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noting that a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a default final judgment is reviewed for a gross abuse of discretion
Summary of this case from Sterling Mirror Co. v. Waldman Barnett, P.L.Opinion
No. 3D09-294.
February 10, 2010. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 20, 2010.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Miami-Dade County, Maria Espinosa Dennis, J.
Michelle A. Delancy, Miami, for appellant.
Brett Feinstein and Alicia Almansa, Miami Beach, for appellee BVK Investments, Ltd.
Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
Dian Lewis ("Lewis") appeals an order denying her Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Relief from Final Judgment of Foreclosure. We affirm the trial court's order denying the motion to vacate after an evidentiary hearing finding that the process server's affidavit of diligent search was facially sufficient to uphold the service of process by publication and that there was sufficient competent evidence to conclude that a diligent search was conducted.
During the five years preceding the final judgment of foreclosure on her Miami property, Lewis, an attorney, resided in the Bahamas. She maintained a Miami post office box to receive her mail, and never provided her address to her mortgage company or even to the Florida Bar. Lewis admittedly was aware that she had been in arrears on her mortgage payments for some time. She was mailed a series of letters from her mortgage company advising her that her account was in default, including a letter, dated November 16, 2007, from a collection law firm notifying her that it was in the process of filing a complaint to foreclose on her property. Lewis's purported attempts to resolve the matter through email correspondence were unsuccessful. When her mortgage finally went into foreclosure, the process server, attempting to serve the complaint of foreclosure, was unable to locate and personally serve Lewis. The process server indicated on his return of service, and in testimony at the hearing on the motion to vacate, that he had made several attempts at personal service on Lewis. First, he attempted service at an old address of Lewis. He never found her there but, on one occasion, spoke with a tenant who told him that she did not know Lewis's whereabouts. At the property address, the process server found a Dorothy Sharpe living there who informed him that Lewis was residing in the Bahamas. The process server asked Ms. Sharpe for the address of Lewis in the Bahamas, but was told that Ms. Sharpe did not know the address. The process server indicated on the back of the return of service that Lewis resides in the Bahamas. A representative of the mortgage company filed an affidavit of diligent search in compliance with section 49.041, Florida Statutes (2008). Constructive service of process was then accomplished according to the statute. The affidavit of diligent search in support of constructive service shows that no other address for Lewis could be found as a result of other searches which were made, including with the post office, credit, social security, employment, telephone, motor vehicle, license, voter registration and property records. Approximately twelve days after Lewis was notified by letter addressed to her P.O. Box number, that her property was in the process of foreclosure, a foreclosure complaint was filed on November 28, 2007. Lewis was mailed notice of the application for default at the same post office box where she had received all prior correspondence. A final judgment of foreclosure was entered, and the property was foreclosed upon and sold to Appellee, BVK Investments, Ltd. ("BVK"), a bona fide purchaser. Lewis claimed that she never received notice of the impending foreclosure or the sale and moved to set aside the final judgment of foreclosure. Lewis filed a Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Relief from Final Judgment of Foreclosure claiming that the affidavit of service was defective rendering the service void as to BVK. BVK moved to intervene in the proceedings, and the trial judge allowed it to file a Response in Opposition to Lewis's Motion to Vacate. The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing.
Rule 1-3.3 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar requires that an attorney provide the physical location or street address of her principal place of employment to the Florida Bar.
One of Lewis's claims on appeal is that the process server did not conduct a diligent search as there was a real estate "for sale" sign in front of the house, and the process server failed to contact the realtor. We reject this argument as there is no evidence in the record that the process server ever saw the sign.
All that is required under section 49.041, for service by publication, is a sworn statement that diligent search and inquiry has been made to discover the address of the person to be served, whether the person is over 18 years-of-age and that the whereabouts of the person is unknown. The affidavit of diligent search satisfies these requirements.
In response to the factual concerns of the dissent, we include the following facts raised before the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate: The attorney for BVK proffered to the Court that Lewis was a member of the Florida Bar and that she admitted at her deposition that, because she worked on contracts and did closings, she did not want to be found. He further proffered that, at her deposition, she testified that she used her P.O. Box number for her tax returns for the Internal Revenue Service. Evidence was presented that her property insurance carrier had only her P.O. box number, her credit card companies had only her P.O. Box number, the roofer that she hired to put on a new roof on her the property had only her P.O. Box number and the Florida Bar listed Ms. Lewis in its attorney directory under only her P.O. Box number, although she was required by the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar to provide her physical address of employment. Deposition testimony of prior tenants was proffered that they sent their rent to the P.O. Box number. The deposition testimony of Lewis's tenant, Dorothy Sharpe, was proffered to the court that she did not know the address of Lewis in the Bahamas and that she received mail for Lewis at the property address. It was also proffered that Lewis's neighbor testified at her deposition that she thought Lewis lived in New York. The trial judge listened to all of the proffers and evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to vacate and to Ms. Lewis's claim of no notice of the impending foreclosure suit, and denied her motion to vacate. This appeal follows.
The standard of review on a denial of a motion to vacate a final default judgment is gross abuse of discretion. See Cellular Warehouse, Inc. v. GH Cellular, LLC, 957 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court grossly abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate by finding that the affidavit of diligent search was sufficient on its face to hold that constructive service was effective as to the bona fide purchaser. If the trial judge were to find the affidavit to be defective on its face, service would be void as to the bona fide purchaser. If the trial judge finds the affidavit sufficient on its face, but were to determine that a diligent search was not performed, the foreclosure would be voidable, not void, as to the bona fide purchaser. See generally 33 Fla. Jur.2d Judicial Sales § 13 (2009). On the face of the affidavit of diligent search before us, we find that the affidavit is sufficient for purposes of service by publication and that the trial court did not grossly abuse its discretion in so holding. In light of the necessary reliance on the public record by a bona fide purchaser, the affidavit of diligent search was sufficient on its face to establish that an adequate search had been made to locate an address for service upon Lewis prior to effecting constructive service. The resultant foreclosure sale to the bona fide purchaser cannot be set aside. First Home View Corp. v. Guggino, 10 So.3d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that trial court errs in vacating final judgment of foreclosure in sale of property to bona fide purchaser where homeowner is constructively served by publication and affidavit of diligent search is legally sufficient to establish that an adequate search has been made prior to constructive service); Southeast Assoc. v. Fox Run Homeowners Ass'n, 704 So.2d 694 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that notice by publication is adequate where affidavit of diligent search is facially sufficient and foreclosure sale to bona fide purchaser is merely voidable, and not void, and cannot be set aside); cf. Godsell v. United Guar. Residential Ins., 923 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that an affidavit of diligent search deficient on its face voids service by publication).
Contra Redfield Invs. v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 990 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (reversing denial of a motion to quash service where affidavit of diligent search deficient and no bona fide purchaser involved); Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 922 So.2d 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), upon which the dissent relies and which does not apply because the facts are totally different from this case: the rights of a bona fide purchaser were not involved as they are in this case; the mortgage servicing company possessed the correct address of the property owners unlike this case; and only one attempt at personal service was made and returned "seasonal vacant," unlike all of the evidence in this case that Lewis lived in the Bahamas at an undisclosed and undiscoverable address.
The trial court did not end its inquiry there. The second issue raised on appeal is whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's decision finding that a diligent search was conducted to locate an address for Ms. Lewis. We find there was substantial competent evidence. Giron v. Ugly Mortgage, 935 So.2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The process server's testimony along with his affidavit and return of service substantiate that Lewis did not reside at the addresses of her property where service was attempted and that she did reside at an undisclosed and unknown address in the Bahamas. Ms. Lewis never provided any of her tenants, the mortgage company, the IRS, other interested parties or business contacts, including the Florida Bar, with her current physical address. The evidence shows that Lewis received numerous letters from her mortgage company advising her of her default status and was notified, as of November 16, 2007, before the foreclosure was filed, that a collection attorney was in the process of filing suit. Lewis's subsequent correspondence in response to that very letter provided substantial competent evidence from which the trial judge could correctly conclude that Lewis had notification that she was being foreclosed upon. She even admits in the affidavit she filed in support of her motion to vacate that she received the letter, yet she proceeded to negotiate with her mortgagor through email and P.O. Box number, contending now that, although no one had her Bahamian address, she would have given it to her mortgage company and collection firm had they asked for it. This evidence, in conjunction with the search of the records as outlined in the affidavit of diligent search, the testimony and proffers of deposition testimony presented before the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to vacate and other facts raised at the hearing constitute substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's ruling that a diligent search was conducted.
Although we chose to address the argument raised by Lewis on appeal, we note that this second step of analysis is not relevant or necessary when the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is a bona fide purchaser. If the affidavit of diligent search is legally sufficient, the final judgment of foreclosure is merely voidable as to the BFP and cannot be set aside.
See Rosado v. Vosilla, 909 So.2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Kidder v. Cirelli, 821 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), which holds that a property owner who fails to provide his correct address change has no right to complain of lack of notice of the sale of his property for nonpayment of taxes), aff'd, 944 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2006).
There was substantial competent evidence to support the decision of the trial judge. No gross abuse of discretion in the denial of Lewis's motion to vacate the final judgment of foreclosure has been demonstrated. We therefore affirm the order denying the motion to vacate.
We also affirm the order discharging lis pendens.
SHEPHERD, J., concurs.
Because the record clearly establishes that a diligent search for service of process was not conducted by Fifth Third Mortgage Company, the default and final judgment of foreclosure entered against Ms. Lewis must be vacated. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the following record evidence was not provided in the majority opinion and it is essential to the legal analysis establishing why the judgment must be vacated, that evidence will be briefly addressed. Ms. Lewis, who purchased her home in 1996, faithfully and timely made all of her mortgage payments. In the summer of 2005, the property sustained considerable hurricane damage. After submitting a claim to her insurer, Ms. Lewis learned that her hurricane coverage had been eliminated by her insurer and her claim was denied. As a result, and with no notice to Ms. Lewis, the Fifth Third Mortgage Company forced placed insurance on the property.
In January 2007, when Ms. Lewis received her Escrow Account Statement from Fifth Third Bank, showing a charge of $14,289, she immediately contacted the mortgage company and was informed about the forced placed insurance. Ms. Lewis communicated with the mortgage company via telephone, U.S. mail, and email on several occasions in an effort to pay the arrearages caused by the forced placed insurance. Based on the forced placed insurance, Ms. Lewis' monthly mortgage payment of $883.50 increased to $4,360. After further communications, the mortgage company reduced her monthly payments to $2,667.63. Ms. Lewis, however, continued to dispute the amount and requested a breakdown of the charges.
Fifth Third Bank is the servicing agent of Fifth Third Mortgage Company. Thus, for simplicity, Fifth Third Mortgage Company and Fifth Third Bank will be collectively referred to as "mortgage company."
In addition to communicating with the mortgage company, Ms. Lewis contacted the Florida Department of Financial Services on March 20, 2007, lodging her objections. She explained that after her insurer denied her property claim for damages sustained by Hurricane Wilma, the mortgage company purchased an insurance policy in the amount of $14,289 without notice to or consultation with her, covering fire, theft, and property damage but providing for no hurricane protection. She became aware of the mortgage company's unilateral actions when she received an escrow statement from the mortgage company and discovered that her escrow account, which was used to pay her property taxes and insurance, and which always carried a balance, reflected a negative balance as a result of the forced placed insurance. Ms. Lewis explained that she had obtained an insurance policy, which included hurricane protection, for an annual premium of $4,360. The mortgage company, however, was insisting on a monthly payment of $4,337.64, due in large part to the insurance it had purchased, and the mortgage company was refusing to accept payments unless they were in that amount. On April 5, 2007, the Florida Department of Financial Services notified Ms. Lewis that the mortgage company is an Ohio financial institution not within its jurisdiction, and thus, the Department had forwarded her communication to the Ohio Department of Commerce.
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Lewis received conflicting communications from the mortgage company. On April 2, 2007, she received a default letter from the mortgage company stating that she owed $8,602.45, however, two weeks later, she received a statement from the mortgage company stating that she owed only $2,667.63. Ms. Lewis continued to submit her mortgage payments to the mortgage company while attempting to resolve the problem.
On November 16, 2007, Ms. Lewis received a letter from Florida Default Law Group, P.I. ("the law firm"), a law firm retained by the mortgage company to collect the debt by foreclosing the lien on the property. Ms. Lewis immediately responded and requested a breakdown of the moneys owed. She explained to the law firm that, while the mortgage company claimed she owed $22,901.96, she believed the amount owed was $15,199.35; she wanted a breakdown so she could pay the arrearages; and she wanted to resolve the situation as quickly as possible.
The law firm and Ms. Lewis continued to communicate through emails. On February 1, 2008, the law firm notified Ms. Lewis that it was "processing an updated reinstatement letter for [her]." On March 4, 2008, the mortgage company finally sent Ms. Lewis a letter indicating a reinstatement amount of $27,207, but without the breakdown Ms. Lewis had been requesting for months. Although the mortgage company and the law firm were in communication with Ms. Lewis throughout 2007 and from January 2008 through April 2008, neither the mortgage company nor the law firm told Ms. Lewis that they were attempting to serve her to foreclose on the property. The Verified Return of Service reflects that the law firm retained the process server on November 29, 2007, to serve Ms. Lewis. On December 22, 2007, when the process server attempted to serve Ms. Lewis at the property address, he was informed by the tenant residing there that Ms. Lewis was residing in the Bahamas. Despite being told by Ms. Lewis' tenant that Ms. Lewis was residing in the Bahamas, the process server did not attempt to locate Ms. Lewis in the Bahamas and failed to disclose this information to the trial court in his Affidavit of Due and Diligent Search, dated March 24, 2008, stating instead that Ms. Lewis' whereabouts were unknown.
Although the mortgage company had been communicating with Ms. Lewis by sending correspondence to her Miami post office box, by email, and directly by phone, the mortgage company never told Ms. Lewis they were foreclosing on the property. Further, when the process server was unable to serve Ms. Lewis at the property address and learned that she resided in the Bahamas, the mortgage company did not simply ask Ms. Lewis during their many communications for her Bahamian address. Instead, the mortgage company remained silent; failed to disclose to the trial court that it believed that Ms. Lewis lived in the Bahamas, or that it had her phone number, post office box address and email and had been in constant communication with her; and submitted an Affidavit of Due and Diligent Search, stating that the mortgage company was unable to serve Ms. Lewis because her whereabouts were unknown.
Statutes governing service of process are to be strictly construed to assure that defendants are notified of the proceedings and have the opportunity to protect their rights. Shurman v. Atl. Mortgage Inv. Corp., 795 So.2d 952, 953-54 (Fla. 2001); Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 922 So.2d 340, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); see also Redfield Invs. A.V.V. v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 990 So.2d 1135, 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that because lack of personal service implicates due process concerns, the plaintiff must strictly comply with the statutory requirements); Floyd v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 704 So.2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that constructive service statutes require strict compliance). Additionally, " [t]he failure to strictly adhere to the statutes' requirements deprives the court of jurisdiction over the defendant improperly served." Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
Although service of process by publication in a foreclosure action is permitted, see § 49.011, Fla. Stat. (2007), a mortgage holder may only resort to service of process by publication "[w]here personal service of process or . . . service of process under s. 48.194 cannot be had." § 49.021, Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added); see Taylor v. Lopez, 358 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (holding that section 49.021 only authorizes service by publication when the plaintiff cannot effect personal service on a defendant).
Additionally, although a mortgage holder submits an affidavit of diligent search, this does not end the inquiry. Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 343. The trial court must still determine whether the mortgage holder actually conducted a diligent search. Redfield, 990 So.2d at 1138; Giron v. Ugly Mortgage, Inc., 935 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Demars v. Vill. of Sandalwood Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 625 So.2d 1219, 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). "[W]hen a plaintiff seeks service of process by publication, `an honest and conscientious effort, reasonably appropriate to the circumstances, must be made to acquire the information necessary to fully comply with the controlling statutes.'" Gans v. Heathgate-Sunflower Homeowners Ass'n, 593 So.2d 549, 551-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (quoting Klinger v. Milton Holding Co., 136 Fla. 50, 186 So. 526, 534 (1938)).
The test to determine whether the plaintiff conducted a diligent search is "whether the complainant reasonably employed the knowledge at his command, made diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstance to acquire the information necessary to enable him to effect personal service on the defendant." Canzoniero v. Canzoniero, 305 So.2d 801, 803 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Although this Court in Redfield noted that the case law has not drawn a bright line between efforts that demonstrate due diligence and those that do not, this Court concluded that the failure to inquire of the most likely source to obtain information as to the whereabouts of the defendant "falls short of the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary to satisfy this state's service of process by publication law." Id. at 1139.
It is clear from the record evidence that the mortgage company failed to "reasonably employ[] the knowledge at [its] command, [make a] diligent inquiry, and exert[] an honest and conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstance to acquire . . . personal service on" Ms. Lewis. Canzoniero, 305 So.2d at 803. The mortgage company was in possession of Ms. Lewis' Miami post office box number, telephone number, and email address. The process server was told that Ms. Lewis was living in the Bahamas. Despite being in possession of this information, and despite the fact that the mortgage company had been in constant communication with Ms. Lewis during the entire time it was attempting to notify her of the foreclosure proceedings, the mortgage company inexplicably failed to inform her of the foreclosure proceedings, ask her for her current address, or attempt to obtain her Bahamian address through any other means. Thus, while the Affidavit of Diligent Search was facially sufficient because it alleged that a diligent search was made, the instant record demonstrates that the mortgage company did not conduct a diligent search. Therefore, the trial court reversibly erred by denying Ms. Lewis' motion to vacate the default and the final summary judgment of foreclosure. See Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 345 (finding that the default judgment entered against Ms. Shepheard was void due to defective service of process where the mortgage holder failed to follow leads likely to reveal her residence).
By simply asking Ms. Lewis to provide her current address, the mortgage company potentially could have properly served her in the Bahamas either by personal service of process or by substitute service of process through registered mail, in strict compliance with section 48.194, Florida Statutes (2007). If upon inquiry, Ms. Lewis refused to provide her current address, the mortgage company could have attempted to locate her Bahamian address by other means. The mortgage company, however, falsely claimed that it had conducted a diligent search, Ms. Lewis' whereabouts were unknown, and it had no recourse but to serve her by publication.
A judgment against a defendant based upon improper service by publication lacks authority of law. Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 345; Batchin v. Barnett Bank of Sw. Fla., 647 So.2d 211, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). "Such improper service renders the judgment either void or voidable." Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 345; see also Decker v. Kaplus, 763 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Reina v. Barnett Bank, N.A., 766 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). If the service is irregular or defective but the defendant actually receives notice of the proceedings, the judgment is voidable. Shepheard, 922 So.2d at 345; Decker, 763 So.2d at 1230. However, where the service of process is so defective that it amounts to no notice of the proceedings, it is void. Reina, 766 So.2d at 292. A void judgment is a nullity. M.L. Builders, Inc. v. Reserve Developers, LLP, 769 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1960)).
I would find, as the Fourth District found in Gans and the Fifth District found in Shepheard, that the record establishes that the mortgage company's service by publication was void. Where service by publication is void, reversal of the order of sale will defeat the title of the non-party who purchased the property in good faith at the judicial sale. Gans, 593 So.2d at 553; Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 645 F.2d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla. 151, 10 So. 818 (1892)).
In summary, the mortgage company failed to conduct a diligent search in strict compliance with the Florida statutes governing service of process. Because the mortgage company has the burden of proof when invoking jurisdiction of the court and it failed to establish that Ms. Lewis had notice of the legal proceedings against her, the judgment against her is void and must be vacated.