Opinion
No. 00 C 7732
November 16, 2001
ORDER
Aaron M. is a minor disabled child who is eligible for federal education assistance under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter "IDEA"). ( 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.; Complaint ¶ 1.) On December 8, 2000 the Plaintiffs, Aaron M. and his parents, brought this action against the Defendants, the Board of Education of Hawthorn School District No. 73 (hereinafter "Hawthorn School District") and two administrators of Hawthorn School District: Joseph Yomtoob and Jess Porres (hereinafter "school administrators"). (Complaint ¶¶ 2-3.) The Plaintiffs' complaint contains two counts. In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that the parties resolved an earlier dispute concerning Aaron's education by way of settlement in 1995. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have breached that settlement agreement by reneging on a commitment to pay certain travel expenses. Plaintiffs allege that this breach deprived them of their statutory and Constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' conduct violated the "stay-put" provisions of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). In addition, Plaintiffs appeal the results of a due process hearing challenging Defendants' decision, alleging that the hearing officer made erroneous findings of fact and law. Attached as Exhibit A to the complaint are copies of letters from parents in other school districts which Plaintiffs believe support their claim.
The complaint does not state Aaron M.'s age or the nature of his disability.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), answered Count II, and filed a motion to strike Exhibit A under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). As discussed below, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. Although the court agrees that the complaint does not state a § 1983 claim, the court concludes that Count I adequately states a breach of contract claim under Illinois law. Additionally, for the reasons stated below, the Defendant's motion to strike Exhibit A is granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts alleged in the complaint are presumed true for purposes of this motion. The initial dispute between these parties arose in 1995 when Plaintiff requested a due process hearing pursuant to § 1415(f)(1) of the IDEA to challenge Defendants' refusal to pay for Aaron to attend the Boston Higashi School. (Complaint, Count I ¶ 11.) IDEA provides a specific administrative procedure for resolving disputes; the first step in this process is a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1). In December 1995 the Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their request for a due process hearing as part of a settlement agreement. (Complaint, Count I ¶ 13.) Under that agreement, Defendants allegedly committed to fully fund Aaron's placement at the Boston Higashi School, pay the transportation expenses for Aaron to return home for required visits, and pay for Aaron's parents to visit him up to twelve times each year. ( Id. ¶ 12.) Four years later, in November 1999, Plaintiffs assert that the Defendants breached the settlement agreement by refusing to pay for the twelve parental visits. ( Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege that they suffered damages, the cost of the parental visits, as a result of the Defendants' breach of the settlement agreement. ( Id. ¶ 25.)
The complaint provides no details about the Boston Higashi School or the type of educational services that it provides.
On November 27, 1999 the Plaintiffs requested a second due process hearing as a result of the Defendants' decision not to fund the parental visits. (Complaint, Count II ¶ 10.) The Plaintiffs assert that this decision was arbitrary and violated the IDEA "stay-put" provisions. ( 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Complaint, Count II ¶¶ 11, 14.) On August 15, 2000 the hearing officer issued her decision denying Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs assert, without further specifics, that the hearing officer's decision contains errors of fact and law. ( Id. ¶ 26.)
To support their allegations, Plaintiffs attached to their complaint, as Exhibit A, two letters from parents of children attending the Boston Higashi School. The first letter, dated October 26, 2000, states that between October 1994 and August 2000 the Barrington School District paid for twenty-three round trip airline tickets to bring the writer's son home when school was closed and permit parents to attend school meetings and functions. The second letter, dated November 19, 2000, states that the Schaumburg School District paid for twenty-three round trip tickets each year from 1989 to 1995 to bring the daughter of that writer home when school was closed and permit the parents to attend school meetings and functions. ( Id. Ex. A.)
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss Count I
When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court considers the allegations in the complaint to be true and views all well-pleaded facts and any reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164-65 (1993). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court "should ask whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations." Bartholet v. Reishauer, A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). Importantly, the Seventh Circuit recognizes that a "complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect legal theory is not fatal." Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 315 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bartholet, 953 F.2d at 1078).
Plaintiffs did not state a § 1983 claim. They alleged that they were deprived of their statutory and Constitutional rights when the Defendants breached a 1995 settlement agreement by refusing to pay for round-trip airline trips to enable Aaron s parents to visit him in Massachusetts in 1999. An agreement to settle a dispute is a contract; it does not by itself create any constitutional or statutory right and this court has no inherent power to enforce the terms of such an agreement. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Plaintiffs have not stated a § 1983 claim; they have, however, stated a claim for breach of contract under Illinois law. See Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp., 733 N.E.2d 345, 351, 315 Ill. App.3d 199, 206 (1st Dist. 2000) (setting forth elements of a breach of contract claim). Because Plaintiffs have alleged a federal claim in Count II, a claim the Defendants have answered, this court has supplemental jurisdiction over Count I pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1367. Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I is denied.
B. Motion to Strike Exhibit A
Defendants have moved to strike Exhibit A to the complaint which consists of letters from parents residing in other school districts. Defendants argue that these letters were not part of the record at the due process hearing and are irrelevant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states that this court "may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." FED. R. CIV. P 12(f). The IDEA permits a district court to "hear additional evidence at the request of a party" when considering an IDEA claim. 10 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(2). Yet the Seventh Circuit has cautioned that "a district court is not required to allow all evidence proffered by a plaintiff in an IDEA proceeding." Monticello School District No. 25 v. George L., 102 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court may consider additional evidence, but in the absence of procedural infirmities normally will decline to do so. Beth B. v. Van Clay, No. 00 C 4771, 2201 WL 585142, 1, 2 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (Moran, J.), citing Patricia B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 5 F. Supp.2d 801, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff'd, 203 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court must exercise its discretion carefully to ensure that it does not convert the hearing from one of review into a trial de novo. Monticello, 102 F.3d at 901.
Plaintiffs argue that this court should deny the motion to strike because there was a procedural infirmity during the due process hearing. They allege that the hearing officer's decision was based on the services that other students were receiving rather than on Aaron's individual educational needs. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike, at 3.) Notably, however, like the evidence allegedly relied on by the hearing officer, Exhibit A also does not address Aaron's individual needs; it only addresses services that other students in other school districts received. In any event, whether or not the court will consider materials beyond the record at the due process hearing, such materials are not properly part of the complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I (Doc. No. 3-1) is denied. That count adequately alleges a state law contract claim over which this court has supplemental jurisdiction. Defendants' motion to strike Exhibit A (Doc. No. 4-1) is granted without prejudice to consideration of this material, if appropriate, on review of the hearing officer's decision. Defendants are directed to answer Count I within 21 days. A Rule 16 conference is set for Wednesday, December 19, 2001 at 9:00 a.m.