analysis is faulty. The legislature evidently wanted to assure that no jail credit would be extended to an inmate of a jail who committed another offense while so confined. Thus, any jail time accruing under those circumstances is to be deducted whether the credit is computed multiple times, as Marcott urges, or just once, as the State contends.
We have considered each of Marcott's arguments and again conclude the position staked out by this court in Dunson,and the many other courts that have followed this course under similar statutes, is the correct one. It is presumed that statutes were intended to secure a "just and reasonable result." Iowa Code § 4.4. To interpret the various statutes as Marcott contends they should be would be neither just nor reasonable, and would be contrary to "the object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, [and the] underlying policies." Acker, 541 N.W.2d at 519.
This appeal is concerned with the method of calculating the credit for consecutive sentences; apparently Marcott does not challenge the postconviction court's calculation of the credit if the court's method was correct. We do note, however, that our calculation of the days properly credited agrees with that of the postconviction trial court.