Robert Lovett, a state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional right against ex post facto laws by changing the frequency of his parole consideration under a newly enacted law. The district court dismissed his complaint as time barred, and he now appeals pro se. We affirm.

"We independently review the district court's ruling concerning the applicable statute of limitations." Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002 (11th Cir. 1998). "Federal courts apply their forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. Federal law determines when the statute of limitations begins to run. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). Generally, "the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Id. at 561-62 (internal marks omitted).

Georgia's statute of limitations is two years. Thigpen v. Bibb County, Ga., Sheriff's Dep't, 223 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2000). Lott was notified by the defendants in September 1998 that he would not be reconsidered for parole until 2006. As of that time he knew, or should have known, all of the facts necessary to pursue a cause of action, but he did not file his complaint until August 10, 2001, more than two years later. Therefore, his claim was untimely.

Lott contends his complaint should not be time barred under the continuing violation doctrine. "The critical distinction in the continuing violation analysis . . . is whether the plaintiff complain[s] of the present consequence of a one time violation, which does not extend the limitations period, or the continuation of that violation into the present, which does." Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 580-81 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal marks omitted). Here, the defendants' act (deciding not to consider Lovett for parole again until 2006) was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended.

Lovett's final argument is that the untimeliness of his complaint should be excused. He states that he filed his complaint in 2000 but that it was not docketed until later because of delays in the processing of his in forma pauperis paperwork. Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us. Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994). Further, the only evidence regarding Lovett's alleged 2000 complaint is an exhibit to his reply brief, which appears to be from a different case because it contains a different docket number.

AFFIRMED.

Summaries of

Lovett v. Ray

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Feb 28, 2003

327 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003)

holding that the statute of limitations for bringing § 1983 claims in Georgia is two years

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holding that the limitations period for a challenge to a change in the frequency of parole consideration runs from the date when the offender learns of the change, not the date of parole consideration, and that the continuing-violation doctrine does not apply

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holding that parole board's decision not to reconsider a prisoner for parole "was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period is not extended"

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holding that a party waives arguments not made in initial appellate brief

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holding that an argument raised for first time in pro se litigant's reply brief was not properly before this Court

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holding that this court does not address arguments raised by a pro se litigant for the first time in a reply brief

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holding that statute began to run when plaintiff was notified by the defendants in September 1998 that he would not be reconsidered for parole until 2006

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holding that the decision not to consider the inmate for parole "was a one time act with continued consequences, and the limitations period was not extended."

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finding change of plaintiff's parole date was a one-time act with continued consequences and therefore not within the doctrine

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concluding that an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is not properly before this Court

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concluding that a prisoner informed in 1998 that he would not be reconsidered for parole until 2006 "knew, or should have known, all the facts necessary to pursue a cause of action" at that time

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affirming the dismissal of a prisoner's 2001 complaint arising out of the defendants’ alteration of the frequency of his parole consideration because the defendants’ 1998 decision against considering him for parole "was a one-time act with continued consequences," and it did not extend the limitations period

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rejecting the defendant's argument that the two-year period of limitation was extended under the "continuing violation doctrine"

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rejecting continuing violation doctrine in § 1983 action as applied to parole board's repeated denials of parole

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noting that, in § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions

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refusing to consider arguments presented for the first time in a reply brief

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noting we do not address arguments raised for the first time, in a pro se litigant's reply brief

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declining to consider argument raised for the first time in a pro se appellant's reply brief

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In Lovett, we addressed a similar claim that the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles's decision to delay an inmate's parole hearing, pursuant to a newly implemented Board policy, constituted a continuing violation of his constitutional rights against Ex Post Facto laws.

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applying this rule to a pro se appellant

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declining to consider argument raised for first time in reply brief

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disregarding an argument raised for the first time in an appellate reply brief

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noting that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Georgia is two years

Summary of this case from Zamudio v. Haskins

In Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2003), the Eleventh Circuit held, in a brief per curiam opinion, that an inmate's ex post facto challenge based on a change to the frequency with which he would be entitled to a parole hearing had accrued, at the latest, when he became aware of the relevant change in law.Id. at 1182-83; see also Taylor v. Nix, 240 F. App'x 830, 835 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Lovett).

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noting the two-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising out of events in Georgia

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Lovett v. Ray

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