Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-0597
October 23, 2001
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A. and John Di Giulio ("Private Defendants") and the Motion to Dismiss of the United States on behalf of Defendant Janet Reno. After considering the arguments of the parties, the record and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of Private Defendants is PARTIALLY GRANTED and PARTIALLY DENTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Defendants allege in their Memorandum of Law (hereinafter "Memo") accompanying their Motion to Dismiss and incorporated into their Supplemental and Amending Motion to Dismiss that the caption incorrectly identifies Alitalia. See Memo at 1-2.
Defendants allege in their Memo that "Di Giulio" is incorrectly spelled "Di Guillo" in the caption. Id.
Background
In her amended complaint (titled "AMEND ORIGINAL COMPLAINT"), Plaintiff alleges that, in January and February 1999, and again in October 1999, she contacted a local Sales Office of Alitalia Airlines and spoke with Di Giulio regarding employment with the company, but during one of those conversations with Di Giulio "plaintiff was sexually harrasses (sic)." Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 3. Specifically, Plaintiff accuses Di Giulio of demanding that she "spend a night with him" as a condition of employment, and further alleges that he stated that Plaintiff would not be considered for a position because "she could not lift anything heavy." Id. at ¶ 3-5. Di Giulio also allegedly indicated that British Airways employees would receive preferential consideration for positions with Alitalia. See id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff contacted Alitalia, but asserts that the company's "ALL MALE MANAGEMENT" did not take her seriously. Id. at ¶ 6. Alitalia also allegedly refused to participate in the Mediation Program offered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") after Plaintiff filed a complaint with the agency. See id. at ¶ 10. In addition, Plaintiff; who says she has worked for a casino, alleges that Di Giulio defamed her by implying that casino employees are considered unprofessional. See id. at ¶ 17.
The Amended Complaint does not identify during which of the conversations Di Giulio made the allegedly harassing statements.
Plaintiffs' claims against Reno apparently stem from then-Attorney General Reno's alleged failure to prosecute a number of federal officials for unspecified criminal acts while Defendants allegedly have gone unpunished for allegedly harming Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Reno knew of criminal acts by a trio of federal officials after Plaintiff reported them in two earlier cases she filed in this Court. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff further alleges that she wrote to Reno, seeking assistance in upholding federal law, and that Reno has provided other countries with more privileges than U.S. citizens, presumably because the above-referenced federal officials have allegedly silenced Plaintiff while Alitalia, which Plaintiff asserts is a "government owned country" (sic), allegedly has sexually harassed Plaintiff without punishment. See id. at ¶ 15. Finally, Plaintiff apparently claims that Reno has improperly failed to prosecute two judges who allegedly criminally refused to recuse themselves in this case. See id. at ¶ 16.
See Lovoi v. FBI, No. 99-3563 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2000) (claims dismissed); Lovoi v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., No. 98-1246 (E.D. La. July 8, 1998) (case dismissed), aff'd, No. 98-30770 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999) (hereinafter Treasure Chest II); Lovoi v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., No. 97-446 (E.D. La. June 1, 1998) (complaint dismissed), aff'd, No. 98-30648 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999).
See Rec. Docs. 20, 25. The case was realloted July 2, 2001, to the undersigned judge. See Rec. Doc. 42.
As a result of these events, actual and alleged, in March 2000, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in federal court, alleging a panoply of federal and state causes of action. Alitalia and Di Giulio have jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, and the United States of America has filed a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of then-Attorney General Janet Reno.
Plaintiff makes federal claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and 244; 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, 2000d, 2000e, and 12101, et seq.; 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; and the Glass Ceiling Act, Pub.L. No. 102-166, Title II, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). She also asserts defamation and contract claims under Louisiana state law.
Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and resolve all ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of the plaintiff. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). Unless it appears "beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim," the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 284-285 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not defeat a motion to dismiss. See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284).
Analysis Criminal Counts
Plaintiff accuses Defendants of violating two provisions of the federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. § 1505 and 244. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1 (1), (2). However, Plaintiff has brought a civil action against Defendants, and these criminal code provisions do not provide for a private cause of action. See Quarles v. State, 312 F. Supp. 835, 837 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (§ 244 creates only criminal jurisdiction); Weiland v. Byrne, 392 F. Supp. 21, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (§ 1505 creates no standing for private litigant). Thus, Plaintiff's claims under these criminal provisions are dismissed with prejudice.
Civil Claims against Reno
In toto, the Court reads Plaintiffs' Constitutional complaint against Reno as a failure to prosecute the Private Defendants, which in turn denied Plaintiff her right to equal protection. Even assuming that the above-mentioned parties have engaged in unlawful acts, however, Reno is entitled to absolute immunity from a suit under the Constitution for failure to prosecute them.
Plaintiff claims she was denied her right to equal protection under the "FOURTH AMENDMENT." But as Plaintiff has specified that it is her right to equal protection that has been denied, the Court reads the alleged denial to have occurred under the Fifth Amendment.
In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991), the Supreme Court noted that absolute immunity was designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. The immunity extends to any prosecutorial activity that is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). In deciding whether to prosecute the above-mentioned parties, Reno functioned as a government advocate in the judicial process. See id. at 430-31. Thus, Reno enjoys absolute immunity for the decision to prosecute, see id., or not to prosecute, see Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1139 (6th Cir. 1989), in suits under the Constitution against federal officials. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Constitutional claim against Reno is dismissed with prejudice.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 1983, 1985
Given that Reno enjoys absolute immunity for suits based on alleged constitutional violations and that Plaintiffs' allegations under federal criminal statutes provide no private cause of action, there remain no predicate violations necessary to state a claim against Reno under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1985. Thus, any claims against Reno based on these sections also are dismissed with prejudice.
Civil Claims against Private Defendants 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiff asserts claims against Alitalia for sex, age, and disability discrimination. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981, however, prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. The statute reads, in pertinent part, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . ." Plaintiffs' amended complaint nowhere alleges race discrimination. See Rec. Doc. 30. See Bobo v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342-45 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1981 prohibits race — not sex — discrimination); Savoie v. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., No. Civ.A.98-1006 T, 2000 WL 136008, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2000) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not cover sex, age or disability discrimination, only racial discrimination).
Plaintiff responds in her September 2001 opposition to Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that Alitalia discriminated against her because she is "Sicillian/American" (sic). See Rec. Doc. 48 at 4. But Plaintiff raised her ethnicity nowhere in either her original complaint, see Rec. Doc. 1 or amended complaint. See Rec. Doc. 30. The Court "should not consider claims raised for the first time in plaintiff['s] responsive memorandum." See Halter v. Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Annuity Co., 1998 WL 516109, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 1998). Thus, Plaintiffs' claim here is dismissed.
This objection is titled "PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTS TO ALITALIA LINEE AERIE ITALIANE, S.p.A AND JOHN DI GUILLO'S MOTION TO DISMISS." (sic)
Plaintiff asserts that Alitalia discriminated against her under § 1983. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. To state a claim under this section, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants deprived her of a right under the Constitution or federal law and that Defendants acted under color of state law in so doing. Plaintiff does not state in her amended complaint how Private Defendants acted under color of state law. See Rec. Doc. 30. However, she does assert in her September 2001 opposition that Alitalia operated as a federal contractor and thus, by extension as the government itself. See Rec. Doc. 48 at 1-2. Even assuming the Court may consider an allegation raised for the first time in an opposition to a motion to dismiss, the United States does not act under color of state law for purposes of, nor can it be considered a "person" liable under § 1983. See Int'l Islamic Cmty. of Masjid, Baytulkhaliq, Inc. v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 352, 364-65 (D. V.I. 1997), aff'd, 176 F.3d 472, (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim against Private Defendants is dismissed with prejudice.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
As Plaintiff does not allege that Private Defendants have prevented a public officer from performing her or his duties or obstructed justice, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1985(1) and (2).
Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Alitalia under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. To state a claim under this section, Plaintiff must allege a conspiracy involving two or more persons to deprive a person or class of persons of their equal protection right and an act furthering the conspiracy and causing injury. See § 1985(3).
Plaintiffs' claim against Alitalia fails because Plaintiff does not allege a conspiracy involving "two or more persons." Id. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege a conspiracy among Alitalia's "ALL MALE MANAGEMENT." E.g., Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 6, 8, 17. Under the "intra-corporate" conspiracy doctrine, however, a single entity's agents cannot form a civil conspiracy for purposes of § 1985(3). See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiffs' § 1985(3) claim against Private Defendants is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff also lodges a claim that Private Defendants retaliated against her in connection with the acts giving rise to her discrimination claims under Title VII. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that she "made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" under § 2000 e-3 prior to Private Defendants' alleged refusal to hire her. Nor does Plaintiff allege that she had a pre-existing employment relationship with Alitalia such that the failure to hire was retaliatory rather than discriminatory. See Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, Plaintiff has not met her prima facie burden for a retaliation claim. Hence, her claim must fail.
Plaintiff next asserts a claim against Alitalia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5). See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. She alleges that Di Giulio offered her a job in exchange for "spend[ing] the night with him." Id. at ¶ 3.
To state a claim under § 2000-e5 for quid pro quo sexual harassment, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; and (4) the employee's reaction to harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1986).
Under Jones, a plaintiff also must show a fifth element, respondeat superior. See id. at 722. Relying on a subsequent Supreme Court holding, however, the Fifth Circuit has since rejected the need to show this element when the alleged harasser is a supervisor "with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the harassment victim." Celestine v. Petroleos de Venez. SA, No. 00-30171, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20510, at *18 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 2001) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)). Celestine and Faragher were hostile environment cases, but in Faragher, the Supreme Court suggested that there is no need to show this element in the quid pro quo failure-to-hire context either. See 524 U.S. at 790-91. Here, construing the pro se amended complaint liberally, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Di Giulio acted as a supervisor by purporting to have the ability to hire Plaintiff See id. Thus, it is unnecessary that Plaintiff here demonstrate respondeat superior.
Liberally construing the amended complaint, as we must, given that Plaintiff appears pro se, see Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995), the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged the necessary elements: that she is a woman, that the quid pro quo offer offended her, that the offer was made because she was a woman, and that Alitalia, through Di Giulio, denied Plaintiff employment as a result of her rejection of Di Giulio's offer. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 3. This allegation of such a quid pro quo arrangement is sufficient to state a claim against Alitalia.
As the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Di Giulio, see infra, it is not necessary to address the Title VII claim against him.
Alitalia claims in the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff alleges she sought and was denied employment with Alitalia in Louisiana and that because Alitalia does not employ individuals in Louisiana, there was no possibility of employment. See Rec. Doc. 12 at 13-14. Thus, Alitalia argues, because Title VII covers only discrimination against employees and employment applicants, Plaintiffs' claim must fail. See id. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that she sought employment in Louisiana. See Rec. Doc. 30 ¶ 3. Thus, Plaintiffs' claim against Alitalia is sufficient to withstand Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.
In their Motion to Dismiss, which they incorporated into their Supplemental and Amending Motion to Dismiss ("Supplemental Motion to Dismiss"), Private Defendants make reference to Paragraph 3 of the Complaint. Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint (titled "AMEND ORIGINAL COMPLAINT"). But because Private Defendants in the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss assert that Plaintiff did not add any additional facts or causes of action against Private Defendants in the amended complaint and that Defendants do not add any additional defenses, facts, or arguments of law to the original Motion to Dismiss, the Court will treat the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss as Private Defendants' response to the amended complaint for purposes of this Order.
Plaintiff claims as well that Alitalia refused to hire her because she could not lift heavy items. See Rec. Doc. 30 at 4. Construing the pro se amended complaint liberally, to the extent that Plaintiff is alleging that Alitalia refused to hire her because it assumed that she is incapable of heavy lifting due to her gender, Plaintiff states a valid claim. See Pond v. Branif Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1974).
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Plaintiff asserts a claim against Alitalia under the ADA, 29 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. To state an ADA claim, Plaintiff must make out a prima facie case, showing, inter alia, that she is a "qualified individual with a disability, and that the negative employment action occurred because of the disability." Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff asserts that she is disabled, see Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 19, but does not indicate that Alitalia knew of this. Conclusory pleadings are insufficient to state a claim. See Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 931 (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284). Thus, because she fails to plead a necessary element here, Plaintiffs' ADA claim is dismissed. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
Because of the pleading deficiency here, it is not necessary for the Court to decide whether Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the other elements of a prima fade case under the ADA.
Plaintiff claims Alitalia discriminated against her because of her age and retaliated against her in violation of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. To establish a prima facie ADEA case, Plaintiff must prove that (1) she belongs to a protected class, i.e., was over 40; (2) she applied for and was qualified for a position that was seeking applicants; (3) she was rejected; and (4) following her rejection, another applicant not of the protected class was hired. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2001). Construing the pro se amended complaint liberally, the Court finds that the Plaintiff here has alleged the first three elements. She states that she was born in 1950, see Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1, that she sought a position as an outside sales representative, see id. at ¶ 5, and was qualified for this position, see id. at ¶ 18, which was seeking applicants (who allegedly would spend the night with Di Giulio). See id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff; however, does not allege that following Private Defendants' refusal to hire her, Private Defendants hired another applicant not of the protected class. See Rec. Doc. 30. Because of this deficiency, Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case on her discrimination claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' ADEA claim is dismissed. Rehabilitation Act
Plaintiff also alleges that Private Defendants retaliated against her in violation of the ADEA. See id. at ¶ 1. But Plaintiff has not alleged that she "has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation" concerning an alleged ADEA violation. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (d). Nor does Plaintiff allege that she had a pre-existing employment relationship with Alitalia such that the failure to hire was retaliatory rather than discriminatory. Cf. Ruggles, 797 F.2d at 786 (9th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that a prior or current employment relationship is necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim).
Plaintiff also makes a claim that Alitalia is liable to her under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a). Plaintiff, however, has not alleged that Alitalia received federal financial assistance. Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to show this necessary element for a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, her claim is dismissed. See Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 106, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). Title VI
Plaintiff alleges in her September 2001 objection to Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that Alitalia is a federal subcontractor because it provides services to Federal Express, an alleged federal contract recipient. See Rec. Doc. 48 at 1-2. But neither this allegation, nor an allegation that such a contract qualifies as federal financial assistance for purposes of the statute appears in her amended complaint. See Rec. Doc. 30.
Plaintiff also alleges that Private Defendants refused to hire her in favor of British Airways employees. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 4. Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege how, if at all, she is protected as a non-British Airways employee. See Rec. Doc. 30. Thus, this claim must fail. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2).
Plaintiff also makes a claim that Alitalia is liable to her under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. To state a claim here, Plaintiff must show that Defendant receive federal financial assistance and that the assistance be primarily aimed at providing employment. See Ass'n Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 276 (2d Cir. 1981). Plaintiff has not alleged that Alitalia received federal financial assistance. Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to show this necessary element for a claim under Title VI, her claim is dismissed. See Nat'l Ass'n of Govt Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 706 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1994) (in actions alleging discriminatory employment practices, the threshold requirement for recovery under Title VI is that the employer be a recipient of federal funds that are aimed primarily at providing employment).
Plaintiff alleges in her September 2001 objection to Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that Alitalia is a federal subcontractor because it provides services to Federal Express, an alleged federal contract recipient. See Rec. Doc. 48 at 1-2. But Plaintiff does not explain in this objection or in the amended complaint whether such a contract constitutes qualified federal financial assistance or was aimed primarily at employment. See Rec. Docs. 48, 30.
Glass Ceiling Act
Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Alitalia under the Glass Ceiling Act, Pub.L. No. 102-166, Title II, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. The Glass Ceiling Act, however, does not create a private right of action. See id. Thus, Plaintiffs' claim here is dismissed with prejudice.
Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Plaintiff furthermore claims that Alitalia breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 1. Under Louisiana law, however, this claim requires that Plaintiff and Alitalia to have had a contractual relationship. See, e.g., Adams v. Autazoners, No. 98-2336, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14999, at *20 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 1999). It is undisputed that Plaintiff was not hired and had no contractual relationship with Alitalia. Ergo, her claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails and is dismissed with prejudice.
Defamation
Plaintiff also makes a claim against Alitalia for defamation, apparently based on Di Giulio implying to Alitalia management that Plaintiff was considered unprofessional for having worked at a casino. See Rec. Doc. 30 at ¶ 17. To prove defamation under Louisiana law, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants (1) maliciously (2) published (3) a defamatory statement (4) that was false and (5) that caused her injury. See Estiverne v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 1989). Alitalia argues in Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff has not established prongs 2 through 4. See Rec. Doc. 12 at 16-18.
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs' claim fails under prong 4. Di Giulio's alleged statement was not defamatory. See Burt v. Hilton Hotel, Inc., No. 93-3089, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17422, at *7-8 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 1993) (statement that plaintiffs' appearance was unprofessional not defamatory). Therefore, Plaintiffs' defamation claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss Claims against Di Giulio
Rather than determine whether Plaintiffs' claim under Title VII against Di Giulio survives Defendantst 12(b)(6) motion, the Court addresses Di Guilio's contention that the Title VII claim against him should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Here, the parties agree that Plaintiffs' calls were made to Di Giulio in Texas and that Di Giulio resides there.
To exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the Court must determine whether doing so would comport with the due process requirements of the Louisiana and U.S. Constitutions. "The proper inquiry . . . is whether certain minimum contacts exist between [defendant] and Louisiana such that [defendant's] defense of this action will not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Minge v. Cohen, No. 98-2352, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 403, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2000). In particular, the Court inquires whether those minimum contacts are sufficient to establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction. See id. at *4-6, *6 n. 1.
To establish general personal jurisdiction over Di Giulio, Plaintiff must establish that he has contacts with Louisiana that are continuous, systematic, and substantial. See id. at *6 n. 1. Here, Plaintiff does not allege a basis for general personal jurisdiction in her amended complaint. See Rec. Doc. 30. She does allege in her May 2000 and September 2001 oppositions to Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, however, that Di Giulio has contacts in Louisiana with a number of airlines and other companies. See Rec. Doc. 48 at 4; Rec. Doc. 17 at 4. Beyond listing several of these organizations, however, Plaintiff fails to specify the kinds and extent of these contacts, instead making vague reference to "IRS receipts, Alitalia correspondence, telephone bills, etc," Rec. Doc. 48 at 4, "AIRLINE AGREEMENTS and CODE SHARING within the airline industry," Rec. Doc. 17 at 4, and "Complimentary Dinners . . . purchased from Mr. DiGiulio's (sic) Texas Budget for those in the travel industry in Louisiana," id. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 931 (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284). The Court notes, too, that occasional business and personal contacts with Louisiana are insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 649-51 (5th Cir. 1994).
To establish specific personal jurisdiction over Di Giulio, Plaintiff must establish that he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Louisiana and that Plaintiffs' causes of action arise out of or relate to those acts. Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecom. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, Plaintiffs' claims stem from alleged phone calls she made in Louisiana to Di Giulio, who was in Texas. See Rec. Doc. 48 at 3-4. This unilateral activity is insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Di Giulio. See Minge, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 403, at *7 (no purposeful availment existed where plaintiff initiated a number of phone calls to defendant). Thus, the Court may not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Di Giulio.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the United States' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED with prejudice and that Private Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED without prejudice except as otherwise noted above and PARTIALLY DENIED.