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finding that the plaintiff's claim that New York Criminal Procedure Law § 220.15 was unconstitutional because it was vague and violative of equal protection was insufficient to state a valid claim in light of Ex Parte Young, because he did not identify an ongoing violation of federal law which would be remedied by the court's issuance of an injunction
Summary of this case from KM Enters., Inc. v. McDonaldOpinion
1:05-CV-1564 (GLS/RFT).
August 22, 2007
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: TIMOTHY MAKAS, Plaintiff, Pro Se, C10116, Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center, New Hampton, New York.
FOR THE DEFENDANT: HON. ANDREW M. CUOMO, New York Attorney General, JAIME IRENE ROTH, Assistant Attorney General, Albany, New York.
ORDER
Plaintiff pro se Makas brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 220.15 (CPL). See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 220.15; see Dkt. No. 9. Sole remaining defendant, New York State, has filed a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 22. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion is granted, and Makas' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
The court previously issued two compliance orders outlining the deficiencies in the complaint, see Dkt. Nos. 5, 19, and Makas was given the opportunity to amend. See Dkt. No. 9. At this juncture, the majority of the complaint has been dismissed. See Dkt. No. 19. However, Makas has one remaining claim against the State for equitable relief. See Dkt. No. 9.
Makas alleges that CPL § 220.15 is unconstitutional because it is vague and violative of equal protection. As such, Makas asserts a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State. In sum, Makas' remaining claim is barred by sovereign immunity. As a general rule, claims for monetary relief against a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See U.S. CONST. Amend. XI. However:
a limited exception to the general principal of sovereign immunity . . . allows suit for injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of a state official's actions in enforcing state law under the theory that such a suit is not one against the State, and therefore not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354-55 (2d Cir. 2003) (this exception is commonly referred to as the Ex Parte Young doctrine); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). To determine whether this exception applies, "the court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002); see also Mountain Cable Co. v. Pub. Serv. Bd. Of Vt., 242 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404 (D. Vt. 2003) (a federal court may order state officials to conform their future conduct to federal law).
Here, Makas' complaint does not state a valid claim for prospective injunctive relief according to the Ex Parte Young doctrine. Instead, his amended complaint simply asks the court to declare CPL § 220.15 unconstitutional, in addition to other conclusory demands. Specifically, Makas does not identify an ongoing violation of federal law which would be remedied by the court's issuance of an injunction. Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction since Makas' remaining claim does not meet the exception and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, and Makas' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED, that defendant's motion to dismiss ( Dkt. No. 22) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the amended complaint is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY ( Dkt. No. 9), and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court provide a copy of this Order to the parties by regular mail.