Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Ct. No. GIC877154, Judith P. Hayes, Judge. Affirmed.
AARON, J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In December 2004, automobile dealer Steve Lyman purchased a Mercedes-Benz SL 65 (the Mercedes) manufactured by defendant Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC (Mercedes-Benz). In December 2006, Lyman filed a complaint against Mercedes-Benz and others in which he alleged that the Mercedes suffered from "continuing nonconformities." One of the causes of action in Lyman's complaint was a claim pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Song-Beverly Act) (Civ. Code, §§ 1790 et seq.), in which he sought either a refund or replacement of the Mercedes.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to the Civil Code.
During a hearing prior to trial, counsel for Mercedes-Benz informed the court that the parties disagreed as to whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). Under the definition of "new motor vehicle" in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) at issue in this case, a plaintiff who brings a claim pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act must own at least one vehicle that is registered in California. (Park City Services, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 295, 305-306) (Park City Services, Inc.).) Lyman and Mercedes-Benz disputed whether a vehicle such as Lyman's, that is owned by a vehicle dealer and has special dealer license plates, constitutes a vehicle registered in California within the meaning of the statute. After reviewing the parties' briefs and hearing oral argument on this issue, the trial court concluded that the Mercedes did not constitute a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2), dismissed the action, and entered judgment in favor of Mercedes-Benz.
Although the parties refer to the issue as to whether Lyman had "standing" to bring the action, both in the trial court and on appeal, the issue is more accurately characterized as whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).
On appeal, Lyman claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by the manner in which the court determined whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). Lyman also claims that the court erred in concluding that the Mercedes did not constitute a "new motor vehicle" as defined in the statute. (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) We affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In December 2006, Lyman filed a complaint against Mercedes-Benz, Mercedes-Benz of San Diego, and Mercedes-Benz of Laguna Niguel. In his complaint, Lyman alleged that he purchased the Mercedes in December 2004. Lyman alleged that after he purchased the vehicle, he experienced "continuing nonconformities" with it, including problems related to the vehicle's electrical and navigation systems. Lyman alleged that despite numerous attempts, the defendants had been unable to correct the nonconformities.
Although not stated in the complaint, the parties later stipulated that Lyman purchased the Mercedes from Mercedes-Benz of Laguna Niguel.
Lyman brought a claim pursuant to section 1790 et seq. against all defendants. Lyman claimed that the defendants' failure to correct the nonconformities constituted a breach of express and implied warranties, entitling him to a "a refund or replacement" pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. Lyman also brought a claim against all defendants pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2031 et seq.), and a claim for negligent repair against Mercedes-Benz of San Diego and Mercedes-Benz of Laguna Niguel. Lyman subsequently dismissed the action as to Mercedes-Benz of San Diego and Mercedes-Benz of Laguna Niguel, and also dismissed his Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act claim.
On November 2, 2007, Lyman and Mercedes-Benz filed a joint trial readiness conference report in which they indicated that among the issues in dispute were "[w]hether [Lyman] has standing to pursue a claim under . . . California . . . law," and "[w]hether the [Mercedes] is a 'new motor vehicle' under the law." In addition, that same day, counsel for Mercedes-Benz orally informed the court that the parties had a dispute as to whether Lyman had standing to bring the action. Mercedes-Benz's counsel informed the court that the issue could be resolved through "a one day trial or . . . through a briefing schedule." Lyman's counsel agreed that the court could resolve the issue through briefing and oral argument, and stated that the parties could address any evidentiary matters by way of declarations, without the need for live testimony.
After further discussion among the trial court and both counsel, Mercedes-Benz's counsel proposed that Lyman's counsel file an opening brief addressing Lyman's standing to bring this action, because Lyman bore the burden of proof on this issue. Lyman's counsel suggested that she could file a motion in limine. Counsel for Mercedes-Benz said that he would file an opposition, and Lyman's counsel stated that she would "do a reply brief."
The court set a briefing schedule and stated that it would hold a hearing on the "motion[] in limine" on November 16, 2007. Although it is not clear from the trial court's statements regarding the briefing schedule whether the court intended to allow Lyman to file a reply brief, the court's minutes for the hearing state, "The Court grants an OST to set and hear this Motion re[garding] Standing Issue for the date of 11/16/07 [at] 9:15 a.m. Moving papers to be filed on or before 11/09/07; Oppo[sition] is due 11/13/07; No reply."
On November 9, Lyman filed a brief in which he argued that he had standing to maintain the action. Lyman also filed a supporting declaration in which he stated that he is a small business owner doing business under the name of SALS Collectibles. According to the declaration, SALS Collectibles is "engag[ed] in the buying and selling of rare or collectible motor vehicles for profit." Lyman stated that he purchased the Mercedes from Mercedes-Benz of Laguna-Niguel in December 2004. Lyman further stated:
"SALS Collectibles is issued dealer plates from the California DMV. SALS Collectibles is charged a fee for each plate. This fee represents a blanket vehicle registration for all vehicles in the inventory of SALS Collectibles. Every two years, SALS pays a renewal fee to the California DMV for dealer tags on each plate."
Lyman also filed various supporting exhibits that documented his status as a vehicle dealer, his purchase of the Mercedes, and his inventory of vehicles. In addition, Lyman filed as exhibits copies of two forms entitled "VEHICLE/VESSEL TRANSFER AND REASSIGNMENT FORM," and "WHOLESALE REPORT OF SALE." Mercedes-Benz of Laguna Niguel had provided these forms to the California Department of Motor Vehicles to document Lyman's purchase of the Mercedes.
On November 13, Mercedes-Benz filed its brief on the standing issue, and also filed various evidentiary objections to Lyman's declaration. On Friday, November 16, the trial court held a hearing at which the court entertained oral argument. The following Monday, the trial court entered an order in which it concluded that Lyman lacked standing to bring the action because neither the Mercedes nor any of the four other vehicles that Lyman owned were registered in California. After reviewing the relevant law, the court noted that rather than registering the Mercedes and the other vehicles in his inventory, "[Lyman] affixes interchangeable dealer plates to his vehicles."
The trial court did not rule on Mercedes-Benz's evidentiary objections to Lyman's declaration.
The court entered judgment in favor of Mercedes-Benz. In the judgment, the court described the procedures it had employed in considering the issue, as follows:
"The parties had previously stipulated to a bifurcated court trial, with phase one consisting of the determination of whether [Lyman] had standing to pursue the sole remaining claim for violation of the Song-Beverly Act. The parties had submitted briefing on that issue that had, at the Court's suggestion, been labeled as a motion in limine and opposition thereto. [¶] On November 16, 2007, the court heard oral argument on the matter, and on November 19, 2007, having considered the evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, and pertinent legal authorities, the Court ruled that [Lyman] lacks standing to bring this action under the Song-Beverly Act."
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Lyman has not demonstrated that the procedures the court employed in considering whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) violated his right to due process
Lyman claims that the procedures the court employed in considering whether the Mercedes constituted a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) violated his constitutional right to due process.
We need not consider the merits of this claim, because Lyman's sole claim of prejudice on appeal is that the trial court's failure to allow him to file a reply brief in the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to articulate the same legal argument that he presents in his opening brief on appeal, concerning whether the Mercedes constitutes a "new motor vehicle" under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). Specifically, Lyman argues, "[W]here, as here, the central dispute is purely a question of law, the importance of each party's right to present the full spectrum of persuasive legal authority cannot be overemphasized. . . . [H]ad [Lyman] been able to present the legal authority as set forth in [Lyman's opening brief on appeal] to the trial court, the outcome likely would have been far different." As is indicated by the preceding quotation, Lyman does not claim that he was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence on the issue in the trial court.
Since we reject Lyman's argument on this point in part III.B., post, Lyman has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from the procedures that the court employed in considering the issue. Thus, even if the procedures the trial court employed were improper, we would not reverse the judgment on this ground. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475 ["No judgment . . . shall be reversed or affected by reason of any error . . . unless it shall appear from the record that such error . . . was prejudicial . . . ."].)
B. The trial court properly concluded that Lyman cannot prevail on his Song-Beverly Act claim because the Mercedes does not constitute a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)
Lyman claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the Mercedes does not constitute a "new motor vehicle" as defined in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2), and that Lyman thus cannot prevail on his Song-Beverly Act claim. This claim raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we review under the de novo standard of review. (Whaley v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 479.)
1. Governing law
a. Principles of statutory interpretation
In Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pages 305-306, the court outlined the following well established principles of statutory interpretation:
"'Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy. [Citations.]' [Citation.]"
b. The Song-Beverly Act
"The Legislature enacted the Song-Beverly Act in 1970. [Citation.] In general, '[t]he [Song-Beverly] Act regulates warranty terms, imposes service and repair obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who make express warranties, requires disclosure of specified information in express warranties, and broadens a buyer's remedies to include costs, attorney's fees, and civil penalties. [Citations.]'" (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 301-302.)
As applicable to this appeal, the Song-Beverly Act provides:
"If the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22, to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B). However, the buyer shall be free to elect restitution in lieu of replacement, and in no event shall the buyer be required by the manufacturer to accept a replacement vehicle." (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2), italics added.)
c. The Tanner Consumer Protection Act
Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) of The Tanner Consumer Protection Act defines "new motor vehicle" for purposes of section subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2 of the Song-Beverly Act. Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) provides in relevant part:
The Park City Services, Inc. court explained the relationship between the Song-Beverly Act and the Tanner Consumer Protection Act in the following manner: "In 1992, the Legislature spun off some of the provisions of the Song-Beverly Act dealing specifically with motor vehicles into a new section, entitled the Tanner Consumer Protection Act (the Tanner Act). [Citation.] Hence, the existing definition of a 'new motor vehicle' ─ 'a new motor vehicle which is used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes' ─ was moved from the Song-Beverly Act into the Tanner Act [citation], and the Song-Beverly Act was amended to incorporate by reference this definition in the Tanner Act. [Citation.]" (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 305.)
"(e) For the purposes of subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2 and this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
[¶] . . . [¶]
"(2) 'New motor vehicle' means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 'New motor vehicle' also means a new motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight under 10,000 pounds that is bought or used primarily for business purposes by a person, including a partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor vehicles are registered in this state. 'New motor vehicle' includes the chassis, chassis cab, and that portion of a motor home devoted to its propulsion, but does not include any portion designed, used, or maintained primarily for human habitation, a dealer-owned vehicle and a 'demonstrator' or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty but does not include a motorcycle or a motor vehicle which is not registered under the Vehicle Code because it is to be operated or used exclusively off the highways. A demonstrator is a vehicle assigned by a dealer for the purpose of demonstrating qualities and characteristics common to vehicles of the same or similar model and type." (Italics added.)
In his complaint, Lyman alleged that he used the Mercedes "primarily for personal, family and household purposes." However, Lyman abandoned this theory in the trial court in proceedings concerning whether the vehicle qualified as a new motor vehicle under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). On appeal, Lyman maintains that the Mercedes qualifies as a "new motor vehicle" only under the second definition, italicized in the text.
For ease of reference, we refer to the italicized sentence of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) as the "business purposes" definition of a "new motor vehicle."
d. Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 295
In Park City Services, Inc., the court considered whether a plaintiff that had leased a vehicle in California for use in its business in Texas could prevail under the Song-Beverly Act on a cause of action pertaining to that vehicle. (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) In considering whether the plaintiff could prevail, the Park City Services, Inc. court considered whether the subject vehicle constituted a "new motor vehicle" under the business purposes definition in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).
The defendant argued that the Song-Beverly Act does not apply to a vehicle that is used primarily for business purposes when the buyer or lessee has not registered the subject vehicle, or any other vehicles, in California. (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) The plaintiff acknowledged that none of the vehicles it owned were registered in California, but claimed that the subject vehicle was a "new motor vehicle" under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) because the plaintiff used the vehicle for business purposes, and since the plaintiff owned no vehicle that was registered in California, it had "not more than five motor vehicles [] registered in this state." (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2); see Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 306-307.)
The Park City Court Services, Inc. court rejected this contention. After reviewing the legislative history of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2), the court concluded, "[A] vehicle is not within the scope of the Song-Beverly Act if (1) it is used primarily for business purposes, (2) it is not registered in California, and (3) no other vehicles are registered to the plaintiff in California." (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 298-299.)
Although, the Park City Services, Inc. court held that a vehicle is not within the scope of the Song-Beverly Act where the vehicle is used primarily for business purposes and the plaintiff does not own any vehicles that are registered in California, the court did not hold that a vehicle is within the scope of the Song-Beverly Act if a different vehicle is registered to the plaintiff in California. The plaintiff in Park City Services, Inc. conceded that no vehicles had ever been registered to it in California. (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) The Park City Services, Inc. court thus did not have to decide whether a plaintiff could bring a Song-Beverly Act claim based on a vehicle that it bought or used primarily for business purposes, that was not registered in California, based on the plaintiff's ownership of a different vehicle that was registered in California. (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 308, fn. 12.)
e. Registration of vehicles pursuant to the Vehicle Code
Division 3 of the Vehicle Code is entitled, "Registration of Vehicles and Certificates of Title." (Veh. Code, §§ 4000-9808.) Within division 3 there are numerous statutory provisions relating to the registration of vehicles in California, including a list of the types of vehicles that are subject to registration (Veh. Code, § 4000), the procedures by which a vehicle owner may apply for "original or renewal registration" (Veh. Code, § 4150), and the ways in which one may demonstrate compliance with registration laws (Veh. Code, § 4450). Generally speaking, "No person shall drive . . . upon a highway . . . any motor vehicle . . . unless it is registered and the appropriate fees have been paid under this code . . . ." (Veh. Code, § 4000, subd. (a)(1).)
Division 5 of the Vehicle Code governs "Occupation Licensing and Business Regulation." (Veh. Code, §§ 11100-12217.) Chapter 4 of division 5 of the Vehicle Code includes various provisions that govern "Manufacturers, Transporters, Dealers, and Salesmen." (Veh. Code, §§ 11700-11909.) Included among these provisions is Vehicle Code section 11714, subdivision (d), which provides that a licensed dealer "may apply for and the [Department of Motor Vehicles] shall issue special plates which shall have displayed thereon the general distinguishing number assigned to the applicant." Vehicle Code section 11715 defines the ways in which a dealer may use such special plates. That section provides in relevant part:
"(a) A . . . dealer owning or lawfully possessing any vehicle of a type otherwise required to be registered under this code may operate or move the vehicle upon the highways without registering the vehicle upon condition that the vehicle displays special plates issued to the owner as provided in this chapter. . . . A vehicle for sale or lease by a dealer may also be operated or moved upon the highways without registration for a period not to exceed seven days by a prospective buyer or lessee who is test-driving the vehicle for possible purchase or lease, if the vehicle is in compliance with this condition. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
"(f) Every owner, upon receipt of a registration card issued for special plates, shall maintain the same or a facsimile copy thereof with the vehicle bearing the special plates." (Italics added.)
2. Analysis
We begin by defining the precise issue that this case presents. Lyman does not dispute that, pursuant to Park City Services, Inc., a plaintiff who claims that a vehicle qualifies as a "new motor vehicle" under the business purposes definition in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) must establish that it owns at least one vehicle that is registered in California. We assume for purposes of this decision that the Park City Services, Inc. court properly interpreted section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) to require that a plaintiff who brings such an action under the section of the Song-Beverly Act own at least one vehicle that is registered in California. Further, Mercedes-Benz does not dispute that Lyman's Mercedes was "bought or used primarily for business purposes . . . ." (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).) Accordingly, we assume for the sake of argument that Lyman demonstrated that the Mercedes met the business purposes requirement of the statutory definition of a "new motor vehicle." (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)
Lyman attempts to distinguish Park City Services, Inc., on the ground that "the case was decided under a [different] version of [section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)] . . . ." Lyman is mistaken. The Park City Services, Inc. court expressly premised its holding on the legislative history of a 1998 amendment to section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) in which the Legislature first added the business purposes definition of "new motor vehicle" to the statute. (Stats. 1998, ch. 352, § 1 ["'New motor vehicle' also means a new motor vehicle that is bought or used for business and personal, family, or household purposes by a person, including a partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor vehicles are registered in this state"].)
In its opposition to Lyman's motion in limine, Mercedes-Benz stated, "There is no dispute that the [Mercedes] was bought by a business for business purposes (i.e. not bought primarily for personal, family, or household purposes) . . . ."
The narrow issue in this appeal is thus whether a vehicle, such as the Mercedes, that displays special dealer license plates (Veh. Code, §§ 11714, 11715), constitutes a "vehicle[] . . . registered . . . in California." (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) We conclude that such a vehicle is not "registered in California," within the meaning of the statute.
As described in part III.B.1.e., ante, division 3 of the Vehicle Code establishes a specific and detailed statutory scheme for registering vehicles in California. In this case, it is undisputed that that Lyman did not register the Mercedes under the usual provisions for registering vehicles set forth in division 3 of the Vehicle Code.
Further, as the italicized portion of section 11715, subdivision (a) of the Vehicle Code quoted above makes plain, special plates entitle a dealer to operate a vehicle on the highways "without registering" the vehicle. (Italics added.) Given the specific and plain language of Vehicle Code section 11715, subdivision (a), we conclude that vehicles that display special dealer plates do not constitute "vehicles . . . registered . . . in California." (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.)
We reject Lyman's arguments to the contrary. Lyman maintains that although Vehicle Code section 11715, subdivision (a) "appear[s] to suggest that the 'special plates' issued to dealers provide . . . something other than what is commonly understood to be 'registration' of the vehicle," various related provisions of the Vehicle Code purportedly make "clear that vehicles displaying dealer plates are indeed deemed 'registered.'" Lyman notes that Vehicle Code section 11715, subdivision (f) refers to "a registration card for special plates," and argues that this reference would "make no sense" if the "display of special dealer plates did not amount to registration of the vehicle." However, if anything, the text of Vehicle Code section 11715, subdivision (f) supports the conclusion that it is the special plates that are registered, not the vehicles on which a dealer chooses to display such plates.
Lyman also cites Vehicle Code section 9262, subdivision (e) as support for his contention that dealer-owned vehicles that display special plates are "registered" under California law. That section provides in relevant part that when a licensed dealer "applies for special plates as provided in . . . subdivision (b) of [Vehicle Code] Section 11714, the fee for the plates and the annual renewal of the plates is the prevailing vehicle registration fee as set forth in [Vehicle Code] Section 9250 for the period for which the special plates are issued or renewed." In our view, this statute does not support Lyman's position, but rather, undermines it.
It is clear that the Legislature intended for this cross-reference in Vehicle Code section 9262 to refer to the special dealer plates authorized under Vehicle Code section 11714, subdivision (d). (See part III.B.1.e., ante.) Former Vehicle Code section 11714, subdivision (b), is now codified at Vehicle Code section 11714, subdivision (d). (Stats. 1988, ch. 444, § 1.)
Vehicle Code section 9250 provides in relevant part, "(a) A registration fee of thirty-one dollars ($31) shall be paid to the department for the registration of every vehicle or trailer coach of a type subject to registration under this code, except those vehicles that are expressly exempted under this code from the payment of registration fees."
Pursuant to Vehicle Code section 9262, subdivision (e), a licensed dealer must pay a fee for each special plate that it seeks to acquire, rather than a fee for each vehicle in its inventory. The special plates that are issued pursuant to Vehicle Code section 11714 are assigned a number that is distinct to the dealer, rather than to the vehicle.
These statutes do not provide a method for registering dealer-owned vehicles (B. C. Cotton, Inc. v. Voss (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 929, 955 ["[r]egistration entails the provision of information and the compilation of a list, roster or the like"]), and there is nothing in any of these statutes that supports Lyman's assertion that "dealer-owned vehicles, like others, must be registered." On the contrary, the statutes support the conclusion that a dealer may own more vehicles than it has special plates, and that the dealer may transfer the special plates among different vehicles in its inventory.
Lyman's interpretation of the statute would require that we conclude either that a dealer alters the registration status of a vehicle under California law by putting on, and taking off, such special plates or, as Lyman suggests in his declaration, that a dealer affects a blanket registration of all of the vehicles in his inventory by paying the fee for special dealer plates. We see nothing in the statutes that Lyman cites that would support either such notion. Vehicle Code section 9262, subdivision (e) merely establishes the amount of the fee for such special plates; it does not mean that vehicles that display special dealer plates are "registered."
Lyman also argues that the legislative history underpinning Vehicle Code section 11715 supports his claim that vehicles that display dealer plates are "registered" under California law. In support of this argument, Lyman filed an unopposed motion requesting that this court take judicial notice of various documents pertaining to "predecessor legislation [of Vehicle Code section 11715], [Vehicle Code section 11715's] historical underpinnings, and other pertinent sections of the Vehicle Code." All of the legislative history predates the enactment of the 1998 amendment to section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) in which the Legislature first adopted the "business purposes" definition of "new motor vehicle." We grant Lyman's unopposed motion and take judicial notice of the documents referenced therein.
Specifically, Lyman requests that we take judicial notice of the following documents: a 1905 statute pertaining to dealer-owned vehicles (Stats. 1905, ch. 612, § 2) (request # 1); a 1913 statute pertaining to dealer-owned vehicles (Stats. 1913, ch. 326, §§ 7, 9) (request #2); a 1971 statute adopting former Vehicle Code sections 11714, 11715 (Stats. 1971, ch. 929, § 3) (request #3); portions of a 1913 bill pertaining to dealer-owned vehicles (Assem. Bill No. 2095 (1913 Reg. Sess.) as introduced on Apr. 18, 1913) (request #4); a 1949 Opinion of the Attorney General (13 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 39 (1949)) (request #5); portions of a 1971 bill pertaining to special dealer plates (Assem. Bill. No. 2313 (1971 Reg. Sess.) as introduced on Apr. 14, 1971) (request #6); a legislative committee report pertaining to Assembly Bill No. 2313 (Sen. Com. on Trans., analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2313 (1971 Reg. Sess.) ref. hearing Jun. 3, 1971) (request #7); portions of the Legislative Counsel's Digest for a 1975 bill establishing fees for special dealer plates (Sen. Bill No. 678 (1975 Reg. Sess.) as introduced on April 1, 1975) (request #8); two publications of the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department of Motor Vehicles, General Procedure Governing the Registration of Vehicles by Licensed Dealers (Sacramento: 1936)) (Department of Motor Vehicles, History of the Department of Motor Vehicles (Sacramento: 1961)) (requests #9, #10); former Vehicle Code section 9262, subdivision (b) (Stats. 1975, ch. 182) (request #11).
We have found nothing in the legislative history that Lyman presents that is directly relevant to the issues on appeal. Most fundamentally, because the Legislature first used the phrase "motor vehicles registered in this state" in section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) in 1998 (Stats. 1998, ch. 352, § 1), the meaning of vehicle registration under versions of the Vehicle Code as it existed prior to 1998 and the related historical material, is of limited interpretative value. Accordingly, we conclude that none of the legislative history that Lyman offers supports the conclusion that a vehicle that displays special dealer license plates is registered in California within the meaning of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2).
Lyman also argues that to conclude that dealer vehicles that display special plates are not registered would be contrary to the remedial purposes of the Song-Beverly Act, the terms of which are to be liberally construed. However, a court may not use the maxim of liberal construction to construe words to have other than their plain meanings. (See Mason v. Department of Real Estate (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1354.) Finally, Lyman argues that our interpretation of section 1793.22., subdivision (e)(2) would lead to an absurd result because "a small vehicle dealership that acquires a defective dealer-owned vehicle would never have standing to sue under the statute, unless the business also owned an unrelated vehicle subject to non-dealer registration." (Italics added.) However, Lyman does not claim that any other vehicles that he owns or previously owned are, or ever have been, subject to non-dealer registration in California. Therefore, as in Park City Services, Inc., we need not determine whether a plaintiff can prevail on a Song-Beverly Act claim arising from a vehicle bought or used for business
Lyman notes that section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) provides in relevant part, "'New motor vehicle' includes the chassis, chassis cab, and that portion of a motor home devoted to its propulsion, but does not include any portion designed, used, or maintained primarily for human habitation, a dealer-owned vehicle and a 'demonstrator' or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty but does not include a motorcycle or a motor vehicle which is not registered under the Vehicle Code because it is to be operated or used exclusively off the highways." (Italics added.) Lyman does not argue on appeal that the Mercedes constitutes a new motor vehicle under this provision.
purposes and not registered in California, based on the plaintiff's ownership of a different vehicle that is registered in California. (See Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 308, fn. 12 ["For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether the subject vehicle itself must be registered in California"].) Thus, neither this court, nor the Park City Services, Inc. court, has interpreted section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) in a manner that would lead to the allegedly absurd result that Lyman posits.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McDONALD, J.
Further, the Park City Services, Inc. court assumed for purposes of its decision that both the 1998 amendment, as well as a 2000 amendment of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2), applied to that case. (Park City Services, Inc., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 298-299.) The 2000 amendment provided that only a vehicle "bought or used primarily for business purposes," qualified as a "new motor vehicle" pursuant under the business purposes definition in 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2). (Stats. 2000, ch. 679, § 1.) Section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) has not been amended since 2000. Thus, the Park City Services, Inc. court applied the same version of section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) that is applicable to this appeal.