Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-1435, Section "K"(4).
August 18, 2004
Before the Court are a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Patricia Lynch (Doc. No. 80) and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Harry Lee, in his capacity as Sheriff for Parish of Jefferson ("Lee") (Doc. No. 83). Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits, depositions and the relevant law and having heard the argument of counsel this day in open court, the Court finds that both motions must be denied as there are questions of fact precluding summary judgment.
As stated in a Pre-Trial Order filed in this matter on February 12, 2004, Lynch contends that she suffers from a mental disability defined as personality disorder and paranoia. She was allegedly ordered by her supervisors to obtain treatment through an outpatient program at DePaul Hospital in April of 1999. Plaintiff contends that while she was receiving treatment, her supervisors schemed to terminate her by directing her co-employees to draft letters of complaint regarding Lynch's conduct on the job. Lynch contends that at no time was it alleged that she could not perform her job duties. Nonetheless, upon completion of the April treatment period, she was terminated. After her being terminated, she was reinstated in a different position ostensibly so that she could vest in her pension plan. Indeed, she signed a letter agreement stating that she was being reinstated only for that purpose and that her employment would end upon vesting. She subsequently, while in the second, less-paying position, filed a complaint with the EEOC. She indeed was again terminated on February 24, 2000.
The instant suit was filed pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition, Lynch has brought Louisiana state law claims. Lynch contends that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability:
(a) when she was fired from her position with the tax collection division on or about May 19, 1999;
(b) when she was rehired at a lower paying job, without the privileges and responsibilities that accompanied her position with the tax collection division; and
(c) when she was finally fired from the motor pool position on January 21, 2003.
In the motion before the Court, she seeks judgment that she had a disability as defined by the ADA, or alternatively, that her employer perceived her as having a disability. In response, Lee filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a finding that plaintiff never requested an accommodation, has no disability under the act and thus has no valid claim pursuant to the ADA. The Court will first address plaintiff's motion.
In the body of the motion, there was a request for a finding of liability; however, at oral argument, it was made clear by counsel for plaintiff that she seeks only the noted findings.
A similar Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was apparently heard by Judge Beer and summarily denied without reasons. Thus, there is the issue of whether the law of the case doctrine precludes the Court considering this motion. As the Court has stated previously,
Generally, the doctrine of "law of the case" is a "rule of practice based upon sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter." Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle v. Chrysler Corp., Inc., 56 F. Supp.2d 694, 698 (E.D. La. 1999) (citing Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. United States Smelting, Refining Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950))). But the doctrine is not an inexorable command A court will follow a ruling previously made unless the prior ruling was erroneous, is no longer sound, or would work an injustice. Id. The court explained the doctrine in Loumar:
[W]hen a district judge has rendered a decision in a case, and the case is later transferred to another judge, the successor should not ordinarily overrule the earlier decision. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 at 788, 794-95 (1981).
The law of the case doctrine is not, however, a barrier to correction of judicial error. It is a rule of convenience and utility and yields to adequate reason, for the predecessor judge could always have reconsidered his initial decision so long as the case remained in his court. Therefore, his decision should not bind a successor with jurisprudential straps stronger than those that compel him to adhere to an opinion once rendered. See Abshire v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1982). Id.Holden v. Connex-Metalna Management Consulting, 2000 WL 174878 (E.D.La. Nov. 20, 2000). Considering the posture of this case, the Court finds that it must re-examine the issues presented.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. "[M]ere allegations or denials" will not defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" that establish an issue for trial. Id.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must avoid a "trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts" are tasks for the trier-of-fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To that end, the Court must resolve disputes over material facts in the non-movant's favor. "The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, with evidence competent under Rule 56, is to be believed." Leonard v. Dixie Well Service Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1987).
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The seminal issue before the Court is whether summary judgment can be granted with respect to Lynch being disabled or that her employer perceived her to be disabled. This Court has struggled with this issue in Bice v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 21018638 (E.D.La. May 5, 2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment on whether the plaintiff was "disabled" under the ADA standards, this Court noted:
The term "disability" under the ADA includes: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. Demar v. Car-Freshner Corp., 49 F. Supp.2d 84, 88 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for ADA purposes. Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002). To qualify as having an actual disability, a claimant must show that their impairment limits a major life activity. Id. "Major life activities," include activities that are of "central importance to daily life." Id. Examples are walking, seeing, hearing, performing manual tasks, concentrating, learning, hearing, speaking, breathing, and working. Id.; Demar v. Car-Freshner Corp., 49 F. Supp.2d 84, 88 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
The limitation on a major life activity must be "substantial." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195. The EEOC regulations define the term "substantially limits" as (i) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform, or (ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population. . . ." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). According to the EEOC, the following factors should be considered when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in performing a major life activity: 1) the nature and the severity of the impairment, 2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, 3) the permanent or long term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
In Toyota, the Supreme Court found that these terms need to be interpreted strictly to "create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Id. Toyota limited the ADA analysis to include only those impairments that prevent or severely restrict an individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. Id. at 198. Accordingly, the ADA does not consider every impaired person to be disabled. DeMar, 49 F. Supp.2d at 89. The determination that an individual has a disability is made on a case by case basis and viewed in relation to how well an average person in the population can perform that activity. Id.; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999). The court's focus is on the effect of the impairment on the life of the individual, rather than the diagnosis. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
The Court finds that there are questions of fact with respect to whether Lynch is actually "disabled" under the statute. From the record before it, the Court cannot find under the appropriate standard that she is substantially limited in performing a major life activity.
Nonetheless, the Court must examine whether her employer regarded her as having such an impairment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has delineated that standard as follow:
One is regarded as having a substantially limiting impairment if the individual (1) has an impairment which is not substantially limiting but which the employer perceives as constituting a substantially limiting impairment; (2) has an impairment which is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; or (3) has no impairment at all but is regarded by the employer as having a substantially limiting impairment.Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 508 (citing Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1996). "Regarded as" having a disability "turns on the employer's perception of the employee" and is therefore a "question of intent, not whether the employee has a disability. DeMar, 49 F. Supp.2d at 94. It is not enough to show that the employer was aware of the disability, the plaintiff must show that the employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled in such a way that it substantially affected her ability in a major life activity. Id.
Certainly there is compelling evidence that the Sheriff's Department considered her to be disabled. The May 13, 1999 memo from Emile Gauthreaux, Jr. to Sheriff Lee states, "Dr. Gerstein has advised us that Ms. Lynch has a personality disorder that will take a very long time to treat, perhaps years. He also suggested that if Ms. Lynch was to allowed to return to work she should be reassigned to a different division." Such evidence is indeed probative. However, Gauthreaux's deposition testimony and the white papers could indicate that Lynch simply was seen as an employee who was bringing too many personal problems to the office and as a result was a detriment to the workings of the Tax Collection office.
Also, there is a question of fact as to the extent if any Lee regarded Lynch as disabled. If the defendant regarded her as disabled to perform her job at the time, that may not be sufficient if that perception was limited to a narrow range of tasks. As stated in Blanks v. Southwestern Bell Communications, Inc., 310 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2002), "If the employer excludes the impaired employee from a broad range of jobs, the employee is "regarded as" disable under the ADA. See [Bossier] at 334. If the employee is merely excluded from a narrow range of jobs, then he or she is not "regarded as" disabled under this prong. Id. (asserting that a "broad range" implies more than two job types.") As such, the Court must deny plaintiff's motion. The Court will now turn to Lee's cross-motion.
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As noted, Lee seeks judgment that plaintiff never requested an accommodation, has no disability under the act and thus has no valid claim under the ADA. From the foregoing analysis, the second and third requests-judgment that Lynch has no disability and no valid claim under the ADA-cannot be granted. There are material questions of fact as delineated above. As to the first issue-whether plaintiff requested an accommodation, and if she did not, then a finding that she is precluded from asserting that claim-there are material questions of fact.
As stated in Talyor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996):
Under the ADA an actionable disability means, in relevant part, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a). To prove discrimination, an employee must show that the employer knew of such employee's substantial physical or mental limitation. Id. at 163. Stated otherwise, "Because the ADA requires employers to accommodate the limitations arising from a disability, and not the disability itself, an employee seeking to assert a disability discrimination claim must produce evidence that the employer knew not only of the employee's disability, but also of the physical or mental limitations resulting therefrom." Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1999). Certainly, the May 13, 1999, memo could demonstrate that Lynch's employer had knowledge of her disability and that accommodation would be needed. Indeed, considering the entire method by which Lynch was treated for her illness, the EAP program and Dr. Gerstein's involvement, the contention that the accommodation claim fails because of the "failure" of plaintiff to "request" an accommodation rings hollow.
The process with respect to an accommodation has been described as interactive process. A compelling description of the proper inquiry is found in Beck v. Univ. of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996):
No hard and fast rule will suffice, because neither party should be able to cause a breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or inflicting liability. Rather, courts should look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or failure by one of the parties to make reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific accommodations are necessary. A party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith. A party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or response, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, court should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then assign responsibility.Id. at 1135. Because of the deposition testimony of Gauthreaux, Gerstein and Lynch, the Court finds that this determination must be made by the jury. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Patricia Lynch (Doc. No. 80) and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Harry Lee, in his capacity as Sheriff for Parish of Jefferson ("Lee") (Doc. No. 83) are DENIED.