Opinion
B314227
11-07-2022
Estate of JOSEPH H. ZINGALI, Deceased. v. SARA SHAMONKI et al., Claimants and Respondents. SUZANNE LEONE, Petitioner and Appellant,
The Morse Law Group and Jonathan S. Morse for Petitioner and Appellant. Joens & Joens and Matthew J. Joens for Claimants and Respondents Roger Black and Juan Ortiz. No appearance for Claimant and Respondent Sara Shamonki.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. 20STPB09597 Jonathan L. Rosenbloom, Judge. Reversed with directions.
The Morse Law Group and Jonathan S. Morse for Petitioner and Appellant.
Joens & Joens and Matthew J. Joens for Claimants and Respondents Roger Black and Juan Ortiz.
No appearance for Claimant and Respondent Sara Shamonki.
EGERTON, J.
Suzanne Leone, daughter of decedent Joseph H. Zingali, appeals probate court orders (1) denying her petition to appoint her nominee as personal representative of her father's estate; (2) granting the petition of claimant Sara Shamonki to appoint her nominee as estate representative; and (3) requiring the representative to post a bond. Under Probate Code section 8465, subdivision (b), the nominee of the decedent's child has priority over a creditor's nominee to serve as personal representative, provided the child's nominee is otherwise competent to serve in that capacity. (See also id., §§ 8461 & 8402.) Leone contends the probate court failed to make the requisite finding of incompetence in denying her petition for appointment, and she maintains there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding in any event. Thus, she argues the probate court had no discretion to appoint the claimants' nominee in preference to her own. We agree and reverse with directions to issue letters of administration to Leone's nominee, without bond, subject to the claimants' petition to require a bond upon a finding of good cause.
Claimants Roger Black and Juan Ortiz concurred in Shamonki's petition and are respondents in this appeal. We refer to them collectively as "claimants." Shamonki did not file a respondent's brief or substantively participate in this appeal. There are several terms for estate representatives: executor (designated in a will and appointed by the court); administrator (appointed by the court without decedent's designation); and personal representative (sometimes a synonym for administrator but often a generic term also encompassing executors). (Smith v. Cimmet (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1391, fn. 3; Prob. Code, §§ 8420 et seq., 8440, 8460, subd. (a); Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2022) ¶¶ 3:326 to 3:330.) The distinction is not material here. Thus, in most cases, we will use the term personal representative in this opinion. (Smith, at p. 1391, fn. 3.)
Statutory references are to the Probate Code, unless otherwise designated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2020, Joseph H. Zingali and three others, including Shamonki's father and the mother of Black and Ortiz, died in a plane crash during takeoff. Zingali had a living trust (Trust) and left a pour-over will (Will). The Will named Zingali's eldest daughter Veronica Sewell as executrix and his daughter Suzanne Leone as alternate executrix with a waiver of bond for each. The Trust named Sewell as successor trustee, and Sewell later appointed Leone as co-trustee.
In November 2020, Black and Ortiz filed a petition to administer Zingali's estate (Estate), requesting that Sewell be appointed as personal representative and that she post a bond in advance of their anticipated wrongful death claim against the Estate. The petition alleged Zingali was the pilot or co-pilot of the plane that crashed; he owned "several pieces of real property in a trust[ ]"; and the beneficiaries of his Estate were "currently attempting to liquidate the assets without going through probate or addressing creditors."
Sewell declined to serve as executor or personal representative. Leone agreed to serve as executor, but objected to the bond. In response to the petition, she argued the Will specified that the executor and alternate executor should serve without bond; petitioners had made no showing of good cause to require a bond; and the amount requested for the bond was grossly excessive. The probate court denied the petition without prejudice.
In December 2020, all three claimants filed creditor's claims based on their anticipated wrongful death action against the Estate. Black and Ortiz filed a second petition, requesting that Leone be appointed executor of the Estate with a bond in excess of $3.5 million.
Leone agreed to serve as executor, but again objected to the bond. In a sworn declaration she testified that all real property controlled by her father at the time of his death was titled in the name of his Trust and there were no known assets to be probated in her father's Estate.
Leone declared that she had discussed the Will and Trust with her father on several occasions, and her father had "made it clear" that he wanted all of his property to be "collected and distributed by means of the Trust . . . to avoid the complications and expense of probate."
The probate court held a hearing on the petition. It noted the claimants "allege[d]" estate assets had been sold below market value and suggested the parties consider "appointing a third-party fiduciary to act." Leone balked at the suggestion, emphasizing that the Estate had "no assets to be probated"; Zingali had a living trust to avoid probate altogether; and the "sole purpose" of the probate proceeding was to "provide a vehicle to defend the wrongful death action." As she had offered to serve as the Estate's personal representative to facilitate the wrongful death action, Leone maintained there was no need for a fiduciary "at this point." The court acknowledged that if "[Leone] is willing to act, then perhaps I jumped the gun a little bit [by] making that suggestion." It ordered Leone to lodge the Will and continued the hearing on the petition for appointment.
At the continued hearing, Leone reaffirmed her willingness to serve as personal representative of the Estate to facilitate and defend the claimants' anticipated wrongful death action. The claimants, however, repudiated their petition to appoint Leone, adopting the probate court's earlier suggestion that a third party should be appointed to administer the Estate. They argued there were "serious disagreements" with Leone over the factual merits of the contemplated wrongful death action and they asserted Leone or Sewell "or whoever it was that was acting as the trustee" had sold or transferred certain real properties shortly after Zingali's death.
In a declaration filed in objection to the request for a bond, Leone said she had spoken to an investigator from the National Transportation Safety Board, who had advised that a witness saw Shamonki's father in the pilot seat of the aircraft upon arrival and departure from the municipal airport where the accident occurred. At the hearing, the claimants argued Leone had "no personal knowledge of the plane accident" and they "disputed" her representation that "she knows that her father wasn't flying the plane."
Leone "strongly object[ed]" to the suggestion that she improperly dealt with assets, emphasizing again that all the assets in question "were in the trust" and "[t]he only way she could dispose of them would be as a trustee, not as an executor" of the Estate. Because there were "no assets to be probated" and the only purpose for the probate was "to give [the claimants] an opportunity to file their lawsuit," Leone urged that "it would serve no interest to wait[ ]" to appoint a personal representative.
In view of the claimants' apparent "concerns about whether it would be a potential conflict of interest for Ms. Leone to serve," the probate court proposed a further continuance to allow the parties to "meet and confer and decide about a third party private professional fiduciary." Inquiring whether the claimants wished to withdraw their petition, the court observed that "it sounds as though circumstances did change here and that maybe with the development of certain facts, Ms. Leone might not be the ideal candidate to act in this role." The court added, "My concern, based on somewhat what [claimants' counsel] have said, is that having Ms. Leone in this role is just going to invite-may result in additional conflict that would not otherwise exist."
With the claimants' consent (and over Leone's objection), the probate court continued the hearing on the petition another 60 days, explaining the continuance would "preserve the option of keeping Ms. Leone as the potential personal representative," while also giving the parties "the opportunity to nominate a private professional fiduciary after, of course, you do some investigation."
The parties failed to reach an agreement. In advance of the continued hearing, they filed competing petitions to appoint a personal representative.
Leone nominated her deceased father's nephew, James Loveridge. Loveridge offered a declaration confirming he was neither Zingali's heir, nor a beneficiary of the Trust, and he had "no financial interest, directly or indirectly, in the outcome of any civil actions which may be prosecuted against . . . the Estate." He said he had substantial managerial experience as a business broker, business consultant, and insurance adjuster before his retirement, and he had never been convicted of a crime or accused of mishandling funds.
The claimants nominated Richard Marshack, a bankruptcy attorney and professional fiduciary. In objection to Leone's petition, the claimants argued Leone had failed "to even acknowledge that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the liability of Joseph Zingali and, thus, the liability of the Estate with respect to creditors." They maintained this, "coupled with the several dubious transfers of decedent's properties at substantially less than market value, on its face show[s] that decedent's daughter, Suzanne Leone, or anybody in the Zingali family, cannot be fair and impartial as Administrator of the Estate." With respect to Loveridge specifically, the claimants argued "it appears that Mr. Loveridge has a conflict of interest because he is the relative/cousin of Ms. Leone and her sisters, against whom a fraudulent transfer action may be filed." In contrast, they asserted Marshack was "the most qualified nominee" and would be "the most neutral person to serve as personal representative."
Shamonki filed the petition nominating Marshack, and Black and Ortiz concurred with the nomination, while leaving their original petition on calendar as a placeholder.
The probate court held a hearing on the competing petitions, observing at the outset that the decisive factors were "suitability," "qualifications," "workload," and "whether the personal representative has any conflicts of interest."
Leone explained that Loveridge was a retired businessman, but not a professional fiduciary. Although he was a relative, Leone emphasized Loveridge was not an heir and he had "no interest in the estate or the trust" that would give rise to a conflict of interest.
The claimants restated their objection to Loveridge, arguing, "He does have a conflict, because it's his family that would stand to benefit." They asserted Marshack had no conflict and, as a professional fiduciary, he was "by far, the most qualified."
Leone objected to the suggestion that only a professional fiduciary could serve as personal representative, emphasizing the claimants had cited "no authority" for that position. The court responded, "That's this Court's authority," adding, "If I have the option of hiring someone experienced and qualified to undertake an estate administration, I'm going to do so."
The court then observed, "[I]f the administrator of this estate is somehow going to be an interested party in the litigation, that could be problematic. Mr. Marshack has no dog in the fight here. So I have not heard a compelling argument against appointing him."
Leone objected, arguing, "[T]he probate [code] . . . is very clear that the family's appointee trumps any appointee that may be a creditor." Further, because the claimants' anticipated lawsuit would necessarily be filed against the Estate's representative, Leone asserted the "real question" was whether the claimants should be allowed to choose their litigation opponent in derogation of the decedent's family's right to appoint its chosen representative. Finally, Leone emphasized the claimants had presented no evidence to prove Loveridge was not qualified to administer the Estate, and she offered to have him testify, under oath, to satisfy any questions the court may have about his qualifications. The court rejected the offer, responding, "He's a family member."
The probate court granted the claimants' petition to appoint Marshack as personal representative and denied Leone's petition. It ordered a bond in the amount of $100,000. Leone filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The Probate Court Was Statutorily Mandated to Appoint Leone's Nominee Absent Evidence of Incompetence
As Zingali's child, Leone contends she had statutory priority to appoint a personal representative for her father's estate, and the probate court thus erred by appointing the claimants' nominee. (See §§ 8465, subd. (b), 8461, subds. (b) & (q).) She maintains the court made no finding under the governing statutes to justify its departure from the statutory mandate and there was insufficient evidence to support an implied finding. We agree the evidence was insufficient to support the requisite finding, and the probate court therefore had no discretion to appoint the claimants' nominee in preference to the nominee of the decedent's child.
Section 8465 authorizes the court to appoint as administrator or personal representative of an estate a person nominated by any person otherwise entitled to appointment and specifies that "[i]f a person making a nomination for appointment of an administrator is the surviving spouse or domestic partner, child, grandchild, other issue, parent, brother or sister, or grandparent of the decedent, the nominee has priority next after those in the class of the person making the nomination." (§ 8465, subds. (a)(1) & (b), italics added.)
The term "class of person," as used in the statute (§ 8465, subd. (b)), refers to the persons listed in section 8461. Under section 8461, a "person's statutory priority to administer an estate is based on his or her relation to the decedent." (Estate of Lewis (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 507, 511.) The statute lists the persons "entitled to appointment as administrator in the following order of priority:" "(a) Surviving spouse or domestic partner," "(b) Children," "(q) Creditors," "(r) Any other person." (§ 8461.) Thus, under sections 8465 and 8461, the court must give priority to a child's nominee for appointment as personal representative of the estate before considering a creditor, a creditor's nominee, or any nominee other than that of the decedent's surviving spouse or domestic partner. (See In re Estate of Somerville (1936) 12 Cal.App.2d 430, 432 [predecessor statute to section 8465 "plainly gives priority to a competent nominee of a child, parent, brother or sister of a decedent over persons in subsequent classes"].)
A court is authorized to depart from the prescribed order of priority only if it finds the person making the nomination or the proposed personal representative is not competent to act in that role. (See Estate of Lewis, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 514; Estate of Garrett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 831, 836-837; In re Estate of Connick (1922) 189 Cal. 498, 502.) As relevant to the parties' arguments in this appeal, under section 8402, subdivision (a)(3), a person is not competent to act as personal representative if "[t]here are grounds for removal of the person from office under Section 8502." Section 8502 authorizes the court to remove a personal representative if: "[t]he personal representative has wasted, embezzled, mismanaged, or committed a fraud on the estate, or is about to do so"; "[t]he personal representative is incapable of properly executing the duties of the office or is otherwise not qualified for appointment as personal representative"; or "[r]emoval is otherwise necessary for protection of the estate or interested persons." (§ 8502, subds. (a), (b) & (d).)
Leone contends the probate court made no express finding under sections 8402 and 8502 to justify its departure from the order of priority prescribed in sections 8465 and 8461. Our review of the record confirms as much. While the court verbally acknowledged the claimants' "concerns about whether it would be a potential conflict of interest for Ms. Leone to serve," the court never adopted those allegations as express findings and the court's written order makes no reference to (let alone any finding under) section 8402 or 8502. Indeed, the closest the probate court ever came to accepting the claimants' stated objections to Leone and, by extension, her nominee Loveridge was its suggestion that Loveridge's qualifications were immaterial because, "He's a family member." As the governing statutes unambiguously give priority to the decedent's family members in designating who may serve as personal representative, this plainly was not an authorized basis to find Leone or Loveridge incompetent. (See § 8461, subds. (a)-(n) [listing persons in kinship relation to deceased in priority position to creditors for appointment as estate administrator].)
In any event, the court's more direct statements about its preference for Marshack suggest that the decisive factor was not the familial relationship, but Marshack's experience (and Loveridge's lack of experience) as a professional fiduciary. That too was not an authorized basis to depart from the statutorily mandated order of priority.
Estate of Lewis is instructive. There, the mother and legal guardian of the decedent's minor children petitioned to administer the decedent's estate. (Estate of Lewis, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 509-510.) The public administrator filed a competing petition for appointment, arguing he was" 'better suited to handle' the large, 'complex' estate"-valued at over $15 million-because he "had 'three attorneys assigned to [the] case,' and 'a team of investigators and professional fiduciaries.'" (Id. at p. 510.) A potential creditor argued in favor of the public administrator's petition, citing her anticipated litigation with the estate, and the guardian's previous statement about the estate's assets, which the creditor characterized as" 'fraudulent on its face.'" (Id. at p. 511.) The trial court appointed the public administrator and denied the guardian's petition. (Ibid.) The reviewing court reversed.
Rejecting the public administrator's contention that the appointment was authorized under sections 8402 and 8502, the Estate of Lewis court held that, "in the absence of a finding that [the children's guardian] was not competent to act as personal representative, the court lacked statutory authority to appoint the public administrator, instead of [the guardian]," who had statutory priority to administer the estate under section 8461. (Estate of Lewis, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 514; see also id. at p. 511.) The same rule applies here. Because lack of experience as a professional fiduciary is not a statutory ground to declare a proposed representative incompetent, the probate court had no discretion to appoint the claimants' nominee in preference to Leone's on that basis.
The absence of an express finding, however, does not mandate reversal of the probate court's orders. On the contrary, because Leone did not request a statement of decision, we must affirm the orders if the evidence supports an implied finding that either Leone or Loveridge was not competent to serve as personal representative. Where the appealing party challenges a trial court's ruling for lack of a necessary finding but does not request a statement of decision, all intendments will favor the ruling, and the reviewing court will presume the trial court made all necessary factual findings supported by substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 649; Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Glencoe Ins. Ltd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222-1223.) Of course, where the undisputed evidence contradicts a necessary finding, no implied finding will be made. (See Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 506-510; see also National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 769, 772; Feduniak v. California Coastal Com. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1360 [where the facts are undisputed and only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from them, it is essentially a question of law whether a factual finding could be made].)
Claimants argue the probate court expressly adopted their arguments as findings by referring to their petition and objection in its minute order. Even if we treated this as an express finding, it would not change the disposition of this appeal. As we explain, there was insufficient evidence to support either an implied or express finding that Leone or Loveridge were incompetent to serve as personal representative.
The claimants contend there was evidence to support an implied finding of incompetence on three grounds under sections 8402 and 8502. First, they argue the evidence proved "Ms. Leone or her family members, such as Mr. Loveridge, had and/or would embezzle, or commit a fraud on the estate, particularly considering Ms. Leone and [her sister's] prior fraudulent conveyances." (See § 8502, subd. (a).) Second, they assert "it is highly unlikely that Ms. Leone or Mr. Loveridge would undertake to investigate Ms. Leone or her family's own fraudulent conveyances," notwithstanding what they contend is the personal representative's duty to do so. (See id., subd. (c).) And, third, they argue the evidence supported a finding that "non-appointment of Ms. Leone and her family member, Mr. Loveridge, was necessary in order to protect any remaining assets of the estate and to protect interested persons, such as creditors," again because the supposed fraudulent transfers represented an "adverse interest" and "hostile acts" against creditors and claimants. (See id., subd. (d).)
Our review of the record confirms there was no evidence to support an implied finding of incompetence on any of these grounds. This is because, contrary to the claimants' premise for all three charges, there was no evidence that Leone, Loveridge, or any member of the Zingali family made a transfer (fraudulent or otherwise) of assets belonging to the Estate. Rather, to the extent there was evidence regarding ownership of any transferred property, that evidence categorically proved the property belonged to the Trust at the time of Zingali's death.
The claimants cite just two pieces of evidence to support their assertion that Leone "undertook to liquidate and fraudulently convey Mr. Zingali's assets to her family members" after her father's death: (1) a declaration by counsel for claimants Black and Ortiz; and (2) a declaration by Leone herself. In his declaration, the claimants' counsel identified a "list of decedent's real properties," which he said "appear[ed] to have been sold since [Zingali's] passing," including two properties in Torrance-on Normandie Ave. and Halldale Ave.- that counsel claimed had been sold for "substantially under the market value." Critically, counsel's declaration offered no evidence as to whether the Trust held title to the properties or whether the properties became part of the Estate at the time of Zingali's death.
The claimants otherwise cite portions of their petitions and Leone's responses that essentially repeat the relevant parts of these declarations. They also cite an appraisal report that states one of the relevant conveyances was an "[a]rm[']s length sale" at fair market value as determined by the independent appraiser.
Counsel's declaration does not state the basis for his claimed "personal knowledge" of the sale date and price of each property conveyance. His assertion that the Normandie and Halldale properties were sold for substantially below their fair market value is based upon a comparison of each sale price with an "estimate[ ]" provided by "Redfin." Those estimates, as Leone correctly pointed out in her objections, are hearsay. (See Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a); DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 681 [hearsay statements do not become admissible simply because they appear in a declaration].)
Leone addressed these charges in her declaration, explaining the trustee had deeded the Normandie property to her sister "in accordance with my father's wishes as specifi[ed] in his Living Trust" and the trustee had sold the Halldale property "AS IS" at the property's "appraised" value to tenants who had occupied it for over 20 years. With the exception of the Normandie property, Leone declared each property had been sold "by the Trust . . . to an unrelated third party in an arms-length transaction at market value." (Italics added.) This was consistent with Leone's earlier declaration that "[a]ll real property controlled by my father at the time of his death was titled in the name of his living trust." She declared further that "[n]o properties owned by the Trust ha[d] been sold or conveyed" since the claimants filed their creditor's claims, and that "[t]he Trust still own[ed] real property."
As Leone acknowledges, if the claimants ultimately obtain a judgment in their planned lawsuit against the Estate, assets in the Trust will be available to them to the extent the Estate is insolvent. (See § 19001, subd. (a).) However, "[t]he potential availability of trust assets to a judgment creditor in the course of the administration of the trust . . . creates no statutory duty obligating a trustee to prefer a claimant with an unresolved claim against the estate to the interests of the trust's beneficiaries." (Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc. v. Dobler (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1335 (Arluk).) On the contrary, "[t]he statutes governing trustee duties make clear that a trustee 'has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the [trust's] beneficiaries.'" (Ibid., quoting § 16002, subd. (a).) Thus, absent a judgment in favor of a claimant or an order indicating such a judgment is "imminent," a trustee does not commit a fraudulent conveyance by "distributing [trust] assets to the trust beneficiaries to the potential detriment of a disputed claimant who later obtains a judgment against the decedent's estate." (Arluk, at pp. 1340-1341.)
Leone's undisputed declaration established the Trust held title to all real property her father controlled at the time of his death and all relevant conveyances involved only Trust assets. The original petition filed by Black and Ortiz likewise alleged, "Mr. Zingali owned several pieces of real property in a trust[ ]." (Italics added.) And, although Shamonki later alleged in her petition (with Black's and Ortiz's concurrence) that she was "informed and believe[d] that Mr. Zingali owned several pieces of real property, some of which were in trust(s)" (italics added), neither she nor the other claimants offered any evidence to substantiate the insinuation that the Zingali family transferred anything other than Trust assets. Because the conveyance of trust assets for the apparent benefit of trust beneficiaries does not constitute a fraudulent transfer, even if made to the potential detriment of disputed claimants who might later obtain a judgment against the estate (Arluk, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1340-1341), the probate court could not reasonably find Leone or her nominee incompetent to serve based on these conveyances.
Leone requests we take judicial notice of court documents, filed after this appeal was taken, related to Shamonki's petition to disqualify and remove Leone as co-trustee of the Trust. Because the documents are not relevant to our disposition of this appeal, the request is denied.
Absent evidence to support a finding of incompetence, the probate court had no discretion to depart from the statutorily prescribed order of priority. The court erred by appointing the claimants' nominee in preference to the nominee of the decedent's child. (§ 8465, subds. (a)(1) & (b); see also § 8461, subds. (b) & (q); Estate of Lewis, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 511, 514.)
For the first time on appeal, the claimants contend their nominee was entitled to priority for appointment under section 8441, subdivision (b), based on the mere allegation that they are entitled to a wrongful death judgment in the amount of $100,000,000. Because the claimants failed to make this argument below, the probate court plainly did not exercise its discretion under the statute, and we deem the argument forfeited for this appeal. (See Newton v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 [reviewing court generally will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal that could have been but were not presented to trial court].)
2. The Probate Court Must Make a Finding of Good Cause Before Disregarding the Beneficiaries' Unanimous Bond Waiver
Except as otherwise provided by statute, every person appointed as personal representative must "give a bond approved by the court" before letters of administration are issued. (§ 8480, subd. (a).) The bond is required for the "benefit of interested persons" and works to ensure "the personal representative's faithful execution of the duties of the office according to law." (Id., subd. (b).)
A bond is not required if all beneficiaries under a will waive the requirement in writing and attach their waivers to the petition for appointment of a personal representative. (§ 8481, subd. (a)(2).) Notwithstanding the beneficiaries' waiver, the court may nonetheless require a bond "for good cause" on the petition of any interested person or on its own motion before or after issuing letters of administration. (Id., subd. (b).)
If a bond is required, the court has discretion to fix the amount, "but the amount of the bond shall be not more than the sum of: [¶] (1) The estimated value of the personal property. [¶] (2) The probable annual gross income of the estate. [¶] (3) If independent administration is granted as to real property, the estimated value of the decedent's interest in the real property." (§ 8482, subd. (a).)
Having denied Leone's petition to appoint Loveridge as personal representative, it is doubtful that the probate court considered the beneficiaries' attached unanimous waiver of the bond requirement, and the court plainly did not find good cause existed to reject that waiver with respect to Loveridge's appointment.
Because the order requiring a bond was tethered to the appointment of claimants' nominee, we must reverse the bond order. Before the court may require a bond on remand, it must consider the beneficiaries' waiver and determine whether good cause exists to require a bond. (§ 8481.) If a bond is required, the amount may not exceed the statutory maximum, as established by evidence of the estimated value of personal property and the probable annual gross income of the Estate. (§ 8482, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The orders are reversed. The probate court is directed to grant Suzanne Leone's petition to appoint James Loveridge as personal representative of the Estate and to issue letters of administration to Loveridge, without bond, subject to the claimants' petition to require a bond upon a finding of good cause. Leone is entitled to costs.
We concur: LAVIN, Acting P. J., ADAMS, J. [*]
[*]Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.