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concluding that any error in consolidating two cases was harmless
Summary of this case from Thuesen v. Amerisure Ins. Co.Opinion
No. 05-07-00381-CV
Opinion issued April 16, 2008.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 366-03258-06.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and MOSELEY.
Opinion By Justice MOSELEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Robert H. Liebbe, Sr. sued appellees Aladdin Rios and Elisa Rios for trespass and to collaterally attack a prior judgment entered in another case involving them. The trial court denied Liebbe's relief and awarded attorneys fees to appellees. The Court previously determined Liebbe's brief was defective and directed him to file an amended brief correcting the deficiencies. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.9. Liebbe filed an additional document entitled "Index of Brief" containing many of the same defects as the original brief. We will proceed with this document as appellant's brief. Appellees have not filed a brief.
The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Further, Liebbe has not requested a Reporter's Record. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represented by counsel. Harris v. Showcase Chevrolet, 231 S.W.3d 559, 561 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007 no pet.); Shull v. United Parcel Serv., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
An appellant's brief "must state concisely all issues or points presented for review." Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e). Courts should liberally construe briefing rules. Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Bouchet, 963 S.W.2d 52, 54-5 (Tex. 1998). A point of error is "sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the error about which complaint is made." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1995)). However, a point that is merely an abstract proposition of law or a general complaint about the trial court's actions is too general and indefinite to merit review. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Dayton, 958 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied); see also Thomann v. Lakes Reg'l MHMR Center, 162 S.W.3d 788, 794 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.) (general directive in brief to review summary judgment affidavits for hearsay and improper conclusions is insufficient to direct appellate court's attention to error complained of). An issue on appeal unsupported by argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for this Court to review. Birnhaum v. Law Offices of G. David Westfall, 120 S.W.3d 470, 477 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). Similarly, we cannot speculate as to the substance of the specific issues appellant claims we must address. Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied). This Court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained of occurred. Id.
The record indicates that appellees sued Liebbe in the 380th District Court of Collin County in 2005 as cause number 380-01330-05 ("the 2005 suit"). Final judgment was signed in that case on August 18, 2005. The judgment recites that all parties appeared through their attorneys of record and announce ready, a jury was not requested, and the trial court decided all fact questions. The judgment granted a declaratory judgment that appellees had an "equitable easement" over certain property and denied all relief sought by Liebbe.
Liebbe, represented by an attorney, appealed the judgment in the 2005 suit to this Court, where it was filed as cause number 05-05-01566-CV. Liebbe's attorney later filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. (Liebbe asserts the motion was filed without his knowledge or authority.) On January 9, 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal. Our mandate issued on March 11, 2006.
On October 3, 2006, Liebbe filed the present suit, pro se, in the 366th District Court of Collin County. His petition asked for damages for trespass, negligence per se, and diversion of ground surface water onto his property. He also alleged that after a trial before the 380th District Court, an "EQUITY COURT, without jurisdiction," his claim for these damages was dismissed by an "objectively unreasonable judgment, DENYING DUE PROCESS UNDER, negating the purpose of [sic] 42 u.s.c.s. 1983 and Constitutional Rights of due process." Appellees filed an answer alleging Liebbe's claims were barred by res judicata and a counterclaim for sanctions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §§ 9.001-.014, 10.001-.006 (Vernon 2002). On October 26, 2006, the judges of the 366th District Court and the 380th District Court both signed an order on motion to consolidate purporting to consolidate Liebbe's new suit with the 2006 suit.
Following this order, Liebbe filed several papers complaining about the consolidation order and asserting that the prior final judgment was void. After additional hearings and proceedings, the 380th District Court signed a "Final Order" on March 29, 2007, reciting that the court heard evidence on January 29, 2007 and stating the court denied all relief sought by Liebbe and awarded Rios $2500.00 in attorney's fees. Liebbe filed his notice of appeal within thirty days of this final order.
Liebbe's current suit, now on appeal, was clearly a collateral attack on the prior judgment in the 2005 suit. See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005) (describing collateral attack as attempt to avoid binding force of judgment in separate proceeding). To succeed in a collateral attack, the party attacking the judgment must show the prior judgment is void, not merely voidable. Id.; Armentor v. Kern, 178 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A judgment is void only when it is apparent the court rendering the judgment "had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act." Prostok, 165 S.W.3d at 346 (quoting Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985)). In a collateral attack, the challenged judgment is presumed valid, and the party challenging it has the burden to show that it is void. See Stewart v. USA Custom Paint Body Shop, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1994).
As best as we can determine from Liebbe's brief, he contends the final judgment of the 380th District Court is void because it granted appellees an equitable easement and Liebbe contends appellees had an adequate remedy at law. Liebbe's pleading in the trial court cited to several general maxims of equity including that exhaustion of legal remedies is required as a prerequisite to equity jurisdiction. His brief also refers to the following language from State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994):
Equity jurisdiction does not flow merely from the alleged inadequacy of a remedy at law, nor can it originate solely from a court's good intentions to do what seems "just" or "right;" the jurisdiction of Texas courts-the very authority to decide cases-is conferred solely by the constitution and the statutes of the state.
Morales discussed the limited authority of a civil court to declare the constitutionality of a criminal statute and concluded "[a] naked declaration as to the constitutionality of a criminal statute alone, without a valid request for injunctive relief, is clearly not within the jurisdiction of a Texas court sitting in equity." Id. The case before us does not involve a civil court's jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a criminal statute. However, the proposition that the jurisdiction of Texas courts is conferred solely by the constitution and statutes of this State does apply and defeats Liebbe's argument.
The Texas Constitution provides that a district court's jurisdiction "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. District courts in Texas are courts of general jurisdiction with the power to "hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity" and to "grant any relief that could be granted by either courts of law or equity." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 24.007-.008 (Vernon 2004). Thus, "[c]ourts of general jurisdiction presumably have subject matter jurisdiction unless a contrary showing is made." Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002).
For over one hundred years, all claims in law or in equity have been presumed to fall within a district court's jurisdiction unless the Texas Legislature or Congress has provided otherwise. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000). In Texas, the "traditional distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity have never carried the procedural significance accorded to them in other states of the Union." Casa El Sol-Acapulco, S.A. v. Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd by agr.) (quoting 1 Roy W. Mcdonald, Texas Civil Practice § 4:4 (rev.1992)).
The final judgment in the 2005 suit is regular on its face, does not affirmatively show the court lacked jurisdiction, and is presumed valid. See Dubai Petroleum Co., 12 S.W.3d at 75. Liebbe's argument that Rios had an adequate remedy at law does not show how the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Liebbe has not presented us with a record to overcome the presumption that the 380th District Court had jurisdiction. We conclude the final judgment is not void and the trial court did not err in denying Liebbe's collateral attack. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d at 346.
Liebbe also raised several complaints about the order consolidating his present lawsuit with the prior 2005 suit. We agree the consolidation was ineffective because the prior suit was no longer pending in the 380th District Court when the consolidation order was signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 174(a) (court may consolidate actions involving common question of fact or law when they " are pending before the court"). However, the record does not show that the consolidation order probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or prevented appellant from presenting the case to the appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). As discussed above, this suit was a collateral attack on the final judgment in the 2005 suit. Although we do not have a reporter's record of the proceedings below, the trial court's "final order" recites that it heard evidence at a non-jury trial, denied all relief requested by Liebbe, and awarded Rios attorneys' fees. Thus, the record indicates Liebbe had notice of the proceedings after the consolidation order and appeared at the hearings before the trial court. We conclude that any error in consolidating the two actions did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment or prevent appellant from presenting the case to the appellate court. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). We conclude Liebbe's brief presents nothing further for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e); Dayton, 958 S.W.2d at 455.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.